Whether, having made reasonable enquiries, the plaintiffs are unable to obtain sufficient information to make the decision whether or not to commence proceedings?
- This requires an objective assessment of the information already possessed by the plaintiffs to determine whether they are lacking something reasonably necessary to make a decision whether or not to commence proceedings for breach of s 18 of the ACL against the unidentified defendants and Mr Press for knowing involvement in that breach. For example, an applicant may be entitled to preliminary discovery of documents relevant to available defences, or the extent of the apprehended breaches, or the likely quantum of damages as well as of documents which may establish whether there is a cause of action: Morton v Nylex Ltd [2007] NSWSC 562 at [33]. However, preliminary discovery cannot be used to build up a case which the applicant plaintiffs have already decided, or could decide, to bring: Morton at [33].
- The defendants submitted that it is clear that the plaintiffs have already decided, or could decide, to bring proceedings against Mr Press and consequently do not satisfy this requirement. Reliance is placed on three letters sent by H&L in April and May 2024 to Mr Press, which I have referred to earlier. Having carefully considered that correspondence, I reject this submission.
- First, the H&L correspondence does not indicate that the plaintiffs have already decided to commence proceedings either in England or in Australia against the defendants. The reference in the first H&L letter to the Practice Direction makes clear that the purpose of that letter is to follow a procedure mandated by the Practice Direction before making a decision to commence proceedings in England. The statement in the second H&L letter that 'leading counsel had been instructed, with a view to preparation of particulars of claim' does not indicate that a decision to commence proceedings has been made. Read in context, it is merely a statement that further steps are being taken in preparation for commencement of a proceeding should such a decision be made. While the language in the H&L letters is quite strident in stating the allegation of wrongdoing by the defendants, each of them indicates that the plaintiffs' 'investigation' of the facts is ongoing and the final H&L letter notes that 'much of the relevant material will be within your possession or control' which is clearly correct.
- Second, it is clear from the H&L letters that they concern a claim for breach of the Consultancy Agreement rather than s 18 of the ACL. The potential for a claim under s 18 of the ACL is the subject of the letters from Corrs to the defendants and it is clear from the Corrs letters that no decision has been made by the plaintiffs to commence proceedings under s 18 of the ACL. Indeed, Corrs put the defendants on notice that an application for preliminary discovery would be the next step. As noted earlier, the conduct alleged to be in breach of s 18 of the ACL was undertaken by different defendants and the claim will raise different issues to the claim of breach of the Consultancy Agreement.
- Third, while White J (as his Honour then was) observed in Morton at [33] that preliminary discovery cannot be used to build a case which the plaintiff on the information it has could bring, the mere fact that a plaintiff has sufficient information to plead a claim does not mean that it has sufficient information to bring proceedings: Racing New South Wales v Racing Victoria (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 576 at [56]. It is clear from Mr Johnson's evidence that the plaintiffs do not know the extent to which the unidentified defendants have used iSAM's Pricing in conjunction with its symbols or indeed whether it was using different pricing. These are both material matters for a decision whether or not to commence proceedings against Mr Press for knowing involvement in a breach of s 18 by the unidentified defendants. Further information on these matters will be relevant to the extent of the apprehended breaches and the likely quantum of damages, both of which are important (particularly on the facts presently known to the plaintiffs) to the decision whether to commence proceedings. While the H&L letter of 24 April 2024 alleges that the plaintiffs' loss from the alleged breaches of the Consultancy Agreement is substantial, and estimated to be $1,083,000, this is clearly stated to be on a provisional and estimated basis.
- Fourth, the defendants' contention is that the Consultancy Agreement was terminated by notice given by the defendants on 1 August 2023. On that basis, the restraint period under the Consultancy Agreement terminated on 1 February 2024. Accordingly, the conduct after that time which the plaintiffs allege is in breach of s 18, including in April 2024, would not be part of a claim brought in proceedings in the United Kingdom but rather proceedings brought in Australia for infringements of s 18 of the ACL.
- For these reasons, I reject the submission that the correspondence by H&L with the defendants indicates that the decision to bring proceedings against the defendants has already been made. Nor in my view can it be said that the application for preliminary discovery is brought to build up a case which the plaintiffs could decide to bring on the basis of the information already held.