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austlii:cth/HCASJ/2024/2
procedural. Application for leave to issue or file the proposed writ of summons dated 12 October 2023 dismissed without an oral hearing.
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
The applicant wanted to bring a broad damages and remedies claim against South Australia in the High Court. A Justice had directed the Registrar not to accept the proposed writ unless another Justice gave permission. Steward J applied the principles in Re Young, finding that the proposed claims were misconceived and that the attempt to use the High Court’s jurisdiction was confused or manifestly untenable. The Court refused permission and dismissed the application without an oral hearing.
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2,135 words · generated 03/10/2026
Robert Heath Salmoni applied for permission to issue or file a proposed writ of summons in the High Court. The proposed defendant was the State of South Australia. The writ sought, among other things, compensation, general damages, aggravated damages, exemplary damages and costs totalling $68,640,025.25 ([2]).
The principal allegations were connected to the applicant’s arrest and imprisonment on 17 May 2020, in relation to charges of unlawfully choking, suffocating or strangling another and aggravated assault. The proposed writ described unsuccessful bail applications, his release on bail on 8 December 2021, and his acquittal by a jury on 11 September 2023 ([2]). It invoked the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and alleged violations of rights and freedoms. The proposed claims included allegations described by the applicant as libel, false arrest, wrongful imprisonment, abuse of process and malicious prosecution ([2]).
The proposed writ also sought other remedies connected with a “long-term parental order”, a pending interim intervention order application, civil proceedings, the applicant’s marriage and an unfair dismissal application ([3]). The judgment records these as matters included in the proposed claim. It does not set out their underlying facts or decide their merits separately.
Before the application was considered by Steward J, the applicant had attempted to submit a claim to the South Australian Court Administration Authority. The writ said it was electronically submitted on 2 October 2023 and that the applicant had been told it was with Chambers for a decision about whether it could proceed ([9]). The writ said the applicant chose to file in the High Court because of concern about delay and because he considered the High Court’s original jurisdiction relevant ([9]).
On 19 October 2023, Gleeson J directed the Registrar, under r 6.07.2 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth), to refuse to issue or file the writ unless a Justice first granted leave ([1]). Salmoni then applied for leave. His affidavit relied on broad principles including “natural justice, due process, the rule of law, human rights and international public law”, and identified “fairness, equality and access to justice” as grounds ([5]). Steward J noted that no further argument was advanced about why leave should be granted ([6]).
The order was that the application for leave to issue or file the proposed writ dated 12 October 2023 was dismissed. The decision was made without an oral hearing ([10]).
The decision applied the framework stated in Re Young, which Steward J reproduced at [7]. Under that framework, a Justice considers an application for leave by reference to the same criteria that inform the Registrar’s initial action under r 6.07.1. Those criteria concern whether the proposed document appears on its face to be an abuse of the Court’s process, frivolous or vexatious, or outside the Court’s jurisdiction.
The framework also explains that abuse of process has no closed set of categories. For the purpose of this application, it includes an attempt to invoke the High Court’s original or appellate jurisdiction on a basis that is “confused or manifestly untenable” ([7]). The safeguard is that a proceeding should be stopped at this preliminary point only in “the clearest of cases” ([7]).
Steward J applied that test to the proposed writ and supporting material. At [8], his Honour characterised the proposed causes of action as misconceived and the attempted invocation of the Court’s jurisdiction as confused or manifestly untenable. The judgment does not give a claim-by-claim legal analysis of every cause of action. Its stated basis is an overall assessment of the proposed application on its face.
The applicant’s reasons for leave did not supply further argument to meet that assessment. The affidavit identified general legal and procedural principles, but the judgment records no developed explanation of how those principles made the proposed writ suitable for filing in the High Court ([5]–[6]). The decision therefore does not determine whether the applicant’s underlying allegations about arrest, imprisonment, prosecution or other matters were true. It determines whether the proposed writ could be issued or filed under the leave procedure.
The writ’s account of the South Australian filing was also material to the Court’s assessment. The applicant said a claim seeking remedy had already been submitted to the South Australian Court Administration Authority and remained under consideration as to whether it could proceed ([9]). Steward J said that this part of the writ confirmed the conclusion that the proposed High Court application was an abuse of process ([9]). The judgment does not establish that simply having a matter pending in another court always makes a High Court filing abusive. Its conclusion concerns this proposed writ and its stated circumstances.
The judgment presents itself as an application of existing procedural principles, not as a decision changing the law. Its account of the governing approach comes from Re Young, cited at [7] and again at [8]. The judgment does not identify a new test or alter the quoted standard.
Before this decision, the quoted Re Young framework already provided that a proposed document could be refused at the leave stage if it appeared on its face to be an abuse of process, frivolous or vexatious, or outside the Court’s jurisdiction. It also provided that a confused or manifestly untenable attempt to invoke the High Court’s jurisdiction could amount to abuse of process, while reserving preliminary dismissal for the clearest cases ([7]).
In this decision, Steward J applied that framework to the particular proposed writ. The key application appears at [8]: the causes of action were found to be misconceived, the attempt to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction was characterised as confused or manifestly untenable, and the matter was treated as one of the clearest cases for refusing leave. Paragraph [9] adds that the applicant’s own description of the pending South Australian filing confirmed the abuse-of-process assessment.
The judgment’s effect, as shown by its text, is therefore case-specific. It confirms the use of the Re Young approach in deciding an application under r 6.07.3. It does not purport to decide what remedies might be available for the underlying events, whether any particular cause of action could succeed in another forum, or what legal effect the cited international instrument might have in a properly constituted proceeding.
At [7], the judgment states that the r 6.07.3 discretion is exercised by reference to the criteria used by the Registrar under r 6.07.1. In plain English, the Justice deciding whether to grant leave asks whether the proposed document appears, on its face, to fall within the specified problem categories. This is a screening assessment of the proposed document, not a full trial of every allegation.
The same paragraph says abuse of process “cannot be confined within closed categories”. The plain-English point is that the concept is not restricted to a fixed checklist. The judgment then identifies an example relevant to this case: an attempt to invoke the High Court’s jurisdiction on a basis that is confused or manifestly untenable.
The qualification at [7] is important: stopping a proceeding at the outset is appropriate only in “the clearest of cases”. The decision does not describe the leave process as an ordinary merits hearing. It describes a limited discretion that can prevent a document from proceeding where the problem is apparent on its face and sufficiently clear.
At [8], Steward J says that the proposed causes of action were “misconceived” and that the application sought to invoke jurisdiction on a “confused or manifestly untenable” basis. In plain English, the Court considered the proposed claim legally defective in its presented form and considered its asserted basis for using the High Court’s jurisdiction untenable. The paragraph records the Court’s assessment; it does not provide detailed reasons addressing each allegation individually.
At [9], the Court points to the writ’s own description of the South Australian filing. It records that the proposed claim had been submitted there and was awaiting consideration of whether it could proceed. Steward J treated this as confirmation of the abuse-of-process conclusion. The paragraph should be read in context: it explains the Court’s assessment of this application, rather than stating a general rule that parallel or pending proceedings invariably amount to abuse.
Finally, [10] records that leave was refused without an oral hearing. The judgment had earlier explained, through the Re Young passage at [7], that an application under r 6.07.3 could be decided without an oral hearing because the document is assessed “on its face”.
The judgment is most directly relevant to applications under r 6.07.3 where a Registrar has been directed to refuse a document unless a Justice grants leave. It addresses the screening of a proposed document that, on its face, may be abusive, frivolous or vexatious, or outside the Court’s jurisdiction.
A central feature of this case was that the proposed claim combined many allegations and remedies across different subject areas. It sought substantial damages linked to arrest, imprisonment and prosecution, invoked human rights material, and also included other family, civil, marriage and employment matters ([2]–[3]). The judgment does not say that breadth alone establishes abuse. Rather, Steward J concluded that this particular set of proposed causes of action was misconceived and the attempted invocation of the High Court’s jurisdiction confused or manifestly untenable ([8]).
Another feature was that the applicant’s stated grounds for leave relied on broad principles, without further developed argument explaining why the document should be accepted ([5]–[6]). The case may therefore be relevant when assessing whether the face of a proposed filing and its supporting materials clearly meet the leave threshold. It does not establish that reliance on principles such as fairness, access to justice or human rights will always be insufficient. The judgment’s conclusion rests on the complete application before the Court.
The proposed writ also described a claim already submitted to a South Australian court administration body and awaiting a decision about whether it could proceed ([9]). That circumstance was expressly treated as confirming the abuse-of-process finding in this case. The judgment does not specify the procedural status of that separate matter beyond what the writ itself said, and it does not explain what the South Australian court would have decided.
The supplied judgment does not discuss any later treatment of this decision by other courts. It was delivered on 23 January 2024, and the text provided contains no subsequent judicial citations to it. No conclusion about later application, approval, distinction or criticism can be drawn from this judgment alone.
The authority it does discuss is Re Young, reported at (2020) 94 ALJR 448 at 451 [10]–[13] and 376 ALR 567 at 570. Steward J quotes the principles from Re Young and applies them to the proposed writ ([7]–[8]). In particular, the judgment relies on Re Young for the criteria governing the leave discretion, the explanation of abuse of process, and the requirement that preliminary refusal be reserved for the clearest cases.
Accordingly, the judgment’s stated precedential relationship is that it applies Re Young. Any account of how later courts have treated either this decision or Re Young would require material beyond the judgment supplied here.
The decision is narrow in the questions it resolves. It refuses permission to issue or file this proposed writ; it does not decide the underlying allegations or the availability of particular remedies. The judgment records the applicant’s account of arrest, detention, bail, acquittal and other matters, but does not make findings after a trial about those events ([2]–[3]).
It also does not analyse each alleged cause of action separately. The judgment’s central conclusion is that the proposed causes of action, considered in the application as presented, were misconceived and that the attempt to invoke the High Court’s jurisdiction was confused or manifestly untenable ([8]). It does not explain whether any individual allegation could be reformulated or considered in another proceeding.
The judgment does not set out a detailed jurisdictional analysis of the proposed claim, nor does it address the specific legal effect of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights invoked by the applicant. The reasons focus on the r 6.07 leave discretion and abuse-of-process assessment.
Finally, the judgment does not resolve the status or merits of the claim submitted to the South Australian Court Administration Authority. It records the applicant’s statement that the matter was pending consideration about whether it could proceed, and treats that statement as confirming the assessment of abuse of process in this High Court application ([9]). The precise consequences of the South Australian process are not addressed.
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Source: the High Court of Australia (www.hcourt.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
STEWARD J
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY ROBERT HEATH SALMONI FOR LEAVE TO ISSUE OR FILE
[2024] HCASJ 2
Date of Judgment: 23 January 2024
B63 of 2023
ORDER
Representation
The applicant is self-represented.
STEWARD J. The applicant sought to file an application dated 12 October 2023 for a constitutional or other writ. On 19 October 2023, Gleeson J directed the Registrar pursuant to r 6.07.2 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) to refuse to issue or file the writ without the leave of a Justice of the Court first had and obtained. The applicant now applies for that leave. The facts and legal claims underlying the applicant's proposed writ of summons can be stated briefly.
The applicant seeks to commence proceedings against the State of South Australia in the original jurisdiction of this Court for, amongst other things, orders for compensation, general damages, aggravated damages, exemplary damages and costs in the sum of $68,640,025.25. The applicant alleges that claim arises from South Australia's "libel torts, libel actions, libel permanent defamation of character, libel false arrest, libel wrongful, unjustified imprisonment, libel abuse of process and for 572 days of sustained libel deprivation of liberty" (footnotes omitted) and makes a claim for malicious prosecution. The applicant relies on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, alleging that a litany of his rights and freedoms have been violated. According to the applicant, those allegations are grounded in his arrest and imprisonment on 17 May 2020 for charges of unlawfully choking, suffocating or strangling another and aggravated assault. The writ of summons describes multiple unsuccessful bail applications, though the applicant was ultimately released on bail on 8 December 2021. The writ also asserts that the applicant was acquitted of the charges by a jury on 11 September 2023.
The applicant also seeks a range of other remedies in connection with, amongst other things, a "long-term parental order"; a "pending interim intervention order application"; various civil proceedings; his marriage; and an unfair dismissal application.
Globally, the applicant submits that "these causes of action lie in the abuse of the process of the system of justice by wrongfully setting the law in motion and that they are designed to discourage the perversion of the machinery of justice for an improper purpose".
As intimated above, Gleeson J directed the Registrar to refuse to issue or file the writ without the leave of a Justice of the Court first had and obtained. The grounds of the application for leave to issue or file appear in an affidavit affirmed by the applicant on 15 November 2023 as follows:
"The document is founded upon the fundamental domestic legal principles of natural justice, due process, the rule of law, human rights and international public law.
I hereby submit the fundamental grounds of the application for leave to issue or file the refused document in the High Court of Australia are the following three key principles of fairness, equality and access to justice."
Beyond that set out immediately above, no further argument is advanced by the applicant as to why leave to issue or file should be granted.
The principles governing the discretion to refuse leave were set out by Gageler J (as his Honour then was) in Re Young:1
"The direction of a Justice pursuant to r 6.07.2 of the High Court Rules is available to be sought by the Registrar under r 6.07.1 of the High Court Rules in respect of a document which 'appears' to the Registrar 'on its face' to be 'an abuse of the process of the Court, to be frivolous or vexatious or to fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court'.
The discretion to refuse leave on an application made under r 6.07.3 of the High Court Rules falls to be exercised by a Justice by reference to the same criteria as those which inform the action of the Registrar under r 6.07.1. The discretion will ordinarily be exercised to refuse leave to issue or file a document where the document appears to the Justice determining the application 'on its face' to be an abuse of the process of the Court, to be frivolous or vexatious or to fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
As Edelman J has recently emphasised, it is implicit in the requirement that a document the subject of an application under r 6.07.3 be considered 'on its face' that the application falls to be determined without an oral hearing. Unlike an interlocutory application governed by Pt 13 of the High Court Rules, in respect of which r 13.03.1 provides that the Court or a Justice may direct that the application is to be determined without listing it for hearing, no direction of a Justice is needed for an application under r 6.07.3 to be determined without listing it for hearing.
The concept of abuse of process cannot be confined within closed categories. Sufficiently for present purposes, it encompasses an attempt to invoke the original or appellate jurisdiction of the High Court on a basis that is confused or manifestly untenable. Needless to say, exercise of the discretion to nip a proceeding in the bud is appropriate only in the clearest of cases."
It is plain from the face of the application and its supporting materials that the applicant's proposed causes of action are misconceived. The application attempts to invoke this Court's jurisdiction "on a basis that is confused or manifestly untenable", and is properly regarded as an abuse of process.2 I am therefore satisfied that this is one of the "clearest of cases"3 in which it is appropriate to exercise my discretion to refuse leave to issue or file the proposed application.
That the application is an abuse of process is confirmed by the applicant's writ of summons which records as follows (footnotes omitted):
"The [applicant] submits this claim was electronically submitted to the South Australian Court Administration Authority for listing in the Supreme Court of South Australia Civil Jurisdiction on October 2, 2023. The [applicant] made attempts to enquire with the Court Administration Authority Higher Court Registry with regard to the status of the application. The authorised staff member advised the [applicant] that the claim had been forwarded to Chambers for deliberation and a decision on whether the claim may proceed was pending. On the basis the [applicant's] claim seeking remedy and justice has been further delayed, the [applicant] has concerns and chooses to file this Writ in the High Court of Australia where the original jurisdiction is conferred and your Honour’s decision will be binding."
(2020) 94 ALJR 448
Application for leave to issue or file the proposed writ of summons dated 12 October 2023 dismissed without an oral hearing.