..., the FER does not appear to fully consider or assess the large, isolated building having regard to the Deemed-to-Satisfy provisions of the Building Code of Australia; nor does it assess in full against the performance requirements applicable to such buildings.

1. On 7 February 2025, the BAB issued Directions and Orders requiring -

(a) The Applicant to file and serve further information, including but not limited to the following-

(i) The Fire Rescue Victoria's (FRV) view regarding the classification of the buildings and whether the building is a large isolated building;

(ii) Premising that the canopy structures may have been constructed without building permits, whether the municipal building surveyor for the Kingston City Council be joined as an interested party; and

(iii) Having regard to the FRV's pre-regulation 129 Letter of Advice dated 5 April 2024 referred to 6 variations, whereas the FRV in its Report dated 25 July 2024 lists only 3 variations.

(b) The Interested Parties to file and serve any material in support of or in opposition to the Applicant's further material.

1. On 5 March 2025, the BAB issued Directions and Orders stating that the proceeding would be heard 'on the papers'.
2. On 19 March 2025, a further FER dated 19 March 2025 was filed with the BAB (2nd FER).
3. On 20 March 2025, further applications under s 160 of the Act and s 160A of the Act were filed with the BAB.
4. On 25 March 2025, the BAB received an email from Red Fire Engineers advising that -

(a) The original (nine) Applications were withdrawn;

(b) Further applications (Applications 1-8) being commenced under s 160A of the Act; and

(c) An application (Application 9) being commenced under s 160 of the Act.

APPLICANT'S STATEMENT OF CONTENTIONS (IN SUMMARY FORM)

1. The Applicant relies on the 2nd FER.
2. Red Fire Engineers revised the original applications to apply for a determination that the proposed Performance Solution complies with the relevant Performance Requirements of the BCA and to modify cl E1.3 of the BCA applying to Class 5, 7b and 8 buildings to allow the departure relating to the fire hydrant system. We note that the revised application initially sought to modify reg 129(1) of the Building Regulations 2018 (the Regulations) which was further revised to a modification of E1.3 of the BCA. However, for avoidance of doubt, reg 129(1) of the Regulations is not a provision for the purposes of s 160(1) of the Act.
3. Subject to the design in the 2nd FER being implemented, Red Fire Engineers is of the opinion that the building is not a large-isolated building because -

(a) The subject building is to be protected with an automatic sprinkler system throughout the warehouses including the canopy area. The warehouses are fire separated achieving an FRL of 90/90/90 with exception of a few parts of the walls; and

(b) The roller doors not achieving an FRL are to be protected with sidewall or wall wetting sprinklers (the 2nd FER is inconsistent on this requirement) and the parts of the walls concealed within the office ceilings are to be protected with fire resistant insulation from within the warehouses as specified in the 2nd FER.

1. A large isolated building is a DtS concession from meeting the floor area and volume limitations pursuant to cl 2.2 of the BCA.
2. As demonstrated by the 2nd FER, the subject building does not adopt all requirements for large isolated buildings as specified in cls 2.3 and 2.4 of the BCA because the combination of the fire safety systems result in a building with the same potential fire size, intensity and hazard as a DtS building with 'full' fire compartments.
3. Due to the nature of the site and the existing warehouse being close to the boundary, perimeter access is unable to be achieved. Therefore, hardstands cannot be provided within 50 metres of every hydrant.
4. Therefore, external hydrants located more than 50 metres from the hardstand will be utilised to achieve coverage.

SECOND INTERESTED PARTY'S STATEMENT OF CONTENTIONS (IN SUMMARY FORM)

1. The Fire Rescue Commissioner (FRC) submits that it appears that the canopy structure was built without due regard to the FRC's advice. Fire Rescue Victoria (FRV) has not been able to locate any record of an application for a formal reg 129 report and consent prior to the canopy being constructed. It is unclear how the building permit was issued to construct the canopy without the report and consent of the FRC when the design team clearly stated that the building would be considered a large isolated building.
2. The requirement for the FRC's report and consent under regulation 129 should have prevented this building from being constructed. The FRC cannot provide support for buildings post construction where it was clearly indicated that such support would not be given.
3. The FRC does not consider the current access to and around the building to be sufficient to facilitate fire brigade intervention.
4. Single sided vehicle access to a large building represents significant restrictions to fire brigade intervention and may restrict responding firefighters to defensive firefighting only. Conversely the presence of perimeter vehicle access (PVA) to a building gives firefighters confidence that there are multiple access points and fire hydrants around a building. A typical large building without PVA will cause significant delays to decision making when it is difficult to assess access into the building and hydrant locations. Firefighters will only access a fire compartment for the purposes of attacking a fire when they have the protection of a charged hose line connected to a hydrant in a safe location.
5. Extreme distances between hardstands and attack hydrants will only exacerbate intervention delays if firefighting teams are sent to investigate long distances on foot. Each round trip to retrieve firefighting equipment from the firefighting appliance located on the nearest public road or hardstand will take excessive time adding further to intervention delay.
6. Intervention delays are likely to test the limits of the onsite water supply for the sprinkler systems. Fire Brigade Intervention Modelling (FBIM) is likely to indicate how long the sprinkler system will be operating prior to FRV's arrival on scene. The intervention delay could introduce a scenario where the water supply is exhausted before firefighters begin intervention activities after initial search and rescue is complete.
7. There is also fire fighter life safety risk related to extreme distances to a hardstand as there is only a limited supply of air in Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA). Although firefighters will attempt to travel to the building entry point upwind in clean air, being forced to walk through the smoke plume to access the building and return to the appliance becomes a distinct possibility when there are no options about where to site the appliance. Travel distances within any building should be limited to a maximum 100m to allow a sufficient factor of safety for SCBA limitations. In this case travel distances around the building appear to be over 200m before firefighters enter the building.
8. Wall collapse or structural failure to the external walls is a concern for any structure fire. Safety officers assigned the role of monitoring the structure during a fire event will be impaired due to limited visibility down the sides and rear of the building without placing themselves in the collapse zone. Localised failure may become a significant problem given the limited space between the external walls and the adjoining properties. The escape route for firefighters could easily be compromised causing a further extended travel distance back to the hardstand around the other side of the building.
9. Defensive firefighting opportunities are also limited by the lack of PVA as there are fewer locations to place an aerial appliance or ladder platform. The adjoining properties also provide limited locations.
10. It is the experience of FRV that restricting use of parts of a building through signage and inclusions on Essential Safety Measures is unlikely to stop those areas being used for the storage of goods. While it was likely the intention of the party that instigated the canopy works to only use these areas for certain purposes, it will be difficult to enforce these restrictions on future tenants.
11. The circumstances by which the canopy was constructed without the report and consent of the FRC should be determined and appropriate action taken.
12. Finally, the FRC does not support the building design as currently presented. Works should be proposed that address the lack of fire brigade vehicle access to each of the warehouses. This may involve partial or full removal of the canopy.

1. The 2nd FER correctly sets out that the Performance Requirements 'do not reference a fire-resistance level (FRL)'. The criteria in CP1 and CP2 criteria clearly exemplifies this, for example, CP2 states that -

A building must have elements which will, to the degree necessary, avoid the spread of fire...

1. The acceptance criteria in the 2nd FER are noted as -

The new canopy does not increase the risk of structural collapse and fire spread to adjoining fire compartments and unduly increase the risk to life safety of the occupants and firefighting personnel.

1. As critical aspects for such assessment are missing from the 2nd FER (nor was such information contained within the 1st FER), we are unable to fully assess compliance with the Performance Requirements.
2. In particular, the assessments documented in the 2nd FER, do not provide any clarification as to what the current potential fire size (fuel load) within the warehouses could be. It also does not restrict the uses of the warehouses themselves.
3. For fire brigade intervention, the 2nd FER somewhat simplistically states that -

The fire brigade intervention is not expected to be unduly affected due to the provision of sprinklers and fire compartmentation between warehouse and canopy.

1. The overall assessments appear to rely mostly on the provisions of sprinkler protection being provided to the building, without giving any details other than the type of system that is being used. We therefore conclude that based on insufficient and inadequate material we are unable to conclude whether there is compliance with the relevant provisions of the building regulations.
2. The 2nd FER sets out that -

For this building, we expect that their main activities during a fire will include assistance with evacuation and fire extinguishment using the fire hydrant system, supported by the automatic sprinkler system.

The FRC's operational firefighting concerns around sufficient access has not been satisfactorily assessed or addressed.

1. We therefore cannot assess whether the proposed measures are appropriate to meet the Performance Requirements of CP1 and CP2; in particular, in relation to avoiding fire spread to exits, between buildings or in a building, and whether the proposed structural stability of the buildings and canopy are appropriate to, among others, fire brigade intervention.
2. Finally, we are of the view that if the applications had remained applications under s160(2)(b) of the Act, we could not have been satisfied that the relief originally sought in Applications 1 through to 6 were not detrimental to the public interest.

[1] The listing dated 30 April 2025 was 'on the papers'.