//
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2026] NSWSC 1006
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-08-24
Nixon J
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: In the matter of Tahmoor Coal Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [2026] NSWSC 1006
Hearing dates: 17-18 August 2026
Date of orders: 19 August 2026
Decision date: 24 August 2026
Jurisdiction: Equity - Corporations List
Original judgment source is linked above.
Before: Nixon J
Decision: Leave to amend granted; discovery ordered
Catchwords: CIVIL PROCEDURE - amendment of pleadings - where Originating Process and Points of Claim allege that a particular transaction was an uncommercial transaction and seek relief pursuant to s 588FF of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – where the plaintiffs sought leave to amend the Originating Process to add a claim for relief pursuant to s 588FF(1)(g) and sought leave to amend the Points of Claim to reflect matters raised by the First Defendant’s evidence and the Plaintiffs’ evidence in reply – whether there is an explanation for any delay in making the amendments – whether the Defendants will be prejudiced by the amendments
CIVIL PROCEDURE – discovery – whether the Plaintiffs have explained the relevance of the categories – whether the Plaintiffs have complied with Practice Notice SC Eq 11 – whether the scope of various categories should be narrowed – whether a “Sabre order” should be made
Legislation Cited: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 588FB, 588FF, 588FJ
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 64(1)
Cases Cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27
In the matter of Felan’s Fisheries Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1273
McGoldrick v SportsTG Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 1154
Sabre Corporation Pty Ltd v Russ Kalvin’s Hair Care Co (1993) 46 FCR 428
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Shaun Fraser and Jonathan Henry in their capacity as joint and several liquidators of Tahmoor Coal Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (First Plaintiff)
Tahmoor Coal Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (Second Plaintiff)
Clydesdale Engineering Limited (First Defendant)
Global Loan Agency Services Australia Nominees Pty Ltd (Second Defendant)
Liberty AM Holdings (UK) Ltd (Third Defendant)
Liberty Primary Metals Australia Pty Ltd (Fourth Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
V Whittaker SC and T Rogan (Plaintiffs)
A Henskens SC and M J Connor (First Defendant)
Solicitors:
Norton Rose Fulbright (First Defendant)
White & Case (Second Defendant – submitting appearance)
No appearance (Third Defendant)
Bird & Bird (Fourth Defendant)
File Number(s): 2026/201238
Publication restriction: Nil
On 17 and 18 August 2026, I heard two applications by the Plaintiffs seeking, respectively, leave to amend the Originating Process and Points of Claim, and orders for discovery. Each of those applications was opposed by the First Defendant, Clydesdale Engineering Limited (CEL).
These applications were made in circumstances where, as explained below, the proceeding has been expedited and is currently listed for a three-day hearing commencing on 8 September 2026. The Plaintiffs’ current estimate (which was not disputed by CEL) is that a further five hearing days will be required. Prior to the hearing of these applications, the Court informed the parties that it would be possible either for the additional five days to follow shortly after the existing three days allocated for the hearing, or alternatively, for the matter to be heard in a two-week block in November 2026.
At the conclusion of the hearing in respect of the Plaintiffs’ applications on 18 August 2026, I determined that the Plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend and that orders for discovery should be made (those orders were subsequently made on 19 August 2026, after instructions were sought regarding the time required for discovery and for the service of further evidence by CEL).
After I had indicated that I would grant the relief sought by the Plaintiffs, CEL requested that I provide my reasons for doing so, which I set out below.
The proceeding was commenced on 15 May 2026 seeking, among other things, orders pursuant to ss 588FB and 588FF, or alternatively, s 588FJ of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act) in respect of a transaction of Tahmoor Coal Pty Ltd which was said to comprise various finance and security documents (Transaction).
In particular, the Originating Process seeks:
a declaration that the Transaction is, or certain aspects of the Transaction (including the giving of security) are, a voidable transaction within the meaning of s 588FE(2) of the Act, by reason that it constituted an uncommercial transaction within the meaning of s 588FB of the Act; and
an order under s 588FF(1)(h) of the Act that each of the finance documents and security documents was void from the date it was made, and an order under s 588FF(1)(e) of the Act wholly discharging the security given by Tahmoor pursuant to the Transaction; or
alternatively, an order under s 588FJ(1) of the Act that each circulating security interest created by the Transaction is void, except insofar as such security interest secures an advance paid to Tahmoor at or after the time the relevant interest was granted.
On 12 August 2026, the Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Motion seeking an order under s 64(1) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (CPA) that they be given leave to file an Amended Originating Process (Proposed AOP) and an Amended Points of Claim (Proposed APOC).
The Proposed AOP makes two main changes, namely:
the expansion of the matters said to constitute the Transaction by adding:
(a) an additional transaction document described as the “Upstream NC****D Proceeds Loan” (the parties to which are CEL and the Third Defendant); and (b) certain payments, totalling just over US$20m, which were made by CEL and the Fourth Defendant (LPMA) to Tahmoor in the period between 31 July 2025 and 5 November 2025 (Funds Advanced); and
the addition of an additional prayer seeking, further or in the alternative, an order under s 588FF(1)(g) that the Defendants be permitted to prove in the winding up of Tahmoor for an amount that the Court sees fit.
There is no dispute that the payments described as the “Funds Advanced” were made. The affidavit of Mr Deepak Sogani, affirmed on 9 July 2026 (Sogani Affidavit), which was filed by CEL, addresses those payments in some detail.
There is a dispute as to whether, in the event that the Plaintiffs establish their claim, the Court would make an order in respect of the Upstream NCD Proceeds Loan, given that the parties to that document (namely, CEL and LMPA) are United Kingdom corporations. However, this is a legal issue that can be addressed by submissions at the final hearing.
The dispute on the amendment application centred principally on the addition of the proposed prayer for relief pursuant to s 588FF(1)(g) of the Act.
There was also a dispute regarding the Proposed APOC. However, as the Plaintiffs pointed out, the factual matters added by the Proposed APOC are essentially taken from either the Sogani Affidavit or from the evidence filed by the Liquidators in reply to the Sogani Affidavit.
The Sogani Affidavit contains evidence in support of the proposition, which was introduced by the Amended Points of Defence filed by CEL on 19 June 2026 (APOD), that the Funds Advanced were received by Tahmoor “for genuine purposes” and “directly benefited Tahmoor”.
The evidence of the Liquidators, filed in response to the Sogani Affidavit, is to the effect that the Funds Advanced were insufficient to restore Tahmoor to solvency, did not reduce the amount outstanding to Tahmoor’s creditors, and only delayed an inevitable insolvency appointment, and that unsecured unrelated creditors would have been in a better position if the Transaction had not been entered.
The Proposed APOC also adds the following paragraph at the end of the section dealing with relief:
“Further, or in the alternative, an order under s 588FF(1)(g) that the defendants be permitted to prove in the winding up of Tahmoor for an amount that the Court sees fit.”
CEL referred to Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27 at [103] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), as standing for the proposition that where an amendment is sought at a late stage, an explanation for the delay will ordinarily be required. CEL submitted that the “absence of any explanation here is fatal to the plaintiffs’ application”.
I do not accept this submission.
First, the Plaintiffs identified that most of the factual matters which are sought to be added by the Proposed APOC arise either directly from the Sogani Affidavit (which was filed on 9 July 2026) or from the Liquidators’ evidence in reply (which was filed on 31 July 2026). The proposed amended pleadings were served on CEL on 6 August 2026. That is not a significant delay.
Secondly, while CEL submitted that the “underlying facts” regarding the new matters raised by the Proposed APOC were known to the Plaintiffs prior to 15 May 2026, it is plain from a review of the Sogani Affidavit that a number of matters upon which CEL relies in contending that the Funds Advanced were of “benefit to Tahmoor” – including, in particular, dealings by the representatives of the Gupta Family Group Alliance (GFG Alliance) with various third parties – were not able to be known by the Liquidators prior to the service of the Sogani Affidavit. Given those matters, I am satisfied that the Plaintiffs have adequately explained why the amendment application is being made at this point in time.
Thirdly, CEL suggested that the Plaintiffs had made a deliberate forensic choice not to seek relief under s 588FF(1)(g) of the Act in their Originating Process. However, no such proposition was put to the solicitor for the Plaintiffs, who gave evidence in support of the Plaintiffs’ application. In any case, in circumstances where the Court is satisfied that a transaction of a company is a voidable transaction within the meaning of s 588FE of the Act (which was a matter already pleaded in the Originating Process and the Points of Claim), the Court has the power to make, in the exercise of its discretion, one or more of the orders set out in s 588FF(1) of the Act (including an order under s 588FF(1)(g)). That is the case whether or not s 588FF(1)(g) of the Act is specifically pleaded.
I accept the Plaintiffs’ submission that the effect of adding a specific reference in the pleadings to s 588FF(1)(g) of the Act, in circumstances where such relief was in any event available if the Plaintiffs established their claim that the Transaction is voidable, is to put CEL on notice, as a matter of procedural fairness, that the Plaintiffs may seek an order of this type if their claim is established.
CEL submitted that the Court should exercise its discretion to refuse the amendment application having regard to the terms of the Deed of Security Release entered by, inter alia, the Plaintiffs and CEL on 26 May 2026.
CEL did not advance a submission that the Plaintiffs had, by making the amendment application, breached any particular term of the Deed.
Instead, CEL submitted that:
as at the date of the Deed, the Plaintiffs had pleaded the case that the Defendants were to meet (with the Points of Claim being annexed to the Deed);
it “was strictly on that basis that [CEL] agreed to release its security under the Deed to allow the sale of the mine to proceed”; and
“[a]s a matter of discretion, that in and of itself, would weigh heavily against the Court granting the amendment in respect of s 588F(1)(g)”.
I do not accept this submission. By the Deed, the parties agreed to seek the proposed Short Minutes of Order which were annexed to that Deed (Deed SMO), which set out a timetable to a hearing by the end of August 2026 (with the parties agreeing otherwise to take the next available date).
The Deed SMO included orders for the Defendants to file any Points of Defence and any evidence on which they intend to rely.
In that context, it is unsurprising that the Deed did not contain any provision to the effect that the Plaintiffs would not amend their pleading, or seek discovery, or seek leave to adduce further evidence, or take any other procedural step which is commonly taken by a plaintiff after receipt of a defendant’s evidence. Instead, the Deed SMO included liberty to apply on one day’s notice and included an order that “[u]nless the Court otherwise orders, no party may rely on any affidavit or evidence not filed or served in accordance with these orders” (thereby implicitly recognising that it was open to the parties to seek the Court’s leave to rely on further material).
In addition, it is relevant that the Deed was entered in circumstances where the Plaintiffs were seeking an expedited hearing, on the basis that the matter was urgent, and CEL was resisting this course. This is not a case where the Plaintiffs agreed to an expedited hearing in order to obtain CEL’s agreement to release its security, but rather it is one where CEL agreed to release its security on the basis that a timetable would be agreed that allowed for a hearing at a much later date than was sought by the Plaintiffs. It has been CEL’s position - as stated in both its Points of Defence and APOD - that “the proceedings are not urgent”.
For those reasons, I do not consider that the terms of the Deed or the Deed SMO provide a reason for the Court to decline to exercise its discretion to grant the relief sought.
CEL complained that it does not know, from the Proposed APOC, the relief sought by the Plaintiffs or the grounds on which they seek such relief.
In particular, CEL submitted as follows:
“The plaintiffs do not plead or identify the specific relief that they seek under s 588FF(1)(g), in that they do not state with any specificity, the orders they intend to seek from the Court, including: which defendants the orders may relate to; which category or categories of payments they will seek to limit recovery of; the amount that the defendants may prove for in the winding up; or whether they seek to limit the defendants’ ability to prove as secured creditors in the winding up, and if so to what extent.”
Senior Counsel for the Plaintiffs explained that the form of order that the Plaintiffs will seek under s 588FF(1)(g) of the Act will depend on the evidence available at the hearing (including any documents to be tendered from the discovery regarding matters raised by the Sogani Affidavit, which the Plaintiffs do not currently have, and any matters arising from cross-examination at trial). The Plaintiffs are therefore unable to articulate at this point in time every potential formulation of the relief which they may seek in submissions. However, they have put CEL on notice of the factual matters which they will seek to establish at the hearing and have indicated, in submissions on this application, that a potential form of the relief which may be sought – at one extreme – would be that the Defendants are not entitled to prove in the winding up of Tahmoor for any amount in respect of the Funds Advanced.
In circumstances where CEL is aware, from the Proposed APOC, of the factual matters which the Plaintiffs seek to establish in respect of the Transaction and the Funds Advanced, and is aware that the Plaintiffs intend to seek relief under s 588FF(1)(g) of the Act depending on the findings made in respect of those matters (including potentially an order that CEL is not entitled to prove in the winding up for some or all of the Funds Advanced), I am satisfied that CEL is able to prepare to meet the Plaintiffs’ claim at the hearing.
CEL submitted that it had taken forensic decisions on the basis of the case as pleaded – including the decision not to adduce either evidence as to solvency or evidence as to Tahmoor’s use of the Funds Advanced - and that there is now no opportunity to serve evidence on those matters, such that CEL is irreparably prejudiced. CEL also indicated that, if the amendment is allowed, it might seek to bring a cross claim for restitution in respect of the moneys paid to Tahmoor.
The answer to this submission is that, as the Plaintiffs acknowledged, if CEL seeks an opportunity to put on evidence in response to the amended claim, or to bring any cross-claim by reason of the amended claim, it will be given that opportunity.
At the hearing of the amendment application, CEL did not advance any submission to the effect that if the September hearing dates were maintained, with additional hearing days being added, it would not be able to take such steps in advance of that hearing. Instead, the argument proceeded on the basis that the position was uncertain, but that CEL wanted to do all it could to maintain the September dates.
At the hearing of the amendment application, I was not satisfied that, in the event that CEL required additional time to prepare any evidence on which it relied, it would be prejudiced if the hearing was deferred until November.
That was because CEL’s evidence of prejudice in this regard consisted of little more than material in the nature of submission from its solicitor, asserting that there was a “risk” (of unspecified extent) that, in the event that the hearing of this proceeding was deferred by some two months, the amounts available to CEL would be “substantially erod[ed]” (by an unspecified amount). Further, as noted above, it is CEL’s position – as pleaded in the APOD – that this proceeding is “not urgent”.
Subsequently, after I had indicated that leave to amend would be granted, CEL sought orders for it to file any further evidence by 25 September 2026 and for the hearing to be deferred to mid-November (which I made).
In determining an application for leave to amend, the Court must, pursuant to s 58(1) of the CPA, seek to act in accordance with the dictates of justice and must, for the purpose of determining what are the dictates of justice in the particular case, have regard to the provisions of ss 56 and 57 of the CPA. In particular, the Court must seek to give effect to the overriding purpose of facilitating the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings: ss 56(1)-(2) of the CPA.
CEL seized upon the Plaintiffs’ acknowledgement that, if leave to amend were refused, the Plaintiffs would be able to bring an application for relief under s 588FF(1)(g) of the Act in a subsequent proceeding and submitted that, in those circumstances, there would be no prejudice or injustice to the Plaintiffs in refusing leave to amend.
This submission fails to take adequate account of the overriding purpose in s 56(1) of the CPA.
CEL did not dispute the proposition that any such subsequent hearing would require consideration of the same matters regarding the Transaction and the Funds Advanced, and would likely involve the same documentary record and at least some of the same witnesses. To bifurcate the issues in this way would almost certainly lead to a significant increase in the time and cost required to resolve this matter. Further, the delay and cost would increase if there were an appeal from the decision in the first hearing which would need to be determined before the second could proceed.
Those matters point strongly in favour of the Court exercising its discretion and allowing the amendment, so that all issues can be determined, on the same evidence, at the one hearing.
The parties prepared, in compliance with orders made by Black J, a schedule identifying the discovery categories sought by the Plaintiffs, and the response by CEL to each category. I deal below, in a summary way, with the issues emerging from that schedule.
Notwithstanding the fairly limited matters in dispute raised by the schedule, CEL objected, at the hearing, to providing any discovery at all (even in respect of categories to which it had consented, subject to certain amendments being made).
In short, CEL contended that the Plaintiffs had failed to comply with the requirements of Practice Note SC Eq 11, in that the Plaintiffs did not identify why the various categories were required to determine the issues arising on the pleadings, and did not provide an estimate of the costs of discovery, and therefore the application should be refused.
I do not accept these submissions.
The Plaintiffs’ written submissions identified the particular issues to which the discovery categories related, by reference to specific paragraphs of the Points of Claim and Points of Defence, as well as by reference to specific factual issues raised by the Sogani Affidavit.
CEL’s written submissions in response did not engage with those contentions in any detailed way.
I am satisfied, having reviewed the matters referred to in the Plaintiffs’ submissions, that the relevance of each of the categories to the issues in dispute has been established. In particular:
category 1, which seeks external insolvency and restructuring advice, relates to Tahmoor’s solvency, which is in dispute (see APOD at [2]), and the likelihood of third-party funding, the rationale for the intercompany funding and Tahmoor’s position post-funding (which are, as outlined below, also in dispute);
categories 2 to 8.3, which seek documents relating to the likelihood of third-party investment, are relevant to CEL’s defence that it was, by paying the Funds Advanced, providing liquidity to Tahmoor during the period while Tahmoor was awaiting third party funding (see APOD at [1(c)], [63(b)]);
categories 8.3 to 15 and 18 to 19, which seek documents relating to the rationale for the intercompany funding, are relevant to CEL’s pleading that Tahmoor was “pursuing a plan” which was “intended to ensure all creditors were paid in full” (APOD at [1(c)]) and that a reasonable person in Tahmoor’s position “would have held the realistic expectation that [external] funding would become available” (APOD at [1(f)]);
categories 16-17, which seek documents relating to the intercompany funds advanced, are relevant to CEL’s contention that the Funds Advanced benefitted unsecured creditors (APOD at [1(f(A))]); and
category 20, which seeks documents relating to Mr Sogani’s role, are relevant to the reliability of Mr Sogani’s evidence regarding the Transaction.
CEL relied on the decision of Black J in In the matter of Felan’s Fisheries Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1273 for the proposition that the Court should decline to make discovery orders where the person seeking such orders has failed to comply with the requirements of SC Eq 11. In the case, his Honour determined that the application for discovery failed to comply with the requirements of paragraph 6 of SC Eq 11, which provides as follows:
“Any application for an order for disclosure, consensual or otherwise, must be supported by an affidavit setting out;
the reason why disclosure is necessary for the resolution of the real issues in dispute in the proceedings;
the classes of documents in respect of which disclosure is sought; and
the likely cost of such disclosure.”
In particular, his Honour observed that an explanation as to why disclosure is necessary for the resolution of the real issues in dispute “can readily be given, and often is readily given, by identifying the real issues in dispute in the proceedings, typically by reference to the pleadings, and then indicating why the particular category of disclosure is necessary to address those issues” (at [5]). As set out above, I am satisfied that this has been done in the present case.
It is true that the Plaintiffs have not provided an estimate of the likely costs of disclosure. However, in Felan’s Fisheries at [6], Black J observed that it is sometimes difficult for the party seeking discovery to provide such an estimate and that he would not have ruled against the application for discovery “on that basis alone”.
I accept the Plaintiffs’ submission that they are not in a position to know the likely costs of discovery, since this depends on matters which are unknown to them. In particular, the proposed categories seek, for the most part, documents which appear to have been reviewed, or are related to documents which appear to have been reviewed, by Mr Sogani for the purposes of preparing his affidavit. In those circumstances, CEL is well placed – having filed the Sogani Affidavit in this proceeding – to ascertain the extent of the documents which will need to be reviewed and disclosed and the cost of doing so. CEL did not file any evidence which sought to quantify the costs of discovery, nor did it advance any submission that the discovery sought was oppressive or disproportionate having regard to the likely cost. Instead, the submissions proceeded on the basis that the discovery sought by the Plaintiffs might well be able to be provided in a relatively short timeframe and, importantly, in advance of the anticipated hearing date of 8 September 2026 (being three weeks from the date of the hearing of the amendment application). It was only after I had determined the amendment and discovery applications, and after further instructions were sought, that CEL indicated that it would require until the end of September 2026 to provide discovery of the categories sought.
The schedule filed by the parties in respect of the discovery categories identified two main respects in which CEL sought to narrow the Plaintiffs’ proposed categories.
First, where the Plaintiffs sought communications “about” certain subject matters, CEL proposed the discovery of communications “referring to” those matters. I accept CEL’s submission that this alternative form of wording is appropriate, as it allows decisions as to whether a document falls within a category to be made by reference to the text of the document itself, without the need for any judgment to be made as to whether the document might be “about” a subject matter to which no reference is made.
Secondly, where the Plaintiffs sought communications between representatives of the GFG Alliance, CEL proposed that discovery be limited to communications between certain nominated individuals. I do not accept that such a limitation is appropriate. The Plaintiffs explained that they did not have any basis to confirm whether or not the nominated people were the individuals who engaged in the communications in question. If they are, then the disclosure will be the same under either form of wording of the category, such that there does not appear to be any prejudice to CEL (assuming its position as to the identity of the individuals involved is correct) in framing the category in the terms proposed by the Plaintiffs.
In addition, a contention had previously been raised by CEL that certain categories sought the production of privileged material. The Plaintiffs tendered documents in support of a submission that it was reasonably arguable that any privilege may be that of Tahmoor (or may be joint privilege of Tahmoor and one or more other entities). CEL did not, in oral address, advance any submission to the contrary. In those circumstances, I was satisfied that any issue as to privilege in respect of documents falling within the categories could be addressed by an appropriate regime of orders.
For those reasons, I determined that the Court should, subject to the revision noted above, make orders for discovery of the categories sought by the Plaintiffs.
In addition, the Plaintiffs sought a “Sabre order” to the effect that, in the event that CEL identifies that any documents or categories of documents are not within its possession, and reasonably believes that such documents are or may be in Mr Sogani’s possession, CEL must seek to obtain from Mr Sogani and produce those documents, or explain on affidavit why it is unable to do so.
The power to make such orders is contained in s 61 of the CPA, and such power is to be applied in accordance with the principles in Sabre Corp**oration Pty Ltd v Russ Kalvin*’*s Hair Care Co (1993) 46 FCR 428 at 432: see McGoldrick v SportsTG Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 1154 at [19]-[30].
I accept the Plaintiffs’ submission that those principles are satisfied so far as concerns the proposed Sabre order in respect of Mr Sogani. In particular:
first, given that the Sogani Affidavit refers to or contemplates the existence of documents in each category, it is likely that the documents which are sought are in fact in the possession of Mr Sogani;
secondly, since Mr Sogani has prepared an affidavit which CEL has filed in this proceeding, there is a real likelihood that CEL would be given access to such documents upon making a request to Mr Sogani;
thirdly, the proposed order is restricted to CEL taking reasonable steps to obtain the documents;
fourthly, the documents sought are relevant to the issues in dispute;
fifthly, the documents sought are necessary for disposing fairly of the proceedings, since the Plaintiffs require access to documents relating to the matters addressed in the Sogani Affidavit in order to be in a position to test the assertions about those matters set out in the Sogani Affidavit; and
sixthly, there is no evidence to the effect that the production of the documents would cause CEL or Mr Sogani any hardship. That is not surprising given that Mr Sogani deposed that he prepared his affidavit based on his “review of the books and records of the entities comprising the GFG Alliance”, such that he has presumably already collated and considered documents relevant to the various matters in his affidavit to which the discovery categories relate.
For those reasons, I determined that it was also appropriate to make the Sabre order sought by the Plaintiffs.
Pleadings and evidence
Discovery
(a) The First Defendant must request such documents from Mr Sogani and thereafter discover all additional produced to it by Mr Sogani; and (b) On or before 4pm on 30 September 2026, the First Defendant must file and serve an affidavit by a responsible officer of the First Defendant with knowledge of what steps the first defendant has taken to obtain the documents from Mr Sogani, deposing to the efforts made by the First Defendant to obtain the documents or copies of the documents, including details of its requests to Mr Sogani and the responses thereto.
Hearing dates
Other
Notation
The Court notes that the First Defendant, if and when it retains any expert for the purpose of adducing evidence on the costs and conditions for funding available in the marketplace to the Second Plaintiff as at the relevant time period pursuant to Order 7, proposes to notify the Plaintiffs of the fact of that retainer and the identity of the expert retained.