• The circumstances of the offence are directly relevant to, and capable of, rationally affecting the assessment of risk posed by the applicant to children and therefore cannot be disregarded pursuant to s 26A(1)(c)(i) of the Act;
• The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances pertinent to the applicant that are capable of mitigating the underlying risk/s inherent in the presumptive disqualification offence such that he remains a risk to vulnerable persons including children.
• The applicant has not rebutted the presumption under s 26A (1) (a) of the Act and as such it must be determined that he is to be prohibited from working with children.

Administrative Review - Child Safety (Prohibited Persons) Act 2016 - Review of a decision by the Central Assessment Unit to issue a prohibition notice - Unacceptable risk to children - Consideration of conviction

Child Safety (Prohibited Persons) Act 2016 ss 4, 26A, 32

Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 ss 40, 270a

South Australian Civil and Administration Tribunal Act 2013 s 35

LVM v Department of Human Services [2021] SACAT 36

R v Skinner [2016] SASCFC 106

R v Yavuz [2018] SASCFC 24

Ms C Grant with Mr Milburn for the respondent, in person

This is an edited and redacted version of the Tribunal's decision pursuant to s 71A (4) of the Evidence Act 1929. The parties and participants of the proceedings have also been de-identified in accordance with the Tribunal's anonymisation policy. Other facts and details that may lead to the identification of any person may have also been anonymised or omitted. These changes do not affect the Tribunal's decision or its reasons for decision.

1. This is a review of a decision of the respondent (the CAU) on 6 March 2024 to issue to the applicant a prohibition notice, under section 32 of the Child Safety (Prohibited Persons) Act 2016 (CSPP Act). The effect of the notice is that the applicant cannot work with children in any child related work.

Background - presumptive disqualification offence

1. On 18 October 2023 the applicant applied to the Central Assessment Unit (the respondent) for a Working with Children Check (WWCC). A check of police and court records revealed that the applicant had a prior conviction on 5 December 1983 for one count of Attempted Rape contrary to sections 48 and 270a of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935.[1]
2. Under the CSPP Act this offence is defined as a "presumptive disqualification offence" (PDO), which means that the applicant is presumed to pose an unacceptable risk to children for the purposes of a WWCC because he is a person who has been 'found guilty of a presumptive disqualification offence'.[2]
3. The criminal offence was dealt with in the Supreme Court of South Australia on 6 December 1983. The sentencing remarks of the Honourable Mr Justice Wells were before the respondent and are contained in the Respondent's Book of Documents filed in the Tribunal (pp29-30).
4. Regarding the circumstances of the offence, whilst the facts of the offence are not mentioned in the sentencing remarks the facts are contained in the Police Incident and Arrest report (p25 BoD); I accept that those allegations would have been before the sentencing court on the guilty plea.
5. The facts accepted by the court are that the offence arose out of a course of conduct on 31 August 1983 whereby, in breach of a restraining order, the applicant visited his ex-wife at her home and attempted to have sexual intercourse with her against her will, after forcibly entering her home. The victim (the applicant's estranged wife of five months) said she opened the front door slightly with the safety chain attached after hearing a noise at the door and the applicant then pushed against the door forcing his way in. Thereafter, the court found that the applicant attempted to have penetrative sexual intercourse with the victim without her consent.
6. The victim's statement indicates that the victim was in bed asleep at about 11 pm when woken by the applicant attempting to enter her home. She was in her nightie when she went to the door. The victim says that the applicant forced his way into the flat where he attempted to have sexual intercourse with her, but she struggled violently against his repeated attempts. The victim says that penetration did not occur, but the applicant became aroused and eventually ejaculated on her stomach before leaving her home.
7. The Police Incident report reveals that Police attended at the applicant's address five days after the incident. The applicant told them he had just come from his ex-wife's address. He told Police that he was aware that there was a restraining order in place. He was arrested for breaching the restraining order on 5 September 1983 and conveyed to the Police Station where he was questioned about the 31 August incident.
8. The applicant made a brief statement to Police about the August incident, only admitting to having attended his ex-wife's address on the night of the incident. He volunteered no further information but corrected Police when they relayed the allegations to him, by stating that he had ejaculated on the victim's stomach not on her leg. The Police report reveals he then handwrote on the record of interview that the statement by his ex-wife was true and that she had aroused him because she was in her nightie.
9. On entering a plea of guilty the applicant was convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 18 months, with a non-parole period of 7 months. The sentence was suspended, and the applicant was placed on a bond to be of good behaviour for a period of 2 years.

1. On 14 November 2023 the respondent issued a preliminary prohibition notice to the applicant on the basis that the applicant had been found guilty of a PDO. The respondent invited the applicant to make submissions to rebut the preliminary finding that the applicant posed an unacceptable risk to children.
2. A person can rebut the presumption by establishing to the satisfaction of the CAU (or subsequently of the Tribunal) that:

(i) the circumstances of the presumptive disqualification offence are such that the offence should be disregarded in determining whether the person poses an unacceptable risk to children; or

(ii) such exceptional circumstances exist in relation to the person that the person does not appear, or no longer appears, to pose an unacceptable risk to children.[3]

1. The onus of satisfying the CAU that a person falls within one of the exceptions in s 26A(1)(c)(i) or (ii) rests with the applicant.
2. The applicant failed to provide any submissions to the CAU by the relevant date despite an extension of time being granted (to 20 February 2024), to which the applicant did not respond.
3. By notice dated 6 March 2024 the respondent issued a prohibition notice to the applicant pursuant to section 32(1) of the CSPP Act.. That notice prohibits the applicant from engaging in child-related work as the applicant is a prohibited person.
4. The applicant now seeks a review by SACAT of the respondent's decision to issue that notice. He seeks to have the prohibition notice set aside, and in its place that he be granted a WWCC.
5. Having considered all the material before the Tribunal and the submission of the parties I have decided that the applicant continues to pose an unacceptable risk to children as he has not rebutted the presumption created by s 26A of the CSPP Act. For the reasons set out below the decision under review is affirmed.

Nature of review to SACAT and material considered

1. The Tribunal conducts its review of the respondent's decision as an independent body.
2. In exercising its review jurisdiction, the Tribunal examines the decision of the decision-maker by way of rehearing. On a rehearing, the Tribunal must reach the correct or preferable decision but in doing so must have regard to, and give appropriate weight to, the decision of the original decision-maker.
3. In undertaking this review, I have had regard to the material that was before the respondent, including the documents in the respondent's two Book of Documents, marked R 1A and R 1 (one redacted and closed[4] and one unredacted and served on the applicant) filed under section 35 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SACAT Act).
4. I have considered oral submissions from the applicant and written and oral submissions from the respondent. I also permitted each party to tender additional evidence on review.
5. During the hearing the applicant tendered a letter (A1), dated 4 March 2024, and a letter (A2) dated 4 March 2024. Neither letter was sworn or signed, and the authors were not called to give evidence, so I have placed less weight on them as a result.
6. The respondent tendered an affidavit annexing a chain of emails from the applicant to SACAT and other agencies culminating in a threatening email to the Minister for Human Services dated 18 October 2024 (R2).
7. The respondent also tendered 3 bundles of email chains authored by the applicant and sent to SACAT (and copied to the respondent by the SACAT registry). These were filed with the respondent's outline of argument and marked by the respondent as CAU1 (dated 12 and 14 October 2024), CAU2 (dated 14 October 2024) and CAU3 (dated 11 February 2025). For convenience I admitted them all as one bundle and marked them as R3.

1. The decision under review was made on 6 March 2024. The review to SACAT was filed on 6 August 2024. The applicant had 14 days to seek a review of the decision. In his application for review to SACAT the applicant says that he did not receive notice of the decision until 2 August 2024.
2. The respondent has not taken issue with the time that it took for the applicant to seek a review to SACAT. I will therefore extend the time for the applicant to bring the review to SACAT.

1. The applicant is 66 years of age. He has completed an aged care course through TAFE and said he would now like to work in the aged care sector.
2. The applicant told the Tribunal that he had attempted to obtain legal representation but had not been successful. He was unhappy with the legal advice that he was given and indicated that he would now represent himself in the matter. The emails from the applicant to SACAT, the Crown Solicitor and other parties (R2 and R3) appeared to contain some written submissions about why his criminal history should be ignored and why he was not an unacceptable risk to children, but the emails were difficult to follow.
3. To assist the applicant to present his argument to rebut the presumption in s 26A of the CSPP Act the Tribunal Member questioned the applicant about the relevant offence and any of his personal circumstances or steps taken towards rehabilitation that might satisfy the Tribunal that he no longer poses an unacceptable risk to children.
4. The applicant bears the onus of rebutting the presumption. He agreed to give evidence to the Tribunal on oath regarding the circumstances of the offence and his personal circumstances.

The circumstances of the presumptive disqualification offence

1. Regarding the offence of attempted rape of his ex-wife the applicant agreed that he had pleaded guilty to that matter in the Supreme Court in 1983, although he said he was told to plead guilty by his lawyer and he wished he had not done so as he was not guilty. He agreed that he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 18 months, suspended.
2. He said the offence occurred 42 years ago when he was about 21 years of age.
3. The sentencing remarks indicate that a psychiatric report was tendered to the court, but this is not before the Tribunal. The original decision-maker did not have that report, and it is not contained in the Book of Documents.
4. The applicant could not recall seeing a psychiatrist in 1983, although he recalled that someone spoke to him in prison. He said that he did not have a psychiatric disorder when the incident occurred.
5. The applicant says he had some counselling after the court matter (about 40 years ago) when he returned to live in Broken Hill. There was no detail of what that entailed.
6. He was told in the court case that when he approached his ex-wife on the 31st of August 1983, he had breached a restraining order, but he says he never knew about the restraining order as it was never served on him.
7. When questioned about the allegations in the Tribunal (which were accepted by the sentencing court after his guilty plea) the applicant did not dispute that he attended the victim's address on the night of the offence and entered the victim's home.
8. However, the applicant took issue with the findings and the contents of the Police Incident Report. He disputes that he entered the victim's home forcibly; he agreed there was a chain on the door, but he said that he and the victim were both pushing against the door from either side, and that he fell into house after the victim stood back from the door (presumably breaking the chain in the process).
9. He also agreed that he had eventually had a sexual encounter with his ex-wife. But he said this was with his ex-wife's consent and he did nothing wrong. He said that after entering her home he sat at the table in her apartment and spoke to her. He said that later, during the act of sexual intercourse, he had "pulled out and ejaculated on her stomach and not on her leg". He says she then got angry with him because she wanted to get pregnant.
10. The applicant feels that he has been wronged all these years; he maintains that the offence simply did not occur and that he was wrongfully convicted after being persuaded to enter a guilty plea by his lawyer.[5]
11. The applicant points out that the offence occurred a very long time ago and he has never been violent to any other woman or any children or committed any similar offence since that time. He refers to the character references filed on his behalf (from his ex-partner and his son) which support his good character and his lack of any violent or sexually abusive tendencies.

1. The applicant was living in Broken Hill up to 1999 and then moved to Adelaide. (Although, he apparently returned to Broken Hill after the PDO, committing and being convicted of several offences in Broken Hill from 1987 to 2009).
2. The applicant told the Tribunal he has worked as a miner and a handyman. He worked for mining companies all over NSW e.g., Goulburn and Orange.
3. When he moved to Adelaide, he was working as a concrete truck driver. He did that for 15-16 years, 6 days a week, 12 hours a day. That was for multiple companies. He has not been employed since November 2022 and is currently on unemployment benefits.
4. He owns a house but still has a mortgage. He owns two cars.
5. After the relationship with his ex-wife broke down, he then had a relationship with a woman for around 36 years, but they separated about 4 years ago. They have one child, a son, aged 27 years old. The applicant now lives by himself.
6. Written letters were produced by the applicant's former partner and son as character references in support of the applicant. In her unsigned letter the applicant's former partner says she does not accept that the applicant could have offended in 1983 as alleged. She speaks of his good character and his non-violent and non-aggressive character. The applicant's son also speaks highly of his father's character in his unsigned letter.

1. After the attempted rape conviction the applicant agreed that there was a second charge for a sexual offence resulting in a court outcome in Broken Hill for the applicant on 19 October 1988 (BoD p 26).
2. This relates to a charge for an offence of sexual assault without consent. The Police Incident Report indicates that the alleged victim was a 16-year-old girl. The applicant said it was a consensual act and he "thought she was older than that".
3. The antecedent report[6] reveals that the applicant was found "not guilty by verdict"; this tends to suggest that it went to trial and there was a not guilty outcome. The applicant said that it did not go to trial, but he agreed that he was not convicted of the offence, and he did not go to jail. I accept this. There is very little information in the BoD about this matter and I place little weight on it.

1. At some time after leaving Broken Hill, the applicant told the Tribunal that he threatened to kill a police officer. He says this was about three or four years ago; he threatened the officer over the phone (this apparently occurred in Adelaide). He wasn't charged with this offence, but mental health workers visited him. He was told he had Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
2. He says he does not have a psychiatric disorder now, although he agreed that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia by someone at the Lyell McEwin Hospital 'about 4 years ago'. He said there was a person behind the counter at the hospital talking about him whom he believed to be his ex-wife.
3. He was hospitalised at that time, apparently under an inpatient mental health treatment order, and received medication without his consent. He thinks he had depression at that time but says he was misdiagnosed with schizophrenia. During that enforced treatment he says he had suicidal ideation; he believed this was caused by the drugs prescribed to him for his mental health condition. The Northern Community Mental Health team assisted him with mental health services when he was discharged. The applicant told the Tribunal that they said he was psychotic and narcissistic.
4. He was discharged from the care of mental health services and said he stopped taking medication for his mental health about one and half to 2 years ago. He is no longer on any prescribed medication for a mental health disorder.
5. The various emails sent by the applicant to SACAT, the Crown Solicitor's Office and other government agencies, tendered by the respondent (R2 and R3), were discussed with the applicant. The emails include repeated statements about past suicidal ideation due to alleged false criminal allegations and his alleged persecution by government agencies, plus a theme of his world view that there is a bias of believing women over men. In a long email to SACAT, dated 11 February 2025, the applicant detailed a difficult and traumatic childhood, including violence and sexual abuse resulting in PTSD.
6. Of significant concern is an email dated 18 October 2024 tendered by the respondent as an exhibit to an affidavit.[7] The email was sent by the applicant to the Minister for Human Services. The text of the email is:

I have had enough of this I wondered why I was acquitted of it in 1988 I got acquitted of it I did not even do the first one now they bring it up her statement slandering me. If I get angry I know how to make explosives. > > (Emphasis added)

7. The applicant admits sending the latter email and agreed in the Tribunal that the comments he had expressed are not appropriate for someone who wants to establish that they are a suitable person to work with children. He told the Tribunal that when he sent this email "It was because of those drugs. They still had an effect on me in 2024." I understand him to be referring here to anti-psychotic medications prescribed for his mental health disorder.

1. The respondent submits that the applicant has not displaced the presumption in s 26A of the Act.
2. Counsel for the respondent submits that the circumstances of the PDO are not such that the offence should be disregarded in determining whether the person poses an unacceptable risk to children and, further, that there are no exceptional circumstances existing in relation to the person to indicate that the person does not appear, or no longer appears, to pose an unacceptable risk to children.
3. The respondent submitted that there must be some unique or particular feature of the presumptive disqualification offence that would justify it being disregarded for the purpose of a WWCC.[8] Counsel observed that the Working with Children Check Guidelines sets out some factors to be considered when assessing the circumstances of the presumptive disqualification offence which may include, but are not limited to:

the age of the offence, its contextual triviality, and any penalty imposed by the sentencing court; the role or conduct of the person in the broader context of the offending; whether the offending arose in the context of an abusive relationship; the existence of any victims of the offence and its impact on them; whether there is information indicating the person was acting in self-defence or otherwise defending another against an unprovoked assault or attack; or whether the person committed the offending under the direction of a person in authority or otherwise under duress.

4. The respondent notes that most of the suggested factors are simply not applicable in this case.
5. The respondent conceded that two factors that might give rise to considering whether the presumption could be displaced are that the PDO occurred in 1983, and the penalty imposed was relatively low. Further it is noted that the sentencing judge described the circumstances of the offence as "exceptional and rather special" justifying a suspended sentence.[9] However, the respondent argues: "it cannot be said that the offence was 'trivial', even in circumstances where the case was regarded by the sentencing judge as 'exceptional and rather special'. There is limited context within the sentencing remarks to shed light on why the case was considered 'exceptional' or 'special', other than the consideration the judge gave to the applicant's lack of antecedents, his unhappy childhood, and his 'excellent work record'.
6. During oral submissions the respondent's Counsel postulated that the community standards/mores of the time might explain the sentencing judge's comments about the 'special circumstances' of the offence (namely, that the victim was the applicant's estranged wife, he was unable to come to terms with the separation and that the applicant was sexually aroused by seeing his wife in her nightgown).[10] However, she observed that there was nothing special or unique about the offending when considered objectively. The sentencing judge had also stated that "proceedings in a court of summary jurisdiction[11] had given you fair warning that you were in effect harassing [the victim] and following a dangerous, and, incidentally, an illegal course".
7. As to the applicant's personal circumstances, the respondent submits that there is nothing to demonstrate there are exceptional circumstances existing in relation to the person to indicate that he does not appear, or no longer appears, to pose an unacceptable risk to children. In particular, the respondent pointed to the applicant's complete lack of insight, remorse or acknowledgement of any wrongdoing regarding the PDO. The respondent argues that this continues to be a concerning factor despite the age of the offence.
8. The respondent says that a lack of antecedent offending or good character are not in themselves sufficient to establish exceptional circumstances. Further, the respondent notes that on the applicant's own evidence there is a concerning history of ongoing mental health issues (although the applicant disputes the diagnosis) and this is demonstrated by the content of the recent emails sent to the Tribunal and other government agencies.
9. The respondent submits that the applicant has not provided evidence that is capable of disturbing the findings of the respondent at first instance and that this finding should be affirmed by the Tribunal.

1. Under the Act a WWCC in respect of a person consists of the respondent assessing assessable information relating to a person against the prescribed risk criteria to determine whether or not the person poses an unacceptable risk to children.
2. In conducting a WWCC, the respondent is not bound by the rules of evidence and may inform itself as it sees fit. In addition, a WWCC must be conducted in accordance with any other requirements set out in the regulations and the guidelines. Reference to the "guidelines" is a reference to the Working with Children Check Guidelines that are published by the Minister pursuant to s 4(1)-(2) of the Act (the Guidelines). The Guidelines appear as Document 12 in the BoD.
3. The paramount consideration in respect of the administration, operation, and enforcement of the CSPP Act is always 'the best interests of children, having regard to their safety and protection', and decisions must be made with reference to the primary object of the Act, being to 'minimise the risk to children posed by persons who work with them'.
4. On completing a WWCC in respect of a person, the respondent must determine whether the person is, or is not, to be prohibited from working with children. That turns upon the determination of whether or not the person poses an unacceptable risk to children (as per s 26(1)). The respondent is required to issue a prohibition notice to a person if it determines under s 26(5) that a person is prohibited from engaging in child-related work.
5. A complete risk assessment process has not occurred in this matter as the applicant has been convicted of a PDO.
6. As indicated above, pursuant to s 26A of the CSPP Act, certain persons are presumed to pose an unacceptable risk to children for the purposes of a WWCC. Among the criteria of persons who are presumed to pose an unacceptable risk to children for the purposes of the CSPP Act are persons who have been 'found guilty of a presumptive disqualification offence'.
7. The respondent submits, and I agree, that several observations are to be made about s 26A(1)(c).

(a) First, s 26A(1)(a)-(c) have the effect that where a WWCC is being conducted in respect of a person who meets the statutory definition of a 'person who has been found guilty of a presumptive disqualification offence', that person will be presumed to pose an unacceptable risk, and required to be issued a prohibition notice, unless they fall within one of the exceptions in s 26A(1)(c)(i) or (ii).

(b) Second, the onus on satisfying the CAU that a person falls within one of the exceptions in s 26A(1)(c)(i) or (ii) rests with the person.

(c) Third, the exception in s 26A(1)(c)(ii) is available in respect of any person who is a 'person who has been found guilty of a presumptive disqualification offence'. It does not, however, attract a broad ranging 'exceptional circumstances' exception. Rather, to come within the s 26A(1)(c)(ii), the exceptional circumstances must be "in relation to the person" - that is, they must be "personal to the applicant' - and they must bear logically on the acceptability of the risk (or apparent risk) the person poses to children.

1. In LVM v Department of Human Services[12] Senior Member Rainford stated that:

"what s 26A of the CSPP Act is designed to do, is to prohibit from working with children, as a class, those persons who are charged with a prescribed offence or a presumptive disqualification offence ... even where there is no other evidence of risk to children. Parliament clearly intended that this be the case no matter how draconian the consequences might appear to a person...".

2. As a matter of context and purpose, unless the offence ought to be 'disregarded' (in which case the presumption never should have been attracted) all persons charged with relevant presumptive disqualification offences must satisfy the 'exceptional circumstances' test under s 26A(1)(c)(ii).
3. In determining what constitutes exceptional circumstances for the purposes of s 26A(1)(c)(ii), Senior Member Rainford, in LVM v Department of Human Services, applied two interpretations from the Supreme Court when sitting in the criminal jurisdiction.

(a) In R v Skinner[13] Justice Doyle stated:

It has been held that special reasons or circumstances take the particular case out of the contemplated scope of the statutory provision, or outside of the circumstances contemplated by Parliament.

(b) In R v Yavuz[14] the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia considered the meaning of the phrase 'exceptional circumstances':

Special or exceptional circumstances are therefore those circumstances which, when present, so markedly change the nature of the particular case that it is no longer within the mischief which the legislature intended to address with the specified order generally to be made.

1. Importantly, a lack of antecedent offending or recent evidence of good character are not in themselves sufficient to establish exceptional circumstances. The Guidelines indicate that the approach to considering whether exceptional circumstances exist is as follows:

Exceptional circumstances about a person are those that are out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon, such that they justify displacement of the statutory presumption that the person poses an unacceptable risk to children. Such exceptional circumstances are not limited to the circumstances of the offence or charge upon which the presumption arises.

2. The circumstances, or factors, that may contribute to that finding are discussed above.
3. The Guidelines go on:

Importantly, circumstances informing the exceptional circumstances assessment must be individual to the person. Circumstances that are exceptional for one person may not be exceptional for another; the assessment is in some measure predicated on the starting point of the person in question. > > Circumstances must also, either individually or collectively, address and mitigate the underlying risk/s inherent in the presumptive disqualification offence that led to the statutory presumption arising. Information evincing sustained, self-motivated change will generally be afforded greater weight than that of short-term and/or third-party ordered compliance (e.g. measures required to be undertaken as part of parole conditions).

1. In this case I am not persuaded that the applicant has established that the circumstances of the offence are such that the offence should be disregarded.
2. While the offence occurred in 1983 it cannot be said that the offence was 'trivial'. A significant sentence of imprisonment was imposed, albeit it was suspended. I agree with the observations of the respondent about the characterisation of the sentencing judge's comments that the offence was 'exceptional and rather special', justifying a suspended sentence. In my view those comments relate to the judge's approach to sentencing a young man who had a lack of relevant antecedents, an unhappy childhood, and an 'excellent work record'. I also agree with the respondent's counsel that the community views of the time (in 1983) may also potentially be reflected in those comments regarding a sexual offence against an estranged spouse. Respectfully, those views, which may have been held in 1983, are no longer recognised as in any way exculpatory or mitigating of sexual violence towards women, even those who are or had been in a domestic relationship with the accused.
3. To be clear, I do not consider that the comments made by the sentencing judge mean that the offence should be disregarded for the purposes of s 26A of the Act.
4. In fact, there are some very concerning aspects to the offence. I observe that the victim to the attempted rape was very distressed after the offence, which had occurred in the context of a violent, prolonged, sexual assault following a forcible entry into her home. The attack was sustained, and the victim fought against the applicant's continued sexual overtures. The victim had previously sought the protection of a restraining order to prevent the applicant from approaching her. So, the victim was clearly fearful of the applicant prior to the commission of the serious offence.
5. Despite his plea of guilty, the applicant now says he did not commit the crime. However, I do not accept the applicant's explanation now for what occurred in August 1983.
6. I am satisfied that the offending occurred in the context of a troubled relationship which had broken down and where the victim had successfully obtained a restraining order to prevent the applicant from approaching her, yet he breached that order twice around the time of the offence. The victim had chained her front door for good reason. The applicant's explanation that he had accidentally fallen into the victim's home through a chained door after the victim drew away from the door is simply fanciful.
7. The applicant's evidence that, after forcibly entering her home at 11 pm at night, he and his estranged wife (the applicant for the restraining order) then sat down for a civilised conversation, following which they engaged in consensual sexual relations resulting in her being upset with him (because he had not continued with penetrative sex to enable her to conceive a child), simply beggars belief. I roundly reject the totality of the applicant's evidence about his version of the events of the 1983 offending.
8. Neither do I accept the applicant's evidence that he was not aware that there was a restraining order in place when he approached and entered the victim's house. I note that the antecedent report reveals that the applicant was convicted of breaching the restraining order in the Elizabeth Magistrates Court on 23/08/1983. He was also convicted of a further breach of the order on 18/01/1984 (this appears to relate to the day when he arrested by Police about the attempted rape and was taken in for questioning). In the Police Incident Report the officer records that the applicant told the Police on 5 September 1983 that he knew there was restraining order in place. The sentencing judge alludes to the fact of the restraining order in his sentencing remarks regarding "the proceedings in the Magistrates Court" noting the proceedings had "given you (the applicant) fair warning ...that you were, in effect, harassing your wife and following a dangerous and, incidentally, an illegal course."
9. The offending is directly relevant to, and capable of, rationally affecting the assessment of risk posed by the applicant to children and therefore cannot be disregarded pursuant to s 26A(1)(c)(i) of the Act.
10. The presumption therefore remains, unless it can be displaced due to exceptional circumstances of the applicant.
11. I note that the offence occurred a very long time ago when the applicant was a young man and was presumably much less emotionally mature than he is now. I may have been persuaded to set aside the decision given the effluxion of time had the applicant been able to satisfy the Tribunal that there were exceptional circumstances about the applicant to suggest that he no longer poses a risk to children.
12. Unfortunately, to the contrary, the evidence reveals that the applicant has longstanding mental health issues (involving suicidal ideation and a threat to kill a police officer), which is currently untreated. A recent email to a government agency threatening the use of explosives is of significant concern. The applicant himself acknowledged that the latter email was unhelpful for his prospects on the review.
13. Further, the applicant's explanation now for what occurred in 1983 reveals a significant, ongoing lack of insight, remorse or reflection about his criminal conduct towards a vulnerable victim in her own home. Continuing to blame the victim, his lawyer and the justice system for his conviction for this serious offence against a vulnerable victim is not at all demonstrative of a reformed or rehabilitated individual. Despite the significant passage of time, there is no evidence before the Tribunal evincing sustained, self-motivated change by the applicant regarding this violent conduct towards a vulnerable victim.
14. The applicant has not demonstrated any insight about his past offending, nor can he point to any relevant counselling to address his past violent sexual offending.
15. I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances pertinent to the applicant that are capable of mitigating the underlying risk/s inherent in the PDO that he remains a risk to vulnerable persons including children.
16. I recognise that the applicant will be unhappy with the outcome of the review. It may be that he can seek some professional mental health assistance to address his mental health issues and some counselling to assist in developing some insight about his past offending. This may enable him to make a further application for a clearance at a later time.
17. I am not satisfied that the applicant has provided evidence that is capable of disturbing the findings of the respondent at first instance and find that the decision should be affirmed by the Tribunal.
18. As the Tribunal has affirmed the decision at first instance, namely that the applicant has not displaced the presumption under s 26A of the Act, the Tribunal need not undertake the risk assessment contemplated by the CSPP Act, nor consider any other assessable information.[15]
19. I note that the CAU has not undertaken that assessment either because of the existence of the PDO.

1. The respondent's decision to issue a prohibition notice was the correct and preferable decision and should be affirmed.

[1] The offence of Attempted Rape for which the applicant received a conviction in 1983 falls within the meaning of presumptive disqualification offence provided for in r 15A (a) (v) and r 15 (l) of the Child Safety (Prohibited Persons) Regulations 2019 (the Regulations).

[2] S 26 A of the CSPP Act.

[4] Pursuant to confidentiality orders made by the Tribunal under s 60 of the SACAT Act.

[5] Police Antecedent Report, Book of Documents pp22 - 24.

[7] Sworn on 26 February 2025 and marked R2.

[8] Citing unreported decisions of the Tribunal in support of that submission.

[11] Presumably a reference to the restraining order application.

[12] [2021] SACAT 36 at [16].

[13] [2016] SASCFC 106 at [94].

[14] [2018] SASCFC 24.

[15] For example, I have not assessed or weighted the other offending revealed on the applicant's antecedent report.