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Cited legislation

3 cited instruments linked from this judgment.

The proposed application was dated 3 October 2023. It sought, among other things, to set aside court orders on the stated ground of “fraud perjury and abuse which caused miscarriage of justice” [3]. The application did not identify which court or which orders were being challenged. Having considered the proposed application and supporting material, Steward J said it appeared the applicants were seeking to set aside orders of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, although the terms of those orders remained unclear [4].

The proposed relief extended beyond setting aside orders. It included requests concerning the first applicant’s claimed inheritance rights in her deceased father’s estate, the return of assets by family members and a former solicitor, removal of alleged “fraudulent lies perjury” from court files, and an extension of time [5]. The underlying New South Wales proceedings involved, among other matters, administration of the estate of Ronald Robinson, transactions by the first applicant’s late mother, and family-provision claims under the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) [6].

The applicants alleged fraud, perjury, unconscionable conduct, undue influence and abuse involving family members, a solicitor and former legal representatives. The proposed defendants included five named Supreme Court Justices and the Court of Appeal, described by the applicants as “the people who allowed the fraud, perjury and abuse” [7]. The judgment reports those as allegations; it does not make findings that the alleged conduct occurred.

A procedural step had already restricted filing. On 30 October 2023, Jagot J directed the Registrar under r 6.07.2 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) to refuse to issue or file the proposed application unless a Justice first granted leave [1]. The applicants then sought that leave. Steward J considered the application on its face and refused it without an oral hearing [12].

Why the court decided this way

The governing approach was drawn from Re Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448, as quoted at [9]. Under the rules described there, a Registrar may seek a direction where a document appears on its face to be an abuse of process, frivolous or vexatious, or outside the Court’s jurisdiction. The leave discretion under r 6.07.3 is exercised by reference to those same criteria.

The quoted principles explain that abuse of process cannot be confined to fixed categories. It includes an attempt to invoke the High Court’s original or appellate jurisdiction on a basis that is “confused or manifestly untenable” [9]. At the same time, the judgment stresses that stopping a proceeding before it begins is appropriate only in “the clearest of cases” [9]. The threshold is therefore not expressed as a general licence to reject difficult or imperfect documents. The inquiry is whether the document, on its face, falls within the specified grounds.

Steward J identified several features of this proposed application. First, its central request to set aside orders did not say which court or orders were involved. The supporting material allowed a likely identification of the Court of Appeal decision, but the orders remained unclear [3]–[4]. Second, the application sought an extensive range of relief concerning an estate, individuals’ assets, court files and time limits [5]. Third, Steward J concluded that the proposed materials did not disclose a cause of action against the named defendants [10].

The earlier proceedings mattered to the abuse-of-process analysis. The first applicant had brought a special leave application in 2020 concerning a Court of Appeal decision which dismissed her appeal from orders approving releases under s 95 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) in respect of further family-provision claims. The High Court dismissed that special leave application on 29 April 2020 [11]. Steward J considered that the present proposed application appeared substantially to concern the same facts and circumstances that had been before the Court of Appeal [11].

The judgment stated two related propositions about relitigation. It will generally be an abuse to begin an original-jurisdiction High Court proceeding where the nature of the matter is amenable to appeal. The same is true where an application is, in substance, an attempt to relitigate issues after the appeal process has concluded without further reason [11]. Applying those propositions, Steward J characterised this proposed proceeding as an abuse of process [12].

The result followed from that characterisation. Steward J was satisfied it was appropriate to refuse leave, and did so without an oral hearing [12]. The reasons do not determine whether any of the applicants’ factual allegations were true. The decision concerns whether this proposed document should be permitted to be issued or filed under the High Court Rules.

Before and after state of the law

The judgment does not purport to announce a new general test. It applies the filing and leave procedure in rr 6.07.1–6.07.3 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), using the principles stated in Re Young [9]. The legal framework described in the judgment therefore existed before this application: a document may be screened where it appears on its face to be abusive, frivolous or vexatious, or outside jurisdiction, and a Justice considering leave applies the same criteria.

The decision’s contribution is its application of those principles to a proposed proceeding that appeared unclear as to the orders challenged, did not disclose a cause of action against the proposed defendants, and substantially revisited matters considered in earlier litigation [10]–[12]. It illustrates how the abuse-of-process principle may operate where an applicant seeks to use original jurisdiction after an appeal process has concluded. The judgment frames that proposition cautiously: such a proceeding will “generally” be an abuse where the matter is amenable to appeal, or where it is an attempt to relitigate without further reason [11].

The judgment does not set out a comprehensive account of the limits of the High Court’s original jurisdiction, nor does it decide a substantive dispute about the estate. It also does not establish a categorical rule that every attempt to revisit earlier litigation is abusive. Its stated reasoning depends on the apparent substantial overlap with the earlier proceedings and the absence of a further reason identified in the proposed application [11].

The decision also reiterates that an application under r 6.07.3 can be determined without an oral hearing. The quoted passage from Re Young explains that the document is assessed “on its face”, and that no separate direction is needed to determine such an application without listing it for hearing [9]. Steward J used that process here [12].

Key passages with plain-English translation

At [9], the judgment states that “the discretion to refuse leave” is exercised by reference to the criteria governing the Registrar’s action under r 6.07.1. In plain English, the leave application is not an unrestricted reconsideration of whether the proposed case might be worth hearing. The Justice examines whether the document appears to fall within the rule’s stated grounds.

Also at [9], abuse of process is described as including an attempt to invoke the High Court’s jurisdiction on a “confused or manifestly untenable” basis. This does not itself resolve the merits of the claims. It describes a procedural basis for refusing permission to file where the proposed proceeding, viewed on its face, cannot properly invoke the Court’s process.

The qualification at [9] is important: intervention to stop a proceeding at the outset is appropriate “only in the clearest of cases”. In plain English, the screening power is described as one to be used cautiously. The judgment’s reasons identify why Steward J considered this to be such a case: the absence of a disclosed cause of action against the named defendants, the unclear orders sought to be set aside, and the substantial overlap with completed proceedings [4], [10]–[11].

At [10], Steward J says the proposed application sought to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction “on a basis that is confused or manifestly untenable”. The paragraph then explains the immediate reasons: the materials did not disclose a cause of action against the named defendants and the application appeared to be an attempt to relitigate matters previously before the New South Wales Supreme Court.

At [11], the judgment distinguishes the proposed proceeding from an ordinary appeal route by noting the previous appeal-related history. The first applicant’s special leave application had been dismissed in 2020. The current application appeared substantially to concern the same facts and circumstances. In plain English, the Court viewed the proposed writ application as repeating matters for which the appeal process had already concluded.

Finally, [12] records the result: Steward J considered the application properly an abuse of process and refused leave without an oral hearing. The order at the beginning of the judgment specifies that leave was refused. The reasons do not rule on the truth of the underlying allegations of fraud, perjury or abuse.

What fact patterns trigger this precedent

The case is relevant to a proposed High Court filing where a Registrar has directed that the document not be issued or filed without a Justice’s leave under r 6.07.2, and the applicant then seeks leave under r 6.07.3. The judgment indicates that the document is assessed on its face against the criteria in r 6.07.1 [9].

The pattern most directly addressed here includes several features together: unclear identification of the orders to be challenged; relief framed in broad or uncertain terms; no apparent cause of action against the named defendants; substantial overlap with earlier state proceedings; and an earlier appeal process that has concluded without a further reason for bringing the matter in the High Court’s original jurisdiction [3]–[5], [10]–[11].

The precedent should not be reduced to the proposition that serious allegations, or allegations made by an unrepresented person, are automatically abusive. The judgment reports allegations but bases its conclusion on the form and substance of the proposed proceeding, including its relationship to prior litigation [7], [10]–[12]. Nor does it decide that every matter previously raised in an appeal is barred from any later proceeding. Its stated proposition concerns a proceeding that is, in substance, an attempt to relitigate issues after the appeal process has concluded without further reason [11].

For legal research or compliance review, the judgment directs attention to the actual document: what orders are identified, what legal claim is disclosed against each proposed defendant, what jurisdiction is invoked, and how the proposed proceeding relates to earlier proceedings. Those are features Steward J discussed in this case, not a substitute for the full rules or an independent assessment of another matter.

How later courts have treated it

The supplied judgment contains no account of later judicial treatment of In the matter of an application by Sarah Jane Robinson & Anor for leave to issue or file. It was decided on 21 February 2024, and the supplied material gives no later cases applying, distinguishing or questioning it. It would therefore be unsupported to describe the decision as having been followed or adopted by subsequent courts.

The judgment itself relies on earlier authorities and materials. It applies the principles set out in Re Young [9]. It also cites Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate, Dimitrov v Supreme Court (Vic), and KDSP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs for the general proposition concerning original jurisdiction, appealability and relitigation [11]. It refers to Hastwell v Federal Court of Australia and the Judges Thereof by transcript citation on relitigation after conclusion of an appeal process [11].

Those references show the sources Steward J relied on for the legal framework. They do not establish how courts later treated the 2024 decision. A later-treatment assessment would require materials outside the judgment supplied here.

Still-open questions

The decision leaves the substantive allegations unresolved. It does not determine whether fraud, perjury, undue influence or abuse occurred in the estate proceedings or in the conduct of those proceedings. It records the applicants’ allegations and decides the procedural leave question [6]–[12].

The reasons do not specify the precise New South Wales Court of Appeal orders that the applicants intended to challenge, because the proposed application did not identify them clearly [4]. They also do not examine in detail the legal basis for each remedy sought, including the requested return of assets or removal of material from court files. The decision instead concludes at the filing stage that the materials did not disclose a cause of action against the named defendants [10].

The judgment does not define exhaustively what would count as a “further reason” for bringing a later proceeding after an appeal process has concluded. It states that relitigation without further reason will generally amount to abuse, but does not explore the possible kinds of circumstances that might distinguish another case [11]. Nor does it set out a detailed test for deciding when a matter is sufficiently “amenable to appeal” for the original-jurisdiction principle to apply.

Finally, the judgment does not elaborate on the factual or legal relationship between every allegation in the proposed application and the issues determined in the New South Wales proceedings. Its conclusion is that the proposed application appeared substantially to concern the same facts and circumstances [11]. That assessment is specific to the materials before Steward J and should be read within that procedural context.

This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on, relying on, or using this analysis, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.