Whilst the principle of parity normally operates in relation to co-offenders or across the range of those convicted of the offence in question (see Siganto v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 656at 670 and in relation to the same crime Postiglione at 309), this Court held in Warman (at 341) that where defendants (not being co-offenders) are prosecuted under different sections of the Act, the Court should nonetheless adopt an approach to sentencing which "shows consistency and not disparity in punishment in the same way as discussed by Mason J in Lowe " where there exists common factual circumstances giving rise to the charges. It should also be noted that the Court considered parity in Warman in the context of a labour hire company and the defendant who utilised that labour.
Hence, the decision in Warman would require that the defendants, even though prosecuted under different sections of the Act, shall be treated consistently in accordance with the principles in Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606. The principle is also applicable to the consideration of Lyndhurst and each defendant. Lyndhurst was prosecuted under a different section of the Act, but was the employer of the deceased worker under licence and lease arrangements with the defendants. The prosecution of Lyndhurst and the defendants arise out of the same factual substratum.
Nevertheless, the principle of parity only operates to the extent of comparing like with like. Differences in sentences arising from different circumstances will not violate the principle. These factors will include, in the case of the defendants, differences in the maximum penalty for the offence: Siganto v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 656 at 670.
22 The defendant submits that its culpability is less than that of Qantas because of substantial mitigating factors applicable to it. Qantas, unlike the present defendant, was not a first offender and therefore faced a maximum penalty of $825,000. Qantas is a large international corporation and it did not, unlike the present defendant, plead guilty at the first opportunity. Qantas also restricted the defendant's access to its labour hire workers under the labour hire agreement due to site security imperatives.
23 I do not see that this last mentioned item is relevant to the question of the culpability of Qantas. It was no doubt legally entitled, under the agreement to restrict the defendant's access to its workers at the freight terminal. It was, however, as earlier discussed, incumbent upon the defendant to take appropriate measures to ensure the safety of its workers in circumstances where it was not able to supervise directly or on a day to day basis. Its particular status as a labour hire company and its special responsibilities towards its workers by virtue of their physical isolation from the labour hire company in my view is sufficient to provide a basis for concluding that its culpability is equal to that of Qantas. This is especially so when the statutory obligations to ensure safety under the occupational health and safety legislation are equally applicable to both the labour hire company and the host employer.
24 The Court has been informed that the defendant has no prior convictions. The maximum penalty therefore which the defendant faces is $550,000. The absence of prior convictions entitles the defendant to leniency normally extended to an offender who is otherwise not adversely recorded.
25 The defendant also entered a plea of guilty at the first opportunity. This is conceded by the prosecutor. It is therefore entitled to a discount of its sentence in accordance with the principles outlined in R v Thompson; R v Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383; 115 A Crim R 104.
26 I consider an appropriate discount for the utilitarian value of the plea is 25 per cent.
27 I also take into account in the defendant's favour the impressive number of procedures and other measures it has developed and implemented following the commission of the offence. These have been earlier set out in this judgement.
28 The defendant through Ms Smith has also expressed its sincere remorse in relation to the incident involving Mr Evans. It has also provided assistance to Mr Evans throughout his rehabilitation through regular visits, frequent telephone calls, offers of assistance, direct assistance with regard to workers' compensation, as well as financial assistance. The defendant by its guilty plea, and as a separate consideration from utilitarian principles has also expressed contrition. It has also cooperated with WorkCover during the course of investigations. All these matters I take into account in the defendant's favour on penalty.
29 In addition the defendant has frankly acknowledged responsibility for its failure to conduct a risk assessment which contributed to creating a situation of potential danger to the safety of employees. It also acknowledges that it was responsible for inspecting the "full scope" of the work of its employees at the freight terminal. These matters are relevant to the defendant's expression of contrition and will be taken into account in its favour: Morrison v Powercoal Pty Ltd (No 3) (2005) 147 IR 117 at [119].
30 Ms Smith in her affidavit sworn on 12 September 2005 stated that the defendant's profit margins had not increased since the incident although the defendant has invested considerable sums of money in improving matters of safety for its employees. In oral submissions the defendant conceded that there is no evidence before the Court of its capacity to pay a fine. In the absence of appropriate evidence the Court cannot therefore consider the issue.
Penalty