it is a special provision which does not occur in this case. RicHarpson v AUSTIN.

B. L. [HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA.] general words, and the sense in which they are used is to be red only from the subject matter with which the legislature ealing when it used them. A "public place" for the pur- of defining the offence dealt with in Reg. v. Wellard (2) me thing, in Ex parte Brian (3), it was quite another. Here blic places" must be interpreted with regard to the objects of ute, that is, the protection of markets. If the appellant's

.R. 4 P.C., 184, at p. 191. (2) 14 Q.B.D., 63. (3) 2S.B (N.S.W.), 125.

hat the defendant was doing was selling within his H- ©. or A.

it is a special provision which does not occur in this case. RicHarpson

premises can be described as a public place, then every which attracts a large number of persons is a public place. names of shops which might be given by way of illustration Melbourne and Sydney will readily occur to anyone, where tl isa large stream of people going in and out all day. It hardly be contended that in an Act of this kind such shops intended to be included in the term "public places" within #l meaning of this section. On that ground, therefore, which is of fact, I think the appellant must succeed.

I would like to add to what has been said by my brother with regard to the case of Weedon v. Davidson (1) that son expressions were used which perhaps went beyond the necessity of the occasion, and have, I think, been misunderstood. Look at my own judgment there, I find that I said that the rem having been given by this penal section, was in substitution other remedies under the old law. That statement is accur: but I did not intend to convey that the remedy was substiti to the exclusion of other remedies given by the old law. If words bear that meaning I think they went too far. There is 1 reason why the old remedy for the protection of market right by action for disturbance of market should not exist at the s time as this new remedy. The enforcement of the old remed; a very different thing from the enforcement of this new remedy which lays open to prosecution not only a person who sets a market, but every person who sells goods contrary to the visions of sec. 25. For these reasons I am of the opinion the learned Judge below took an erroneous view of the case, that the appeal must be allowed. i

Appeal allowed. Order appealed from charged. Order to review discha with costs. Order of the jus restored. Respondent to pay the c of the appeal.

Solicitors, for the appellant, Doyle & Kerr. Solicitors, for the respondent, Harwood & Pincott.