9 For the defendant the affidavit of Steven Robert Woodland was read. Mr Woodland was required for cross-examination.
10 Mr Woodland was the defendant's Manager Freight Procedures & Training. His evidence included the following:
(i) Qantas operates a national and international airline. Qantas currently employs approximately 30,001 employees across Australia, with approximately 19,501 in NSW and with approximately 260 employed at the Qantas Sydney International Freight Terminal.
(ii) Mr Evans performed the duties of a freight store person at the Freight Terminal for approximately five months prior to the Incident. Mr Evans commenced at the Freight Terminal on 16 July 2003. Mr Evans was competent in performing his duties as a freight store person. Mr Evans received comprehensive training from Qantas in relation to his duties as a freight store person including training in occupational health and safety.
(iii) Following the Incident, Qantas conducted an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the Incident. The Incident was reported to WorkCover by Qantas within the prescribed period of time.
(iv) The Minerva Report listed various hazards identified throughout the Freight Terminal. The specific risks which were factors in the Incident were not identified in the Minerva Report. The hazards identified in the Minerva Report were thoroughly and systematically addressed by Qantas.
(v) Qantas viewed the Minerva Report as identifying all the risks and hazards associated with the operations of those areas of the Freight Terminal considered by Minerva. Further risk assessments were conducted on an 'as needs' basis within the Freight Terminal where a further issue arose or a risk or hazard was identified.
(vi) The area where the Incident occurred was semi-restricted in that workers were not to access the area unnecessarily. Because there are transfer vehicles moving up and down the tracks, people are expected not to be walking on those tracks unless, and only to the extent that it is necessary in the course of, performing their duties.
(vii) During Occupational Health and Safety Awareness training, temporary store persons, such as Mr Evans, are told that the areas in which they are required to work are the breakdown stations adjacent to the 'Echo' ETV track. They are specifically instructed during this training not to cross the ETV tracks on foot for any reason including to access the area where the Incident occurred. Further, no worker is required to sit or squat near the Roller Decks in the course of their duties. No clear instructions were given to workers not to sit on, or squat near, the Roller Decks, because the workers would have had no reason to do so as part of their duties.
(viii) The 'Charlie' ETV being operated by Mr Loader did not detect Mr Evans as Mr Evans was on the 'Echo' ETV tracks not the 'Charlie' tracks. I am advised that when Mr Loader engaged the Roller Decks, he did not see (and was not expecting to see) Mr Evans sitting on or squatting near the other end of the Roller Decks.
(ix) At the time of the Incident Mr Evans was wearing baggy 'cargo style' shorts. These shorts were not Qantas issue. Standard Qantas uniform 'industrial style' shorts are issued to Qantas staff to be worn when working within the Freight Terminal, and are of a more fitted and shorter style. Mr Evans had been issued with standard Qantas uniform long trousers, but not shorts. At the time, the shorts and pants were treated as 'uniform' rather than personal protective equipment because it had not been identified that there were tasks being performed by persons such as Mr Evans which would expose him to a risk of entanglement via his shorts or pants.
(x) In relation to the Roller Deck, although not guarded in the strict sense, the rollers on the Roller Deck was, at the time of the Incident, covered by a checker plate which is welded or screwed on top of the rollers as part of the Roller Deck's structure. It is not possible to provide better guarding of the nip point because the rollers would not then be able to function.
(xi) The drive chain and sprocket located at the end of the Roller Deck were not guarded at the time of the Incident as they are recessed back within a cavity at the end of each Roller Deck. At no time prior to the Incident had guarding been installed on the Roller Decks in the Freight Terminal, as the potential for entrapment within the drive chain and sprocket had not been identified as a risk due to the machinery being recessed within the cavity as referred to above and there being no cause for any person to have either their person (for example, hands) or clothing near the cavity in the course of their duties.
(xii) Following the Incident, Qantas conducted a risk assessment and implemented a number of changes in relation to the Freight Terminal, as follows:
(a) all radios were removed from the Freight Terminal;
(b) all power points located near the roller decks were locked out to ensure that unauthorised persons cannot access them;
(c) procedures were introduced which allow only supervisors to enter the area where the Incident occurred;
(d) all warehouse staff were briefed on the procedures which allow only supervisors to enter the area where the Incident occurred;
(e) signage warning that the roller decks may move without warning was erected;
(f) a hazard alert was issued to all employees and personnel regarding sitting on the roller decks;
(g) the induction training was modified to include a specific direction not to sit on or near the roller decks;
(h) industrial style shorts were issued to all Liana employees and other temporary staff and a requirement was imposed for all staff that Qantas issue industrial shorts or trousers be worn;
(i) a method of guarding the drive chain and sprockets located at the end of each roller deck was developed; and
(j) all workers in the area, including supervisory staff, were retrained in the various procedures outlined above.
(xiii) Prior to, and at the time of the Incident, Qantas had a commitment to occupational health and safety. This commitment was reflected, in among other things, the ' Qantas Safety Policy '. The Safety Policy was originally introduced in 1964 and is subject to continual revision, the most recent of which was conducted in October 2002. At the time of the Incident and subsequently, each employee, both at the Freight Terminal and elsewhere at Qantas, is trained in relation to the Safety Policy, and is provided with a copy of it.
(xiv) Qantas places great importance on the proper training of all its workers in OH&S. Qantas is continually reviewing its OH&S training courses, and updating them where necessary, to ensure that all workers are provided the most effective training to perform their jobs safely. Qantas provides extensive OH&S training to its employees. Such training was being provided at the time of the Incident and continues to be provided now.
(xv) An occupational health and safety committee had been place at the Freight Terminal for more than 10 years prior to the Incident. The OH&S Committee is still in place. At the time of the Incident, the OH&S Committee met between 6 and 8 times each year and minutes of OH&S Committee meetings were taken. That is still the case. Qantas management endeavours to act promptly on recommendations made by the OH&S Committee.
(xvi) In April 2001, Qantas implemented an occupational health and safety management system known as 'S.A.F.E.' or 'Safe Airline for Everyone'. S.A.F.E. is an overarching safety regime within which all Qantas divisions and departments are required to develop, among other things, local workplace safety plans and procedures.
(xvii) Qantas has a rehabilitation policy. The Rehabilitation Policy was first introduced in 1998 and is subject to continual revision. The Rehabilitation Policy was most recently revised in February 2002. The Rehabilitation Policy is displayed in the lunchrooms and office areas at the Freight Terminal. The Rehabilitation Policy is displayed on noticeboards in each division of Qantas. At the time of the Incident, all employees in the Freight Terminal had received awareness training in relation to the Rehabilitation Policy during their induction training. During this training, I am advised that all employees were provided a copy of the Rehabilitation Policy. That is still the case. I am advised that Mr Evans undertook this Induction Training on 16 July 2003.
(xviii) In addition to the OH&S systems outlined above, Qantas has a comprehensive first aid system in place for the treatment of injured staff.
(xvix) Matters regarding safety are reported to the Board through a variety of mechanisms.
(xx) In the 2001/2002 financial year, Qantas spent approximately $16 million on managing OH&S. In the 2002/2003 financial year, Qantas spent a further $30.5 million. In the 2003/2004 financial year, Qantas spent $30 million of which $10 million was capital expenditure. In the 2004/2005 financial year, Qantas spent $20 million plus capital expenditure.
(xxi) I am authorised by Qantas to say, on its behalf, that Qantas regrets the Incident involving Paul Evans on 21 December 2003 occurring.
Consideration