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[2003] NSWIRComm 1042
plaintiff. Order that Premier Motor Service Pty Limited pay $5,419.70 to Mr Jason Ball within 21 days; order to take effect from 11 September 2003.
The Industrial Relations Commission accepted the Transport Workers' Union's small-claims application on behalf of Mr Jason Ball and found that his resignation, given after more than five years' service and explained in evidence as caused by an ultimatum from his partner about long work hours, amounted to 'domestic or other pressing necessity' under the Long Service Leave Act. Applying established authorities and a subjective four-part test, the Commissioner ordered Premier Motor Service to pay pro rata long service leave of $5,419.70 within 21 days; the Commission may hear such small claims by an industrial organisation and order interest at the prescribed rate.
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1,697 words · generated 24/06/2026
This was a small-claims arbitration in the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales concerning entitlement to pro rata long service leave. The Transport Workers' Union of NSW (the TWU) lodged a dispute under s.130 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 alleging that Premier Motor Service Pty Limited had failed to pay pro rata long service leave to its member, Mr Jason Ball. Mr Ball had been employed by Premier (and its predecessor) for in excess of five years. On 25 June 2003 he tendered his resignation in writing stating only "personal reasons" (Exhibit 1). The TWU brought the claim as a small-claims application under Ss.379–380 of the Act on behalf of Mr Ball for $5,419.70 (principle $5,328.00 plus interest $91.70), an amount within the then small-claims cap (see decision).
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
Conciliation was attempted and failed. The matter proceeded to a hearing on 11 September 2003 before Commissioner P J Connor. The employer did not appear and the hearing proceeded ex parte. Mr Ball gave evidence that he and his partner had been together for fourteen years, had two children, and that his partner had given him an ultimatum because of the excessive time he spent away from home as a coach driver; he had since taken lower-hours work selling ice cream. The Commissioner assessed the credibility and substance of that evidence against the statutory test in S.4(2)(a)(iii) of the Long Service Leave Act 1955 and the authorities dealing with resignation for "domestic or other pressing necessity" and concluded the claim had substance. An order was made that Premier pay $5,419.70 within 21 days, effective 11 September 2003.
Procedurally, the Commissioner confirmed that an industrial organisation recognised under the 1996 Act may bring a small-claims application and that the Commission constitutes an "industrial court" for the purposes of Ss.379–380 and may order interest under S.372(1) at the prescribed Supreme Court rate.
Statutory foundation: S.4(2)(a)(iii) of the Long Service Leave Act 1955 expressly recognises a pro rata entitlement where a worker with at least five years' service resigns "on account of illness, incapacity or domestic or other pressing necessity". That statutory text is quoted at the outset of the decision and frames the legal question.
Legal standard from authority: The Commissioner relied on prior authorities that have considered the scope of "domestic or other pressing necessity". He quoted Sheldon J in Franks v Kembla Equipment Company Pty Ltd to describe the general approach: the test is whether there is "a really serious problem in the home, although not necessarily a crisis", rejecting frivolous reasons but cautioning against over-exacting standards. The Commissioner also adopted the four-factor statement of test cited from the Full Bench in Computer Sciences of Australia v Leslie: (1) does the reason fall within the section; (2) is the reason genuinely held and not colourable; (3) was it the real or motivating reason; and (4) would a reasonable person in the worker's circumstances have felt compelled to resign. The Commissioner further emphasised that the enquiry is essentially subjective, focused on what motivated the worker, in line with Eyles v Cook.
Application to the facts: The Commissioner found the factual matrix, more than five years' service; a resignation framed as "personal reasons"; contemporaneous evidence of an ultimatum from the partner about long hours; subsequent taking of lower-hours employment, sufficient to satisfy the four-part and subjective tests. He compared Mr Ball's situation to earlier cases (for example Kirwan) where an ultimatum from a spouse had been accepted as a valid domestic necessity. The absence of volunteered detail in the resignation letter did not detract, because employees often do not wish to "bandy around the workplace" private reasons; the Commission accepted Mr Ball's oral evidence as credible and genuine.
Procedural power: The Commissioner confirmed the TWU's right to use the small-claims procedure on behalf of a member, the Commission's role as the industrial court for such proceedings, and the power to order interest at the prescribed rate.
Result: Payment ordered in favour of Mr Ball.
Before: Prior to this decision the established approach to "domestic or other pressing necessity" claims, as articulated in Franks and applied in later decisions, was in place: a balance between rejecting frivolous claims and recognising genuine domestic pressures. The Court's task has been to apply those principles sensitively to the facts of each case, with an emphasis on the worker's perception and motive.
After: This decision applies and affirms the existing approach. It confirms three practical points:
The decision does not create new statutory tests or alter settled law; instead it illustrates consistent application on the facts.
Statutory quotation (S.4(2)(a)(iii)): The statute says a worker with at least five years' service is entitled to pro rata long service leave if the worker's employment ends because of illness, incapacity, death, or resignation for "domestic or other pressing necessity". Plain English: if you have worked five years or more and you have to quit for a genuine, serious domestic reason, you may still get a proportion of long service leave.
Franks passage as quoted: "The test...is whether there is a really serious problem in the home...the colourable and frivolous should be rejected...but over-exacting standards should not be adopted...a reasonable man might feel compelled to seek its solution by terminating his employment." Plain English: the tribunal must screen out pretend or trivial excuses, but not require an impossibly high standard. The question is whether a realistic person in the worker's position would have felt they had to quit because of the home situation.
The four-point test from Computer Sciences: (1) is the reason within the statute; (2) is it genuine; (3) was it the worker's real motive; (4) would a reasonable person in those circumstances have felt compelled to quit. Plain English: check that the reason fits the law, that the worker actually believed it, that it was the real cause (even if not the only cause), and that it would plausibly make someone quit.
Subjective assessment point: The Commissioner stresses that the enquiry looks at the worker's perspective and motive, not simply what a commissioner personally thinks is sufficiently "pressing". Plain English: the focus is on how the worker experienced the situation, not on imposing an outside standard of what everyone would consider a crisis.
The decision is applicable where:
The decision is particularly instructive for cases where the written resignation is terse but oral evidence supplies the substantive domestic reason.
The judgment itself does not canvass subsequent appellate treatment. It applies and endorses the established line of authority (Franks; Computer Sciences; Kirwan; Clancy; Eyles) without purporting to alter the law. Practitioners should therefore treat this decision as an affirmed example of the existing approach: apply the four-part test, adopt a subjective analysis of motive, and accept credible domestic ultimata as potentially sufficient. To determine whether later appellate courts have modified these principles practitioners must search subsequent reported decisions or later Full Bench/appeal determinations; none are discussed in this decision.
Margin between subjective and objective: The decision stresses subjectivity, but still asks whether a "reasonable person in the circumstances" might have felt compelled to resign. That dual language leaves room for tension between purely subjective motives and an objective yardstick. Practitioners should prepare evidence that addresses both the worker's sincere perception and why that perception was objectively plausible in the real circumstances.
Extent of evidence required where resignation letter is non-specific: The decision accepts oral evidence post hoc. It leaves open precisely how strong or corroborated that evidence must be where the written record is terse. Employers may contest credibility; unions should document contemporaneous communications when possible.
Employer inquiry obligations: The Commissioner remarked that Premier did not ask Mr Ball to explain his "personal reasons". The judgment does not resolve whether an employer that declines to inquire, or that fails to canvass reasons, can later rely on absence of particulars. The practical effect is that lack of inquiry will not prevent an employee from establishing a claim, but the precise limits remain open.
Interaction with transfer of business provisions: The decision notes the transfer of business provisions applied because Premier took over operations in 1996, but the judgment does not elaborate whether or how transmission of business affected entitlement or calculation. Where a contractor/employer changed, parties should check continuity and accrual issues under Ss.101–104.
Quantification and interest: The Commissioner accepted interest at the Schedule J Supreme Court rate as used by the TWU. The decision implicitly confirms the Commission will apply that rate, but more detailed points about the computation period and compounding were not explored.
Practical takeaways: gather contemporaneous evidence if possible, elicit and preserve credible explanation of domestic necessity, be ready to demonstrate genuineness and motivating effect, and remember that unions may pursue small claims in the Commission with statutory interest available.
IN THE MATTER of a dispute between the Transport Workers' Union of New South Wales and Premier Motor Service Pty. Limited re: failure to pay pro rata Long Service Leave.
_____________________________________________________________________
S.4(2)(a)(iii) of the 1955 Long Service Leave Act, provides pro rata long service leave in the following circumstances:
"...in the case of a worker who has completed with an employer at least five years service as an adult and whose services are terminated by the employer for any reason other than the worker's serious and wilful misconduct, or by the worker on account of illness, incapacity or domestic or other pressing necessity, or by reason of the death of the worker..."
Pursuant to the provisions of S.130 of the 1996 Industrial Relations Act, the Transport Workers' Union of New South Wales has lodged a notification of an industrial dispute with Premier Motor Service Pty Limited, a division of Nowra Coach Travel Pty Limited. The dispute concerns the failure of Premier to pay pro rata long service leave to Mr Jason Ball, its member whose resignation the TWU claims was due to "...domestic or other pressing necessity...".
The TWU has pressed its claim in these proceedings as a small claim under Ss.379 and 380 on behalf of Mr Ball. In particular, S.380(1) provides as follows:
"An industrial organisation may, during any proceedings before the Commission, make an application for an order under this Part and for the application to be dealt with under S.379 (small claims procedure)."
That remedy is available only to an "industrial organisation" recognised under the 1996 Act, ie the TWU in these proceedings. That position was confirmed by the Full Bench of the Commission (Glynn and Hungerford JJ and Connor C) in its unreported decision of Wednesday, 10 February, 1999 in Maldoc Pty Limited v. Bollard [Matter No. IRC 2710 of 1997]. The maximum amount of any order for a small claim is confined by S.379(3); it presently stands at $10,000.00. The TWU claim in this hearing is for the payment of a sum of $5,419.70 - within the existing limits of S.379(3). The amount owing is $5328.00 plus interest of $91.70.
Interest may be payable at the prescribed rate for a small claim under S.372(1), viz:
"An industrial court may order that there is to be included, an amount ordered to be paid under this Part (except under S.368), interest at the prescribed rate on the whole or any part of that amount for the whole or any part of the period from when the amount became due to the date of the order."
An "industrial court" is defined in S.364(1)(b) as including:
"...in the case of proceedings under S.380 (small claims during other Commission proceedings) - the Commission whether or not in Court Session...".
And so, as I indicated in my unreported preliminary decision of Tuesday, 15 July, 2003 in the S and L Steel New South Wales Pty Limited Case [Matter No.IRC 7306 of 2002 at p.6], in this hearing I become a "court" for the limited purposes of Ss.379 and 380 proceedings. The prescribed rate in S.372(1) is the rate of interest set from time to time in Schedule J of the Supreme Court Rules [S.272(4)] and I understand the TWU's calculations are based on that rate.
The matter was listed before me for a conference on Wednesday, 23 July, 2003. Conciliation failed to resolve the matter and I programmed it for arbitration on Thursday, 11 September, 2003, issuing the certificate of attempted conciliation required by S.135 and lodging it in the prescribed manner. Mr Kaine represented the TWU and Mr Ball in the hearing, calling him to give evidence. There was no appearance on behalf of Premier in the proceedings and Mr Kaine submitted that the matter proceed ex parte. I propose to accede to that request.
In the Dima Homes Case (1989) 5 AILR Rep.4 the Full Bench of the former State Industrial Commission (Bauer J, Varnum DP and Sheils CC) commented that for compulsory conference proceedings taken under S.25AA (the equivalent of Ss.379 and 380 in the 1940 Industrial Relations Act) that:
"...the only essentials are proper and fair notice and sufficient particulars to regulate the decision making process..."
I am satisfied that Premier was aware of these arbitrated proceedings since it was informed of them on Wednesday, 23 July, 2003 by me when the matter was programmed for hearing. Mr Ball was called to give evidence in the hearing by Mr Kaine and his evidence has persuaded me that the TWU claim has substance.
Mr Ball and his partner have been together for fourteen years. He has two children. He was employed by Premier and its predecessor (Lindsay Coaches) for in excess of five years. Premier took over the coach operations in the middle of 1996 and the transmission of business provisions of Part 8, Protection of Entitlements on Transfer of Business [Ss.101 to 104] would therefore apply to it. On Wednesday, 25 June, 2003 he tendered his resignation [Exhibit 1], viz:
"...This is to inform you that I...resign from Nowra Coaches Pty Limited because of personal reasons..."
Mr Ball did not volunteer what those "...personal reasons..." were. Nor was he asked to explain them by Premier. In my opinion, it is not surprising that employees would decline to be particularly forthcoming with that type of information which is often personal to them and which they do not necessarily want bandied around the workplace. Nevertheless, Mr Ball has now indicated in his evidence that he had been faced with an ultimatum from his partner to leave his employment because of her opposition to the excessive time he was spending away from home with his driving duties for Premier. He is now working in selling ice cream and he works less hours than he had formerly done as a coach driver.
In Franks v. Kembla Equipment Company Pty Limited (1969) AR 17 Sheldon J of the former Commission described the approach to be taken in claims of this nature (at p.18) in the following manner:
"...The test, I would suggest, is whether there is a really serious problem in the home, although not necessarily a crisis. On the one hand, the colourable and frivolous should be rejected but, on the other, over-exacting standards should not be adopted. After all, what is being dealt with is not a sphere-shaking issue but a reason for terminating employment and a material consideration must be whether the domestic situation is such that a reasonable man might feel compelled to seek its solution by terminating his employment..."
In Computer Sciences of Australia Pty Limited v. Leslie (1983) 6 IR 188 the Full Bench of the former Commission proposed (at p.191) four tests for any claim for pro rata long service leave based on the "...domestic or other pressing necessity..." ground, generally reflecting the approach of Sheldon J in Frank v. Kembla Equipment Company Pty Limited, viz:
"...(1) Was the reason claimed for termination one which fell within the section? (2) Was such reason genuinely held by the worker and not simply colourable or a rationalisation? (3) Although the reason claimed may not be the sole ground which actuated the worker in his decision to terminate, was it the real or motivating reason? (4) Was the reason such that a reasonable person in the circumstances in which the worker found himself placed might have felt compelled to terminate his employment?..."
But it appears to me to be a subjective assessment that must be made, ie what is perceived from the point of view of the employee and what was actually motivating him, rather than what a third party - a member of the Commission - may believe [Eyles v. Cook (1967) 13 FLR 42 at p.45].
There are a number of authorities on the question of what may constitute domestic or other pressing necessity which are helpful to me. For instance, the Full Bench (McKeon, Beattie and Perrignon JJ) in Clancy v. David Jones Limited (1965) AR 383 was prepared to grant pro rata long service leave to a husband who had lived with his wife and two young daughters in his parent's small house. The relationship between the wife and the mother-in-law had become somewhat strained and the wife gave an ultimatum to her husband that unless he found another house or another job, she would put her daughters in a boarding school and leave him. To '...keep the peace...' the husband complied with his wife's wishes. Horsington CIM in Kirwan v. H G Palmer Pty Limited (1964) IAS Current Review 156 was prepared to grant pro rata long service leave to a husband who terminated his employment involving long working hours because his wife had threatened to leave him unless he gave up his job. The husband did not wish to resign from his job but unless he did so he faced the possibility of his wife leaving him and the consequent disruption of his home and family life. In Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees' Union of Australia v. Sydney City Council (1988) 25 IR 401 I was satisfied that an employee's resignation had been motivated by a confrontation with his wife who wished to move to the country to be with her mother. He was obliged to leave his Sydney based employment to accompany her. I supported the payment of pro rata long service leave to that employee.
As I indicated in Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees' Union of Australia v. Sydney City Council (at p.404), each claim for payment of pro rata long service leave based on the "...domestic or other pressing necessity..." ground turns on its own facts. But, in my opinion, the circumstances before me in this hearing fall comfortably into the type of case where pro rata long service leave has in the past been granted and I have no difficulty in making a similar conclusion in this hearing. Indeed, the circumstances described to me by Mr Ball in his evidence in this hearing parallel the circumstances in Kirwan v. H G Palmer Pty Limited. Consequently, I make the following order to conclude this matter:
1. Premier Motor Service Pty Limited shall pay the sum of $5,419.70 to Mr Jason Ball within 21 days.
2. This order shall take effect on and from Thursday, 11 September, 2003.
(1983) 6 IR 188
(1967) 13 FLR 42
(1988) 25 IR 401
Order that Premier Motor Service Pty Limited pay $5,419.70 to Mr Jason Ball within 21 days; order to take effect from 11 September 2003.