Both defendants pleaded guilty to the charges laid against them.
8 An extensive statement of agreed facts was tendered. It was agreed that:
As Project Manager, Skelton, on behalf of Barlow, engaged the services of various contractors at the site. As part of this process HHF had a Safety Management Plan Document Register (" SMP ") consisting of some 13 pages with an issue date of 31 October 2000. The intention was that it to be provided by HHF to each contractor with the tender and contract documents, and to every person on site as part of a site-specific induction. In addition to the SMP, HHF maintained a "Hazard Control" policy. That policy was to be provided by HHF to all contractors with tender and contract documents and to every supervisor on site at site induction, where applicable.
The SMP required that all personnel planning to work on site be inducted before having access to the work area. This was a general site induction which covered the rules and requirements of the site, emergency procedures, reporting procedures and site amenities. In accordance with the SMP, a record of each person's induction and qualifications was to be completed at the end of each induction. A Safety Management Plan Site Register (" Site Register ") was filled in and signed by those contractors who had undergone a site induction at the construction site. Skelton co-signed as the HHF representative.
In addition, under the SMP, contractors were required to hold weekly toolbox meetings. The SMP also provided:
"Wherever a potentially hazardous situation could occur, including working at heights or in confined spaces, bringing fuel or hazardous material to site, explosive power tools, cranage, oxy cutting and welding, special processes the HHF representative or the Contractor shall initiate a formal Hazard Control procedure to identify the hazards, suitable work method statements, risk analysis, permits to work as outlined in procedure HHF OHS 02 HAZARD CONTROL".
The Hazard Control policy provided that "at least seven days prior to work" commencement on site, the following safety system will be implemented". The system then identified four matters that were to be addressed: a "Hazard Identification Sheet", the provision of a "Work Method Statement", the provision of a "Risk Analysis Sheet" and a "Work Safety Permit". The Hazard Identification Sheet was to be "used to identify all possible hazards pertaining to the project task" and that "initially this will be completed by the HHF representative, who will sign each hazard box which has a potential hazard relating to project task". The Hazard Identification Sheet was then to be "reviewed by HHF representatives and contractor's supervisor to agree on critical hazards". The Hazard Control policy required contractors, in the event of potentially hazardous situations, to submit a work method statement ("WMS") and a Risk Analysis Sheet.
Skelton also kept a Daily Site Diary which purported to record, among other items, toolbox talks held, safety walks taken and any inductions completed.
On or about 17 June 2002, Munroe an employee of Mystold Pty Ltd (" Mystold ") commenced work at the construction site. Munroe says he received a site induction either on that day or on 24 June 2002 from Skelton. The Daily Site Diary for 17 June 2002 records a toolbox talk given to excavator drivers and ground workers.
Munroe's duties involved the operation of the excavator for the removal of trees and rocks in preparation for road construction. He operated under the supervision Harbourside Developments Pty Ltd (" Harbourside Developments ") and Skelton. On the day of the incident he received all his instructions from Skelton. The excavator was hired by Harbourside Developments from Mystold. Harbourside Developments also sub-contracted the services of Munroe's employer, Mystold.
Between about 25 and 28 June 2002, Skelton on behalf Barlow engaged the services of Metro Tree Lopping Services Pty Ltd (" Metro ") to remove and grind tree stumps. On the first day of work Skelton directed Metro workers to their designated area of work at the construction site. Metro's director at the site, Dennis Warren Cockayne (" Cockayne "), appointed a spotter to watch out for the excavators operating at the site. On subsequent days, Metro workers operated inside an area bounded by a 2.4 metre high fence, with two access gates. The excavators were on the other side of the boundary fence. According to Cockayne, Skelton instructed Metro workers to stay within their designated work area away from the excavators.
On the morning of the accident, Wednesday July 3 2002, Wilson arrived at the construction site with Colnan and Jardine. Wilson brought equipment with him to the construction site, namely one yellow Verneer wood chipper and one white IZUZU medium truck, registration number XJR 985. The wood chipper was attached to the truck. The job had an estimated duration of about 4 hours. Wilson had provided Colnan with personal protective equipment including gloves, eye protection and earmuffs. Jardine provided his own ear protection, eye protection and boots. Skelton did not provide an adequate site induction to Wilson, Colnan and Jardine before they commenced work.
Sometime after arriving at the site Skelton showed Wilson the area to be cleared that morning. After pointing out the area to be cleared, Skelton left the area in which the work was to be performed and gave Wilson no further supervision. Prior to commencing work Wilson had a toolbox talk with Colnan and Jardine and instructed them on the work to be performed. Jardine and Colnan commenced work under the direct supervision of Wilson. The work was carried out in the vicinity of Munroe's excavator with no boundary between the workers and the excavator. Wilson and Colnan had both previously worked around moving plant. Jardine had worked on construction sites for a number of years and had been involved with heavy machinery all of his working life.
After having spoken to Wilson, Skelton directed Munroe to utilise the excavator to remove approximately 23 trees and that the trees so removed would be processed through the defendant's chipper. Munroe noticed that the excavator would be operating on a 1 in 4 slope. He consulted with Wilson, Colnan and Jardine about the work. The system or work being utilised at the time of the incident was as follows:
(a) Munroe would use the excavator to push down the trees, a few at a time;
(b) Throughout this time the truck and chipper were 12 to 15 metres from the area where the excavator was being operated.
(c) Munroe told Wilson, Colnan and Jardine to stay behind the excavator when the trees were pushed over. The trees were being pushed over away from where Colnan and Jardine were standing and onto the remaining wood. On the back of the excavator there were warning signs to keep clear from the swing area of the excavator.
(d) Once the trees were pushed over, Munroe would swing the excavator around and indicate to the tree loppers to come in to sling the trees. Jardine would place a sling on the trees indicated by Munroe and then place the sling over the bucket teeth of the excavator.
(e) While the trees were being slung, Munroe would wait with the excavator bucket down.
(f) Once the tree loppers were clear of the excavator, Munroe would then use the excavator to move the slung trees to within a meter or so of the chipper.
(g) Colnan would then utilise a chainsaw to dissemble the tree. Colnan and Jardine would then feed the tree through the chipper.
(h) Wilson had a leg injury and was not able to participate in the work. Wilson spent the majority of the time next to the discharge chute of the chipper, directing the flow of woodchips into the truck. Skelton contends he agreed with Wilson that Wilson would act as "spotter". Skelton did not take any steps to satisfy himself that Wilson was undertaking that task.
(i) As the excavator moved down the slope removing trees, the workers reversed the truck with the wood chipper attached, behind the excavator.
When operating the excavator Munroe's vision did not extend to the rear of the excavator but according to him, the workers were about 10 metres behind the excavator.
Just before the incident, Jardine, working with the excavator, delivered a tree to the chipper. Colnan processed the tree into the wood chipper. The chipper was so noisy that none of the workers could be heard. In addition, the workers were wearing ear protection. Jardine motioned to Colnan who in turn passed Jardine the sling. Jardine walked off towards an area on the far side of the excavator where further trees were to be removed. Colnan continued to cut branches and feed them into the wood chipper. Both Wilson and Colnan were facing towards the truck with their backs to the excavator.
A couple of minutes later, Munroe queried as to Jardine's whereabouts. Neither Wilson nor Colnan knew where he was and the work paused for a minute or so whilst they looked around. They failed to locate him and resumed work. A minute or so later, Munroe informed them he had found Jardine. Wilson and Colnan went to investigate and found Jardine lying on the far side of the excavator beside a large rock partially covered with small branches and foliage.
The sling which had been used by Jardine over the course of the day was found approximately 15 metres up a slope north of Jardine's body attached to a tree.
Accordingly to the autopsy report dated 14 September 2002, Jardine suffered multiple injuries consistent with being run over by a heavy vehicle such as an excavator. The autopsy report dated 14 September 2002 also showed the deceased suffered from "severe coronary artery disease" and that in one of the deceased's coronary arteries there was evidence of a fresh haemorrhage into a plaque deposited on the wall of the artery, indicating the deceased may have suffered a myocardial infarction or "heart attack". Dr Langlois undertook the post mortem examination and expressed the opinion that it was "extremely difficult" to determine whether the haemorrhage into the plaque happened prior to or following the deceased suffering various injuries. Dr Langlois expressed the opinion that:
"Such an event [the heart attack] could have caused Mr Jardine to collapse where upon he was then run over by the excavator. However there was severe trauma to the chest and there was a tear of the heart. Therefore, it is possible that the haemorrhage into the plaque occurred as a result of the chest trauma. From a purely pathological view it is extremely difficult to separate these two possibilities. An investigation into the circumstances of the incident may assist in clarifying this matter".
Senior Constable Paul Anthony Green of the Berowra Police Station attended on the construction site shortly after the accident and observed that "there was very little blood as a result of the large head injury that the deceased had suffered, which was unusual with such a head injury, in my experience". In the statement made to the Police on 30 July 2002 Skelton also observed "I did not see any blood" when giving evidence about viewing Jardine's body shortly after it was discovered. In his statement given to police on 1 August 2002, Thomas Patrick Forde observed:
"I then looked at his head and his body, his head was badly damaged with a large opening in the back of his head on the top right hand side … I noticed that there was no blood around his head where the wound was. I thought this was strange that there was no blood. I thought he might have been dead before this happened".
As such, it is not possible to determine whether Jardine died before or after the incident.
The first and second defendants have no previous convictions for an offence under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 or its predecessors.
9 Other evidence in the proceedings was an affidavit of Jeffrey Robert Clarke, general manager of the corporate defendant and an affidavit of the personal defendant. Neither deponent was required for cross-examination. Mr Clarke provided information about the background of the corporate defendant its operation and his role in the company. As well, he provided information about the corporate defendant's approach to safety on the Mt Ku-ring-gai site including safe work method statements, safety inductions and compliance with safety requirements.
10 Following the incident, the corporate defendant commissioned an independent occupational health and safety consultant to provide an assessment of the OH&S issues at the Mt Ku-ring-gai site. The assessment was made and a package of improvement measures was implemented. This included an "Occupation Health Safety and Rehabilitation Manual", which contained the policy and procedure for the company.
11 One of the components of new package is a site safety management plan. It is a generic document which is to be tailored and reviewed for specific project requirements.