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[2014] AATA 526
respondent. The decision under review was affirmed. The Tribunal was not satisfied that C1 met the good-character criterion in s 21(2)(h) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth).
The Tribunal reviewed the refusal of C1's citizenship application. It considered his assault conviction, his account of what happened, whether he had accepted responsibility and changed his behaviour, and the other evidence about his family and character. The Tribunal was not convinced that he was genuinely remorseful or had rehabilitated. It therefore was not satisfied that he was of good character and affirmed the Minister's refusal.
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2,073 words · generated 02/10/2026
In C1 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] AATA 526, Senior Member A K Britton of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal reviewed a decision refusing C1's application for Australian citizenship. The Tribunal affirmed that refusal.
The refusal rested on the statutory requirement that the decision-maker be satisfied an applicant is of “good character” at the time of the decision. The Tribunal identified the relevant provision as s 21(2)(h) of the (Cth). C1's character was assessed principally in light of his conviction for assaulting his 12-year-old son.
3 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
This was C1's third citizenship application. His first had been refused because he did not meet the residence requirement. His second had been refused on character grounds, and his review application was unsuccessful in C1 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] AATA 519. In the present review, C1 maintained that he had reformed and had not hit any of his children since his arrest in March 2010. The Minister disputed that account, arguing that C1 had not shown remorse and that too little time had passed since the offence and the expiry of his good behaviour bond.
The earlier assault conviction followed an incident on 28 March 2010. According to the background material set out in the decision, C1 punched his son after accusing him of frightening the baby and disobeying him. C1 was convicted in the Local Court on 6 September 2010 and received a two-year good behaviour bond. The court also made an apprehended domestic violence order for three years concerning each of his seven children. The District Court dismissed C1's appeal against conviction and sentence in May 2011.
The Tribunal's review was not a reconsideration of the criminal conviction. The question it framed was whether, on the evidence before it, C1 was then of good character. It examined his account of the assault, evidence of possible later conduct, statements from family and friends, and the relevance of his family circumstances and medical history.
The decision turned on the Tribunal's evaluation of C1's credibility, insight, remorse and rehabilitation. Its conclusion was not that family circumstances or positive evidence were irrelevant. Rather, it found those matters insufficient to overcome concerns arising from the evidence as a whole.
The Tribunal noted that C1 continued to describe his conviction as not being a crime, but as a matter of disciplining his child. He said he now understood that hitting his son in the face was wrong, while also maintaining that his son had behaved wrongly. The Tribunal considered that this was a reluctant concession and that C1 appeared still to justify much of the conduct.
The Tribunal was careful to distinguish C1's views about physical discipline from the character assessment itself. It stated that holding the opinion that parents may use physical punishment is not, in itself, evidence of bad character. That view mattered only insofar as it shed light on whether C1 was genuinely remorseful and whether the assault was a one-off occurrence.
A significant difficulty for C1 was the evidence about a police report made by his eldest daughter in September 2010. She alleged that her father had hit her on the forearm after a disagreement. No charges were laid, and the Tribunal noted that police apparently attached significance to the delay in reporting. Nonetheless, the report raised doubts about C1's claim that he had not used physical punishment after the March assault. It also affected the reliability of the daughter's later statement that there had been no abuse since the subject offence.
The Tribunal also found inconsistencies between C1's evidence that he had not hit his children before the assault and evidence given by two children in the Local Court, together with C1's statement to police at the time of his arrest. These conflicts led it to doubt the reliability of his evidence more broadly.
Evidence from C1's wife, and from two family friends, did not dispel the concerns. The Tribunal considered the wife's evidence that she had not seen C1 hit a child or lose his temper, alongside her earlier evidence that she had not witnessed the assault. It also noted that the friends who supplied references either did not know about the conviction or did not believe that C1 had hit his son. The Tribunal reasoned that their lack of knowledge raised questions about how well placed they were to comment on his conduct at home.
The decision acknowledged potentially positive aspects of C1's circumstances. The family home might have become more harmonious, and the children might be doing well. But the Tribunal did not treat those matters as proof of remorse or as proof that the conduct would not recur. It concluded that it could not be satisfied on balance that C1 was genuinely remorseful and had rehabilitated. That finding led directly to its conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to establish good character.
The decision did not purport to change the legal meaning of “good character”. It applied the existing statutory test in s 21(2)(h) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth), which requires satisfaction as to character at the time of the decision. The Act did not define the term, so the Tribunal said it was guided by the ordinary meaning as interpreted by the courts.
For that interpretation, the Tribunal referred to Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 68 FCR 422. It set out passages from Davies J and Lee J. Davies J described “good character” as capable of referring to a person's moral qualities or reputation, while observing that criminal convictions and character references can be important sources of information. Lee J described the ordinary meaning as concerning enduring moral qualities, rather than good standing or reputation alone. The Tribunal used those passages as guidance in assessing the evidence.
The decision also addressed the role of the Australian Citizenship Instructions, issued on 1 July 2013. The Instructions listed factors relevant to character, including whether offences were committed, their number and seriousness, whether there were victims, sentence length, and any ongoing obligations such as a good behaviour bond. They also listed possible mitigating considerations, including time since the offence, responsibility and remorse, subsequent conduct, rehabilitation, and stable family life.
The Tribunal referred to Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) [1979] AATA 179; (1979) 2 ALD 634 for the proposition that it must take the Instructions into account unless there are cogent reasons not to do so. It did not identify a change to that approach. Instead, it applied the listed factors to C1's evidence.
Accordingly, the “after” position shown by this decision is an application of the stated test to a particular evidentiary record, not a new statutory rule. The decision does not establish a fixed period that must pass after an offence, nor does it state that a conviction automatically prevents a finding of good character. It explains how offence evidence and evidence of reform were weighed in this review.
The Tribunal framed its task as deciding “whether on the available material C1 is now of good character”. In plain English, it assessed C1's character at the time of the review, rather than treating the past conviction as the only question.
It stated that holding the view that parents may use physical punishment “of itself” was not evidence of bad character. The Tribunal was not deciding the general social debate about physical discipline. It treated C1's views as relevant to how far he accepted responsibility and whether the offence was isolated.
The Tribunal found that the later complaint by C1's daughter raised doubts about his claim that he had not used physical punishment since the assault. This was not a finding that C1 had been convicted of a later offence: the decision records that no charges were laid. Rather, the report was evidence the Tribunal considered when assessing the reliability of his account.
On remorse and rehabilitation, the Tribunal said it could not be satisfied “on balance on the available evidence” that C1 was genuinely remorseful and had rehabilitated. The wording reflects an evidentiary assessment. The Tribunal did not resolve the possible medical explanation for C1's lack of insight. It noted that the nurse's 2010 assessment suggested schizophrenia might explain that lack of insight, but concluded that the explanation did not make the evidence sufficient to establish good character.
Finally, the Tribunal stated that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that C1 was then of good character. In practical terms, it found that the positive evidence did not meet the statutory test, so the Minister's refusal remained in place.
The decision is most directly relevant to citizenship character assessments where an applicant has a criminal conviction and the decision-maker must consider whether later conduct and evidence of reform alter the assessment. It addresses the relevance of the offence's nature, a victim, a sentence and a bond, all matters listed in the Instructions.
It is also pertinent where an applicant relies on remorse, rehabilitation, stable family life, or character references. The decision illustrates that such material is assessed for its strength and reliability. References from people who do not know about the conduct in question, or who disbelieve it occurred, may carry less persuasive force in a character assessment, as this Tribunal reasoned.
The decision is relevant where an applicant's current account conflicts with earlier statements or evidence. Here, the Tribunal compared C1's present evidence with statements and testimony described in the prior AAT decision and the criminal proceedings. It treated those inconsistencies as relevant to whether his evidence about reform was reliable.
The decision should not be read as making every allegation equivalent to a conviction. The later incident involving C1's daughter resulted in no charges. The Tribunal nevertheless considered the report as part of the material before it and explained the limited role it played: it raised doubts about the reliability of C1's claim that he had not used physical punishment again.
The supplied judgment contains no later court decisions discussing C1 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] AATA 526. It therefore does not provide a basis for describing how later courts have followed, distinguished, or otherwise treated this decision.
The judgment itself refers to earlier authorities. It discusses Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 68 FCR 422 for the meaning of good character, and Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) [1979] AATA 179 for the Tribunal's treatment of ministerial policy instructions. It also refers to C1's earlier AAT matter, [2013] AATA 519, as procedural and background history. Those references show the sources the Tribunal relied on or mentioned; they do not establish later treatment of the 2014 decision.
The decision does not set out a numerical or fixed minimum period between an offence and a citizenship decision. The Minister argued that insufficient time had passed, noting that the bond had expired less than two years earlier, but the Tribunal's conclusion was based on its overall assessment of the evidence, including remorse, rehabilitation and credibility.
Nor does the decision establish a general rule about how much weight character references must receive. It explains why the particular references did not resolve the concerns in this case: the referees were unaware of the conviction or did not believe the assault had occurred. The judgment does not specify how different references, based on fuller knowledge of the relevant conduct, would be assessed.
The Tribunal also did not determine whether C1's schizophrenia caused his lack of insight or remorse. It noted the nurse's assessment and C1's denial of mental illness, then left the possible explanation unresolved. The reasons do not provide a broader account of how mental illness should affect the statutory character assessment.
Finally, the judgment does not decide whether the alleged later incident involving C1's daughter occurred as reported. It records the allegation, the absence of charges, the police response and C1's evidence. Its significance in the decision was that it raised doubts about C1's denial of later physical punishment.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
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CITIZENSHIP - Application for Australian citizenship - Whether the Applicant is of "good character" - Applicant's criminal history - weight to be given to character references - Decision affirmed
Irving v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 68 FCR 422
Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) [1979] AATA 179; (1979) 2 ALD 634
Australian Citizenship Instructions - 1 July 2013
... the term 'good character' is not precise in its denotation. In one sense, it refers to the mental and moral qualities which an individual has. In another sense, it refers to the individual's reputation or repute: see The Oxford English Dictionary, meanings 11, 12 and 13; The Macquarie Dictionary meanings 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Necessarily, when decisions are made in Australia under the Act in relation to persons who are overseas, greater attention tends to be given to objective facts and to reputation or repute rather than to a detailed analysis of the person's inherent qualities. I do not suggest that, in the context, 'good character' refers to reputation and repute as such. It does not. But criminal convictions or the absence of them and character references are likely to be an important source of primary information. If there is a criminal conviction, the decision-maker will have regard to the nature of the crime to determine whether or not it reflected adversely upon the character of the applicant. If the conviction was in the past, the decision-maker will turn his attention to whether or not the applicant has shown that he has reformed. If persons speak well of the applicant, the decision-maker will take that into account.
Unless the terms of the Act and Regulations require some other meaning be applied, the words "good character" should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense, namely, a reference to the enduring moral qualities of a person, and not to the good standing, fame or repute of that person in the community. The former is an objective assessment apt to be proved as a fact whilst the latter is a review [of] subjective public opinion ... A person who has been convicted of a serious crime and thereafter held in contempt in the community, nonetheless may show that he or she has reformed and is of good character. ... Conversely, a person of good repute may be shown by objective assessment to be a person of bad character [citations omitted].
Whether the citizenship applicant has committed any offences and if so, whether they disclosed that in their citizenship application
The number and frequency of offences
Whether the offence is "serious" or "minor"
Whether there were any victims of the offence
Whether the offence was pre-meditated
The length of any sentence imposed
Any ongoing obligations in relation to the sentence received, such as a good behaviour bond
Mitigating factors - could the applicant be of good character anyway
...
10. The Applicant was born in Taiwan in 1959, left school at about age 15 and worked as a truck driver and in security. While in military service, about 1980, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia and placed in a 'psychiatry institute' for some time. He later wrote two books on the causes of mental illness and defects in the government treatment of hospital patients. He married but had great difficulty in finding employment sufficient to support himself and his family. This has been said to result from the stigma of both mental illness and his anti-government publishing. He felt abandoned by his family and discriminated against. He and his wife contemplated suicide. He and his family arrived in Australia in 2002 and in 2008 he was granted a Subclass 202 (Global Special Humanitarian) visa enabling permanent residence. His partner and their seven children all hold the same class of visa. Four of the children were born in Australia. All family members have resided continuously in Australia since arrival. The Applicant was granted a disability support pension and he has never been employed in Australia. His wife has an intellectual disability.
11. While in Taiwan, the Applicant came to believe that if he were divorced the family would receive more social security benefits than if he remained married. He and his wife then obtained a divorce even though they have continued living together and had several more children. They have not re-married. The Applicant's belief was, predictably, quite wrong and the family barely managed.
12. After arrival in Australia, the Applicant was unable to work and was assisted by Red Cross. In 2010 the family of two adults and seven children lived in cramped circumstances with only three bedrooms. On 28 March 2010, the Applicant accused his 12 year old son of frightening the baby and of disobedience. He punched the boy several times. An older sister called DOCS and the police attended. The Applicant maintained his right to discipline his son in the way he chose. He was charged with common assault of his son. He pleaded not guilty and contested the charge but on 6 September 2010 he was convicted in the Local Court and placed on a bond to be of good behaviour for two years. The magistrate also made an apprehended domestic violence order for three years concerning each of the seven children.
13. The evidence in the Local Court from two of the children was that the Applicant frequently became enraged by any misconduct, shouted at the children and hit them. The eldest daughter said that she woke on that morning to the Applicant shouting angrily for 30 minutes to an hour "like heaps of times before" and later she saw him punch her brother. He had hit that brother frequently in the past. She said that after she called DOCS and the police on that day "he don't hit me anymore but he continued hitting [the victim] ... after that".
32. At the time of the assault, at the Local Court, in his email of 5 February 2013 to the Minister's delegate and at the Tribunal, the Applicant continued to maintain that he was not committing a crime, merely disciplining his child:
I was teaching my son a lesson, my son called the police ... generally when he was not following my instructions I would give him a hit ... usually I only hit him on his body or on his arm ... he fought back ... so I hit him on his face ... I did not pay much attention, I lost control. I, I, I lost control of my emotions [police interview Q89 to Q111 excerpts]
33. In his evidence in the Local Court in 2010 the Applicant said:
Q: ... And when you hit your son what were you trying to do by hitting your son?
A: Yes. Yes he should be punished. That happens too many times, he didn't listen to me.
... If he had not fought back to me I wouldn't have hit him.
... I am from Taiwan. In our culture to discipline your children is the right thing. I was not aware that to disciplining my child in, or even to hit my child, is a kind of action, I mean, is a kind of activity that breached the law ...
34. In his email dated 5 February 2013 to the Minister's delegate:
My conviction is not a crime. It is for disciplining my kid.
35. And in his Tribunal evidence, when asked about the rejection of his appeal to the District Court against his conviction:
Judge said hitting was not a crime and I walked away ... the judge said if he frightened child for a long time ... judge said not a crime.
36. In fact the District Court judge dismissed the appeal and confirmed the conviction.
I certify that the preceding 35 (thirty-five) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member A K Britton
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Irving
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs
(1996) 68 FCR 422
The decision under review was affirmed. The Tribunal was not satisfied that C1 met the good-character criterion in s 21(2)(h) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth).
14. The victim said that his father had accused him of frightening the baby and hit him a number of times and then later that day when the Applicant told him to take his bowl from the living room to the kitchen, he had pushed his father to get to the bowl and his father had then punched him three times, once in the face. The Applicant had hit him before. When the police arrived the Applicant was at first polite but "the shouting and aggressive nature [began] very quickly", especially when the police placed him under arrest.
15. On 26 May 2011 the District Court dismissed the Applicant's appeal against conviction and sentence. On each occasion the Applicant was not legally represented although he had a Mandarin interpreter.