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[2007] NSWDC 172
District Court of NSW
2007-08-10
Original judgment source is linked above.
Introduction
The matter complained of was published by e-mail to David Riolo, the Managing Director of Titan Management Pty Ltd ('Titan'); Paul Osborne, Accreditation Office of the National Rugby League ('NRL'); and Allan Gainey, an Accredited Player Agent with the NRL.
(a) The Plaintiff makes deliberately false promises to 15, 16 and 17 year old football players to induce them to engage him as their agent. (b) The Plaintiff makes promises to 15, 16 and 17 year old football players, to induce them to engage him as their agent, which he fails to keep.
(c) The Plaintiff was too cowardly to face the mother of a young football player who confronted the Plaintiff about the approaches he had made to her son.
(d) The Plaintiff was too cowardly to face the Defendant (Sam Ayoub) when he saw the Defendant at a training session for young football players.
(e) The Plaintiff's behaviour as an NRL Accredited Player Agent is contrary to the ethical requirements of the NRL Rugby League Accredited Player Agent Scheme ('APAS'). CPR 15.19 - EXTRINSIC FACTS
(1) The Plaintiff is an employee of Titan, which is an Accredited Player Agent under the APAS, and he is thereby an Accredited Employed Agent. (2) David Riolo is the Managing Director of Titan.
(3) The APAS governs the conduct of persons, including the Plaintiff, who work as Player Agents for players in teams fielded by Clubs in the NRL, and imposes a Code of Ethics on such Agents.
(4) 'The Tigers' is the popular name for the West Tigers Rugby League Football Club, one of the Clubs in the NRL.
(5) The Tigers Club fields, inter alia, teams of 15, 16 and 17 year old players.
(6) The Defendant is a director of Ultra Management (Sports) Pty Ltd, which is an Accredited Player Agent under the APAS, and is thereby an Employed Accredited Agent. PERSONS TO WHOM EXTRINSIC FACTS KNOWN
At the time of publication to each of them of the matter complained of, the above extrinsic facts were known to David Riolo, Paul Osborne and Allan Gainey.
[Paragraph 6, renumbered, and Particulars of Aggravated Damages, retained as now]."
Pleading extrinsic facts 7. The first matter for consideration is the adequacy of the pleading set out in paragraph 2, which asserts that the imputations all arise by reason of "certain extrinsic facts", namely the matters listed in paragraphs 1-6 of the particulars of extrinsic facts.
The defendant's first objection is that most of these particulars are not of extrinsic facts but of identification, which is unnecessary. While it is essential to the plaintiff's case to prove that the defamatory matter was published and concerning him, there is a clear distinction between cases where the plaintiff is named and those where the plaintiff is not. Where publication refers by name to the plaintiff it is necessary to prove only that it is published by the defendant, not that the persons to whom it is published had any knowledge of the plaintiff: Mirror Newspapers Limited v World Hosts Pty Ltd (1979) 141 CLR 632 at 639.
The plaintiff, Isaac Moses, is identified by name in the subject line of the email as well as in the text in line 7 and line 17. He is identified as performing the conduct which is the subject matter of the email, namely complaints about the plaintiff that he makes "bullshit" promises to the young football players (for examples are given in lines 11-15) but that he is too much of a coward to face up to the parents of the players when they attempted to confront him. No particulars of identification are necessary for any imputation.
The defendant's second objection is to the pleading of the whole case as a true innuendo. The phrase "natural and ordinary meaning" includes not only the literal meaning but also inferences that are conveyed by words. The ordinary reasonable reader drawing on his general knowledge would be able to determine from reading the matter complained of that the plaintiff's job is to sign young players for some kind of football code. The ordinary reasonable reader is not fettered by strict legal rules of construction and is able to draw on general knowledge, including general knowledge that the Tigers is a club which has something to do with football. The test of reasonableness guides and directs the court in its function of deciding whether it is open to the jury in any particular case to hold that reasonable person would understand the word complained of in a defamatory sense: Jones v Skelton [1963] 1 WLR 1362 per Lord Morris at 1371. True innuendoes are pleaded where a publication which is prima facie innocent (or conveys a defamatory meaning, but of a different kind) nevertheless conveys a specific defamatory imputation because of special circumstances called "extrinsic facts", which are known to some of the persons to whom the matter is published. A number of the cases in relation to true innuendo deal with conduct which prime facie appears to be innocent but is in fact in breach of some ethical or other obligation (e.g. Tolley v Fry [1931] AC 333).
Although the matter complained of is written in informal terms, the identity of the plaintiff, the recipient of the publication and subject matter are sufficiently clear from the point of view of identification. In addition, there is nothing in the particulars of identification to convey some extrinsic fact giving rise to any of the imputations except possibly for imputation (e). Each of (a), (b), (c) and (d) is taken from the matter complained of.
The one possible exception is imputation (e), which refers to ethical requirements of Accredited Player Agents. This refers to the fact that the plaintiff as an Accredited Player Agent is subject to the Accredited Player Agent Scheme. This scheme governs the conduct of persons such as the plaintiff who work as player agents to find new players for the NRL teams. The scheme includes a code of ethics. There is no reference to this obligation in the publication.
It is not, however, necessary to plead a true innuendo where the matter complained of was published essentially to a group or class of persons possessing particular knowledge due to their position or profession. In Drummond- Jackson v British Medical Association [1970] 1 All ER 1094 at 109, Lord Denning MR defined the ordinary reasonable reader as being "persons who read the British Medical Journal, namely medical men". A similar approach was taken by Merkel J in Nixon v Slater and Gordon (2000) Aust Torts Rep [81-565] concerning a booklet about a law firm distributed to medical practitioners and by Foster J in FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v RAIA Insurance Brokers Ltd (1992) 108 ALR 479 concerning a publication to a group of architects.
Strictly speaking, since it is apparent from the matter complained of that the recipients of the publication knew these facts, it is not necessary to plead that a code of ethics is imposed on the plaintiff, for the reasons enunciated by Lord Denning MR. Furthermore, if such an extrinsic fact were to be pleaded, some precision as to which of the ethical requirements was involved may be required. Merely pleading that there is a code of ethics is not particularly enlightening. The matter complained of talks of the plaintiff being subject to "legal issues" and the lodging of a formal complaint. There is enough for a defamatory imputation of misconduct to be conveyed, but if the plaintiff wants to plead that his conduct is contrary to a specific requirement of the APAS not in the matter complained of then he must plead the specific provision. Nevertheless, imputation (e) as presently drafted is not a matter I am persuaded needs the particularisation of extrinsic facts.
Accordingly the pleading of the imputations as arising only by reason of extrinsic facts is struck out, with leave to replead.
Imputations (a) and (b) 16. On the understanding that same or similar imputations would be pleaded as arising in the natural and ordinary meaning, I note the submission of Mr Littlemore QC that the making of deliberately false promises and the making of promises either do not differ in substance or conflict and cannot arise at the same time. This is clearly a case where a fall-back imputation of making promises he could not keep (as opposed to deliberately false promises) should be pleaded, since the two cannot both arise at the same time and accordingly imputation (b) should be pleaded as a fall-back imputation to imputation (a).
Imputations (d) and (e) 17. The terms of the matter complained of concerning the way that the plaintiff walked off in a cowardly way when he saw the defendant is, in my view, capable of conveying imputation (d).
Orders
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Isaac Moses
Sam Ayoub
CITATION: Isaac Moses v Sam Ayoub [2007] NSWDC 172
Drummond- Jackson v British Medical Association [1970] 1 All ER 1094 FAI General Insurance Co Ltd v RAIA Insurance Brokers Ltd (1992) 108 ALR 479 Jones v Skelton [1963] 1 WLR 1362 CASES CITED: Kazi Zafar Ahmed v John Fairfax Publications Pty Limited [2006] NSWCA 6 Mirror Newspapers Limited v World Hosts Pty Ltd (1979) 141 CLR 632 Nixon v Slater and Gordon (2000) Aust Torts Rep [81-565] Tolley v Fry [1931] AC 333
(1992) 108 ALR 479
(1979) 141 CLR 632