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austlii:cth/HCASJ/2025/14
procedural. The application dated 21 February 2025 for leave to issue or file an application for a constitutional or other writ was dismissed without an oral hearing under r 13.03.1 of the High Court Rules...
The High Court Rules allowed a Justice to require Mr Groom to obtain leave before filing his proposed writ application. Steward J found that the Registry followed that procedure, and that the proposed application had no arguable basis for its requested orders and sought to invoke the Court's jurisdiction in a confused or manifestly untenable way. Leave was refused and the application was dismissed without an oral hearing.
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2,244 words · generated 03/10/2026
Steward J dealt with an application by Stephen Groom for leave to issue or file a proposed application for a constitutional or other writ. The proposed writ application was dated 17 February 2025, and the leave application was dated 21 February 2025. The Court's order was that the leave application be dismissed. The reasons explain that the proposed document had first been referred to a Justice under the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), and that a direction had been made preventing its issue or filing unless leave was obtained: [6]–[7].
3 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The proposed application concerned Mr Groom's challenge to an intervention order made against him in South Australia. The judgment records that the order was originally made on 19 October 2011 as a domestic violence restraining order under the Domestic Violence Act 1994 (SA). It was later deemed to be an intervention order under the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA): [2]. Mr Groom's application to revoke it was dismissed by the Magistrates Court on 30 November 2016. A single judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia upheld that order on 23 February 2017, and the Court of Appeal delivered judgment on 7 December 2017: [2].
Mr Groom's later special leave application challenged the validity of the intervention order. The judgment says that the High Court refused that application on 6 March 2025: [3]. In the proposed writ application, Mr Groom alleged that there was no originating complaint, and no certificate of service, in the original proceeding. He also questioned whether the Justices had been made aware of what he described as the jurisdictional defect: [4]. He sought mandamus requiring the Chief Executive and Principal Registrar to refer the alleged defects to the Justices, a declaration concerning the Registry's alleged failure to do so, a stay of the special leave application, and further orders: [5].
The leave application relied on Mr Groom's affidavit of 20 February 2025. He argued, among other things, that the leave requirement had not initially been raised and was not expressly required by a statutory provision or High Court Rule. He also asserted procedural unfairness and delay, and characterised the issues as raising matters of public importance: [8]. Steward J rejected the procedural-fairness argument and concluded that the proposed writ application disclosed no arguable basis for the relief sought: [9], [11].
There is an apparent chronology inconsistency in the judgment's text. Paragraph 1 says that the special leave application was filed on 11 December 2025, but paragraph 3 says it was refused on 6 March 2025, before this judgment of 17 March 2025. The judgment does not resolve that inconsistency. It is therefore best treated as an apparent textual error, rather than silently corrected or relied on.
The decision turned on the interaction of rr 6.07.1, 6.07.2 and 6.07.3 of the High Court Rules. Rule 6.07.1 allows a Registrar, where a document appears on its face to be an abuse of process, frivolous or vexatious, or outside the Court's jurisdiction, to seek a Justice's direction. Rule 6.07.2 allows the Justice to direct the Registrar not to issue or file the document unless the party first obtains a Justice's leave: [9]. After Gordon J made such a direction on 18 February 2025, Mr Groom applied for leave under r 6.07.3: [6]–[7].
Steward J first addressed Mr Groom's argument that he had not been told about the requirement for leave. The judgment states that there was no merit in the contention that this caused procedural unfairness or undue delay. The Registry's referral to Gordon J and her Honour's direction were “plainly in accordance with the process provided for by the Rules”: [9]. The point was not that the applicant's concern had been ignored. Rather, the Court held that the applicable Rules authorised the referral and the resulting direction.
The Court then considered the merits of granting leave. At [10], Steward J set out the ordinary grounds for refusing leave: the proposed document appears on its face to be an abuse of process, frivolous or vexatious, or outside the Court's jurisdiction. The reasons cite Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448; 376 ALR 567 for both the meaning of abuse of process and the caution that refusal of leave is appropriate “only in the clearest of cases”. Re Young is the source identified by the judgment for the proposition that abuse of process can include attempting to invoke the High Court's original or appellate jurisdiction on a confused or manifestly untenable basis: [10].
Applying that approach, Steward J found that the proposed writ application sought to invoke the Court's jurisdiction on a “confused or manifestly untenable” basis: [11]. The reasons do not separately analyse each requested order. Instead, they give the broader conclusion that neither the proposed application nor its supporting affidavit disclosed an arguable basis for the relief sought. The claims would amount to an abuse of process if the document were filed: [11]. The consequence was that leave had to be refused and the application dismissed: [12].
The result is procedural in form, but it rested on a substantive assessment of the proposed document's apparent basis. The Court did not determine the underlying validity of the South Australian intervention order in this leave decision. The special leave application had already been refused, and the proceeding before Steward J concerned permission to file a further document.
The judgment does not purport to establish a new rule about the validity of South Australian intervention orders. Its stated legal framework is the existing filing-control process in rr 6.07.1–6.07.3 of the High Court Rules: [9]–[10]. It explains how that process operated in this case and applies the abuse-of-process principles drawn from Re Young.
On the text provided, the relevant position before this decision was that a Registrar could refer a document raising the specified concerns to a Justice; the Justice could direct that it not be issued or filed without leave; and a party could then seek that leave. The Court described the ordinary grounds for refusing leave and the “clearest of cases” standard at [10]. The decision does not identify a prior uncertainty about those Rules, nor does it state that it changes their meaning.
After this decision, the immediate procedural result was that Mr Groom's proposed writ application was not permitted to be filed and his application for leave was dismissed under r 13.03.1 without an oral hearing: [12]. The judgment's reasoning confirms, in this particular application, that a proposed filing may be refused where it discloses no arguable basis for the relief and its attempt to invoke the Court's jurisdiction is confused or manifestly untenable: [11].
The judgment provides no basis for claiming that it changed the law beyond this application. Nor does it determine any general rule about when a Registry must bring an alleged jurisdictional defect to the attention of Justices. It holds that the referral and direction in this matter followed the Rules: [9]. That is a narrower conclusion than a general statement about all Registry processes or all applications alleging jurisdictional error.
At [9], Steward J says that the Registry's referral to Gordon J, and her Honour's direction that the document not be issued or filed without leave, were “plainly in accordance with the process provided for by the Rules”. In plain English, the Court considered that the Registry used the procedure the Rules authorised. It rejected Mr Groom's claim that not being told earlier about leave made that process unfair or caused undue delay.
At [10], the judgment explains that the relevant discretion will ordinarily be exercised where a proposed document appears on its face to be abusive, frivolous or vexatious, or outside jurisdiction. “On its face” focuses the inquiry on what the document itself appears to show. The Court also stresses that refusing leave is appropriate “only in the clearest of cases”. This expresses caution against treating the filing restriction as routine.
The same paragraph explains that abuse of process is not limited to closed categories. It can include an attempt to invoke the High Court's jurisdiction on a basis that is confused or manifestly untenable. That proposition is attributed to Re Young. The practical point in this judgment is that a proposed document can be refused where the way it invokes the Court's jurisdiction is untenable, even if the applicant describes the issue as one of public importance.
At [11], Steward J states that the proposed application and affidavit did not disclose an arguable basis for the relief sought. In plain English, the materials submitted to support leave did not show a legally arguable foundation for the orders requested. The Court then concluded that filing the proposed document would be an abuse of process.
At [12], the Court records the formal result: the leave application was dismissed without an oral hearing under r 13.03.1. This was not an order deciding the underlying intervention-order dispute afresh. It disposed of the application for permission to file the proposed writ application.
The judgment is most directly relevant to a procedural situation where a proposed document in the High Court has been referred to a Justice because it appears on its face to be abusive, frivolous or vexatious, or outside the Court's jurisdiction. A direction has then been made under r 6.07.2 requiring leave before the document can be issued or filed, and the applicant seeks leave under r 6.07.3: [6]–[10].
It is also relevant where the proposed document seeks to use the High Court's original or appellate jurisdiction on a basis that may be characterised as confused or manifestly untenable. The judgment adopts that description from Re Young and applies it to the proposed writ application before it: [10]–[11]. The specific allegations here concerned an asserted absence of an originating complaint or certificate of service, and alleged Registry failures in dealing with the applicant's special leave matter: [4]–[5].
The decision should not be read as saying that any allegation of a missing originating document or service certificate is necessarily abusive. The reasons do not examine those alleged defects in the underlying South Australian proceeding on their merits. The holding is about the proposed High Court filing and whether it disclosed an arguable basis for the particular relief sought: [11]. Whether a different filing presents a clear case for refusal would depend on its own face and circumstances, applying the Rules and the cited standard.
The judgment supplied for analysis contains no later judicial decisions discussing or applying [2025] HCASJ 14. Its own references to other cases are to earlier decisions: Groom v Police [2017] SASCFC 161, [2017] SASC 21, Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448; 376 ALR 567, and Groom v Police [2025] HCADisp 17. The first two appear as part of the procedural history of the intervention-order matter, Re Young is cited for the filing-leave and abuse-of-process principles, and the 2025 HCADisp decision is identified as the refusal of the special leave application: [2]–[3], [10].
Accordingly, no conclusion about subsequent treatment can be drawn from this judgment alone. The available text does show that Steward J used Re Young as the source of the applicable approach and applied that approach to the proposed document: [10]–[11]. It does not show whether later courts have followed, distinguished, or limited the reasoning in Groom's leave decision. Any account of later treatment would require additional legal sources, which are not included in the judgment text provided here.
The judgment does not decide whether the intervention order was valid, whether an originating complaint or certificate of service existed, or what legal consequence any absence of those documents might have had in the South Australian proceedings. Those matters are described as Mr Groom's allegations, not findings made by Steward J: [4]. The special leave application challenging the intervention order had been refused on 6 March 2025, but the reasons for that refusal are not set out in this judgment: [3].
The reasons also do not examine each form of relief sought in detail. The proposed application requested mandamus, a declaration, a stay and further orders: [5]. Steward J's conclusion was that the proposed application and affidavit, considered together, disclosed no arguable basis for relief and would be an abuse of process if filed: [11]. The decision therefore gives no separate analysis of the legal requirements for each remedy.
The judgment does not provide a general account of how an applicant must be notified of a direction requiring leave, beyond rejecting the fairness and delay arguments on the facts of this Registry referral: [9]. Nor does it explain what circumstances would fall short of the “clearest of cases” threshold. Its operative analysis applies that threshold to the document before it, rather than defining a comprehensive test: [10]–[11].
Finally, the apparent filing-date inconsistency at [1] and [3] remains unresolved in the text. Paragraph 1 gives 11 December 2025 as the filing date of the special leave application, while paragraph 3 records its refusal on 6 March 2025. This is internally inconsistent with the judgment date of 17 March 2025. The reasons provide no correction, so an analyst should flag rather than repair it.
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Source: the High Court of Australia (www.hcourt.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
STEWARD J
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY STEPHEN GROOM FOR LEAVE TO ISSUE OR FILE
[2025] HCASJ 14
Date of Judgment: 17 March 2025
A5 of 2025
ORDER
1. The application dated 21 February 2025 for leave to issue or file an application for a constitutional or other writ be dismissed.
Representation
The applicant is unrepresented
By his application for special leave to appeal, Mr Groom sought leave to appeal from part of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of South Australia handed down on 7 December 2017.1 For present purposes, the factual and procedural history of that decision need not be set out, save that it in part concerned an application for permission to appeal from a decision of a single judge of the Supreme Court of South Australia of 23 February 2017,2 upholding an order in the Magistrates Court of 30 November 2016, dismissing Mr Groom's application to revoke an intervention order made against Mr Groom. That intervention order was originally made on 19 October 2011 in the form of a domestic violence restraining order under the Domestic Violence Act 1994 (SA), which was then deemed to be an intervention order under Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) ("the IO Act"), when cl 37(1) of Sch 1 of the IO Act came into effect.
Mr Groom's application for special leave to appeal challenged the validity of the intervention order. That application for special leave to appeal was refused by this Court on 6 March 2025.3
The grounds for the proposed application raised by Mr Groom include, inter alia: that the Registry has a duty "to ensure that matters raising fundamental jurisdictional defects are brought before the Justices for urgent consideration"; that the Registry has "failed to acknowledge or act upon the lack of an originating complaint" in relation to the intervention order; and that while the Registry had confirmed that the special leave application had been referred to the Court, "no evidence has been provided that the Justices have been made aware of the jurisdictional defect at the heart of the case". According to Mr Groom, the "jurisdictional defect at the heart of the case" is that the originating proceeding concerning the intervention order "lacks an originating complaint, or any certificate of service making all subsequent proceedings void".
Mr Groom seeks relief in the form of: a writ of mandamus compelling the Chief Executive and Principal Registrar of the High Court of Australia to immediately refer to the Justices of the High Court the "fundamental jurisdictional defects" in the originating proceeding and the failure of the respondents in the special leave application to file a defence; a declaration that the failure to so refer constitutes a failure of duty by the Registry; an order staying the special leave application until the jurisdictional defect is determined; and any further orders the Court deems necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice.
On 18 February 2025, Gordon J directed the Registrar pursuant to r 6.07.2 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) ("the Rules") to refuse to issue or file the application for a constitutional or other writ without the leave of a Justice of the Court first had and obtained.
Mr Groom now applies for leave, pursuant to r 6.07.3 of the Rules, to issue or file his proposed application for a constitutional or other writ.
Mr Groom relies in this application on an affidavit sworn by him on 20 February 2025. In that affidavit, he asserts that "[t]he requirement for leave was not initially raised when my application was first submitted, nor is it explicitly mandated under any statutory provision or High Court Rule." He further states that failure to inform him of the requirement for leave has resulted in a denial of procedural fairness and undue delay in having the matter considered, and that "there is no clear legislative or regulatory provision requiring leave to be obtained in these circumstances". Mr Groom also puts forward a number of additional reasons why leave should be granted, including that his application "raises significant constitutional and legal questions concerning the administration of justice and the rule of law", as well as issues of public importance, and that to date, "no valid complaint, certificate of service, or grounds" for the intervention order issued against Mr Groom have been provided.
Rule 6.07.1 of the Rules provides that if an application appears to a Registrar on its face to be an abuse of the process of the Court, to be frivolous or vexatious or to fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court, the Registrar may seek the direction of a Justice. Rule 6.07.2 provides that the Justice may direct the Registrar to refuse to issue or file the document, without the leave of a Justice first had and obtained by the party seeking to issue or file the document. There is no merit to Mr Groom's contention that a failure to inform him of the requirement for leave has resulted in a denial of procedural fairness and undue delay, nor in his contention that the Rules do not require leave to be obtained in these circumstances. The Registry's referral to Gordon J of the application for a constitutional or other writ, and her Honour's subsequent direction to the Registrar to refuse to issue or file that application, was plainly in accordance with the process provided for by the Rules.
As for the other matters raised by Mr Groom, the discretion to refuse leave in the present application for leave to issue or file under r 6.07.3 of the Rules will ordinarily be exercised where the document appears "on its face" to be "an abuse of the process of the Court, to be frivolous or vexatious or to fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court".4 The concept of abuse of process, which cannot be confined within closed categories, encompasses "an attempt to invoke the original or appellate jurisdiction of the High Court on a basis that is confused or manifestly untenable".5 Exercise of the discretion to refuse leave to issue or file a document is appropriate "only in the clearest of cases".6
It is plain on the face of the proposed application for a constitutional or other writ that Mr Groom seeks to invoke this Court's jurisdiction on a basis that is "confused or manifestly untenable". Neither the proposed application for a constitutional or other writ, nor the affidavit filed in support of the application for leave to issue or file, disclose an arguable basis for the relief sought. The claims described in the proposed application for a constitutional or other writ would be an abuse of process if the document was filed, and accordingly, should not be filed.
It follows that Mr Groom's application for leave to issue or file must be rejected. I direct that the application dated 21 February 2025 for leave to issue or file an application for a constitutional or other writ be dismissed without an oral hearing pursuant to r 13.03.1 of the Rules.
Groom v Police [2017] SASCFC 161. ↩
[2017] SASC 21. ↩
Groom v Police [2025] HCADisp 17. ↩
Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448 at 451 [10]-[11] per Gageler J; 376 ALR 567 at 570; see also the Rules, r 6.07.1. ↩
Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448 at 451 [13] per Gageler J; 376 ALR 567 at 570. ↩
Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448 at 451 [13] per Gageler J; 376 ALR 567 at 570. ↩
(2020) 94 ALJR 448
The application dated 21 February 2025 for leave to issue or file an application for a constitutional or other writ was dismissed without an oral hearing under r 13.03.1 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth): [12].