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The procedural history began with a direction made by Beech-Jones J on 24 December 2024. Under r 6.07.2 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), the Registrar was directed to refuse to issue or file Ms Scott’s proposed application unless leave of a Justice was first obtained ([1]). Ms Scott therefore applied for leave under r 6.07.3 ([1]).

In her supporting affidavit, Ms Scott sought an oral hearing to address the reasons for the r 6.07.2 direction. Alternatively, she sought notice of the specific reasons and an opportunity to make submissions before the leave application was determined on the papers, invoking procedural fairness ([2]). The judgment records that she had already included a brief statement of her argument in the proposed application, and that she could make submissions in support of leave in the affidavit accompanying her application ([3]).

The proposed application named the Federal Court of Australia, O’Sullivan J, McElwaine J and Nimlaw Pty Ltd as proposed defendants ([4]). It sought several forms of relief. These included declarations and an injunction relating to a claim under s 23 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), including an extension of time under the Limitations of Actions Act 1936 (SA); certiorari concerning judgments of O’Sullivan J and McElwaine J; and declarations and an injunction concerning access to specified investigation records ([4]).

Edelman J described the proposed application’s allegations as confused and prolix. They included generalised allegations about prejudgment and judicial independence, fraud in obtaining judgments, and allegations made in other courts concerning tyranny, oppression, corruption, maladministration and conspiracy ([5]). The supporting affidavit and exhibits totalled nearly 500 pages and were described as extremely difficult to follow ([5]).

The Court concluded that the proposed application attempted to invoke its original jurisdiction on a basis that was, on its face, confused or manifestly untenable. It characterised the proposed application as both an abuse of process and vexatious, and refused leave ([5]-[6], [9]). The judgment also referred to earlier proceedings brought by Ms Scott and noted the Court’s power to make a vexatious proceedings order, but made no such order in this decision ([7]-[8]).

Why the court decided this way

The reasons address two connected matters: the procedure for the leave application, and the character of the proposed writ application.

On procedure, Edelman J said that a direction under r 6.07.2 is based on an assessment of the proposed application documents “on their face” ([3]). The judgment states that such a direction does not require additional submissions, an oral hearing, or reasons to be given to the affected person ([3]). The explanation is that the direction is a preliminary assessment of the proposed documents, rather than a final determination following an oral hearing.

The judgment separately explains how an applicant can put forward a case for leave under r 6.07.3. Submissions can be included in a supporting affidavit. The application for leave is also determined without an oral hearing: Edelman J adopted the reasoning that it is implicit in the requirement for consideration “on its face” that the application be decided without one ([3], citing Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448 at 451 [12]; 376 ALR 567 at 570). On the facts recorded, Ms Scott had an opportunity to state her argument in the proposed application and filed an affidavit in support of leave ([2]-[3]).

On the substance of the proposed application, the Court considered the relief sought and the way the allegations were presented. The judgment does not decide the underlying South Australian claim, the correctness of the Federal Court judgments, or the merits of any claimed access to records. Its focus is whether the proposed application, in its presented form, should be permitted to enter the High Court’s process.

Edelman J described the application as “confused or manifestly untenable” on its face ([5]). The length and difficulty of the supporting affidavit and exhibits were relevant to the Court’s account of how the application was presented, as were the broad and confused allegations described in the reasons ([5]). The Court then characterised the application as an abuse of process and vexatious ([6]).

For the vexatious characterisation, the judgment states that an application may be frivolous or vexatious where the manner of presentation, or the inappropriate nature of the court to which it is brought, means the court’s jurisdiction has not properly been invoked ([6], citing Varcoe [2022] HCATrans 125 at 3-4 and Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn (2022) 276 CLR 216 at 245-247 [70]-[73]). Applying that approach, the Court found that leave should be refused ([6]).

Before and after state of the law

The judgment does not purport to announce a broad change in the law. It applies the High Court Rules and principles stated in authorities already cited in the reasons. Its most direct procedural explanation concerns how the rules operate at the initial screening and leave stages.

As explained in the decision, r 6.07.2 permits a direction to the Registrar to refuse to issue or file a proposed application unless leave is obtained. The reasons describe the direction as resting on the face of the proposed application documents. They say that neither reasons nor a further opportunity to make submissions or attend an oral hearing is required at that stage ([3]).

The next stage, where leave is sought under r 6.07.3, likewise proceeds on the documents. The applicant may put submissions in a supporting affidavit, but an oral hearing is not required ([3]). The judgment relies on Re Young for that “on its face” approach, including the proposition that the requirement implies determination without an oral hearing ([3], citing Re Young at [12]).

As to abusive or vexatious proceedings, Edelman J cited Re Young for the conclusion that the proposed application was an abuse of process ([6]). The reasons also cite Varcoe and Citta Hobart for the formulation concerning the manner in which issues are presented or the appropriateness of the court in which they are presented ([6]). The decision applies those propositions to the specific application before it.

The judgment therefore records the application of existing procedural and abuse-of-process principles to a particular proposed proceeding. It does not state that the rules were amended, establish a new general test, or determine the validity of the underlying claims Ms Scott sought to raise. Its effect, as described in the reasons, is to refuse this application for leave.

Key passages with plain-English translation

At [3], Edelman J states that a r 6.07.2 direction “does not require any further opportunity to be afforded for more submissions or for an oral hearing”. In plain English, the preliminary direction to the Registrar can be made by examining the filed documents, without first hearing further argument from the person seeking to file them.

Also at [3], the judgment says that submissions supporting an application for leave can be made in an affidavit, and that the leave application is determined without an oral hearing. The practical meaning of the passage is confined to the procedure described under rr 6.07.2 and 6.07.3: the applicant can put written material before the Justice, but the reasons do not treat an oral hearing as a required part of that process.

At [5], the Court says the proposed application sought to invoke the High Court’s original jurisdiction on a basis that was “confused or manifestly untenable”. In ordinary language, the Court considered that the legal and factual basis presented in the documents was not sufficiently coherent or tenable on its face to justify allowing the proposed proceeding to be filed.

At [6], the Court states that the proposed application was an “abuse of process” and “also vexatious”. The reasons link that conclusion to the way the application presented its issues and to whether the Court’s jurisdiction had been properly invoked. This is a conclusion about the proposed application as presented, rather than a determination of every allegation or underlying dispute described in it.

At [8], the Court records that it can make a vexatious proceedings order on its own initiative under s 77RN of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). It adds that repeated vexatious proceedings, including abuses of the Court’s processes, can be relevant to such an order. The final sentence, “At present, nothing further needs to be said about this issue”, makes clear that the Court did not make or determine such an order in this decision.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

The decision is most directly relevant to the procedural situation it describes: a proposed application for a constitutional or other writ has been made subject to a r 6.07.2 direction, and the applicant then seeks leave under r 6.07.3. In that setting, the reasons state that the proposed documents are assessed on their face and that neither the preliminary direction nor the leave application requires an oral hearing ([3]).

It is also relevant where a proposed proceeding’s presentation is itself in issue. The Court connected the assessment of abuse or vexatiousness to the manner in which issues are presented and to whether the court is an appropriate forum for them ([6]). The facts that informed the Court’s assessment here included the numerous forms of relief sought, the confused and prolix allegations, and the difficulty of following nearly 500 pages of affidavit material and exhibits ([4]-[5]).

The decision also addresses the relevance of repeat filings. It records prior directions and leave decisions concerning Ms Scott, and states that repeated vexatious proceedings can be a reason for a vexatious proceedings order under s 77RN ([7]-[8]). It does not, however, establish that any repeated filing automatically results in such an order. The Court expressly left that issue without further consideration in this matter ([8]).

The judgment should not be read from its text as resolving the substantive merits of the types of relief Ms Scott proposed. It does not adjudicate the South Australian claim, the challenged Federal Court judgments, or the requested investigation records. Its operative decision is procedural: leave to issue or file the proposed writ application was refused ([9]).

How later courts have treated it

The judgment itself contains no references to decisions made after 24 February 2025. On the material provided, it is therefore not possible to describe how later courts have treated Scott [2025] HCASJ 11. No post-decision applications of, distinctions from, or criticisms of this judgment appear in its text.

The decision does refer to earlier authorities and proceedings. It relies on Re Young (2020) for the proposition that an application required to be considered “on its face” is determined without an oral hearing, and cites that case in relation to abuse of process ([3], [6]). It also cites Varcoe [2022] HCATrans 125 and Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn (2022) 276 CLR 216 for the stated approach to when the manner of presentation or the appropriateness of the court means jurisdiction has not properly been invoked ([6]).

The reasons also describe Ms Scott’s earlier High Court proceedings. Gordon J made a r 6.07.2 direction on 24 April 2024; Jagot J refused leave on 14 June 2024; and Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ refused leave to appeal on 5 September 2024 because such an appeal would have no prospects of success ([7], citing [2024] HCASJ 23 and [2024] HCASL 216). These are prior procedural events, not later treatment of the 2025 decision.

Still-open questions

The decision leaves the substantive disputes underlying the proposed application undecided. It does not determine whether Ms Scott could establish a claim under the South Australian legislation identified in the proposed relief, whether any extension of time was available, or whether the Federal Court judgments should be set aside. Nor does it decide whether the requested investigation records could be obtained ([4]-[6]).

The Court did not make a vexatious proceedings order. Although it noted the power under s 77RN of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), and the possible relevance of repeated vexatious proceedings or abuses of process, it said that nothing further needed to be said “at present” ([8]). The decision therefore does not resolve whether an order would be made in a later proceeding or what particular terms such an order might have.

The reasons also do not provide a detailed account of every document in the nearly 500-page affidavit and exhibit bundle. They describe the material as extremely difficult to follow and identify broad categories of allegations, but do not analyse each allegation individually ([5]). The holding is correspondingly tied to the application as presented and assessed on its face.

Finally, the judgment explains the procedural requirements it applied, but does not examine possible exceptions or address every circumstance in which a hearing might be required in other kinds of High Court proceedings. Its stated conclusions concern the rules and applications before Edelman J in this matter ([1]-[3], [9]).

This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.