Inspector Sequeira v O'Neill Shows Pty Limited

JUDGMENT: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION OF NEW SOUTH WALES IN COURT SESSION CORAM: BOLAND J Thursday 16 April 2004

INSPECTOR BRENDAN SEQUEIRA v O'NEILL SHOWS PTY LIMITED

Prosecution under section 16(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 JUDGMENT [2004] NSWIRComm 94

1 On 7 January 2001 Shahir Ali and his two sons, Zoheb aged seven and Zarif aged four, attended a Muslim festival known as the Ramadan Eid Festival at Fairfield Showground, Smithfield Road, Prairiewood in the State. Mr Ali purchased tickets for a ride on an amusement machine known as the "Love Express". An attendant directed them to a carriage. Zoheb, the older son, got in first and was seated in the inner centre side of the carriage. Shahir Ali followed next and sat in the middle between his two sons. Zarif, the youngest son, was seated in the outer platform side of the carriage. After all three were seated the attendant closed the restraint bar.

2 Soon after the three passengers were seated in the carriage, the device commenced moving in a forwards or clockwise direction. The momentum of the ride forced Shahir Ali towards the outer platform side, exposing Zarif, who was seated on the outer platform side, to crushing injuries. A locking mechanism restraining the three passengers also failed during the ride and it was later discovered that the restraint bar's release mechanism was accessible to passengers whilst the ride was in motion.

3 The defendant was prosecuted by Inspector Brendan Sequeira of the WorkCover Authority of New South Wales pursuant to s 16(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983. Section 16(1) provides: 16. Employers and self-employed persons to ensure health and safety of persons other than employees at places of work (1) Every employer shall ensure that persons not in the employer's employment are not exposed to risks to their health or safety arising from the conduct of the employer's undertaking while they are at the employer's place of work.

4 The charge was that the defendant failed to: Ensure that persons not in its employment, and in particular, Zoheb Ali, Shahir Ali and Zarif Ali were not exposed to risks to their health and safety arising from the conduct of the defendant's undertaking, to wit, while they were at its place of work, contrary to Section 16(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983. The particulars of the charge are: On 7 January 2001, at Fairfield Showground, Smithfield Road, Prairiewood in the State of New South Wales the defendant, being an employer, failed to ensure that persons not in its employment, and in particular Zoheb Ali, Shahir Ali and Zarif Ali were not exposed to risks to their health or safety arising from the conduct of the defendant's undertaking while they were at the defendant's place of work. The particulars of the charge are that the defendant: (a) Failed to make arrangements for ensuring the absence of risks to health in connection with the use and handling of the amusement device known as the 'Love Express'; (b) Failed to provide or maintain plant, namely the amusement device known as the 'Love Express', that was safe and without risks to health; (c) Failed to provide or maintain a safe system of work in connection with safe use and operation of the amusement device known as the 'Love Express'; (d) Failed to provide such adequate instructions and/or training as was necessary to Stephen Burton, Harry Howe and the defendant's other employees so as to ensure the health and safety at work of persons other than employees, particularly the patrons Zoheb Ali, Shahir Ali and Zarif Ali, in connection with the use and operation of the amusement device known as the 'Love Express'.

5 Initially the defendant had pleaded not guilty to the charge. On the morning of the commencement of the trial the defendant entered a plea of guilty and an adjournment was sought and granted so that the parties could consider the terms of an agreed statement of facts. Proceedings later continued in relation to sentencing and costs.

6 The statement of agreed facts, formal parts omitted, was in the following terms: 3 At the time of the alleged offence the defendant was an employer. 4 On 7 January 2001 Shahir Ali, Zoheb Ali and Zarif Ali were persons not in the defendant's employment and were attending a Muslim festival known as the Ramadan Eid Festival at Fairfield Showground, Smithfield Road, Prairiewood ("the site"). 5 At the time of the alleged offence, Shahir Ali, Zoheb Ali and Zarif Ali were exposed to the risk of ejection while riding as passengers on an amusement device known as the Love Express at the site. The Love Express was owned and operated by the defendant. 6 At the time of the alleged offence Zarif Ali, a four-year-old boy, was exposed to the risk of crushing injuries while riding as a passenger on the Love Express. 7 At the time of the alleged offence the defendant carried on the business of providing amusement parks services and owned and operated several amusement park devices including the Love Express. Failure to ensure safe seating arrangements (unsafe arrangements and unsafe system) 8 At about 3.30pm at the site on 7 January 2001 Shahir Ali and his two sons Zoheb Ali (aged 7 years) and Zarif Ali (aged 4 years) purchased tickets for a ride on the Love Express. An attendant directed them to a carriage. The restraint bar was opened by the attendant to enable the three passengers to get into the carriage. Zoheb, the older son, got in first and was seated in the inner centre side of the carriage. Shahir Ali followed next and sat in the middle between his two sons. Zarif, the youngest son, was seated in the outer platform side of the carriage. After all three were seated the attendant closed the restraint bar. 9 This seating arrangement was unsafe in that Zarif, the smallest passenger, was exposed to crushing injuries while the device was in motion, rotating in a clockwise direction. As a result of perceived outward forces, passengers will be pushed outwards towards the perimeter edge. 10 Soon after the three passengers were seated in the carriage, the device commenced moving in a forwards or clockwise direction. The momentum of the ride, in fact, forced Shahir Ali towards the outer platform side, crushing Zarif who was seated on the outer platform side. Failure of locking mechanism at inner centre side (failure to maintain safe plant) 11 When the device had performed about three rotations, Shahir Ali and his two sons were holding onto the restraint bar. (See photograph "v", Annexure A). The restraint bar did not have an R pin which would normally function to secure nuts and bolts in place. Instead both the inner centre and outer platform sides of the restraint bar were fastened to the frame of the car each by a bolt and a nylon insert lock nut (also called a "nyloc nut") (refer photograph marked "v"). The restraint bar pivots between the two fastener assemblies for the purpose of opening. 12 The bolts at both ends of the restraint bar act as hinge pins holding the joints together. Loss of a bolt causes the joint to separate. It is therefore imperative for safety reasons to ensure that the bolt on the inner centre side of the restraint bar is kept in place. 13 A nylon insert lock nut used to secure a bolt has a captive polymer insert at the end of the thread. This insert is unthreaded and will be threaded during first installation. Due to the elastic/plastic nature of the insert, additional frictional force is applied to the thread. This will increase the prevailing torque and therefore reduce the potential for loosening. In many applications, these nuts may only be used once as the prevailing torque of the polymer insert may be reduced below the design level once a thread is formed. These nuts are not suitable for joints that are subject to higher temperatures or joints that are regularly loosened or tightened. 14 The Love Express was generally assembled and disassembled approximately five times a year. During these times the nylon insert lock nuts which secured the bolts to the restraining bars and to the carriages were re-used each time the device was re-assembled. 15 Dr Saman Fernando, who prepared a report in relation to the circumstances of the offence, purchased five nylon insert lock nuts and five M12 bolts (the type believed to be used on the Love Express). He then conducted tests in order to assess the performance of a nylon insert lock nut at repeated use. 16 The test programme results showed that one out of five nuts, could be loosened by hand at first loosening and that three out of the five nuts did not retain enough torque to prevent hand-loosening after four tightenings. 17 Failure to ensure nyloc nuts on the hinge joints of the Love Express carriage were not re-used, and failure to ensure that R pins were attached to the bolts on those hinge joints, resulted in a risk of the restraint bar coming loose and passengers being ejected while the Love Express was in motion. Failure to provide safe plant: Access to Restraint Bars' Release Mechanism by Passengers 18 The release mechanism on the restraint bar was accessible to passengers at the time of the offence and could be disengaged by them and released while the Love Express ride was in motion. 19 According to Mr Garry O'Neill, a director of the defendant, passengers clipped on the restraint bar themselves, although sometimes the operator did. All that is required is pulling the bar over and clicking it in place. The restraint bar was clipped or latched into place by a spring-loaded latch and a back-up D shackle welded to a split ring dog clip (see Senior Constable Harris photographs "ac" and "ae" (Annexure A)). 20 Failure to ensure that the release mechanism on the restraint bar could not be accessed and opened by passengers exposed those passengers to the risk of ejection once the restraint bar was released, while the Love Express was in motion. 21 Regulation 157E(1)(a) Construction Safety Regulations requires amusement devices to comply with Australian Standard AS 3533.1-1997 Amusement rides and devices . 22 The restraining bar on the Love Express did not comply with clause 2.8.6 of AS 3533.1-1997 in that its operation was not interlocked with the controls. 23 Clause 2.8.6 of AS 3533.1-1997 provides that, "Where the motion of an amusement device is such that there is a risk of patrons being ejected from the device, restraints shall be interlocked with the device controls as follows: (a) All restraints shall be locked in the riding position by a positive means and the release mechanism shall be inaccessible to patrons. Release actuators shall be provided in positions accessible in an emergency to persons other than patrons while the device is at any stage of its operational cycle. (b) For normal operation, release actuation may be achieved either by automatic means or direct actuation by operational staff at the loading and unloading locations. Automatic actuation shall occur only while the device is stationary at the unloading position. (c) Means shall be put in place to confirm the locked condition of all restraints before a device reaches the point of its operational cycle beyond which the safety of patrons could be compromised. Such means shall be automatic and shall stop the device until such intervention as may be necessary by operating staff is completed." 24 The use of nyloc nuts to secure the restraining device to the seat is not in compliance with clause 2.6.3 of AS 3533.1-1997. Clause 2.6.3 of AS 3533.1-1997 provides that, "bolted joints, which may need to be disconnected for assembly, dismantling or maintenance or which carry live, working or wind loads, shall not incorporate bolts of diameter less than 12mm and shall not employ self locking nuts". Failure to provide adequate instructions and/or training 25 According to Mr O'Neill, at the time of the alleged offence three people were employed by him to work on the Love Express. These included Stephen Burton, the operator, and two others, neither of whom O'Neill could recall by their full names. He remembered that one was "Harry", who he described as a Maori, and the other he described simply as a backpacker. 26 Apart from Burton, the workers were itinerant casual workers. They did mainly manual labour, helping to set up the rides. They collected tickets and made sure that cars were locked. 27 None of them received any formal training and nothing was documented. O'Neill told them how to load the cars and how to lock the cars. Other than that, in his interview Mr O'Neill questioned the need for further training: "It depends on what level of training you want. To train, you know to teach them two locks on a car. What do I need to train, how long do I have to spend with someone? If you can't shut that door and lock it" (Q381 Interview between Mr Garry O'Neill and Inspector Jessica Doyle, 20 December 2001). 28 On the day of the alleged offence Shahir Ali and his two sons were directed to a carriage by an attendant and seated in an arrangement which was unsafe because it exposed Zarif, the four-year-old son, to a risk of crushing injuries. In addition, at no time were Shahir Ali or his sons given any instruction not to access the restraint bar while the Love Express was in motion.

7 The prosecutor also tendered a bundle of colour photographs taken by senior constable Craig Harris on 7 January 2001 showing the carriages of the Love Express and the restraining devices.

8 The defendant tendered an affidavit of Garry Wayne O'Neill, managing director of the defendant. It was deposed that:

· The defendant currently employs three people fulltime and up to 30 on a casual basis at the major shows.

· The defendant has been operating at showgrounds and fairs around Australia for 30 years.

· The defendant has no convictions pursuant to the Occupational Health and Safety Act during this time.

· The deponent speaks at industry conferences and trade shows on safety and training programs organised by AALARA and the Showmens' Guild. Through Rotary and other activities the company has undertaken a wide range of charitable work to assist the disadvantaged in our community. This includes fundraising work for Calvary Hospital and support for Rotary's "Australia Day festival to raise funds for local charities".

· A number of inspections were carried out on the "Love Express" by WorkCover inspectors: (i) On 7 January 2001 principal inspector Roger Jennings attended Fairfield show and inspected the ride. (ii) Mr Jennings spoke to the deponent about an incident at the showground that day and in the course of that conversation the deponent pointed to car 9 and Mr Jennings said: "I will have to inspect it." He then walked over and examined the car. After returning he said: "I have examined the car and the passenger restraint safety bar. Both are in a satisfactory condition. I inspected the safety latches and both the main latch and the supplementary clip worked properly. The ride is okay to work." I did not operate the ride again that day, or subsequently at that fair. I said words to the effect: "I think that someone else should look at the ride to make sure that WorkCover is satisfied. Otherwise the Council will make us pack up." He said: ""I will write you a prohibition notice. Show them that and they can't make you pack up." I said: "That would be good." Mr Jennings then wrote a prohibition notice dated 7 January 2001.

· The ride remained assembled at the showground awaiting further inspection by Workcover for a further three days. The deponent rang WorkCover every day asking when an inspector coming to look at it the ride. On or about 10 January 2001 the deponent received a telephone call from a person who identified themselves as a person from WorkCover. That person said "You can move the ride. We are not sending anyone out to look at it." The deponent did not work the ride again until the Vietnamese Festival held at Warwick Farm in February 2001.

· The deponent did not want to work the ride again until Workcover had cleared it because it was of paramount importance that the defendant ensured that the ride was properly inspected and any potential risks to the public identified. Any income the company had to forego while it waited for the inspection to take place was irrelevant to the deponent.

· On 3 October 2001 the deponent received the report of Bill Chachaty, engineer, Rural Industry Team, WorkCover dated 21 May 2001. This report made the following recommendations: (a) The self-locking performance of Nylok nuts when used for connections that require frequent dismantling should not be solely relied upon as means of preventing the nuts from unscrewing. (b) Reliable provisions should be included to restrain the nuts of the restraining arm pinned connection against axial movement. This may be in the form of an "R" pin, a split pin or an additional lock nut. (c) A competent person should establish an inspection and maintenance programme for the device.

· The company immediately implemented these recommendations.

· As at February 2004 the defendant fully satisfied the AM-SAFE accreditation criteria in respect of its Safety and Risk Management systems and demonstrated continuous improvement to the satisfaction of the AM-SAFE auditors.

· The AM-SAFE accreditation the company received on 6 February 2004 is evidence that it has updated its practice and procedures. Training of staff has changed significantly. All staff are aware of AM-SAFE operational checklists and procedures in regard to the passenger restraint bar and its locking device. They are also aware of appropriate seat allocation and have been trained to direct patrons accordingly.

· Annual registration of the amusement device known as the "Love Express" required an engineer's structural certificate. This was done annually by Marvena Singh. Before 7 January 2001 it was inspected on 15 October 2000. She subsequently inspected it for registration on 27 November 2001. The company for the financial year 2001/2002 received revenue for ordinary activities was $521,750.00 and its net profit was $23,509.00. In the financial year 2002/2003 the company's revenue for ordinary activities was $742,361.00 and its net profit was $30,003.00.

· Although any fine imposed will be levied on the company, because it is a small company the practical outcome is that the deponent's family will be directly affected by any fine.

9 The primary factor to be considered when determining an appropriate sentence is the objective seriousness of the offence charged. In this case the defendant was charged with an offence under s 16(1) of the Act. The specific failures alleged were: (i) failure to ensure safe seating arrangements; (ii) failure to provide adequate instructions and/or training to staff regarding seating allocation; (iii) failure to ensure nyloc nuts on the hinge joints of the Love Express carriage were not re-used, and failure to ensure that R pins were attached to the bolts on those hinge joints; (iv) failure to ensure that the release mechanism on the restraint bar could not be accessed and opened by passengers.

10 The seating arrangements exposed smaller persons to crushing injuries while the device was in motion, rotating in a clockwise direction. On the day of the offence Shahir Ali and his two sons were directed to a carriage by an attendant and seated in an arrangement that was unsafe. The persons engaged by the defendant to supervise the ride had received no training or instruction in seating arrangements.

11 Where there is a risk to safety that is obvious or foreseeable and nothing is done to avoid the risk it must increase the seriousness of the offence. The risk of crushing injuries arising from a seating arrangement whereby a small person was seated on the outer perimeter of the seat next to a much larger person and where the outward forces, once the device was in motion, would force the larger person up against the smaller person, was an obvious risk.

12 In relation to the nyloc nuts and use of R pins, the defendant acknowledged that a risk to safety existed but submitted that it had held a belief that the arrangements it had in place at the time of the incident were sufficient. The defendant submitted that the risk to safety by reason of the re-use of nyloc nuts without an additional precautionary measure was not an obvious or reasonably foreseeable risk, especially given the fact that Inspector Jennings, who inspected the amusement device on 7 January 2001, was unable to identify any risk and found the safety latches and anchor points for the safety bar to the carriage to be satisfactory and further that the device had been certified by a qualified engineer as complying with Australian Standard AS3533-1997.

13 The failure by the defendant to ensure that nyloc nuts on the hinge joints of the Love Express carriage were not re-used, and the failure to ensure that R pins were attached to all of the bolts on those hinge joints, resulted in a risk of the restraint bar coming loose and passengers being ejected while the Love Express was in motion. There was no evidence that the defendant was aware of the dangers associated with the re-use of nyloc nuts and an engineer had certified the amusement device as fit for purpose. It could not be said, therefore, that there was an obvious risk associated with the re-use of the nyloc nuts.

14 However, the restraint bar did not have an R pin, which would normally function to secure nuts and bolts in place. In the absence of an R pin it was reasonably foreseeable that a nut might work loose and that the restraint bar would, therefore, become loose. The foreseeability of such an occurrence was not limited to an engineer; it was readily foreseeable by the ordinary juryman. Despite the fact that the amusement device was certified to operate by an engineer this does not excuse the defendant from its obligations to ensure health and safety by being proactive in searching out and eliminating any risks such as making sure R pins are in place before each ride. The defendant did not do this, thereby increasing the level of its culpability.

15 As to the failure to ensure that the release mechanism on the restraint bar could not be accessed and opened by passengers, some of the same considerations apply as those relevant to the nyloc nuts. The defendant was relying on certification by an engineer and on the observations of Inspector Jennings on 7 January 2001 to contend that the risk was not obvious or readily foreseeable. My view, however, is that if the locking device on the restraint bars was accessible to passengers and could be disengaged by them, it was foreseeable that this might occur whilst the device was in motion with the risk of passengers being ejected and seriously injured.

16 As the prosecutor submitted, s 16 imposes an obligation on an employer that is not confined to the taking of precautions only when there are warnings or signals of danger or where experience indicates that a risk to safety has arisen and requires a remedy. The statutory obligation means it is essential that an employer should be proactive and not reactive; employers should be on the offensive to search for, detect and eliminate, so far as is reasonably practicable, any possible areas of risk to safety, health and welfare: Ferguson v Nelmac Pty Ltd (1999) 92 IR 188 at 210 where reference was made to Hill J in WorkCover Authority of New South Wales v Atco Controls Pty Ltd (1998) 82 IR 80 at 85.

17 The offence, therefore, involved both obvious risks and readily foreseeable risks. Moreover, it would not have been difficult for the defendant to avoid the risks. As the prosecutor submitted, it was open to the defendant at any time prior to the offence to do all or any of the following: i) properly train or instruct staff to ensure that the smallest passenger was seated on the inner centre side of the carriages; ii) ensure that the release mechanism on the restraint bars of the carriages was inaccessible to passengers; iii) ensure that nylon insert lock nuts were not used with bolted joints that needed to be disconnected for assembly, dismantling or maintenance; iv) ensure that R pins were attached to the bolts on the hinge joints of the Love Express carriages.

18 The gravity or otherwise of the potential risk to safety flowing from a breach of the Act is a relevant consideration in sentencing as a measure of the gravity of the breach and the culpability of a defendant. Here, passengers on the amusement device were subjected to the risk of crushing injuries and ejection from the device whilst it was in motion. Any injuries sustained could have been very serious.

19 One of the main purposes of punishment is to deter others from committing the same offence or similar offences. In Capral Aluminium Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (2000) 49 NSWLR 610, 99 IR 29 a Full Bench of the Commission in Court Session has recognised that in the industrial context, it will be rare that a sentencing court need not impose a sentence that includes an element of general deterrence. This is an appropriate case in which to include in any penalty an element for general deterrence given the nature of the industry, the potential risks that amusement rides represent to the public and the fact that such rides are attractive to children.

20 As to specific deterrence, I consider the defendant is a good corporate citizen, with no previous record over the 30 years it has been operating. The defendant has taken prompt steps to avoid a re-occurrence of the incident that occurred on 7 January 2001. The likelihood of the defendant re-offending is not high and, therefore, any penalty should reflect this fact in so far as specific deterrence is concerned.

21 The final consideration in the context of determining the objective seriousness of the offence is the maximum penalty applicable. In this case it is $550,000. The defendant submitted that had this matter initially proceeded on the facts as disclosed in the agreed statement of facts, it would have proceeded summarily. It was submitted that the Commission could have regard to the jurisdictional limit for a single offence before the Local Court as the notional maximum penalty, that is $55,000. The Commission, it was submitted, is not precluded from imposing a penalty greater than that permitted in summary proceedings when it is found that the matter could have proceeded in that jurisdiction, to finality. However, it is a factor to be weighed in the balance with other objective and subjective matters: R v Allan (unreported, NSWCCA, 17 February 1995); R v Morgan (unreported, NSWCCA, 14 December 1989); R v Sandford (unreported, NSWCCA, 7 March 1994); R v McCormick (unreported, NSWCCA, 30 June 1995); R v Crombie [1999] NSWCCA 297.

22 Section 47 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act provides for the exercise of summary jurisdiction by either the Local Court or the Commission in Court Session. The submission that had this matter initially proceeded on the facts as disclosed in the agreed statement of facts, it would have proceeded summarily, is taken to mean that it would have proceeded in the Local Court rather than in the Commission in Court Session.

23 There are no criteria in the legislation indicating whether a charge should be prosecuted in the Local Court or, alternatively, before the Commission in Court Session. Which court is chosen by the prosecutor to pursue the charge would appear to be a matter entirely for the prosecutor but would, no doubt, depend to a large extent on the prosecutor's assessment of the seriousness of the offence.

24 It would appear on the basis of the agreed statement of facts that it would have been open to the prosecutor to bring the charge in the Local Court. That is not to say, however, that the offence was not a serious offence. The fact that no injury was sustained is not the determinant of the seriousness of the detriment to safety. In my opinion, the defendant did not exhibit a strong regard for health and safety. Passengers were not instructed as to appropriate seating arrangements, leaving small children at risk of being crushed. The release mechanism was accessible to passengers, meaning that if a passenger released the mechanism whilst the device was in motion there was the risk that passengers could be ejected from the ride. R pins were not in place and nyloc nuts were re-used to the point where they would not retain enough torque to prevent hand-loosening. In this latter respect, I note the evidence of Mr O'Neill that he often speaks "at industry conferences and trade shows on safety and training programs organised by AALARA and the Showmens' Guild." One would expect that any person speaking on safety in relation to amusement devices would be familiar with Australian Standard AS 3533.1-1997 "Amusement rides and devices", which provides that "bolted joints, which may need to be disconnected for assembly, dismantling or maintenance or which carry live, working or wind loads, shall not incorporate bolts of diameter less than 12mm and shall not employ self locking nuts". 25 As I observed earlier, children are attracted to amusement rides such as the "Love Express" and children are particularly vulnerable to risk of injury. In those circumstances the obligation on operators of amusement devices to be vigilant and proactive in ensuring safety, assumes even greater significance and it is not sufficient for such an operator to rely on the mandatory annual inspection by an engineer to discharge its obligations regarding the safe operation of the device.

26 Whilst I am prepared to weigh in the balance with other objective and subjective matters that the prosecutor could have chosen to prosecute in the Local Court, it was also equally open to the prosecutor in his discretion to pursue the matter before the Commission in Court Session given the seriousness with which I regard the offence. I am not prepared to accept that the notional maximum penalty in this case is $55,000.

27 There are a number of subjective considerations or mitigating factors that should be taken into account. The defendant pleaded guilty and whilst the entering of the plea at the commencement of the trial did obviate the need for a four-day hearing, it could not be said the plea was entered at the earliest opportunity. The defendant is entitled to a discount of the penalty for the utilitarian value of the plea but the defendant is not entitled to the full discount. As a separate consideration, I consider that the guilty plea was made in the face of a strong prosecution case.

28 Other subjective considerations include: (a) The defendant employer has operated within the amusement ride industry for 30 years without any previous convictions under the occupational health and safety legislation. (b) The defendant has taken prompt and positive steps to ensure that a repeat of the incident does not arise. (c) The defendant may be regarded as a good corporate citizen. (d) The defendant cooperated with WorkCover in its investigation of the incident.

29 Given the objective seriousness of the offence I consider an appropriate penalty to be $90,000. That amount is discounted by 15 per cent for the utilitarian value of the guilty plea and a further discount of 10 per cent for other subjective factors. This results in a penalty of $67,500.

30 The Court makes the following orders: 1. The offence is proven and a verdict of guilty is entered. 2. The defendant is convicted of an offence under s 16(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983. 3. The defendant is fined an amount of $67,500 with a moiety thereof to the prosecutor. 4 The defendant shall pay the prosecutor's cost of the proceedings in an amount as agreed or, if agreement cannot be reached, leave is granted to either party to approach the Court for final orders as to costs. ___________________________

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