[2026] NSWSC 225
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-03-24
Griffiths AJ
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation:
Hearing dates: 24 March 2026
Date of orders: 24 March 2026
Decision date: 24 March 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law - Administrative Law
Before: Griffiths AJ
Decision: The summons filed on 4 September 2025 is dismissed, with costs.
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — review of medical assessment by review panel — judicial review of review panel decision — where medical assessment certificate revoked and replaced by review panel — whether review panel failed to exercise its collective judgment, expose its actual path of reasoning and/or respond to a substantial and clearly articulated argument
Legislation Cited: Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (NSW) r 128
Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW)
Motor Accident Guidelines
Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (NSW) ss 4.11, 4.12, 7.1, 7.17, 7.21, 7.23, 7.26, Sch 2 cl 2(a)
Personal Injury Commission Act 2020 (NSW) ss 20, 33
Cases Cited: Allianz Australia Insurance Limited v Salucci (2023) 106 MVR 154; [2023] NSWSC 1593
Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Susak [2025] NSWCA 91
Buestami v Allianz Australia Finance Ltd (2025) 109 MVR 295; [2025] NSWSC 465
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389
Insurance Australia Group Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance v Keen (2021) 399 ALR 765; [2021] NSWCA 287
Lederer v Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance [2022] NSWSC 322
New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation v Orr (2019) 100 NSWLR 578; [2019] NSWCA 231
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57; [2001] HCA 22
Rodger v De Gelder [2015] NSWCA 211
Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer v Hill (2020) 295 IR 172; [2020] NSWCA 54
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance (plaintiff)
Naomi Kwarteng (first defendant)
Review Panel constituted under s 7.26 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (second defendant)
President of the Personal Injury Commission of New South Wales (third defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
J Gumbert with D Kim (plaintiff)
M A Robinson SC with H Black (first defendant)
Solicitors:
Sparke Helmore Lawyers (plaintiff)
Barwick Boitano Lawyers (first defendant)
File Number(s): 2025/00340158
Publication restriction: Nil
By summons filed on 4 September 2025, the plaintiff (NRMA) seeks judicial review of a decision dated 6 June 2025 by a Review Panel of the Personal Injury Commission (PIC) exercising jurisdiction under s 7.26 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (NSW) (MAI Act).
The Review Panel revoked a certificate dated 31 July 2024 by Medical Assessor Woo, who had assessed the first defendant, Ms Naomi Kwarteng, as having a degree of permanent impairment of 5%. The Review Panel issued its own certificate certifying that Ms Kwarteng had a 12% impairment as a result of a motor accident.
NRMA contends that the Review Panel’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error or error of law on the face of the record (see Jarvis v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd (2022) 102 MVR 476; [2022] NSWCA 232 at [41] per Basten AJA, Bell CJ agreeing).
For the following reasons, the summons will be dismissed, with costs.
No damages for non-economic loss may be awarded in respect of injury unless the degree of permanent impairment of the injured person as a result of the injury caused by a motor accident is greater than 10%.
If there is a dispute about whether the degree of permanent impairment of an injured person is sufficient for an award of damages for non-economic loss, damages may not be awarded unless the degree of permanent impairment has been assessed by a medical assessor under Division 7.5.
medical dispute means—
(a) a dispute between a claimant and an insurer about a medical assessment matter, or
(b) an issue arising about a medical assessment matter in relation to—
(i) proceedings before a court for damages, or
(ii) a merit review by a merit reviewer under this Act, or
(iii) the assessment of a claim by the Commission.
(a) the degree of permanent impairment of the injured person that has resulted from the injury caused by the motor accident (including whether the degree of permanent impairment is greater than a particular percentage)
The President of the PIC is empowered to appoint medical assessors to assess medical disputes: Personal Injury Commission Act 2020 (NSW) (PIC Act) s 33. Medical assessors are required to conduct a medical assessment in accordance with the State Insurance Regulatory Authority’s Motor Accident Guidelines: MAI Act s 7.21(1). They are to issue a certificate on the matters referred for assessment with reasons explaining their findings: MAI Act ss 7.23(1), (7). The Guidelines state in cl 6.21 that: “The evaluation should only consider the impairment as it is at the time of the assessment”.
Part 6 of the Guidelines deals with causation of injury and includes the following material:
Causation of injury
6.5 An assessment of the degree of permanent impairment is a medical assessment matter under clause 2(a) of Schedule 2 of the Act. The assessment must determine the degree of permanent impairment of the injured person as a result of the injury caused by the motor accident. A determination as to whether the injured person’s impairment is related to the accident in question is therefore implied in all such assessments. Medical assessors must be aware of the relevant provisions of the AMA4 Guides, as well as the common law principles that would be applied by a court (or the Personal Injury Commission) in considering such issues.
6.6 Causation is defined in the Glossary at page 316 of the AMA4 Guides as follows: ‘Causation means that a physical, chemical or biologic factor contributed to the occurrence of a medical condition. To decide that a factor alleged to have caused or contributed to the occurrence or worsening of a medical condition has, in fact, done so, it is necessary to verify both of the following:
1. The alleged factor could have caused or contributed to worsening of the impairment, which is a medical determination.
2. The alleged factor did cause or contribute to worsening of the impairment, which is a non-medical determination.’
This, therefore, involves a medical decision and a non-medical informed judgement.
6.7 There is no simple common test of causation that is applicable to all cases, but the accepted approach involves determining whether the injury (and the associated impairment) was caused or materially contributed to by the motor accident. The motor accident does not have to be a sole cause as long as it is a contributing cause, which is more than negligible. Considering the question ‘Would this injury (or impairment) have occurred if not for the accident?’ may be useful in some cases, although this is not a definitive test and may be inapplicable in circumstances where there are multiple contributing causes.
(1) A claimant or an insurer may apply to the President to refer a medical assessment under this Division by a single medical assessor to a review panel for review.
(2) An application for the referral of a medical assessment to a review panel may be made only on the grounds that the assessment was incorrect in a material respect.
A matter may be referred to a Review Panel by a party to the application “only if the President is satisfied that there is reasonable cause to suspect that the medical assessment was incorrect in a material respect having regard to the particulars set out in the application”: MAI Act s 7.26(5).
The Review Panel is constituted by two medical assessors and one member of the PIC who is a member assigned to the Motor Accidents Division of the Commission, as chosen by the President of the PIC: MAI Act s 7.26(5A). Although described as a “review”, the Review Panel is tasked to conduct “a new assessment of all the matters with which the medical assessment is concerned”: MAI Act s 7.26(6). Importantly, it is explicitly provided that any medical re-examination of the claimant for the purposes of a review need not be conducted by all of the members of the Panel where the members agree that only some of them should conduct the re-examination: MAI Act s 7.26(6A). The Review Panel “may confirm the certificate of assessment of the single medical assessor, or revoke that certificate and issue a new certificate as to the matters concerned”: MAI Act s 7.26(7). Section 7.26(9) provides that s 7.23 applies to any new certificate given by a Review Panel under s 7.26. Consequently, reasons must be provided.
Further, r 128 of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (NSW), which are made under s 20 of the PIC Act, provides:
Rule 128 Conduct of panel review proceedings
(1) A panel for panel review proceedings is to conduct and determine the proceedings in accordance with procedures determined by the panel.
(2) A panel may determine the proceedings solely on the basis of the written application.
(3) A panel may also arrange for the proceedings, including medical examinations for the proceedings, to be conducted—
(a) in person, or
(b) by telephone or audiovisual link, or
(c) by other means determined by the President to be appropriate in the circumstances.
(4) A panel is not bound by the rules of evidence.
(5) A panel may inquire into matters that are relevant to the issues in dispute as the panel thinks fit.
(6) A determination of the majority of panel members is taken to be the determination of the panel.
On 24 April 2021, Ms Kwarteng was injured in a motor vehicle accident. Ms Kwarteng and NRMA were in disagreement about Mr Kwarteng’s degree of permanent impairment under Sch 2, cl 2(a) of the MAI Act.
On 4 September 2023, Ms Kwarteng lodged an application for medical assessment with the PIC. NRMA lodged its reply to that application with the PIC on 25 September 2023. The matter was referred to Medical Assessor Woo, who examined Ms Kwarteng on 25 July 2024.
Medical Assessor Woo provided his decision on 31 July 2024, assessing Mr Kwarteng’s degree of permanent impairment at 5% and issuing a certificate under s 7.23(1) of the MAI Act to that effect.
Medical Assessor Woo assessed 0% whole personal impairment (WPI) for each of “Cervical spine DRE I”, “Thoracic spine DRE I” and “Lumbar spine DRE I”, noting that there were “Symptoms of injury with no clinical signs of radiculopathy”.
Medical Assessor Woo found the defendant to be “a poor historian” who was “unable to provide details of the treatment she received following the motor accident”. He found that she had the following “inconsistencies”:
Exaggeration of symptoms; and
Abnormal illness behaviour.
Medical Assessor Woo assessed WPI for “Right shoulder” at 5%. He opined that:
Assessment by range of motion is inappropriate due to the extreme inconsistent assessment conducted by me and various specialists.
There is MRI findings of subacromial/subdeltoid bursitis. The appropriate methodology is by joint swelling …
Severe joint swelling – 30% impairment of acromioclavicular joint
30% of acromioclavicular joint equates 7.5% upper extremity impairment, rounded to 8%
Converted to 5% whole persom [sic] impairment …
The reference to “extreme inconsistent assessment” was a reference to the varying conclusions reached by medical practitioners in the material considered by Medical Assessor Woo, including:
Dr Mohammed Assem’s certificate dated 20 February 2023, which characterised the “intrasubstance tear of supraspinatus tendon” in Ms Kwarteng’s right shoulder as a “non-minor injury”;
Dr Yuk Kai Lee’s report dated 10 March 2023, which assessed Ms Kwarteng’s WPI at 21% and noted that her impairment “may fluctuate more than 3% in the next 12 months” and she may require surgery; and
Dr Stephen Rimmer’s report dated 23 June 2023, where he opined that:
I do not believe she has any genuine physical impairment.
Ms Kwarteng's history and examination bordered on the absurd. She clearly demonstrates abnormal illness behaviou [sic] for the purpose of personal financial gain.
On 28 August 2024, Ms Kwarteng applied for a review of Medical Assessor Woo’s decision. NRMA opposed that application, lodging its reply with the PIC on 16 September 2024.
On 8 October 2024, Ms Stephanie Wigan, a delegate of the President of the PIC, referred Ms Kwarteng’s review application to the Review Panel on the basis that she was satisfied that there was reasonable cause to suspect that Medical Assessor Woo’s medical assessment was incorrect in a material respect. Ms Wigan reached this state of satisfaction in view of Ms Kwarteng’s submission that Medical Assessor Woo did not put to her the allegation that she was exaggerating her symptoms, thereby denying her procedural fairness.
On 6 June 2025, the Review Panel made its determination, revoking Medical Assessor Woo’s certificate and issuing its own under s 7.26(7) of the MAI Act. The Review Panel assessed Ms Kwarteng’s degree of permanent impairment at 12%.
The Review Panel was comprised of General Member Gary Patterson, Medical Assessor Christopher Oates and Medical Assessor Michael Couch.
The Review Panel published a certificate and statement of reasons for its determination on 6 June 2025. The certificate appears on page 1 and the statement of reasons commences on the following page. Significantly, it is divided into several distinct sections under the headings, “INTRODUCTION”, “ASSESSMENT UNDER REVIEW”, “THE REVIEW”, “OTHER ASSESSMENTS”, “STATUTORY PROVISIONS”, “MATERIAL BEFORE THE REVIEW PANEL” and, commencing on page 10, a section headed “EXAMINATION REPORT”. The statement of reasons then concludes with several paragraphs under the heading, “FINDINGS” before the section titled “CONCLUSION”. There can be no doubt that the Panel as a whole was responsible for all sections of the statement of reasons with the exception of the part dealing with the Examination Report, for which the two medical assessors were responsible.
The Review Panel’s reasons set out the details of the motor accident which gave rise to the medical assessment, the procedural history, its approach to the evidence, and the relevant statutory provisions. The Review Panel referred several times in its reasons to Ms Kwarteng’s claim that she had felt “a direct impact of her right shoulder against the car door” and also referred to her complaints of injury and pain relating to her right shoulder, including to her general practitioner, Dr Oreb. The Review Panel stated at [8] that it had read all the documentation provided by the parties and added that, if a particular document was not referred to by the Panel, this did not mean that the Panel, or a Panel Member, had not read it nor taken it into consideration. It further stated at [9] that the fact that evidence was not referred to in the reasons did not mean that the evidence had been overlooked. It added that the Panel has “come to its own conclusions and has taken its own history”. The reasons also summarise the material “which the Panel has considered”.
Under the heading “Examination Report”, the reasons reproduced in full the seven page examination report of the two medical assessors. In describing Mr Kwarteng’s current symptoms, the medical assessors noted that her worst pain was in the right shoulder and that she could not drive because of right shoulder pain. The assessors referred to Ms Kwarteng’s experiences with her right shoulder injury, including being woken up at night by the pain when she rolled onto her right shoulder.
In the section of the Examination Report which addressed upper extremity, the medical assessors noted that they had measured the active range of movement with a goniometer and that, after carefully explaining to Ms Kwarteng the importance of her demonstrating her best efforts at active range of movement, the medical assessors had “decided that the range of movement demonstrated that the right shoulder was reflective of her genuine effort”.
Although the medical assessors determined 0% WPI for “Cervical spine”, “Thoracic spine” and “Lumbar spine”, they found 12% WPI for “Right shoulder”:
Right shoulder
There was no assessable impairment from the uninjured asymptomatic left side.
On the injured right side – flexion 80° gives 7% upper extremity impairment, extension 20° gives 2%, abduction 70° gives 5%, adduction 0° gives 2%, internal rotation 30° gives 4%.
Adding these gives 20% upper extremity impairment which converts to 12% whole person impairment.
There is no indication for making a deduction for a pre-existing or subsequent symptomatic impairment.
The combined whole person impairment is 12% by 0% by 0% by 0% which equals 12%.
The medical assessors also recorded in their Examination Report that there was “no inconsistency observed” and “[n]o abnormal illness behaviour or exaggeration of … clinical presentation” by Ms Kwarteng.
The Review Panel’s central findings and reasoning are subsequently set out at [25]-[30] of its reasons:
FINDINGS
25. The Panel conducts a new assessment of all the matters with which the medical assessment is concerned. The Panel adopts the findings and reasons of the Medical Assessors.
26. The Panel is not required to choose between competing medical opinions and is required to form its own opinion.
27. The medical assessment of permanent impairment is made at the time of the examination. In that respect, the previous assessments are outdated, and do not reflect the current symptomatology, as found by the Medical Assessors, upon examination.
28. The findings of the Medical Assessors are similar to those of Dr Lee in relation to the right upper extremity. The Panel notes that Medical Assessor Woo assessed impairment in the right shoulder by analogy. The Medical Assessors used the range of motion method as they were satisfied that the claimant was making her best efforts.
29. The Panel is surprised by the trenchant comments made by Dr Rimmer and wonders whether cross-cultural factors may have caused some misunderstandings. The Panel notes that the interpreter assisting Dr Rimmer was male. There is no indication, in Dr Rimmer's report, that either a female chaperone, or the claimant's husband, were present during the examination and interview.
CONCLUSION
30. For the above reasons, the Panel concludes the certificate issued by Medical Assessor Woo on 31 July 2024 should be revoked. The new certificate appears at the beginning of these reasons.
NRMA raised the following grounds of review:
The Review Panel:
(a) failed to exercise its collective judgment and constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction because it delegated the operative part of the medical assessment process to the two medical assessors who were part of the Review Panel without involving the legal member; or (b) in the alternative, failed to provide reasons that exposed what part, if any, was played by the legal member in making the decision.
The Review Panel failed to expose its actual path of reasoning for its findings.
The Review Panel constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction and denied NRMA procedural fairness by failing to respond to a substantial and clearly articulated argument made by NRMA.
Grounds 2 and 3 overlapped. For the reasons that follow, all three grounds of review will be rejected.
NRMA submits that the Review Panel’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error because the medical assessment was not carried out by the Review Panel as a whole. NRMA acknowledged that a medical re-examination carried out for the purpose of a review “need not be conducted by all of the members of the panel if the members agree for it to be conducted by only some of the members”: MAI Act s 7.26(6A).
The current regime under the MAI Act differs from the previous CTP scheme (governed by the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW)) which did not provide for the participation of a non-medical assessor in the medical review process. When the MAI Act was first enacted in 2017, it also made no such provision. However, on 1 March 2021, the MAI Act was amended to mandate the “mixed” constitution of the Review Panel for the purposes of a review of a medical assessment (being two medical assessors and one member assigned to the Motor Accidents Division of the PIC). At the same time, s 7.26(6A) was inserted.
NRMA suggested that there are several “essential elements” which must be collectively determined by all members of the Review Panel: the nature of the injuries, whether those injuries were caused by the motor accident in question, and the degree of permanent impairment resulting from the injuries.
NRMA contends that the legal member of the Review Panel “appears to have taken no part in the decision-making process aside from adopting a decision already made” by the Panel’s two medical assessors, who had undertaken “the operative part of the medical assessment process” with respect to Ms Kwarteng.
In support of its position, NRMA referred to Allianz Australia Insurance Limited v Salucci (2023) 106 MVR 154; [2023] NSWSC 1593 where Schmidt AJ observed at [66]-[70]:
It should be observed that the course the Panel pursued does not immediately appear to be a process contemplated by the statutory scheme or the guidelines. Section 63(3) now permits a medical re-examination of a claimant by only some members of the Panel. But it does not envisage the entire assessment being undertaken by only some of its members and their report later being considered by others.
As explained in Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Rutland [2015] NSWCA 328 at [33], the Panel’s task requires that it exercise its collective judgment as to the assessment of the respondent’s impairment.
Given the way in which the Panel structured its reasons, while it did not say so, it may be that it also concluded when it first met that not only should two of its members, those who were medically qualified, re-examine Mr Salucci, but that they would deal in their report both with the results of their re-examination and the matters which were in issue between the parties on the review …
That accords with the Panel adopting that report after it was provided … setting it out before the short reasons given for its adoption.
Whether this was a process which the legislative scheme contemplated that a Panel could pursue when it conducted Mr Salucci’s assessment afresh, does not arise for determination in these proceedings, given the issues lying between the parties. But the approach which was adopted does help explain the errors into which the Panel fell.
It is not clear from the statement of reasons of the Review Panel how, or if at all, the legally qualified member participated in, or was informed of, the results of that medical re-examination. The way in which the statement of reasons is expressed does not reveal what role, if any, was played by the legal member or how the legal member was informed, for the purpose of participating in the decision, about the results of the re-examination. However, no point is taken about that in these grounds.
I do not consider that these passages assist NRMA. They do not reach a concluded view as to how a legal member must participate in a medical assessment in order for there to be a collective judgment by the Review Panel. In any event, the Review Panel’s reasons here disclose that the Panel had “read all the documentation” and had “come to its own conclusions and … taken its own history”. The Panel then set out and summarised the applicable statutory provisions as well as the reports of various medical practitioners that were before the Panel, indicating that it had grappled with the relevant evidence and understood the task that it was required to undertake in respect of not only the medical re-examination but the medical assessment more generally. The reasons reveal that a clear distinction was drawn between the opinion of the medical assessors and the opinion of the Panel as a whole.
Although the Review Panel adopted the findings and reasons of its medical assessors (including in respect of the items identified by NRMA at [37] above), it did not do so uncritically without evaluating the contents of the Examination Report and making its own collective judgment about whether the findings it contained ought to be accepted. It is apparent that the Panel preferred the “current symptomatology, as found by the Medical Assessors, upon examination”, having noted that “the previous assessments [by other medical practitioners] are outdated”. The Review Panel also observed that its medical assessors’ findings were “similar to those of Dr Lee in relation to the right upper extremity”.
It is notable that, at [29] of the reasons (which forms part of the Panel’s findings and is separate from the medical assessors’ Examination Report), the Panel recorded that it was “surprised by the trenchant comments made by Dr Rimmer [concerning Ms Kwarteng’s alleged falsification of her medical condition] and wonders whether cross-cultural factors may have caused some misunderstandings”. These remarks indicate that, contrary to NRMA’s submission, the Panel did exercise its collective judgment in evaluating the medical assessors’ Examination Report (as well as the other material before it) before coming to a view that a new certificate indicating a WPI of 12% should be issued.
NRMA also contended that the Review Panel failed to provide reasons that exposed what part, if any, was played by the legal member in making the decision and that this amounted to an error of law on the face of the record.
I do not accept this submission. The reasons forming part of the Review Panel’s certificate are properly viewed as the collective reasons of each of the medical assessors as well as the legal member, as is made clear at [25] of the Panel’s reasons.
Moreover, as noted above, the explicit terms of the reasons make clear that the Panel as a whole was responsible for all sections of the reasons, with the exception of the Examination Report. It reflects the opinions of the medical assessors but those opinions were then adopted and applied by the Panel as a whole.
Ground 1 is rejected.
NRMA’s submission is also contradicted by a document which was tendered by Ms Kwarteng, without objection, during the course of the hearing. The document is an email sent by the PIC on 3 April 2025, which is the day after the medical re-examination and nine weeks before the Review Panel published its determination. The document confirms that there would be a post-examination conference on 16 April 2025 at 5pm. The email describes the “Decision Maker” as “Michael Couch, Gary Patterson, Christopher Oates” and informs the parties that there would be a teleconference of approximately one hour.
It is an agreed fact that the teleconference proceeded with only the three panel members present. It may comfortably be inferred that the Review Panel discussed the re-examination carried out by the medical assessors and also, most probably, the assessment more generally. There is no evidence that there existed at that time a draft Examination Report or a draft statement of reasons, but that does not assist NRMA in its judicial review challenge. A more probable inference is that those written materials were produced after the teleconference with the involvement of all three panel members. It is unlikely that any such draft written material would have been made available to the parties’ representatives for the purposes of the conference. It is well settled that there is no obligation on an administrative decision-maker to disclose its internal deliberative processes.
NRMA also submitted that the Review Panel’s decision involved an error of law on the face of the record because it failed to expose its actual path of reasoning (see Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Susak [2025] NSWCA 91) in relation to:
why it was satisfied that Ms Kwarteng was applying maximal effort in her right shoulder range of motion;
why it found that there was no abnormal illness behaviour, exaggeration of symptoms or inconsistencies, despite finding that Ms Kwarteng exhibited sub-maximal effort in respect of the cervical spine; and
why it found that the pathology in Ms Kwarteng’s right shoulder was causally related to the motor accident.
In Susak, the Court referred to Bell P’s summary of the relevant principles concerning review of the adequacy of reasons in New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation v Orr (2019) 100 NSWLR 578; [2019] NSWCA 231 at [77]:
These principles include the following:
(i) Decision-makers commonly express their reasons sequentially; but that does not mean that they decide each factual issue in isolation from the others. Ordinarily they review the whole of the evidence, and consider all issues of fact, before they write anything. Expression of conclusions in a certain sequence does not indicate a failure to consider the evidence as a whole: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165; [2003] HCA 30 at [14] (Gleeson CJ);
(ii) the court should not read passages from the reasons for decision in isolation from others to which they may be related: Politis v Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 20 ATR 108 at 111; [1988] FCA 739 at [14];
(iii) the reasons must be read fairly and as a whole: Ex parte Applicant at [147] (Kirby J); Wu Shan Liang at 291; Bisley at 251;
(iv) the reasons recorded ought not to be inspected with a fine-tooth comb attuned to identifying error: Pozzolanic at 287; Wu Shan Liang at 272, 291;
(v) there should be a degree of tolerance for looseness in the language of the tribunal, unhappy phrasing of the tribunal’s thoughts or verbal slips: Pozzolanic at 287; Wu Shan Liang at 272 and 291.
Naturally, these principles need to be applied having regard to the relevant legislative framework within which an administrative decision-maker provides reasons.
On the issue of Ms Kwarteng’s shoulder range of motion, the medical assessors explained in their Examination Report that they had (emphasis added):
… carefully explained to the claimant the importance of demonstrating her best efforts at active range of movement so that an accurate assessment of permanent impairment, if present, could be made.
The Medical Assessors decided that the range of movement demonstrated at the right shoulder was reflective of her genuine effort …
There was tenderness over the right rotator cuff and AC joint. The range of motion internal rotation of the left arm was to the bra strap line posteriorly and to the upper buttock on the right side posteriorly.
The medical assessors used the “active ROM” methodology to assess Ms Kwarteng’s shoulder movements. It is apparent that they formed their own view, based on their first-hand observations when conducting the medical re-examination, that Ms Kwarteng was not exaggerating her clinical presentation and was applying maximal effort in her shoulder movements. The Review Panel adopted this view.
There was no legal requirement for the medical assessors to give a more fulsome explanation as to why they considered that Ms Kwarteng applied maximal effort. Particularly so in circumstances where they had emphasised the importance of her demonstrating her best efforts and where their physical examination included the use of a goniometer to test her active range of movement.
NRMA claimed that there was an internal inconsistency between the Review Panel’s earlier finding that the range of movement demonstrated at the right shoulder was reflective of Ms Kwarteng’s “genuine effort” and the earlier finding concerning the cervical spine. That earlier finding was to the effect that power on Ms Kwarteng’s left side was strong and on the right was moderately strong “but showed evidence of co-contraction, indicating [that] sub-maximal effort was applied” (emphasis added). This was said to be inconsistent with the later statements that the medical assessors had not noted any “abnormal illness behaviour” or “exaggeration of her clinical presentation”.
The medical assessors’ findings concerning the cervical spine are not incompatible with the broader finding of no abnormal illness behaviour, exaggeration of symptoms or inconsistency. As Ms Kwarteng submitted, “co-contraction is an organic finding that is distinct from the usual features that might evidence inconsistency – e.g. adoption of a ‘sick role’, somatisation, clinical discrepancies etc”. I consider that the medical assessors’ recount of their clinical examination of Ms Kwarteng adequately exposes its actual path of reasoning as to why there was “no inconsistency observed”.
NRMA’s complaint of inconsistency is, to my mind, based on an invitation for the Court to apply an inappropriate level of scrutiny to the Review Panel’s reasons, contradicting the principles outlined at [51] above. In particular, NRMA’s approach fails to acknowledge the need to read the reasons fairly and as a whole, and not with a fine-tooth comb attuned to identifying error.
The submissions are also based on an assumption that when the medical assessors refer to there being evidence of “co-contraction, indicating sub-maximal effort was applied”, this amounted to a finding that Ms Kwarteng had exaggerated her clinical presentation. That reads too much into the statement. The Review Panel’s reference to there being an indication that sub-maximal effort had been applied, fairly read, was related to the finding of there being “evidence of co-contraction”, which may have been explained not by any exaggeration on Ms Kwarteng’s part, but rather, by physiological constraints which affected her capacity to apply maximal effort.
In respect of the requirement that Ms Kwarteng’s shoulder pathology was caused by the motor accident, the Review Panel was satisfied that this requirement was met because there was contemporaneous evidence of Ms Kwarteng’s shoulder symptoms. The Panel, adopting the Examination Report of the medical assessors, found that:
These injuries are related to the accident, as they are mentioned on the Application for Personal Injury Benefits form dated 7/6/2021, in the initial Medical Certificate dated 17/5/2021, and in the GP record of the same date. Thus, early documented medical evidence is available.
As Leeming JA stated in Insurance Australia Group Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance v Keen (2021) 399 ALR 765; [2021] NSWCA 287 at [44] (Basten JA and Simpson AJA agreeing), the question of causation is a question of fact and “quintessentially so”. His Honour added that, once a finding of fact is made, “no further explanation of the reasoning is required”. (Different considerations may arise if a party claims that there was no evidence to support a finding of fact of causation, but no such claim is made here).
As noted above, in finding that Ms Kwarteng’s right shoulder injuries were related to the accident (i.e. caused by the accident), the Review Panel found that they were so related, with reference to identified and relatively contemporaneous medical evidence (see further at [66] below).
In its reply submissions before me, NRMA reiterated that the Review Panel had failed to address its argument regarding the significance of the absence of any right shoulder pathology until two years after the motor vehicle accident. It described this as “a significant battleground between the parties” which “needed to be explained as part of the necessary path of reasoning on causation”.
I accept that this argument was sufficiently raised by NRMA and that it was substantive and clearly argued, as is reflected in the following extracts in NRMA’s Reply Submissions (WPI Dispute) dated 25 September 2023 (which were included in the material before the Review Panel):
14. MRI investigations were conducted shortly before these examinations, on 3 February 2023, almost 2 years post-accident, and revealed a right shoulder intrasubstance tear of the supraspinatus tendon. Such condition has not been explained.
15. There is no other radiological investigation of that region in the period between the accident to date, and there is certainly no evidence to support consistent complaints of right shoulder pain and stiffness as alleged. There is no sufficient evidence to justify causation.
16. Before an Assessor could find impairment at the right shoulder, they must explain why pathology did not manifest until 2 years after the accident.
The Review Panel adequately summarised NRMA’s contentions on this matter at [23] of its reasons. It referred to the insurer’s claim that there had been no explanation of the fact that “the aetiology of an intrasubstance tear of the supraspinatus tendon which was not discovered until almost two years post-accident”.
I consider, however, that NRMA’s arguments were adequately dealt with by the Review Panel. It found that the injuries, including the right shoulder injuries, were related to the accident with reference to medical records dating back to mid-2021, being only a couple of months after the motor vehicle accident. The medical records included a reference by the medical practitioner in the certificate of capacity/certificate of fitness dated 7 June 2021 to Ms Kwarteng complaining of pain in her right shoulder. There were similar references to that particular condition in an earlier certificate dated 17 May 2021, in the general practitioner’s medical records dated 17 May 2021, as well as in other medical documentation created during the period 9 August 2021 to 18 October 2021 as referred to in Dr Assem’s medical assessment certificate dated 20 February 2023. Thus there was ample evidence to support the Review Panel’s finding that Ms Kwarteng complained of injuries to her right shoulder shortly after the accident occurred. That evidence was relevant to the issue of causation.
For these reasons, I do not consider that the Review Panel failed to expose its actual path of reasoning. Ground 2 is rejected.
NRMA further submitted that the Review Panel constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction and denied it procedural fairness by not responding to its substantial and clearly articulated arguments (see Susak at [68] and [71]) about:
the inconsistencies in Ms Kwarteng’s right shoulder range of motion on examination; and
the lack of causation between the pathology in her right shoulder and the motor accident.
It is well settled that a decision-maker’s failure to respond to a substantially articulated argument relying upon established facts may amount to either procedural unfairness (see Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 197 ALR 389 at [24] per Gummow and Callinan JJ) or a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction (see Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57; [2001] HCA 22 at [81] per Gaudron J and Rodger v De Gelder [2015] NSWCA 211 at [109] per Gleeson JA (Macfarlan and Leeming JJA agreeing)). That is not to say, however, that there is an obligation to consider every piece of evidence presented by the parties (see Lederer v Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance [2022] NSWSC 322 at [34] per Brereton JA).
Moreover, a party relying upon this head of review must identify each element of the general principles that demonstrate how a substantial and clearly articulated argument relying on established facts was not addressed (see Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer v Hill (2020) 295 IR 172; [2020] NSWCA 54 at [26] per Basten JA, Payne JA and Simpson AJA agreeing). Careful consideration must also be given to how the case was presented below.
As previously noted, grounds 2 and 3 overlap.
On the issue of the alleged inconsistencies in Ms Kwarteng’s clinical presentation, after the two medical assessors conducted their own medical re-examination, it was recorded in the Examination Report that there was “no inconsistency observed” and “[n]o abnormal illness behaviour or exaggeration of … clinical presentation” by Ms Kwarteng. It was made clear at [25] of the reasons that the Review Panel as a whole adopted the findings and reasons of the two medical assessors. This included the medical assessors’ finding that “the range of movement demonstrated that the right shoulder was reflective of [Ms Kwarteng’s] genuine effort”.
As already noted, the Review Panel responded to Dr Rimmer’s view that Ms Kwarteng was engaging in “abnormal illness behaviou[r] for the purpose of personal financial gain” by characterising those comments as “trenchant” and querying “whether cross-cultural factors may have caused some misunderstandings”. These aspects of the Review Panel’s reasons addressed NRMA’s arguments on the alleged inconsistencies in Ms Kwarteng’s clinical presentation.
As to the issue of causation, I repeat what is said at [60]-[62] above. The Review Panel’s remarks were an adequate response to NRMA’s submissions on this issue.
Further, for the reasons given above, I accept that the argument about the alleged absence of any right shoulder pathology until two years after the motor vehicle accident was sufficiently raised in NRMA’s written submissions before the Review Panel, but I have also explained why I consider that the argument was adequately addressed and rejected by the Review Panel.
Ground 3 is rejected.
Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance
Kwarteng [2026] NSWSC 225
(2023) 106 MVR 154
(2025) 109 MVR 295
(2003) 197 ALR 389
(2021) 399 ALR 765
(2019) 100 NSWLR 578
(2001) 206 CLR 57
(2020) 295 IR 172
(2022) 102 MVR 476
(2003) 77 ALJR 1165