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The proposed application named Registrar Burns of the Federal Court of Australia. Its requested relief, however, was directed at an earlier decision of the High Court. Ferdinands sought “[a]n order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of FERDINANDS [v] Registrar Burns [2024] HCASL 312 A19/2024 on 5 December 2024” and “[a] declaration that the decision is unlawful” ([1]). The decision he sought to challenge was Edelman and Jagot JJ's refusal of special leave to appeal.

The earlier proceedings had arisen from Federal Court Registrars' decisions not to accept documents for filing. The judgment records that the Federal Court Full Court upheld the primary judges' dismissals of Ferdinands's judicial review applications. It was satisfied that the Registrars had properly exercised their administrative powers under r 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), and that the primary judges were correct to dismiss the review applications ([5]). The High Court's subsequent refusal of special leave was based on the view that the application presented no reason to doubt the Full Court's decision and that an appeal would have no prospects of success ([3]).

Before Gordon J considered the leave application, Beech-Jones J had directed under r 6.07.2 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) that the proposed writ application could not be issued or filed without a Justice's leave ([2]). Ferdinands filed his application for leave and a supporting affidavit on 3 February 2025. Gordon J read both documents ([2]).

The order was concise: “[t]he ex parte application filed on 3 February 2025 for leave to issue or file an application for a constitutional or other writ is refused.” The reasons explain that neither the proposed application nor the affidavit disclosed a rational legal argument capable of supporting the requested relief. Gordon J considered the claims manifestly hopeless, and filing the proposed proceeding an abuse of process ([6]). She also said the proposed application was vexatious on its face and should not be issued or filed ([6]).

Why the court decided this way

The decisive assessment was of the proposed proceeding's contents. Gordon J identified the relief sought and the prior High Court decision it targeted ([1]). She then stated that she had read the application and affidavit and found neither disclosed “any rational legal argument that could support the relief sought” ([2], [6]). Her reasons do not set out a separate, detailed evaluation of each proposed ground. The stated conclusion is that the materials, taken together, did not provide a rational legal basis for the requested writ or declaration.

The procedural context mattered. The proposed writ application was not an ordinary filing that could simply proceed without scrutiny: an earlier direction under r 6.07.2 required leave first ([2]). Gordon J's assessment was therefore whether the proposed proceeding should be permitted to be issued or filed. Her description of its claims as “manifestly hopeless”, abusive and vexatious explains why she refused that permission ([6]).

The judgment also places the proposed challenge in the sequence of earlier decisions. The High Court had already refused special leave, finding no reason to doubt the Full Court's decision and no prospects of success for an appeal ([3]). The Full Court had upheld the outcomes concerning the Registrars' refusal to accept documents for filing ([5]). Gordon J records those earlier decisions as procedural and factual context. The reasons do not purport to rehear the original judicial review dispute or to reconsider the Full Court's reasoning in detail.

A separate procedural point concerns whether an oral hearing was required. Gordon J stated that a document subject to an application under r 6.07.3 of the High Court Rules is considered “on its face”. She regarded it as implicit that the application could be determined without an oral hearing, referring to Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448 at 451 [12] ([8]). The judgment thus explains that the leave application was dealt with on the filed materials, rather than after oral argument.

Before and after state of the law

This judgment applies the leave-screening process described in the High Court Rules to one proposed proceeding. Paragraph [2] records that r 6.07.2 required Ferdinands to obtain a Justice's leave before issuing or filing the proposed application. Paragraph [8] refers to r 6.07.3 and states that an application under that rule is considered on its face. The reasons also cite r 6.07.1 when identifying the basis for assessing whether the proposed application should be permitted ([6], footnote 8).

The judgment does not set out a broad new test for all applications for constitutional or other writs. It gives a direct application of the facial screening process to the specific materials before Gordon J. The operative reasoning is that these particular materials disclosed no rational legal argument, and that the proposed claims were manifestly hopeless and abusive ([6]).

The judgment also recounts the earlier use of vexatious-proceedings processes in the Federal Court. The Full Court had initiated a process under s 37AO(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), after forming a preliminary view that it might be satisfied Ferdinands had frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings. The Full Court later prohibited him from instituting proceedings in the Federal Court without leave ([7]). That order formed part of the procedural history; Gordon J's order was separately made under the High Court's leave process.

The decision's “after” position, on the material provided, is narrow: leave to file this proposed High Court proceeding was refused. The judgment does not announce a general change in the law, describe how its reasoning might apply to other applications, or provide a subsequent history of the cited rules or decisions.

Key passages with plain-English translation

At [1], Gordon J explains the mismatch between the named proposed respondent and the decision the applicant wanted to challenge. The proceeding was framed as one against a Federal Court Registrar, but the requested order would quash the High Court's refusal of special leave. In plain English, the Court identified that the practical target of the requested relief was its own earlier decision.

At [3], the judgment describes why special leave had earlier been refused: the application had presented no reason to doubt the Full Court's decision, and an appeal would have no prospects of success. This passage summarises the earlier special-leave decision; it is not a fresh determination of the original Federal Court dispute by Gordon J.

At [5], the judgment summarises the Full Court's conclusion that both Registrars acted properly under r 2.26 of the Federal Court Rules, and that the primary judges were correct to dismiss the judicial review applications. The Full Court had considered numerous grounds of appeal in detailed reasons. Gordon J's summary supplies context for the proposed challenge.

The central passage is at [6]: “Neither the application ... nor the applicant's supporting affidavit, discloses any rational legal argument that could support the relief sought.” In plain English, Gordon J found that the filed materials did not explain a legally coherent basis for granting the orders requested. She then described the claims as manifestly hopeless, and filing them as an abuse of process. The judgment presents those as the reasons for refusing leave.

At [8], Gordon J says that an application under r 6.07.3 is considered “on its face” and treats that as implying no oral hearing is needed. In plain English, the Court considered the documents themselves sufficient for deciding this leave application. The paragraph refers to Re Young at [12] for that procedural proposition.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

The decision is most directly relevant, as a description of the Court's reasoning, to an application where a person needs a Justice's leave before filing a proposed constitutional or other writ application and the proposed application and supporting evidence are assessed on their face. The important features here were that the applicant was subject to a prior leave direction, the relief targeted an earlier High Court decision, and the materials were found to disclose no rational legal argument for the relief ([1], [2], [6]).

The judgment also illustrates how a proposed proceeding may be assessed against its procedural history. Gordon J recounted the earlier Federal Court decisions, the High Court's refusal of special leave, and the Full Court's later vexatious proceedings order ([3], [5], [7]). Those events provide context, but the judgment does not say that any one of them alone determines whether leave should be refused in another case.

The decision should therefore be read at the level of what it actually decided: this proposed application, on the filed materials, was considered manifestly hopeless, abusive and vexatious. The reasons do not establish that every application challenging a refusal of special leave, or every application by a person with a vexatious proceedings order, must be rejected. The judgment does not formulate such a rule.

How later courts have treated it

The supplied judgment contains no account of later courts citing, following, distinguishing, or otherwise treating [2025] HCASJ 12. On the source available here, its later treatment cannot be stated.

The authorities mentioned in Gordon J's reasons are earlier decisions, not later treatment of this judgment. These include Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448, cited for the facial consideration and no-oral-hearing point ([8]); Ferdinands v Registrar Burns [2024] FCAFC 105, discussed as part of the procedural history ([3]–[5], [7]); Ferdinands v Registrar Burns [2024] HCASL 312, the special-leave decision that the proposed application sought to challenge ([1], [3]); and Ferdinands v Registrar Burns (Vexatious Proceedings Order) [2024] FCAFC 157, cited for the Federal Court order made on 9 December 2024 ([7]).

Those references show the sources Gordon J relied on or described. They do not establish how a later court has treated the 2025 judgment itself.

Still-open questions

The reasons are brief and confined to the leave application. They do not identify the individual grounds or arguments in the proposed application, explain each alleged defect, or set out the affidavit's contents. It is therefore not possible, from this judgment alone, to reconstruct the proposed arguments in detail or to identify precisely which parts Gordon J considered legally deficient.

The judgment does not give an extended account of how r 6.07.1, r 6.07.2 and r 6.07.3 interact beyond the propositions stated in [2], [6] and [8]. Nor does it elaborate on the precise threshold represented by “manifestly hopeless” in this setting. Its conclusion is grounded in its assessment of this application and affidavit, rather than a lengthy general exposition.

The judgment also does not address the merits of the underlying allegations that Ferdinands had made in earlier proceedings. It reports the Full Court's description of those proceedings and the results of the Registrar-related judicial review applications ([4]–[5]), but Gordon J's task was the leave application before her.

Finally, no later treatment is included in the material supplied. Whether subsequent courts have applied or limited this decision is not answered by this judgment. This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes, and a qualified Australian lawyer should check this analysis before you act on it or rely on it.