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………………Signed…………… Presidential Member M Hassall REASONS FOR DECISION 1. This matter involves a contested application for the appointment of both a guardian and a financial manager pursuant to the provisions of Part 2.1 of the Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (GMP Act). The applications were made by a social worker with Canberra Health Services (SW1) 1 in relation to Kayleigh, a 53-year-old woman presently facing significant physical and mental health challenges. SW1 proposed the appointment of the ACT Public Trustee and Guardian (PTG) as guardian and financial manager. Kayleigh opposed both applications, but in the alternative, in relation to 2 guardianship (only), indicated a preference for her father, Brett, to be appointed. 3 The PTG, Brett, and Kayleigh’s mother, Angela, each supported the appointment of a guardian. The PTG, Brett and Kayleigh each expressed the view that it was not necessary to appoint a financial manager at this stage.

2. Following a hearing before me on 13 March 2026, I made orders appointing Kayleigh’s father, Brett, as Kayleigh’s guardian with power, among other things, to decide where and with whom Kayleigh should live, and to give any consent required for Kayleigh to receive services under the National Disability Insurance Scheme. I declined to appoint any financial manager. I advised the parties that I would publish my reasons. These are those reasons.

Parties and written and oral evidence before the Tribunal 3. Kayleigh did not appear at the hearing but was represented by a legal practitioner, Ms Lee. Kayleigh’s parents, Brett and Angela, each attended the hearing by telephone. The PTG was represented at the hearing by Ms Fernando. Other persons who attended at the hearing included a second social worker (SW2) and Dr Amber Chambers, Staff Specialist Psychiatrist at the Adult Mental Health Rehabilitation Unit (AMHRU) at the University of Canberra Hospital. SW2 and

1 The name Kayleigh bears no resemblance to the protected person’s name and has been used for the purposes of confidentiality 2 The name Brett bears no resemblance to the name of the protected person’s father and has been used for the purposes of confidentiality 3 The name Angela bears no resemblance to the name of the protected person’s mother and has been used for the purposes of confidentiality Dr Chambers each interacted with Kayleigh during her involuntary detention and treatment at the AMHRU (discussed further below).

4. The evidence presented to the Tribunal comprised: (a) SW1’s application for the appointments of the PTG as guardian and financial manager for Kayleigh, filed with the Tribunal on 19 December 2025, and supporting statement (Written Application); (b) handwritten letters from Kayleigh dated 23 December 2025 and 28 December 2025 outlining Kayleigh’s opposition to the appointment of either a guardian or a financial manager; (c) a report of Dr Chambers dated 23 February 2026, outlining her assessment of Kayleigh’s condition at that date and expressing support for the proposed appointments of both a guardian and a financial manager; (d) information provided to the Tribunal by Ms Lee on behalf of Kayleigh; and (e) information and unsworn evidence provided to the Tribunal by each of 4 Brett and Angela (Kayleigh’s parents), SW2, and Dr Chambers.

Background

5. The material presented to the Tribunal established the following undisputed matters: (a) Kayleigh is a single, 53-year-old female Disability Support pensioner with four adult children, an adult brother, and elderly, separated parents, all of whom (except her brother) live in Queensland; (b) Kayleigh ordinarily resides in a three-bedroom ACT Public Housing property in the Canberra suburb of [omitted]. (c) Kayleigh does not own real property, a motor vehicle nor any other significant asset;

4 Consistent with ss 7, 23 and 26 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACAT Act), the Tribunal on this occasion allowed information and evidence to be presented without requiring any witness to be sworn, noting that each party was given the opportunity to ask questions of witnesses, and that no party objected to this course (d) Kayleigh’s income comprises Disability Support pension payments, which are supplemented from time to time by voluntary contributions by Kayleigh’s father, Brett (such as paying for the cost of weekly groceries); (e) Kayleigh does not presently receive any support from the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). (f) Kayleigh has been diagnosed with, and is prescribed medication for, schizophrenia; (g) In the second half of 2025, Kayleigh was involuntarily admitted to an ACT mental health facility and later made the subject of a psychiatric treatment order; at a later stage she became a voluntary patient at AMHRU; (h) Kayleigh also suffers from diabetes and circulatory problems, which resulted in the infection of, and ultimately the necessity to amputate, Kayleigh’s middle right toe during her hospital stay, leaving a wound which requires ongoing care; and (i) Kayleigh self-discharged from the AMHRU on Sunday, 8 March 2026, against medical advice, at which time she returned to her ACT Public Housing residence.

Other evidence Written application

6. SW1 referred to the following addition matters in his Written Application: (a) Kayleigh’s lack of both formal and informal supports in the community, noting that: (i) Kayleigh’s family members primarily live interstate; (ii) at the time of her admission, Kayleigh did not have a functioning mobile phone and had withdrawn from contact with family members; (iii) Kayleigh was brought to hospital by the Police, Ambulance and Clinician Early Response team; (iv) Kayleigh did not own a motor vehicle and experienced challenges accessing public transport; (b) the “uninhabitable” condition of Kayleigh’s ACT Housing residence prior to her involuntary admission to hospital, where among other things there was evidence of hoarding, rotting food, a lack of living space, a lack of functioning appliances, and a prevalent smell of cat urine; (c) Kayleigh’s lack of comprehension of the processes required to obtain additional supports, such as assistance potentially available through the NDIS; and (d) an incident where Kayleigh was unable to access her bank account and entered an incorrect PIN more than 20 times, which in SW1’s view suggested a lack of problem-solving ability and formed part of his motivation for applying for the appointment of a financial manager.

Angela (Kayleigh’s mother)

7. Angela expressed concern about Kayleigh and supported the application for appointment of a guardian, among other things so that Kayleigh can receive NDIS support. Angela did not object to Kayleigh’s father, Brett, being appointed as guardian, but was slightly concerned about how far away Brett lives (i.e., on Magnetic Island near Townsville in North Queensland; Kayleigh lives in Canberra).

Brett (Kayleigh’s father)

8. Brett provided extensive and helpful information to the Tribunal which demonstrated his care and concern for Kayleigh. Among other things, Brett advised that: (a) in the week prior to the hearing, Brett and his wife travelled from North Queensland to spend time with Kayleigh over several days, both at the AMHRU and at Kayleigh’s home in [omitted] — during this time: (i) Kayleigh self-discharged from the AMHRU against medical advice; (ii) Kayleigh told Brett that she does not believe that she is currently suffering from any mental illness; (iii) several days after Kayleigh’s discharge from hospital, Kayleigh experienced an episode of vomiting and, later, breathing problems; Brett eventually called an ambulance, but Kayleigh refused to get in it when it arrived; (iv) Kayleigh made an appointment to see her general practitioner at [omitted] on the Tuesday after the hearing regarding her physical health issues; (b) Brett doubted Kayleigh’s willingness to comply with her anti-psychotic medication regime, in particular the scheduled depot injections (the next of which was due the week after the hearing); (c) Brett was consequently concerned about a risk of a serious and quick decline in Kayleigh’s mental health and, potentially, a further medical emergency; (d) Brett was also seriously concerned about Kayleigh’s ability to treat her amputation wound; (e) in Brett’s view, Kayleigh is unlikely to advise others or seek assistance if she becomes unwell in the community; (f) Brett indicated that he and his present wife (not Kayleigh’s biological mother) travel from Magnetic Island to Canberra to spend time with Kayleigh two to three times each year, propose to continue this schedule, and in addition are willing and able to travel to Canberra, within the space of about 24 hours, in the event of any emergency associated with Kayleigh; (g) Brett recently bought Kayleigh a new mobile phone and presently speaks to Kayleigh on average once every two days by phone and also speaks to Kayleigh’s adult daughter Eileen regularly (with whom Kayleigh also regularly communicates); (h) although there are occasions where Brett and Kayleigh disagree, and she stops talking to him for several days, contact usually resumes and they are able to communicate effectively and without serious conflict; (i) Brett’s opinion was that Kayleigh’s present three-bedroom ACT Housing property was too large for her to be able to maintain; Kayleigh had told Brett that she is happy to move to an apartment; and (j) Brett indicated he is familiar with and committed to the decision-making principles contained in the GMP Act, among other things because he had previously served as a member of guardianship tribunal.

SW2

9. SW2, who interacted with Kayleigh during her stay at AMHRU, advised the Tribunal that: (a) he had been in contact with members of the [omitted] Mental Health Team about supporting Kayleigh in the community, who indicated that they had attempted but had been unable to establish communication with Kayleigh following her self-discharge from hospital; (b) he understood from communications with ACT Housing that ACT Housing was planning to end Kayleigh’s tenancy at her current property and transfer her to a different property; and (c) an application for Kayleigh to receive NDIS support had been prepared during her stay at the AMHRU but had not been finished prior to her self-discharge.

Dr Chambers

10. Dr Chambers provided a written report dated 23 February 2026 which she supplemented with unsworn oral evidence at the hearing. The effect of Dr Chambers’ evidence was as follows: (a) although Kayleigh had some residual paranoid delusions associated with her underlying illness, it was not any aspect of Kayleigh’s mental health which had warranted a longer stay in hospital. (b) Kayleigh’s self-discharge was against medical advice because of Kayleigh’s physical health conditions including type 2 diabetes and severe peripheral vascular disease; (c) Kayleigh likely has poor circulation in her brain as well, which could be affecting her cognition and causing the onset of dementia (in a recent cognitive test Kayleigh had scored 22 out of 30 which was very low for her age); (d) Kayleigh has a groin abscess which also needs treatment and a significantly painful left hip which requires investigation; (e) Kayleigh’s toe amputation wound requires ongoing care such as regular dressing changes; (f) Kayleigh’s overall physical health is deteriorating on a week-by-week basis; (g) Kayleigh has poor and likely deteriorating mobility, having at different times in the past used a walker and a wheelchair; (h) Kayleigh had expressed adamance that she would not return to hospital, and refused to talk to vascular surgeons or about end-of-life care issues; (i) Kayleigh “definitely” has impaired decision-making and “desperately needs” someone to make big decisions for her, such as deciding on appropriate accommodation arrangements (including consideration of a group house accommodation or supported independent living) as well as finalising her NDIS application; and (j) Kayleigh’s attitude towards both her mental and physical health issues was variable.

Ms Lee (on behalf of Kayleigh)

11. Ms Lee on behalf of Kayleigh relayed the following factual information to the Tribunal (the legal submissions made on behalf of Kayleigh are discussed separately below): (a) Kayeleigh’s ability to clean her ACT Housing residence was hampered by her involuntary admission to and stay in hospital; 5 (b) Kayleigh’s beloved pet cat had died whilst she was in hospital; as a result, Kayleigh was upset and in mourning; (c) since discharging herself, Kayleigh had made an appointment to visit her local general practitioner on the Tuesday after the hearing, among other things to check on the state of her amputation wound and “to get a

5 The evidence before the Tribunal indicated that Kayleigh’s cat was cared for by the RSPCA while Kayleigh was in hospital prescription for medicine she was previously on” (this appears to be a reference to oral mental health medication of some kind); (d) the reason Kayleigh had not got in the ambulance called by her father was because she had been upset at the thought of returning to hospital, where she believed she had been mistreated; (e) Kayleigh was willing to engage with the [omitted] Mental Health team but had simply asked them to call back the following week when she was more settled; and (f) Kayleigh needs time to settle back into her home, to heal and to engage with health providers at her own pace.

Legal framework for determination of guardianship and financial management applications Jurisdiction

12. The GMP Act is an “authorising law” within the meaning of section 9 of the ACAT Act. The exercise of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in relation to guardianship and financial management matters is regulated by the provisions of the ACAT Act, the GMP Act and the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Procedures Rules 2024, particularly Part 3.3.

Threshold requirements

13. The tribunal’s power to appoint a guardian is enlivened if a number of threshold requirements are met. Sections 7(1) and (2) of the GMP Act provide as follows (emphasis added): (1) This section applies if the ACAT is satisfied that— (a) someone has impaired decision-making ability in relation to a matter relating to the person’s health or welfare; and (b) while the person has the impaired decision-making ability— (i) there is, or is likely to be, a need for a decision in relation to the matter; or (ii) the person is likely to do something in relation to the matter that involves, or is likely to involve, unreasonable risk to the person’s health, welfare or property; and (c) if a guardian is not appointed— (i) the person’s needs will not be met; or (ii) the person’s interests will be significantly adversely affected. (2) In considering subsection (1)(c), the ACAT must consider— (a) if support necessary for the protected person to make, participate in and communicate their own decisions were to be provided or facilitated—if it is reasonably likely the person’s— (i) needs would be met; and (ii) interests would be adequately protected; and (b) if it is reasonably likely that the necessary support can be provided or facilitated.

14. The threshold requirements for appointment of a financial manager mirror those applicable to guardians, differing only in the following respects: (a) the person’s impaired decision-making ability must relate to “the person’s financial matters or a matter affecting the person’s property”; and (b) in relation to a matter of that kind, there must be either a need or likely need for a decision, or a likelihood of the person doing something which involves 6 unreasonable risk to their health, welfare or property.

15. A person has “impaired decision-making” within the meaning of sections 7 or 8 if the person’s decision-making ability “is impaired because of a physical, mental, psychological or intellectual condition or state, whether or not the condition or 7 state is a diagnosable illness”.

16. A person will not have impaired decision-making only because the person— (a) is eccentric; or (b) does or does not express a particular political or religious opinion; or (c) is of a particular sexual orientation or expresses a particular sexual preference; or (d) engages or has engaged in illegal or immoral conduct; or

6 GMP Act, ss 8(1), 8(2) 7 GMP Act, s 5 (e) takes or has taken drugs, including alcohol (but any effects of a drug may 8 be taken into account).

17. “A person’s interests” for the purposes of sections 7(1)(c) and 8(1)(c) includes: (a) protection of the person from physical or mental harm; (b) prevention of the physical or mental deterioration of the person; (c) the ability of the person to— (i) look after himself or herself; and (ii) live in the general community; and (iii) take part in community activities; and (iv) maintain the person’s preferred lifestyle (other than any part of the person’s preferred lifestyle that is harmful to the person); (d) promotion of the person’s financial security; (e) prevention of the wasting of the person’s financial resources or the 9 person becoming destitute. Eligibility 10

18. Either the PTG or an individual may be appointed as a person’s guardian. The PTG, an individual, or a trustee company may be appointed as a financial 11 manager. A proposed guardian and/or financial manager must consent in 12 writing. The PTG may only be appointed as guardian if there is no suitable 13 individual willing to perform that role. Where the proposed guardian and/or financial manager is an individual, that person must have provided a statutory declaration or evidence otherwise on oath to ACAT disclosing whether they have been convicted or found guilty of a relevant type of offence, refused appointment or removed from office as a guardian or manager, and whether they are bankrupt 14 or insolvent.

19. The tribunal may appoint a manager for property in the ACT of a protected person who lives outside of the ACT only if either the tribunal is satisfied that it is

8 GMP Act, s 6A 9 GMP Act, s 5A 10 GMP Act, s 9(1) 11 GMP Act, s 9(2) 12 GMP Act, s 10(1) 13 GMP Act, s 9(4) 14 GMP Act, ss 10(2), (3) impracticable for a manager for the property to be appointed in the jurisdiction where the protected person lives, or an order appointing a manager for the 15 property under the law of the other jurisdiction cannot be registered in the ACT.

Suitability considerations

20. An individual may only be appointed as guardian and/or manager if ACAT is satisfied that the person “will follow the decision-making principles and is 16 otherwise suitable for appointment”. Section 4(2) of the GMP Act sets out the “decision-making principles”: (a) the decision-maker must provide or facilitate, as far as practicable, support necessary for the protected person to understand the decision to be made, participate in decision-making and communicate their wishes; (b) the protected person’s wishes, as far as they can be worked out, must be given effect to, unless making the decision in accordance with the wishes is likely to significantly adversely affect the protected person’s interests; (c) if giving effect to the protected person’s wishes is likely to significantly adversely affect the person’s interests—the decision-maker must give effect to the protected person’s wishes as far as possible without significantly adversely affecting the protected person’s interests; (d) if the protected person’s wishes cannot be worked out or given effect to at all—the interests of the protected person must be promoted; (e) the protected person’s life (including the person’s lifestyle) must be interfered with to the smallest extent necessary; (f) the protected person must be encouraged to look after himself or herself as far as possible; (g) the protected person must be encouraged to live in the general community, and take part in community activities, as far as possible.

21. In addition, a decision-maker must consult with each carer of a protected person unless such consultation would, in the decision-maker’s opinion, adversely 17 affected the protected person’s interests.

15 GMP Act, s 8A 16 GMP Act, s 10(4) 17 GMP Act, s 4(3)

22. In making its assessment of suitability for the purposes of section 10(4), section 10(5) provides that the matters which ACAT must take into account include: (a) the views and wishes of the person (the protected person) for whom a guardian or manager is to be appointed; and (b) the desirability of preserving existing relationships with family and any other carers; and (c) whether the proposed guardian or manager is compatible with the protected person; and (d) whether the proposed guardian or manager lives in the ACT; and (e) whether the proposed guardian or manager will be available and accessible to the protected person; and (f) the nature of the functions to be exercised under the order and whether the proposed guardian or manager is competent to exercise them; and (g) whether the interests and duties of the proposed guardian or manager are likely to conflict with the protected person’s interests to the detriment of the protected person’s interests.

23. It is not to be assumed that the interests of a domestic partner or relative of a 18 protected person and those of the protected person will necessarily conflict.

Powers which may be conferred

24. The powers conferred by ACAT on a person’s guardian or manager must be those which are the least restrictive of the person’s freedom of decision and action as is 19 consistent with the purpose of the appointment.

25. Within that ambit, the powers which ACAT may confer on a guardian include those which “ACAT is satisfied are necessary or desirable to make decisions for the person in accordance with the decision-making principles”, including (but not limited to) powers: (a) to decide where, and with whom, the person is to live; (b) to decide what education or training the person is to receive;

18 GMP Act, s 10(6) 19 GMP Act, s 11 (c) to decide whether the person is to be allowed to work and, if so, the nature of the work, the place of employment and the employer; (d) to give, for the person, a consent required for a medical procedure or other treatment (including medical research or low-risk research but not including a prescribed medical procedure or medical treatment involving treatment, care or support under the Mental Health Act 2015 (the Mental Health Act); and/or 20 (e) to bring or continue legal proceedings for or in the name of the person.

26. In appointing a financial manager, ACAT may appoint a person to manage all, or a state part of, the protected person’s property “with the powers that the ACAT is satisfied are necessary or desirable to allow the manager to make decisions in relation to the property, in accordance with the decision-making principles”, being “powers that the person would have if the [protected] person were legally 21 competent to exercise powers in relation to [their] property”.

Parties’ submissions

27. The parties’ respective overall positions have been identified already. Some additional submissions, made on behalf of particular parties, addressing specific issues, warrant further mention.

Brett (Kayleigh’s father)

28. In addition to advising the Tribunal that he supported the application to appoint a guardian for Kayleigh, and was willing himself to be appointed to that role, Brett made the following submissions relevant to the applications to appoint a guardian and financial manager for Kayleigh: (a) Notwithstanding Brett’s residence in North Queensland, he submitted that he was nevertheless an appropriate person to be appointed as Kayleigh’s guardian because of his regular travel to Canberra to visit Kayleigh, his willingness to travel to Canberra at short notice, and because of his regular

20 GMP Act, s 7(4). A guardian cannot be conferred with power to vote in an election, make a will or other testamentary instrument, consent to the adoption of a child, give a consent to a marriage or civil union or a consent required for a prescribed medical procedure, or request access to, or revoke a request to access, voluntary assisted dying 21 GMP Act, ss 8(3), 8(4) phone contact with Kayleigh and other family members with whom Kayleigh also communicated. (b) Brett did not see a necessity for the appointment of a financial manager, noting that Kayleigh’s financial affairs were uncomplicated, that Kayleigh successfully managed her Disability Support pension payments (supplemented from time to time by his purchase of groceries, among other things, for Kayleigh) and was not a spendthrift nor a person with addictions.

Kayleigh

29. Ms Lee on behalf of Kayleigh, referring in part to the handwritten letters from Kayleigh to the Tribunal, made the following submissions: (a) the Tribunal should give more weight to the information and evidence presented to it at the hearing than historical material which was now out of date (and, according to Kayleigh’s letters, inaccurate and unfair); (b) Kayleigh is “not crazy” and is both able and entitled to make her own decisions about her health care arrangements, treatment, finances and accommodation; (c) Kayleigh understands the risks associated with refusing particular forms of treatment — the mere fact that others may regard her decisions as poor does not mean that she lacks decision-making capacity; (d) if the Tribunal decides that a guardian needs to be appointed, Kayleigh would prefer that person to be a family member such as her father and potentially the appointment could be only for as long as is necessary to allow NDIS support for Kayleigh to be sorted out; and (e) there is no evidence that Kayleigh has ever misused funds and overall, no need for the appointment of a financial manager.

Determination of guardianship application Threshold considerations

30. The issues which were contested by Kayleigh in the context of the guardianship application, in substance, related to whether or not the threshold requirements for enlivening the Tribunal’s power to appoint a guardian were met. The specific matters which, in my assessment, Kayleigh was contesting were: (a) whether she is a person with “impaired decision-making ability” in relation to a matter relating to her health or welfare; and (b) whether, if a guardian were not appointed, either her needs would “not be 22 met”, or her interests would be “significantly adversely affected”.

“Impaired decision-making ability”

31. In contradistinction with some other legislative provisions, the GMP Act refers to an “impairment” of decision-making ability, rather than a lack altogether of decision-making capacity. At face value, it would appear the intent is that a lesser level of disability is required to support the appointment of a guardian or financial manager under the GMP Act compared with, for example, the making of an order for involuntary psychiatric treatment pursuant to the provisions of the Mental Health Act.

32. As I have already noted, the GMP Act provides that a person has “impaired decision-making” within the meaning of sections 7 or 8 if the person’s decision-making ability “is impaired because of a physical, mental, psychological or intellectual condition or state, whether or not the condition or state is a 23 diagnosable illness”. Neither the terms “impairment” nor “decision-making ability”, however, are defined.

33. The Royal Australian College of General Practitioners “Aged Care Clinical Guide (Silver Book)” describes a patient as having “capacity” to make decisions if they are able: (a) to comprehend and retain information; and 24 (b) to weigh that information in the balance to arrive at a choice.

22 It seemed to be agreed by the parties that it was likely that decisions regarding Kayleigh’s health or welfare would need to be made in the near future, such as where she should live and finalising an application for NDIS support, meaning that s 7(1)(b) of the GMP Act was not in contest in this particular case 23 GMP Act, s 5 24 Royal Australian College of General Practitioners “Aged Care Clinical Guide (Silver Book)” – Part C: Consent and Capacity (online edition) at https://www.racgp.org.au/clinical-resources/clinical-guidelines/key-racgp-guidelines/view-all-racgp-guidelines/silver-book/silver-book-part-c/legal-issues/consent-and-capacity

34. Along similar lines, section 7 of the Mental Health Act provides (emphasis added): For this Act, a person has capacity to make a decision in relation to the person’s treatment, care or support for a mental disorder or mental illness (decision-making capacity) if the person can, with assistance if needed – (a) understand when a decision about treatment, care or support for the person needs to be made; and (b) understand the facts that relate to the decision; and (c) understand the main choices available to the person in relation to the decision; and (d) weigh up the consequences of the main choices; and (e) understand how the consequences affect the person; and (f) on the basis of paragraphs (a) to (e), make the decision; and (g) communicate the decision in whatever way the person can.

35. Although both the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners Guide and section 7 of the Mental Health Act are both dealing with decision-making “capacity” rather than “ability”, in my view these references are of at least some assistance in gleaning the likely intended meaning, in the GMP Act, of “impaired decision-making ability”. Logically, there must be an overlap between the indicia of “decision-making capacity” and those of “decision-making ability”. Conversely, there must also be an overlap between the indicia of a lack of decision-making capacity and “impairment” of decision-making ability.

36. For the purposes of the present matter (and noting the issue was not a focus of the parties’ submissions), I have proceeded on the basis that if a person, because of a physical, mental, psychological or intellectual condition or state (whether or not the condition or state is a diagnosable illness), has reduced (i.e. impaired) ability to do any of the things set out in section 7(a) to (g) of the Mental Health Act, in relation to a matter concerning their health or welfare, it is likely that that person will have “impaired decision-making ability” in relation to that matter within the meaning of the GMP Act.

37. In the present case, I was comfortably satisfied that Kayleigh has impaired decision-making ability in relation to matters concerning her health or welfare, in the sense described above. I note in particular the following matters: (a) the circumstances which led to Kayleigh’s involuntary admission to hospital and associated psychiatric treatment in 2025, including her established diagnosis of schizophrenia and need for ongoing treatment and medication for that condition (noting that at the time of the hearing her condition was stable); (b) the evidence, which I accept, that there were significant concerns about the habitability and functionality of Kayleigh’s ACT Housing residence prior to her hospital admission; (c) the fact that Kayleigh self-discharged from the AMHRU against medical advice, together with Brett’s related evidence, which I accept, that: (i) Kayleigh told Brett that she does not accept that she has any ongoing mental health condition; (ii) Kayleigh declined to accept medical assistance after an episode of vomiting and breathing difficulties in the community; (iii) at the time of the hearing, Kayleigh had postponed engagement with the [omitted] Mental Health Team; (iv) Kayleigh has a number of apparently untreated conditions including a groin abscess and significant hip pain; (d) the circulatory issues associated with Kayleigh’s diabetes progressed to the point where one of Kayleigh’s toes became so infected that it required amputation; (e) the evidence, which I accept, that prior to her hospital admission Kayleigh had lost contact with family members and other supports, and appears, at least for a period, to have been without a mobile phone; (f) Dr Chambers’ opinion that Kayleigh’s poor circulation was likely affecting her brain, potentially leading to cognition issues and the onset of dementia, and her related opinion that Kayleigh “definitely” has impaired decision-making and “desperately needs” someone to make big decisions for her; and (g) Dr Chambers’ evidence, which I accept, that Keyleigh refused to discussion her condition with vascular surgeons, refused to discuss end-of-life care issues and had at times refused blood tests.

Needs will not be met unless guardian appointed

38. By reference to the same evidence, I am also satisfied that if a guardian is not appointed, Kayleigh’s needs will not be met. As observed by Dr Chambers, Kayleigh has some “big decisions” coming up, including where she should live (it seems to be agreed by all concerned that she should not remain in her current ACT Housing three-bedroom residence) and applying for, and if possible obtaining, NDIS support. History demonstrates that Kayleigh has not been able to grapple with these matters on her own. The very significant physical and mental health challenges now facing her mean that it will likely be even more difficult for her to do so in the future. In the circumstances I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that unless a guardian is appointed Kayleigh’s interests will not be met and, to put it another way, that there will be an associated significantly adverse effect on Kayleigh’s interests.

Who should be appointed as guardian?

39. The position of each of Kayleigh, Brett and the PTG was that, if a guardian was to be appointed, the appointee should Brett rather than the PTG. Brett was eligible and had complied with the procedural requirements, including providing written consent and a statutory declaration as to the matters set out in section 10(2) of the GMP Act.

40. Nonetheless, the Tribunal needs to be satisfied that Brett is a suitable person to be appointed, having regard to the matters set out in section 10(5). The principal and perhaps only concern in this context is that Brett and his wife live on Magnetic Island in North Queensland, a ferry trip and at least two plane rides away from Kayleigh in Canberra — a matter which caused Kayleigh’s mother, Angela, some pause in relation to whether Brett was the appropriate person to be appointed as guardian.

41. After careful consideration, I was satisfied that the factors set out in section 10(5) as a whole support the conclusion that Brett is a suitable person to be appointed as guardian. In that regard I note the following matters:

(a) Kayleigh conveyed to the Tribunal that if it decided that a guardian was be appointed, she would prefer that person to be her father, Brett — a matter which must be given considerable weight; (b) I was satisfied that the appointment of Brett as Kayleigh’s guardian would facilitate the preservation of existing family relationships; (c) notwithstanding Brett’s physical distance from the ACT, I was satisfied that he was and will be sufficiently “available” and “accessible” to Kayleigh because, among other things, Brett indicated that he travels to Canberra to visit Kayleigh several times a year, is willing and able to travel to Canberra at short notice if need be, and is otherwise in regular phone contact both with Kayleigh and other relatives with whom Kayleigh regularly communicates; (d) based on the information and submissions made by Brett and by Ms Lee on behalf of Kayleigh, I was satisfied that Brett is “compatible with” Kayleigh — noting amongst other things Brett’s regular contact with Kayleigh, his evident care and concern for her, and Kayleigh’s own expressed preferences; (e) Brett advised, and I accept, that he had previously been a member of a guardianship tribunal and therefore was familiar with and committed to complying with the decision-making principles set out at section 4 of the GMP Act; and (f) I was satisfied that Brett was competent to exercise the powers which I proposed to confer on him as part of the guardianship order and also that his interests and duties were unlikely to conflict with Kayleigh’s interests to Kayleigh’s detriment (noting the effect of section 10(6) of the GMP Act).

42. It is also of course relevant that the GMP Act provides that the PTG may only be appointed as guardian if no suitable individual who consents to being appointed is available. Implicitly, there must be cogent reasons for rejecting the appointment of a family member as guardian who is both willing and preferred by the protected person.

Determination of financial management application

43. The case for appointment of a financial manager was not compelling, at least at this stage. Kayleigh’s financial affairs are not complex — she owns no major assets and her only income (aside from financial contributions from her father) is Disability Support Pension. Whilst there was some evidence of erratic behaviour whilst Kayleigh was mentally unwell, her mental health, at the time of the hearing, appeared to have stabilised and there was no evidence of significant financial mismanagement nor of conditions likely to lead to mismanagement in the future (such as illicit drug addiction).

44. Further, a guardian will have sufficient power, without the appointment of a financial manager, to facilitate Kayleigh’s obtaining of NDIS support (if she is found to be eligible) and also to negotiate and enter into a new lease on Kayleigh’s behalf (should that become necessary).

45. I gave some consideration to the question of whether financial management orders might be necessary to facilitate new automatic account deduction arrangements in connection with, for example, new rental arrangements. Ultimately, I accepted submissions made by Brett that these kinds of arrangements have been able to be sorted out with Kayleigh in the past and he was reasonably confident it would be possible to do so again, without removing Kayleigh’s power to handle her own financial affairs. This is consistent with the Tribunal taking the least restrictive approach.

Conclusion

46. For the reasons outlined above, I made an order appointing Kayleigh’s father Brett as her guardian and declined to make any order appointing a financial manager for Kayleigh at this stage.

……………………………….. Presidential Member M Hassall