90 The defendant does not submit that these amendments have the result that this prosecution, commenced against RAC, cannot be pursued. This is not a case where legislative changes had the effect of dissolving a statutory body and making only limited transitional provisions in relation to civil matters such as considered by Hungerford J in WorkCover Authority (Inspector Rech) v Sydney Market Authority (1997) 82 IR 134. In that case, it was common ground that the Sydney Market Authority was being dissolved. It was a statutory corporation representing the Crown but was dissolved by Act of Parliament. When that occurred it ceased to exist in circumstances where it was proposed that there be a sale of the business to private enterprise. It was also common ground between the parties that, if the prosecution case and possibly any appeal was not finalised before the dissolution of the Authority, then the present charges would abate and effectively lapse. There would be no defendant and that would be indistinguishable from the position where there was a death of a natural person. His Honour noted the provision that, on the dissolution of the Authority, the assets, rights and liabilities (if any) of the Authority became the assets, rights and liabilities of the Crown. In his Honour's view, this was a transitional provision dealing with civil matters only. There was no transitional provision made expressly or by necessary implication dealing with the criminal liability of the Authority. It was held that the legislature had not chosen to maintain the entity for the purposes of finalising criminal charges.
A case more closely resembling the circumstances which arise here is WorkCover Authority NSW (Inspector Gilbert) v Energy Australia - formerly Sydney Electricity (1998) 85 IR 99. That case involved a prosecution under s 15(1) of the Act concerning a linesman formerly employed by Sydney Electricity which had become Energy Australia. On a plea of guilty, Energy Australia had no prior convictions but Sydney Electricity, the original defendant and its predecessor, the Sydney County Council, did have prior convictions. The prosecution sought that the prior convictions be taken into account against Energy Australia. Objection was taken by the defendant which submitted that there was not a mere name change to Energy Australia but there was created a separate legal entity. Here, there had been an amalgamation of a number of legal entities and a separate management structure with a new focus on safety and a new corporate culture. Hungerford J held that, whether the charges continued after Sydney Electricity was dissolved depended upon the statutory transitional provisions under the Energy Act by which the new entity assumed the functions of Sydney Electricity. His Honour noted that, the ordinary rule was that on the dissolution of a defendant statutory corporation to a criminal charge, the charge abates and effectively lapses because there is no continuing legal person in existence against which proceedings may be maintained ( Rech ). Where the legislature creates a successor statutory corporation, the question of whether any criminal liability of the former body is assumed by the new body will depend on the terms of the statute effecting the dissolution on one hand and the creation on the other. His Honour then stated:
In other words, if the legislature by express enactment provides the original and the successor bodies are one and the same legal person then it would follow that an undetermined criminal charge against the former would continue against the latter unaffected by the fact that the former was indeed dissolved. It may even follow that proceedings in respect of a criminal charge for an offence committed by the former body could be instituted against the new body even after the former had been dissolved, provided, of course, that any statutory limitation period did not otherwise operate as a bar. Again, the reason would be the new body was created with the same legal personalty as the former body (at 113).
His Honour accepted that, where transitional provisions allowed a "liability" of the previous entity to be transferred to the new entity, the word "liability" was apt to embrace both criminal responsibility and civil responsibility (Byrne v Garrisson [1965] VR 523 at 528. The appropriate meaning and whether there should be an extended meaning will depend on the statutory context in which it is used. Importantly, in that case, his Honour was required to consider yet another body within the statutory framework where there was a subsequent dissolution and the constitution of another statutory State owned corporation. The transitional provision provided that on and from the dissolution of the first body, the new body was "taken for all purposes … to be a continuation of, and the same legal entity as" the previous body. His Honour was of the view that such a statutory transitional provision evinced a clear intention to transfer the criminal liabilities of the new body.