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[2026] NSWSC 667
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-06-09
Brereton J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: In the matter of Meribel Capital Group Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 667
Hearing dates: 5 June 2026, 9 June 2026
Date of orders: 9 June 2026
Decision date: 09 June 2026
Jurisdiction: Equity - Corporations List
Before: Brereton J
Decision: Leave granted to serve subpoenas outside Australia and deem email service effective
Catchwords: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – service – application for leave to serve subpoenas in Singapore and New Zealand – leave sought under r 11.8AB of UCPR and s 31 of Trans‑Tasman Proceedings Act (Cth) – consideration of interests of parties in adducing evidence – consideration of prejudice to subpoena recipients – consideration of principles of comity – no alternative way of securing evidence – leave to serve subpoenas – orders under r 10.14 of UCPR deeming service effective
Legislation Cited: Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters
Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth)
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Flugge & Geary (Ruling No 5) (2015) 49 VR 606; [2015] VSC 665
Capral Limited v DNV AS [2024] NSWSC 96
Caswell v Sony/ATV Music Publishing (Australia) Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 986
Ceramic Fuel Cells Limited (In Liq) v McGraw-Hill Financial, Inc (2016) 245 FCR 340; [2016] FCA 401
Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Xin (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 1606
Gloucester (Sub-Holdings 1) Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWSC 1419
In the matter of Meribel Invest FIR Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 325
In the matter of Meribel Invest FIR Pty Ltd and In the matter of Meribel Capital Group [2026] NSWSC 593
Stemcor (A/sia) Pty Ltd v Oceanwave Line SA [2004] FCA 391
Sweeney v Howard [2007] NSWSC 262
Texts Cited: N.A.
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: AC Invest FIR Pty Ltd as trustee for AC Invest Pty Ltd (first plaintiff)
Apres Vous Pty Ltd (second plaintiff)
Benjamin Thomas Madsen (third plaintiff)
James Tristan Madsen (fourth plaintiff)
Bruce Madsen Pty Ltd as trustee for Bruce Madsen Family Trust (fifth plaintiff)
Meribel Capital Group Pty Ltd (first defendant)
Meribel Invest FIR Pty Ltd (second defendant)
Meribel Invest NWE Pty Ltd (fourth defendant)
Firmus Grid Pty Ltd (fifth defendant)
Ethele Pty Ltd (sixth defendant)
Simon John Raftery (seventh defendant)
Gillian Raftery (eighth defendant)
Etiene Pty Ltd (tenth defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
D Emmerig (first to fifth plaintiffs)
O Jones SC (first, second, fourth, sixth to eighth and tenth defendants)
No other appearances
Solicitors: Bird & Bird (first to fifth plaintiffs)
Rydge Partners (first, second, fourth, sixth to eighth and tenth defendants)
Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer (fifth defendant)
No other appearances
File Number(s): 2025/444626
Publication restriction: N.A.
These proceedings concern the legal and beneficial ownership of 1,020,048 ordinary shares in Firmus Grid Ltd, originally issued to Meribel Invest FIR Pty Ltd on or around 17 August 2022. I understand that the shares have considerable value (well in excess of $100,000,000). The proceedings are listed for hearing before Nixon J from 29 June to 3 July 2026.
Firmus Grid is an Australian limited company with its registered office in Sydney. It is a defendant in the proceedings and has filed a submitting appearance. It is represented by Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer. Meribel FIR seeks orders for the service of subpoenas to give evidence to Mr Oliver Curtis (co-CEO and director of Firmus Grid), Mr Tim Rosenfield (co-CEO and director of Firmus Grid), Mr Ben Webb (General Counsel and company secretary of Firmus Grid) and Mr Sam Biscoe (deputy CFO of Firmus Grid).
There is an issue in the proceedings concerning the validity of a purported transfer of the Firmus Grid shares procured by Mr Ben Madsen away from Meribel FIR, or AC Invest Pty Ltd on 4 May 2023 to his brother, Mr James Madsen. Mr Ben Madsen has deposed in an affidavit that has been filed and served in the proceedings that he had conversations with "the directors of Firmus" in around April 2023 about a transfer of the shares from Meribel FIR to AC Invest, and that in or after May 2023 he "met with Oliver Curtis or another employee of Firmus Grid" and handed them a share transfer form for the transfer of the Firmus Grid shares from Meribel FIR to Mr James Madsen.
It seems that Firmus Grid has no document recording the receipt of the share transfer form. A transfer from Meribel FIR to Mr James Madsen was apparently approved by the directors of Firmus Grid (including Mr Curtis and Mr Rosenfield) on 20 December 2023. The transfer was apparently registered by Firmus Grid (on the initiative of Mr Webb) with ASIC on 18 January 2024. Meribel FIR contends that the purported transfers from Meribel FIR and AC Invest to Mr James Madsen are invalid. An issue in the proceedings is whether, and if so when, any transfer or transfer form was ever discussed with or provided to Firmus Grid, and the circumstances in which Mr James Madsen came to be registered by Firmus Grid as the owner of the relevant Firmus Grid shares.
On 8 May 2026, Meribel FIR requested HSF Kramer to accept service on behalf of the four people mentioned above, as well as four former directors of Firmus Grid, namely Mr Nicholas Curtis, Mr Michael Rosenfield, Mr Shane Hartwig and Mr Ted Pretty. On 13 May 2026, HSF Kramer advised that it had instructions to accept service on behalf of the former directors, apparently all of whom reside in Australia, but not the four current officers.
On 21 May 2026, the subpoenas were issued and informally served through the Firmus Grid email addresses of each of the recipients, as well as to HSF Kramer.
Meribel FIR and related parties in the proceedings seek: (a) an order granting leave to serve Mr Curtis, Mr Rosenfield and Mr Biscoe pursuant to UCPR r 11.8AB; (b) an order granting leave to serve Mr Webb pursuant to s 31(1) of the Trans*‑Tasman Proceedings Act* 2010 (Cth); and (c) an order confirming service on those individuals by email pursuant to UCPR r 10.14.
By letter dated 28 May 2026, HSF Kramer acknowledged receipt of the subpoenas addressed to the former officers. It is apparent from the letter that HSF Kramer received the subpoenas issued to the four current officers. HSF Kramer reiterated that the firm did not act for those individuals, and did not have instructions to accept service. Nevertheless, on the material before the Court, there cannot be any doubt that the subpoenas have come to the attention of the four current officers.
The letter of 28 May 2026 from HSF Kramer advised that Firmus Grid is a neutral party and takes no position on the application by Meribel FIR concerning the issue of the subpoenas to the four senior officers of the company. The letter did, however, set out in some detail various reservations that Firmus Grid holds about the effectiveness of the course of action taken by Meribel FIR. The letter was useful in bringing various issues to the attention of the Court. The letter correctly stated that Firmus Grid is not obliged to assist Meribel FIR to gather evidence in the proceedings. The letter is consistent with Firmus Grid taking a responsible position in the proceedings, without derogating from its rights. I would infer that its senior executives would take a similar position. It is apparent that they are not cooperating with Meribel FIR in relation to any evidence in the proceedings. They are not obliged to do so. As things stand, it appears that Meribel FIR would propose the unusual course in commercial cases of calling the evidence cold.
Meribel FIR has supplied an outline of the topics that they would seek to adduce evidence about if they were able to call the four Firmus Grid officers as witnesses in their case. The topics are relatively confined. They concern two or three topics per proposed witness and there is considerable overlap. The topics principally concern communications with Mr Ben Madsen about the transfer of the Firmus Grid shares, (i) from Meribel FIR to AC Invest, and (ii) otherwise concerning a transfer to Mr James Madsen; as well as evidence concerning the circumstances and processes pursuant to which Mr James Madsen was registered as the owner of the Firmus Grid shares. These appear to be subjects of real significance in the proceedings. There is a real prospect that the witnesses, if called, would be in a position to give evidence on critical matters.
The application in respect of the four subpoenas was actively opposed by the Madsen parties. On one level, that opposition may be thought to be surprising. That is because the four officers could be in a position to provide strong corroboration to their case and, in particular, they could be in a position to confirm conversations with Mr Ben Madsen that are addressed in his affidavit evidence. The application for leave to serve the subpoenas might just as easily have been made by the Madsen parties.
Broadly speaking, the application raises four matters for consideration.
The first matter concerns the interests of Meribel FIR in adducing the evidence it wishes to adduce at the hearing. Meribel FIR plainly has an interest in calling evidence from the four current Firmus Grid officers. I note that Meribel FIR has indicated that it may not need to call evidence from all of them as well as from the four former officers, but it is not in a position currently to indicate which witnesses may not be required, including because Mr Ben Madsen deposes as to conversations with unidentified persons at Firmus Grid. The Court can proceed on the basis that Meribel FIR would only call witnesses if it perceived that it was necessary for it to do so.
The second matter concerns the legitimate interests of the Madsen parties. I accept that they have a legitimate basis to oppose the orders if the subpoenas threaten the hearing, particularly if there has been a delay on the part of Meribel FIR. The trial of the proceedings has already been adjourned once (by consent). The circumstances would have to be extraordinary for them to be adjourned again. There may be a proper suggestion that Meribel FIR could have made this application sooner. It has known that the Madsen parties have proposed to rely, at the trial, on the evidence of Mr Ben Madsen since late March 2026, but its solicitor did not engage with HSF Kramer about the possibility of obtaining evidence from the four officers of Firmus Grid until early May 2026. It is not an excuse, but it is relevant to note that there was considerable uncertainty about the status of the proceedings over that period: see In the matter of Meribel Invest FIR Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 325 and In the matter of Meribel Invest FIR Pty Ltd and In the matter of Meribel Capital Group [2026] NSWSC 593.
However, it is too early to say that the subpoenas, if issued, will threaten the hearing in any way. Five days have been allocated for the hearing. At the moment, it cannot be supposed that there is inadequate time to accommodate the evidence, including cross-examination, if the subpoenas are served and the witnesses called. If one or more of those subpoenas did pose a difficulty for the trial, that is a matter that would be best addressed by the trial judge. I do not consider that the legitimate interests of the Madsen parties are such that the application should be dismissed. Their legitimate interests can still be accommodated. If it appears that the trial is threatened by the issue of any subpoenas, any leave to issue them could be revoked or other steps taken to protect the legitimate interests of the Madsen parties.
The third matter concerns the prejudice and inconvenience to the recipients of any subpoenas. It may be expected that it would be highly inconvenient for officers if they were required to come to Sydney to give evidence. However there is, unsurprisingly, no evidence of inconvenience or prejudice. If the subpoenas are served, the recipients would have a right to apply to have them set aside. That is the time when any evidence of inconvenience or prejudice would be expected. The legitimate interests of the recipients can thus be accommodated. There is also the real possibility that inconvenience can be considerably ameliorated if evidence were to be given by AVL. I will come back to this shortly.
The fourth matter is the most weighty one on the present application. The application concerns leave to issue four subpoenas in other countries. Mr Curtis, Mr Rosenfield and Mr Biscoe reside in Singapore, while Mr Webb resides in New Zealand. The application for leave raises questions of power and the proper exercise of discretion. The Court must properly consider rules of international law and comity.
Meribel FIR first seeks leave to serve the subpoenas on Mr Curtis, Mr Rosenfield and Mr Biscoe pursuant to UCPR r 11.8AB. That rule provides as follows:
Service of other documents outside Australia
Any document other than an originating process may be served outside Australia with the leave of the court, which may be given with any directions that the court thinks fit.
[49] The better view is that, when a court is asked, pursuant to general rules of court, to grant leave to issue a subpoena to an addressee located overseas, or to grant leave to serve a subpoena on a person overseas, considerations of international law and international comity are not merely matters that the court may have regard to in the exercise of its discretion. Rather, they are mandatory considerations that condition the exercise of the court’s powers. They condition the court’s powers because the court is required to exercise caution and restraint in circumstances where the issue or service of the subpoena might infringe international law or give rise to issues of international comity. It is no light matter to exercise a power that might involve the infringement of the sovereignty of another State.
[50] There is, however, no absolute limitation or restraint on the court’s power to issue or grant leave to serve a subpoena in such circumstances. There is no warrant for reading such an absolute limitation or restriction into general rules that allow for the issue of subpoenas and leave to serve orders overseas where it is not found in the express words of the rules. The requirement to construe general rules in a way which is consistent with international law and the comity of nations is best accommodated by requiring the court to have regard to those matters, and to exercise care and restraint, when being asked to issue and grant leave to serve a subpoena overseas. Whilst the court is bound to have regard to international law and comity and exercise care and restraint, it nonetheless retains the power to issue and grant leave to serve a subpoena overseas in an appropriate case.
[51] The requirement to have regard to international law and comity, and the resulting need for care and restraint may mean that, as a practical matter, a court would in most cases be unlikely to issue and grant leave to serve a subpoena on a person overseas where it is clear that international law or international comity will or may be infringed. Indeed, the authorities suggest that the court would only do so in exceptional circumstances. That does not mean, however, that the court can never issue or grant leave to serve such a subpoena, or that the court lacks the power to do so.
Although his Honour was ultimately concerned with the rules of the Federal Court of Australia, I accept that these remarks apply with equal force to UCPR r 11.8AB.
Other relevant authorities which were considered by Wigney J in Ceramic included Gloucester (Sub-Holdings 1) Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWSC 1419 and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Flugge & Geary (Ruling No 5) (2015) 49 VR 606; [2015] VSC 665. The latter case concerned an application for leave to serve a subpoena that required attendance to give evidence on an Australian citizen who was a resident in Singapore.
I was not taken to any relevant binding rules of international law that may give rise to a claim by one state against another, and I am not aware of any rule that may have application in this matter.
Questions of comity, however, do arise. In Ceramic, Wigney J observed at [46] that compared with international law, comity is a slightly more nebulous concept. His Honour said that comity “may be taken to mean the rules of goodwill and civility between nations, founded on the moral right of a state to receive courtesy from other states.” In Gloucester, White J observed at [16]:
Comity includes that principle of restraint by which courts, recognising the essentially territorial nature of their jurisdiction, are slow to assert their judicial power beyond the limits of their own jurisdiction so as to interfere with the sovereignty of a foreign State…
In ASIC v Flugge, Robson J observed at [15]:
…the serving of a subpoena constitutes an order backed by the threat of punishment for contempt of court if the order is not obeyed and as such involves an interference with the sovereignty of the foreign country to govern, without interference, the liberty and conduct of its own citizens.
I am mindful of and propose to show respect to the sovereignty of the Republic of Singapore.
I accept that in the special circumstances of this case, the issue of the subpoenas will not show disrespect or discourtesy to the Republic of Singapore. The relevant circumstances I take into account are as follows:
Mr Curtis, Mr Rosenfield and Mr Biscoe were born in Australia and are Australian citizens.
It appears that Mr Curtis and Mr Rosenfield were resident in Australia until 2019 and that Mr Biscoe was an Australian resident until 2024.
None of them, on the evidence, is a citizen of the Republic of Singapore. If the three individuals were citizens of the Republic of Singapore, or of any country other than Australia, I would not grant leave.
Each of them is an officer and shareholder of Firmus Grid, which is an Australian company.
The solicitor for Meribel FIR has given evidence that he believes that each of Mr Curtis, Mr Rosenfield and Mr Biscoe visit Australia regularly. The principal basis of that belief appears to be the anticipated listing of Firmus Grid on the ASX. There is some evidence that preparations are underway for Firmus Grid to be publicly listed on the ASX in September 2026, with an expected market value of nearly $7,000,000,000. There is also some evidence that Mr Curtis and Mr Rosenfield were in Australia in April 2026 to give presentations in connection with the proposed float. It is not unreasonable to expect that a substantial listing on the ASX will require some personal attention in Australia in the next few months.
Given that each of Mr Curtis, Mr Rosenfield and Mr Biscoe have assets in Australia (being shares in Firmus Grid) and that apparently each regularly come to Australia, this Court is in a position, relatively swiftly, to enforce compliance or impose punishment: cf Stemcor (A/sia) Pty Ltd v Oceanwave Line SA [2004] FCA 391 at [12] and Sweeney v Howard [2007] NSWSC 262 at [13]. The punishment would not be effected in the Republic of Singapore or concern property located in the Republic of Singapore.
The subject matter of the proposed evidence concerns the affairs of an Australian company in Australia.
The Republic of Singapore has made a declaration, dated 16 May 2023, referencing the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters. The declaration is in the following terms (emphasis added):
1. In accordance with Article 8, paragraph 2 of the Convention, the Republic of Singapore declares that it is opposed to the direct service of judicial documents upon persons within its territory through foreign diplomatic or consular agents, unless the documents are to be served upon a national of the State from which the documents originate…
Meribel FIR does not seek for the subpoenas to be issued in accordance with the Hague Convention. On the evidence, there is insufficient time for that to occur before the hearing (and that is probably true at all relevant times). The Hague Convention is facultative, not mandatory: see Caswell v Sony/ATV Music Publishing (Australia) Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 986 at [30]. Thus while the declaration does not apply directly, it demonstrates that the Republic of Singapore does not appear to be affronted when persons are served within the Republic in circumstances where service is effected on a national of the state from which the judicial documents originate. That is the case here.
…As I understand it, the position has always been that if you have a recalcitrant witness in a foreign country, to get the evidence of that witness, it is necessary to take it on commission, or on some equivalent basis. Whilst that is not the determining factor, it is at least something to be taken into account.
Evidence on commission is not practical in this case. One significant change in the manner in which litigation is conducted now, compared with 2007 when Sweeney v Howard was decided, is the use of AVL. One possibility is that evidence will be given by AVL. The Madsen parties have indicated that they would not oppose an application for evidence to be given by AVL. Meribel FIR has declined to indicate a position. The interference (if any) with sovereignty would be lessened if the witness is not compelled to leave the jurisdiction. I do not consider it to be a discourtesy to the Republic of Singapore to compel an Australian citizen, who resides in Singapore, to give evidence by AVL in proceedings in New South Wales where the evidence concerns dealings in the shares of an Australian company. It is difficult to see how Meribel FIR could resist an application for evidence to be given by AVL. Meribel FIR will not, without leave, have an opportunity to cross‑examine the witnesses.
I propose to grant leave to Meribel FIR to serve the subpoenas on Mr Curtis, Mr Rosenfield, and Mr Biscoe. However, leave will be conditioned on the basis that Meribel FIR will not, unless it can show exceptional circumstances, oppose any application for evidence to be given by AVL. In imposing a condition, I do not intend in any way to control the exercise of discretion of the trial judge. The trial judge may decline to permit evidence by AVL even if any application for leave to give evidence by AVL is unopposed.
Mr Webb resides in New Zealand. As I have indicated, Meribel FIR seeks leave to serve Mr Webb pursuant to s 31 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act. That section relevantly provides:
Subpoenas not to be served in New Zealand without leave
(1) If the proceeding is in an Australian court, the subpoena must not be served in New Zealand without the leave of the court…
(3) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether to give leave under subsection (1) or (2), the court must take into account:
(a) the significance of the evidence to be given, or the document or thing to be produced, by the person named; and
(b) whether the evidence, document or thing could be obtained by other means without significantly greater expense, and with less inconvenience to the person named.
(4) In giving leave, the court:
(a) must impose a condition that the subpoena not be served after a specified day; and
(b) may impose other conditions…
Mr Webb's evidence is potentially important to the issues in the proceedings. His evidence may demonstrate that Mr Ben Madsen's evidence about the purported transfer of shares from Meribel FIR or AC Invest to Mr James Madsen (in around April and May 2023) is not correct, or it may confirm Mr Ben Madsen's evidence. It may also demonstrate that Mr James Madsen was aware of the beneficial interest held by Meribel FIR or Etiene Pty Ltd in the Firmus Grid shares at the time of the purported transfer to him.
There is no apparent alternative way of securing the evidence. Once again, the possibility of evidence by AVL is a mechanism that may lessen the inconvenience to Mr Webb. Mr Webb will be entitled to appropriate conduct money, as will any person served with a subpoena.
I am satisfied that leave to issue the subpoena to Mr Webb should be given, consistently with s 31. Once again, leave will be conditional upon Meribel FIR not opposing an application for evidence to be given by AVL unless it can demonstrate exceptional circumstances.
UCPR r 33.5(1) states that a subpoena must be served personally.
In respect of all four relevant persons, Meribel FIR seeks an order pursuant to UCPR rule 10.14(3). That rule is in the following terms:
If steps have been taken, otherwise than under an order under this rule, for the purpose of bringing the document to the notice of the person concerned, the court may, by order, direct that the document be taken to have been served on that person on a date specified in the order.
Rule 10.14(4) provides:
Service in accordance with this rule is taken to constitute personal service.
[60] Despite the heading of UCPR 10.14 (“Substituted and informal service generally”), UCPR 10.14(1) and (2) provide for a substitute for service, not for service by substituted means.
[61] Construed harmoniously, UCPR 10.14(3) operates in the same way. An order under UCPR 10.14(3) operates to dispense with “service”. The Court may be willing to make such an order if it is satisfied that steps have already been taken for the purpose of bringing the document to the notice of the person concerned.
[62] In this respect, it must be remembered that service of documents is the servant, not the master. Leaving aside claims in personam where the jurisdiction of the Court does not arise other than by service on the defendant (eg Louie v Carroll (1958) 98 CLR 310; [1958] HCA 4), the purpose of service is to ensure procedural fairness by bringing to the attention of a person matters which the person needs to know in order to ensure any subsequent interference with the person’s rights does not occur without the person having an opportunity to be heard (see Independent Liquor & Gaming Authority v Melco Resorts & Entertainment Limited at [2] (Ball J)). The requirement that the person be served, and provision for the means by which that is to be achieved, serve that purpose. Service is an important servant because it allows for a measure of certainty in the process and it relieves the Court of having to enquire into the efficacy of the steps taken in the circumstances of each case. However, the ultimate objective is procedural fairness.
See also Capral Limited v DNV AS [2024] NSWSC 96 at [71]ff per Nixon J.
I accept that orders can be made under UCPR r 10.14(3) in respect of subpoenas. The effect of UCPR r 10.14(4) is that when an order is made under r 10.14(3), then service is taken to constitute personal service.
This view lies in tension with remarks by Barrett J in Nash v Stewart [2010] NSWSC 513. In that case, his Honour observed at [3]:
I am not confident that the court can, consistently with the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, make an order for substituted service in respect of a subpoena requiring a person to attend to give evidence.
At [21], his Honour observed:
…a subpoena to attend to give evidence is something that carries penal consequences in case of disobedience. Someone who does not attend can be arrested and may be punished for contempt. That, I have no doubt, is why personal service is required, and why no clear method (or, as I think is probably the case, no method at all) is provided for allowing some remoter and less secure method of notification. Penal consequences should not be triggered by any such remoter and less secure method.
Meribel FIR points out that the form of rules considered by Barrett J have been amended since his Honour's decision.
I do not accept that the Court's power under r 10.14(3) does not extend to the service of subpoenas. I accept the submission from Meribel FIR that r 10.14(4) serves to reconcile r 10.14(3) and r 33.5(1) and allows them to operate harmoniously. I do accept that an order under r 10.14(3) should not be made lightly. I do not see it as an invitation to employ insecure methods of service. What is critical is notice. I note as an aside that, in my experience, service conducted in person is not always free of controversy or necessarily secure.
The circumstances justify an order under r 10.14(3) in this case. Personal service is impractical given the timing considerations. There is no doubt that the four persons have notice of the subpoenas. In particular, they are all senior officers of Firmus Grid. Firmus Grid is a party to the proceedings. The solicitors for Firmus Grid have been corresponding with the solicitors for Meribel FIR about the subpoenas. Although HSF Kramer does not act for the individuals, the firm did not suggest that the subpoenas have not come to the attention of each of the four persons. It would be beyond credulity to think that HSF Kramer would not have stated that the recipients had not received the subpoenas if that were the case, or was possibly the case. It is likely that some or all of the four persons in question are giving HSF Kramer its instructions on behalf of Firmus Grid.
Meribel FIR also seeks an order pursuant to UCPR r 31.2 that the evidence of the four current and four former Firmus Grid officers be taken orally. That is appropriate in circumstances where none have cooperated with Meribel FIR in order for an affidavit to be prepared.
This does not foreclose an application for evidence to be given by AVL.
For those reasons, I make the following orders:
Leave be granted pursuant to s 31(1) of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth) to serve a subpoena to give evidence on Ben Webb, not to be served later than 15 June 2026.
Leave be granted pursuant to r 11.8AB of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) to serve a subpoena to give evidence on Oliver Curtis, Tim Rosenfield and Sam Biscoe.
Pursuant to r 10.14(3), the subpoenas to attend to give evidence addressed to Oliver Curtis, Timothy Rosenfield, Sam Biscoe and Ben Webb and issued on 21 May 2026 (the Subpoenas) are taken to have been served by way of emails sent to the following addresses on 21 May 2026:
(a) In respect of Oliver Curtis, oliver@firmus.co; hugh.paynter@hsfkramer.com; and henry.gallagher@hsfkramer.com. (b) In respect of Timothy Rosenfield, tim.rosenfield@smc.co; hugh.paynter@hsfkramer.com; and henry.gallagher@hsfkramer.com. (c) In respect of Sam Biscoe, sam.biscoe@firmus.co; hugh.paynter@hsfkramer.com; and henry.gallagher@hsfkramer.com. (d) In respect of Ben Webb, ben.webb@firmus.co; hugh.paynter@hsfkramer.com; and henry.gallagher@hsfkramer.com.
(a) Oliver Curtis; (b) Timothy Rosenfield; (c) Sam Biscoe; (d) Ben Webb; (e) Nicholas Curtis; (f) Michael Rosenfield; (g) Shane Hartwig; and (h) Edward Pretty.
**********
[2026] NSWSC 593
(2015) 49 VR 606
(2016) 245 FCR 340
(1958) 98 CLR 310