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The application arose because Steward J had directed on 7 May 2024 that the Registrar refuse to issue or file the proposed writ unless a Justice first granted leave. That direction was made under r 6.07.2 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth). Mao then sought leave under r 6.07.3 (at [1]).

The proposed writ challenged the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth) and the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth). The relief identified by the Court also included a declaration concerning the “Land of Peace Charter”, damages and exemplary damages. The judgment says it was unnecessary to recount the detailed personal background set out in the proposed writ, including matters of great sadness referred to by the applicant (at [2]–[3]).

The Court placed the application against a history of related High Court proceedings. Since 2016, Mao had brought at least ten applications that were similar to, related to or overlapping with the grievance. They included applications for special leave to appeal, leave to issue or file proceedings, and leave to remove proceedings into the High Court. The Court recorded that each had been refused (at [2] and fn 2).

Edelman A-CJ concluded that the present proposed writ and supporting affidavit did not provide a basis for a rational legal argument supporting the relief. The claims were described as “manifestly hopeless”, and filing the documents would be an abuse of process. The Court additionally described the proposed documents as vexatious on their face (at [4]). The application for leave was therefore refused (at [8]).

The judgment did not make a vexatious proceedings order under s 77RN of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Instead, it warned that further vexatious applications could lead the Court, or its Chief Executive and Principal Registrar, to invite submissions and evidence on whether such an order should be made (at [7]).

Why the court decided this way

The immediate issue was whether the proposed writ should be allowed to pass the leave barrier created by the Registrar-refusal direction. The Court's answer was no, because the proposed documents did not disclose a rational legal argument capable of supporting the requested relief. The judgment's assessment is direct: the claims were “manifestly hopeless” and filing the writ and affidavit would constitute an abuse of process (at [4]).

The Court referred to Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn (2022) 276 CLR 216 at 234 [35], [37] and 246–247 [72]–[73] in support of its assessment of hopelessness and abuse of process. It also cited r 6.07.1 of the High Court Rules and Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448 at 451 [11]–[12] in relation to the treatment of vexatious material (at [4] and fns 3–4). The judgment does not set out a detailed merits analysis of each claim. Its operative conclusion is that there was no rational legal argument in the proposed writ or affidavit that could support the relief sought.

The procedural history was also material. The Court described the earlier applications as similar, related or overlapping, and recorded that they had all been refused (at [2]). That history did not merely provide background: the Court then stated that relitigation after refusal can itself be vexatious and an abuse of process (at [5]). It relied on Re Golding (2020) 94 ALJR 1014 at 1018 [11], and cited other authorities on abuse of process, including Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378, Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251 and Strickland (A Pseudonym) v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (2018) 266 CLR 325.

The Court also addressed the statutory framework for possible future action. Section 77RN of the Judiciary Act permits a vexatious proceedings order if the statutory conditions are satisfied. The judgment identifies those conditions as requiring that a person has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals and has done so “frequently” (at [6]). In considering frequency, the Court said that the quality and nature of proceedings, including their occupation of the time and resources of parties and the Court, are relevant. It cited In the matter of Jerrod James Conomy and Mbuzi v Griffith University for the statutory threshold discussion, and Quach v New South Wales Health Care Complaints Commission for the proposition that the threshold for frequency is relatively low (at [6] and fn 8).

That discussion was a warning, not an order. The Court said there was a “real prospect” that further vexatious filings could prompt an invitation for submissions and evidence about a s 77RN(2) order (at [7]). The disposition remained limited to refusing leave to file the proposed writ.

Before and after state of the law

This judgment does not purport to announce a new general rule. It applies procedural rules and principles already cited in the judgment to a particular application. The immediate legal position before the decision was that the Registrar had been directed not to issue or file the proposed writ without a Justice's leave. The relevant leave application was made under r 6.07.3, and the Court refused it (at [1], [8]).

The judgment's stated principles concern hopeless proceedings, abuse of process, vexatious relitigation and the statutory power to make vexatious proceedings orders. It treats a lack of any rational legal argument capable of supporting the relief as a basis for describing proposed proceedings as manifestly hopeless. In this case, that assessment led to the conclusion that filing the proposed documents would be an abuse of process (at [4]). The Court also states that relitigation after an application has been refused can be vexatious and an abuse of process (at [5]).

On the question of statutory frequency, the Court explains that the assessment is not simply a count of filings. The “quality” and “nature” of the vexatious proceedings matter, including the extent to which they occupy the resources of parties and the Court (at [6]). The judgment says the authorities favour a “relatively low threshold” for satisfying the frequency requirement, while still identifying both statutory conditions that must be met (at [6]).

The decision's effect is narrow. The present application was refused, and the documents were not to be issued or filed. The Court did not find, by an order under s 77RN, that Mao was prohibited from commencing proceedings. Instead, it identified the possibility that further vexatious filings could prompt the statutory process, including an invitation for submissions and evidence (at [7]). The judgment therefore should not be read as making a vexatious proceedings order or as determining the outcome of any future application under s 77RN.

The supplied judgment also does not describe any change to the law after 22 July 2024. It cites earlier authorities and applies the stated principles to the application before Edelman A-CJ. Any account of later doctrinal developments would require sources beyond this judgment.

Key passages with plain-English translation

At [1], the Court explains why leave was required: Steward J had directed that the Registrar refuse to issue or file the writ without a Justice's permission. In plain English, the applicant could not proceed by simply lodging the proposed writ; a Justice first had to decide whether it could be issued or filed.

At [2], the Court records that Mao had made at least ten related applications in the High Court since 2016, and that each was refused. This supplies the procedural history the Court considered relevant to the new application. It does not, by itself, state that every future application would be vexatious. The Court's assessment of the present documents appears separately at [4].

At [4], the Court says there was “no basis” for a rational legal argument supporting the requested relief. It then describes the claims as “manifestly hopeless” and says filing the documents would be an abuse of process. In plain English, the Court considered that the proposed claims lacked a legally supportable foundation and that allowing the documents to enter the Court's process would be improper.

Also at [4], the Court says the writ and affidavit were “vexatious on their face”. This is the Court's characterisation of the documents in this application. It is paired with the practical conclusion that they should not be issued or filed.

At [5], the Court states that relitigation after refusal can be vexatious and an abuse of process. The word “can” matters: the judgment expresses a possible characterisation, not a rule that any later proceeding raising an overlapping matter automatically has that character. The context, including the repeated applications and the content of the current documents, informed the Court's assessment.

At [6], the Court identifies the two statutory requirements for a s 77RN order: vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals, and that the proceedings have occurred frequently. It explains that frequency is informed by the quality and nature of the proceedings and their use of parties' and the Court's time and resources. In plain English, the assessment considers both the pattern of proceedings and their character and impact.

At [7], the Court warns of a “real prospect” that further vexatious filings may lead to an invitation to make submissions and provide evidence about a possible order. This is a warning of possible future consideration. It is not itself a prohibition on filing, nor does it amount to a s 77RN order.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

The decision is most directly relevant to a procedural setting where a proposed High Court writ has been subjected to a prior direction requiring judicial leave before the Registrar may issue or file it. Here, the leave requirement followed a direction by Steward J under r 6.07.2, and the applicant sought leave under r 6.07.3 (at [1]).

The judgment may also be relevant where proposed court documents appear to offer no rational legal argument capable of supporting the relief claimed. The Court linked that assessment to its conclusion that the proposed claims were manifestly hopeless and that filing would be an abuse of process (at [4]). The decision gives no detailed checklist for determining whether a legal argument is rational, and does not decide every possible case involving weak or unsuccessful claims.

A further relevant pattern is persistent relitigation after earlier applications have been refused. The judgment records at least ten related applications in the High Court, all refused, and states that relitigation following refusal can be vexatious and an abuse of process (at [2], [5]). The relationship between proceedings, the nature of the applications, and their history would need to be considered; the judgment does not say that any repeated filing is automatically vexatious.

For possible s 77RN proceedings, the decision is relevant where there is evidence that a person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals. The Court identifies the two statutory requirements and says that the quality and nature of proceedings, including the use of court and party resources, inform frequency (at [6]). Its warning shows that further filings may prompt consideration of an order, but it does not establish that the statutory conditions were finally determined in this application.

The case should not be treated as a ruling on the substantive validity of the two superannuation statutes or as a determination of the merits of every claim described in the proposed writ. The Court's stated basis for refusal was the absence of a rational legal argument supporting the relief in the documents before it (at [3]–[4]).

How later courts have treated it

The supplied judgment is dated 22 July 2024 and contains no account of later judicial treatment of this decision. It is therefore not possible, from the provided text alone, to say whether later courts have followed, distinguished, applied or otherwise considered Mao.

The judgment itself refers to earlier authorities. It cites Re Golding for the proposition that relitigation after refusal can be vexatious and an abuse of process, and notes that the principle was applied in Proietti v Proietti [2024] NSWCA 48 at [13] and [110] (at [5] and fn 5). It also cites In the matter of Jerrod James Conomy, Mbuzi v Griffith University and Quach in discussing the s 77RN frequency requirement (at [6] and fns 7–8). Those citations show the sources Edelman A-CJ relied on; they are not evidence of later treatment of the Mao judgment.

The footnote lists the applicant's earlier High Court applications, including decisions and transcripts from 2015 to 2023 (fn 2). Those are part of the procedural history rather than subsequent treatment of the 2024 decision. A reliable account of post-2024 treatment would require later judgments or other legal sources not supplied here.

Still-open questions

The decision resolves the leave application before Edelman A-CJ but leaves several matters open. First, it does not make a vexatious proceedings order under s 77RN. The Court warns that further filings may prompt an invitation to make submissions and provide evidence, but whether an order should be made would require a separate consideration of the statutory conditions (at [7]).

Second, although the Court identifies the statutory requirements of vexatious proceedings and frequency, it does not determine in this application whether the applicant had, for the purpose of s 77RN, “frequently” instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings. It discusses relevant considerations and the relatively low threshold in the cited authorities, but makes no s 77RN order (at [6]–[8]).

Third, the judgment does not set out the proposed writ and affidavit in full, or analyse each pleaded claim individually. It says a detailed recitation of background was unnecessary and gives a concise description of the claimed legislation and relief (at [3]). Its conclusion is about the materials as a whole: no rational legal argument supported the relief sought (at [4]).

Fourth, the judgment does not determine the substantive constitutional validity of the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 or the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993. It records those statutes as the legislation the applicant purported to challenge, but refuses leave on the basis stated at [4]. The decision should therefore be distinguished from a substantive constitutional judgment deciding those statutes' validity.

Finally, the supplied text does not reveal what happened after the refusal, whether any later application was made, or whether a s 77RN process was initiated. Those matters cannot be inferred from the warning in [7]. This analysis is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes, and a qualified Australian lawyer should check this before you act on it or rely on it.