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austlii:cth/HCASJ/2024/3
procedural. The application for leave to file or issue the document entitled “Application for a Constitutional or Other Writ” dated 14 December 2023 was dismissed without an oral hearing.
6 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The High Court did not allow Anna Laverack to file her proposed writ application. The proposed orders would have restricted communications involving the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Federal Court judges, and directed how the Federal Court proceedings should be managed. Beech-Jones J found no legal basis for the communication restrictions and no supporting material for the allegations of collusion. The orders would improperly interfere with the Federal Court's work. Applying the rule that leave may be refused where a document is, on its face, abusive, frivolous or vexatious, the Justice dismissed the leave application without an oral hearing. The decision did not determine the merits of the Federal Court case Laverack described.
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1,831 words · generated 03/10/2026
In In the matter of an application by Anna Laverack for leave to issue or file [2024] HCASJ 3, Beech-Jones J considered whether Anna Laverack could issue or file a proposed application for a constitutional or other writ in the High Court. The application was dated 14 December 2023. Laverack was unrepresented.
The proposed High Court application arose from Federal Court proceedings that Laverack said she had commenced in March 2023. She alleged that the Commonwealth and New South Wales had, since 2017, conducted a “law enforcement controlled operation” involving continuous surveillance and sustained harassment. She also alleged that Federal Court judges had communicated with the defendants and colluded to frustrate her proceedings ([4]). These were allegations recorded in the judgment, not findings that the alleged surveillance, harassment or collusion had occurred.
On 18 December 2023, Jagot J directed the Registrar not to issue or file the proposed document without leave from a Justice ([2]). Laverack then applied for leave, relying on an affidavit affirmed on 14 December 2023. Her proposed orders included restrictions on communications between the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Federal Court judges; limits on how the Federal Court judges conducted the proceedings; an order preventing the Federal Court Chief Justice from assigning a judge; a pseudonym order; and an order expediting the proceedings ([3]).
Beech-Jones J refused leave without an oral hearing. The decision was about permission to commence the proposed High Court proceeding. It did not determine the merits of the Federal Court proceedings or decide whether Laverack’s underlying allegations were true.
The starting point was the leave-screening framework stated in Re Young and quoted at [6]. A Justice deciding an application under r 6.07.3 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) applies the same criteria that inform the Registrar’s action under r 6.07.1. A document may be refused where it appears “on its face” to be an abuse of process, frivolous or vexatious, or outside the High Court’s jurisdiction. The judgment also quotes the caution that stopping a proceeding “in the bud” is appropriate “only in the clearest of cases” ([6]).
The Court found that threshold met. First, it concluded there was no basis in law for the proposed restrictions on communications. The orders would have required the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Federal Court judges and the Chief Justice not to communicate with each other except in Laverack’s presence or with her knowledge ([7]). The ruling does not set out a general test for every possible order concerning communications. Its finding addresses the orders sought in this application.
Second, the Court considered the supporting material. It found that Laverack’s affidavit did not support her assertions of collusion and conspiracy to frustrate the Federal Court proceedings ([7]). The judgment notes that newspaper articles tendered as evidence of harassment did not refer to Laverack ([5]). It also records that material in the affidavit did not support the assertion that the Federal Court had copied and redeployed actions described by her ([5]). The Court characterised the allegations against the judges as “scandalous”, while noting that it was unnecessary to order their removal from the file ([7]).
Third, the proposed orders would interfere with the Federal Court’s management and determination of its proceedings and with the Chief Justice’s management of that Court. Beech-Jones J described the interference as “improperly and egregiously” intrusive ([7]). The judgment refers in this connection to s 15 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) in footnote 6. It does not explain or develop that provision in detail.
These considerations led the Justice to describe the proposed proceeding as “clearly an abuse of process, frivolous and vexatious” ([7]). The conclusion was not that every claim involving the Federal Court or its judges is necessarily abusive. It was a conclusion about this document, the orders it sought and the material provided with it.
The application was determined without an oral hearing. The quoted Re Young passage explains that an application under r 6.07.3 is assessed on the face of the document and need not be listed for hearing ([6]). The final order accordingly dismissed the leave application “without an oral hearing” ([8]).
The judgment does not present a comprehensive account of the law before and after this decision. Its legal framework is drawn from Re Young, cited at [6], which in turn states the approach to an application for leave under the High Court Rules. The decision applies that existing framework to Laverack’s proposed document.
As set out in the judgment, the relevant framework has several parts. The leave discretion uses the same criteria as those informing the Registrar’s action under r 6.07.1. The proposed document is assessed “on its face”. A document may be refused if it appears abusive, frivolous or vexatious, or outside the Court’s jurisdiction. And, despite those grounds, refusing a proceeding at the outset is appropriate only in the clearest cases ([6]).
The decision’s contribution in this record is therefore its application of those principles, rather than a stated change to them. Beech-Jones J treated the absence of a legal basis for the proposed communication restrictions, the lack of support for the collusion allegations, and the interference with Federal Court administration as reasons why the case met the high threshold ([7]).
The judgment does not say that the legal test changed on 1 February 2024. Nor does the material supplied establish how later courts have interpreted or applied this decision. Any account of a subsequent development in the law would need sources beyond this judgment.
At [6], the judgment quotes the rule that leave will ordinarily be refused where a document appears “on its face” to be abusive, frivolous or vexatious, or outside the Court’s jurisdiction. In plain English, the screening question is whether the proposed document itself shows a sufficiently clear problem of that kind. The quoted passage does not suggest that every weak or disputed claim must be rejected at this stage.
The same paragraph says that stopping a proceeding at the outset is appropriate “only in the clearest of cases”. In plain English, early refusal is a serious step and requires a clear basis. Beech-Jones J relied on the nature of the requested orders and the material supporting the application to conclude that this was such a case ([7]).
At [7], Beech-Jones J says there was “no basis in law” for orders preventing the named parties and judges from communicating except in Laverack’s presence or with her knowledge. In plain English, the Justice considered the proposed communications restrictions legally unsupported as framed in the application.
Also at [7], the Justice states that the affidavit material did not support the collusion and conspiracy allegations. This is an assessment of the support provided by the material in the leave application. It is not a trial finding about every event alleged to have happened in the separate Federal Court proceedings.
Finally, the Court says the proposed orders would “improperly and egregiously interfere” with the Federal Court’s management and determination of its proceedings and the Chief Justice’s management of that Court ([7]). In plain English, the orders would have intruded substantially into the conduct and administration of another court’s case. That concern formed part of the reason for refusing leave.
The decision is most directly relevant to an application for leave to file or issue a proposed High Court document where the alleged defect is apparent from the document and supporting material. Its practical setting involved proposed orders directed at another court’s judges and chief justice, unsupported allegations of collusion, and requests that would constrain communications and the management of proceedings ([3]-[7]).
The judgment does not establish a closed list of fact patterns that qualify as abuse of process. Indeed, the Re Young passage quoted at [6] says the concept of abuse of process cannot be confined within closed categories. The case therefore illustrates an application of the principle, rather than a comprehensive catalogue.
A lawyer or researcher comparing another matter with this decision would likely distinguish between: the nature and breadth of the orders sought; whether the supporting material provides a basis for serious allegations; whether the proposed orders would affect another court’s management of its proceedings; and whether any apparent defect is clear enough to justify refusal before a hearing. These are analytical comparison points drawn from the reasoning, not a separate test stated by the Court.
The decision should not be read as resolving Laverack’s underlying allegations or the merits of her Federal Court claim. The judgment records that she had not served the Federal Court application or statement of claim because a pseudonym application remained outstanding ([4]). It does not decide what would happen in that proceeding.
The judgment supplied here contains no later treatment of [2024] HCASJ 3. It was delivered on 1 February 2024 and cites Re Young as the source of the leave-screening principles ([6]). On the material provided, it is not possible to state whether a later court has followed, distinguished, explained or otherwise treated Beech-Jones J’s decision.
The precedent relationship that can be established from the text is that Beech-Jones J cited Re Young for the governing approach. The judgment quotes the relevant principles and applies them to the proposed application. It does not identify a later judicial decision discussing the Laverack ruling.
Accordingly, this section is limited to the judgment itself. A reliable account of subsequent treatment would require later judgments or other legal sources not included in the material provided.
The decision resolves the leave application before Beech-Jones J, but leaves several matters outside its scope. It does not determine the merits of the Federal Court proceedings, the truth of the surveillance or harassment allegations, or whether the defendants in those proceedings had acted as alleged. It records the allegations and assesses whether the material supplied for the High Court leave application supported them ([4]-[7]).
The judgment also does not provide a detailed interpretation of s 15 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). It cites that provision in connection with the proposed interference with the Federal Court’s management and the Chief Justice’s role ([7] and footnote 6). The decision should not be treated as giving a broad account of every aspect of that section.
Nor does the judgment decide what legal or procedural steps might be available in the separate Federal Court matter. It concerns the proposed High Court document and the threshold leave decision under the High Court Rules. The specific consequences of the ruling for the Federal Court proceedings are not explained beyond the refusal to permit the proposed High Court application to be issued or filed.
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Source: the High Court of Australia (www.hcourt.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BEECH-JONES J
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY ANNA LAVERACK FOR LEAVE TO ISSUE OR FILE
[2024] HCASJ 3
Date of Judgment: 1 February 2024
S168 of 2023
ORDER
Representation
The applicant is unrepresented
BEECH-JONES J. This is an application for leave to file or issue an application for a constitutional or other writ. For the reasons that follow, leave should be refused.
On or about 14 December 2023, the applicant, Anna Laverack, sought to file or issue an application for a constitutional or other writ. On 18 December 2023, Jagot J directed the Registrar of this Court to refuse to issue or file that document without the leave of a Justice first had and obtained by the party seeking to issue or file it.1 Ms Laverack then sought that leave.2 She relies on an affidavit affirmed by her on 14 December 2023.
Proposed order 1 of the application seeks orders against the Commonwealth of Australia (the "Commonwealth") and the State of New South Wales (the "State") to the effect of preventing them from "interven[ing]" in certain proceedings commenced by Ms Laverack in the Federal Court of Australia as part of any attempt to "frustrate or obstruct" those proceedings. This prayer also seeks orders that the Commonwealth and the State not communicate with the Judges of the Federal Court in Ms Laverack's absence or without her consent. Proposed order 2 seeks orders against the Judges of the Federal Court in relation to the conduct of those proceedings, including that they also not "frustrate or obstruct" the proceedings nor communicate with the Commonwealth or the State in Ms Laverack's absence or without her consent. Proposed order 3 seeks similar orders against the Chief Justice of the Federal Court as well as an order preventing her Honour from assigning any Judge to hear the proceedings. Proposed order 4 seeks an order directing the Chief Justice of the Federal Court to grant Ms Laverack a pseudonym order. Proposed order 5 seeks an order directing the Judges of the Federal Court to expedite the proceedings.
The balance of the application sought to be filed or issued in this Court describes the proceedings that Ms Laverack states she commenced in March 2023 in the Federal Court. She states that the statement of claim filed in the Federal Court alleges that since 2017, the Commonwealth and the State have conducted a "law enforcement controlled operation" involving continuous surveillance of her for 24 hours a day and 7 days a week along with a campaign of sustained harassment. Ms Laverack states that she has not served the application or statement of claim commencing those proceedings because she has an outstanding application for a pseudonym order. Ms Laverack asserts that Judges of the Federal Court had conversations with the defendants to those proceedings and colluded with them to frustrate their conduct. She asserts that they have no intention of affording her a "fair trial".
Ms Laverack repeats and expands upon these assertions in her affidavit. Amongst other matters, she asserts that the Federal Court copied "elements of actions from what [she] had described others had done to [her] in the past and redeploy[ed] them with malice". The material referred to in her affidavit provides no support for that assertion. As evidence of the harassment she alleges to have suffered, Ms Laverack annexed copies of newspaper articles said to demonstrate "[a] constant barrage of negative innuendo... projected at [her]". Ms Laverack is not referred to in any of those articles.
The principles governing the discretion to refuse leave to issue or file a document were set out by Gageler J (as his Honour then was) in Re Young:3
"The discretion to refuse leave on an application made under r 6.07.3 of the High Court Rules falls to be exercised by a Justice by reference to the same criteria as those which inform the action of the Registrar under r 6.07.1. The discretion will ordinarily be exercised to refuse leave to issue or file a document where the document appears to the Justice determining the application 'on its face' to be an abuse of the process of the Court, to be frivolous or vexatious or to fall outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
As Edelman J has recently emphasised, it is implicit in the requirement that a document the subject of an application under r 6.07.3 be considered 'on its face' that the application falls to be determined without an oral hearing. Unlike an interlocutory application governed by Pt 13 of the High Court Rules, in respect of which r 13.03.1 provides that the Court or a Justice may direct that the application is to be determined without listing it for hearing, no direction of a Justice is needed for an application under r 6.07.3 to be determined without listing it for hearing.
The concept of abuse of process cannot be confined within closed categories. Sufficiently for present purposes, it encompasses an attempt to invoke the original or appellate jurisdiction of the High Court on a basis that is confused or manifestly untenable. Needless to say, exercise of the discretion to nip a proceeding in the bud is appropriate only in the clearest of cases." (citation omitted)
The proceedings that Ms Laverack seeks to commence in this Court are clearly an abuse of process, frivolous and vexatious. There is no basis in law for making orders directed to the Commonwealth, the State of New South Wales, all the Judges of the Federal Court as well the Chief Justice of the Federal Court to the effect that they not communicate with each other except in Ms Laverack's presence or with her knowledge. The material provided in Ms Laverack's affidavit does not provide any support for her allegations of collusion and conspiracy to frustrate the proceedings she commenced in the Federal Court. Those allegations are "scandalous" (although it is not necessary to order the removal of her application to this Court or her affidavit from the file).4 If granted, the orders Ms Laverack seeks would improperly and egregiously interfere with the Federal Court's management and determination of the proceedings she commenced in that Court, and the management of that Court by its Chief Justice.5
The application for leave to file or issue the document entitled "Application for a Constitutional or Other Writ" dated 14 December 2023 is dismissed without an oral hearing.
(2020) 94 ALJR 448
The application for leave to file or issue the document entitled “Application for a Constitutional or Other Writ” dated 14 December 2023 was dismissed without an oral hearing.