Iiga v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 234

These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision. This has been made clear many times in this Court.

Federal Court of Australia|2026-03-10|Before: Derrington J

The applicant made two related submissions vis-à-vis paragraph 8.2: first, that the Tribunal failed to make any finding as to what specific conduct constituted family violence, and second, that it, consequently, did not consider whether there was a trend of increasing seriousness in his conduct.
The initial difficulty with these submissions is that they proceed on the misapprehension that the Tribunal's consideration of the matters raised in paragraph 8.2 are confined to that which appears in T [60]. It is true that, if that paragraph contained the only consideration of those issues, it would clearly be insufficient. However, it was accepted that the Tribunal had dealt with the issue of family violence at length in its consideration of the risk posed by Mr Iiga to the Australian community: see T [39]. In so doing, it recorded that throughout 2022 and 2023 there were numerous contraventions of domestic violence orders and it detailed some more relevant, specific instances of domestic violence at T [37] - [38], which have been set out above (see supra [13]).
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that, though the Tribunal's reasons are undoubtedly not a model of clarity, they should not be read narrowly nor perlustrated for error. In Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287, the Full Court emphasised that, where judicial review of a tribunal decision is sought, the court "will not be concerned with looseness in the language of the Tribunal nor with unhappy phrasing of the Tribunal's thoughts", and the tribunal's reasons "are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error". Those propositions were accepted by the plurality in Minister for Immigration and Ethic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Wu Shan Liang), where it was said that:

These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision. This has been made clear many times in this Court.

It can thus be accepted that the reasons of administrative decision-makers must be read and construed in a manner that understands that they are not all legally trained and experienced. In this way, they should not be read as if they are equivalent to judgments of the Court.
The applicant's submissions with respect to the first ground of review will be considered on that basis.

Alleged failure to consider acts of family violence

The applicant's first submission is that the Tribunal failed to articulate precisely the conduct amounting to "family violence" for the purposes of paragraph 8.2. Direction 110 defines "family violence" in paragraph 4 as being violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person's family or causes the family member to be fearful.
However, reading the reasons as a whole, the Tribunal did identify and consider two instances of Mr Iiga's conduct that would undoubtedly fall within that definition, being those incidents which occurred in December 2019 and October 2020: see T [37] - [38], extracted at supra [13]. That it did not expressly characterise them as such does not of itself demonstrate error, having regard to the remarks of the plurality in Wu Shan Liang, extracted above (supra [29]). It was, with respect, tolerably clear that thereafter in its reasons when the Tribunal referred to acts of "family violence", it was referring to these two incidents.
Faced with this difficulty, the applicant submitted further that there were other acts of family violence committed by Mr Iiga that were not considered. Specifically, reference was made to Mr Iiga's numerous contraventions of domestic violence orders throughout 2022 and 2023, which were identified by the Tribunal as being incidents in which Mr Iiga "simply ignored the prohibition on having contact with his former partner", but which did not appear to involve any violence or threat thereof: T [39]. The complaint by Mr Iiga is that the Tribunal did not consider that the contraventions amounted to "family violence" for the purposes of Direction 110.
In this regard, reference was made to the decision in Siale v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 608 at [46] (Siale), and it was submitted that it was there accepted that non-violent breaches of domestic violence orders can be considered in the context of paragraph 8.2 of Direction 110. The Court said:

I do not accept the applicant's submission that non-violent breaches of the terms of a domestic violence order can be characterised as "broader conduct" falling for consideration under paragraph 8.1 of the Direction only. Plainly, those breaches can only be referable to the order itself, which is a product of previous family violence conduct committed by the non-citizen, and therefore may well be considered "threatening or other behaviour ... that causes the family member to be fearful". As such, the making of a domestic violence order, and breaches of it, may be evidence of the seriousness of the family violence engaged in by the non-citizen.

The applicant relied on these remarks for the proposition that a breach of a domestic violence order, even where non-violent, constitutes "family violence" within the meaning of Direction 110. However, with respect, to accept that argument would be to extend the Court's reasons in Siale beyond their logical bounds. Though it is true, as the Court observed, that any breach of a domestic violence order may be illustrative of the seriousness of acts of family violence for the purposes of subparagraph 8.2(3) of Direction 110, it is another thing entirely to suggest that such breaches, themselves and without more, constitute acts of family violence. Such a proposition does not emerge from the passage cited, and to accept it would be to effectively disregard the fact that Direction 110 defines acts of family violence by reference to whether the acts in question involved threatened or actual violence, had the effect of coercing or controlling the family member, or caused the family member to be fearful. Adherence to that definition is essential given that Direction 110 declares that the Australian government has "serious concerns" about conferring on non-citizens who engage in "family violence" the privilege of entering or remaining in Australia. To that it can be added that, as a finding by a decision-maker that a person has committed an act of family violence will have very serious consequences in the application of Direction 110, the definition of "family violence" should not be given any broader construction than is required. As the definition is written, a breach of a domestic violence order will only be capable of constituting an act of "family violence" if it involved threatened or actual violence, had a coercive or controlling effect, or caused fear. If a contravention of a domestic violence order does not have that characteristic, it cannot be regarded as an act of "family violence" for the purposes of applying Direction 110.
The material before the Tribunal demonstrated that the relevant contraventions of domestic violence orders by Mr Iiga were benign and seemed to occur with the consent of the persons for whose benefit they were taken out. As such, though the contraventions remain serious and relevant to the overall consideration of Mr Iiga's conduct, the Tribunal did not act in error by not characterising them as acts of "family violence".
It follows that, on a fair reading of the Tribunal's reasons, it is sufficiently clear that the incidents identified at T [37] - [38] were the occasions of "family violence" on which the Tribunal relied for its analysis. The contraventions of the domestic violence could not be similarly characterised.

Alleged failure to consider the diminishing seriousness of the applicant's conduct over time

The applicant's second submission with respect to paragraph 8.2 was that articulated in paragraph 29 of his written submissions, being:

Plainly, the Tribunal failed to appreciate and then consider that: (a) Mr Igga's [sic] initial breaches were the most serious and occurred in June 2018 and September 2019; (b) there was a gap of two years before Mr Iiga committed the further breaches between October 2022 and December 2023; and (c) none of the further contraventions, referred to at [39], involved violent conduct.

The submission sought to be advanced was that the Tribunal did not articulate any reasoning as to whether there was a trend of increasing seriousness in Mr Iiga's conduct, in accordance with subparagraph 8.2(3)(a) (see supra [26]). The submission proceeded on the basis that, had the Tribunal addressed this issue, it would have accepted that the incidents of family violence decreased in intensity over time, given that the 2022 and 2023 incidents, unlike those in 2018 and 2019, did not involve violent conduct.
This submission cannot be accepted because it relies upon the mistaken assumption that Mr Iiga's contraventions of domestic violence orders in 2022 and 2023 were acts of "family violence". For the reasons identified, that cannot be accepted. That being so, the Tribunal was not required to consider those matters for the purposes of subparagraph 8.2(2)(a) of Direction 110.
It follows that the submission made as to the non-compliance with paragraph 8.2 of Direction 110 cannot succeed.
No other allegation of breach of paragraph 8.2 was relied upon and, consequently, the first ground of review must fail.

The second ground of review asserts that the Tribunal acted in error by failing to comply with paragraph 8.1 of Direction 110. In particular, it is alleged that the Tribunal failed to sufficiently consider the "likelihood" of Mr Iiga engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct when assessing the risk posed by him to the Australian community, as required by subparagraph 8.1.2(2)(b).
Paragraph 8.1.2 of Direction 110 reads:

8.1.2. The risk to the Australian community should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct

(1) In considering the need to protect the Australian community (including individuals, groups or institutions) from harm, decision-makers should have regard to the Government's view that the Australian community's tolerance for any risk of future harm becomes lower as the seriousness of the potential harm increases. Some conduct and the harm that would be caused, if it were to be repeated, is so serious that any risk that it may be repeated may be unacceptable.

(2) In assessing the risk that may be posed by the non-citizen to the Australian community, decision-makers must have regard to, cumulatively:

a) the nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community should the non-citizen engage in further criminal or other serious conduct; and

b) the likelihood of the non-citizen engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct, taking into account:

information and evidence on the risk of the non-citizen reoffending; and

evidence of rehabilitation achieved by the time of the decision, giving weight to time spent in the community since their most recent offence (noting that decisions should not be delayed in order for rehabilitative courses to be undertaken).

where consideration is being given to whether to refuse to grant a visa to the non-citizen -whether the risk of harm may be affected by the duration and purpose of the non-citizen's intended stay, the type of visa being applied for, and whether there are strong or compassionate reasons for granting a short stay visa.

Overall, paragraph 8.1.2 is concerned with identifying the risk posed to the Australian community of harm flowing from any future offending by the non-citizen. In the assessment of that issue the decision-maker is to consider the matters in subparagraph 8.1.2(2) which includes the likelihood of the non-citizen engaging in further criminal conduct taking into account evidence of rehabilitation and the risk of reoffending.
In the context of that analytical process, it appears settled that the risk to the Australian community of a non-citizen committing further offences, or engaging in other serious conduct, should be considered in the light of the decision-maker's assessment of the "nature and seriousness of the offending": BYN23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCAFC 14; (2025) 307 FCR 150, 168 - 169 [97].
On behalf of Mr Iiga, it was submitted that, whilst the Tribunal found that there was a "real risk" of a return to past offending (T [58]), it failed to properly assess the "likelihood" of that risk materialising. So the submission went, Direction 110 requires a more definitive assessment of the likelihood of reoffending; something akin to identifying that it was "low", "medium" or "high". It follows, then, that the Tribunal's finding that there was a "real risk" of him re-offending, fell short of a finding of the likelihood of him doing so. That submission misunderstands what is required by Direction 110.
Again, though the Tribunal's reasons lack some clarity, read as a whole and contextually, its expression of the likelihood of future conduct was articulated by identifying that the risk of reoffending was "real". That being something greater than merely speculative or hypothetical; something more than a mere possibility. Moreover, it can be seen to be the consideration of a mandatory consideration when addressing the question of the risk that Mr Iiga posed to the Australian community.
In the course of considering the nature and seriousness of Mr Iiga's conduct, the Tribunal referred to his long and serious criminal record, that many offences committed by him involved violence, including against police, and that there had been a concerning increase in the seriousness of the offending. It was in that context that the Tribunal addressed the requirements of paragraph 8.1.2(2).
It first identified the seriousness of the consequences which would follow were Mr Iiga to engage in any of the types of criminality in which he had previously been involved: see T [47] - [49]. Those consequences were identified as being the suffering of actual or grievous bodily harm with the consequential sequelae, the deprivation of property or money, or the occasioning of serious injury or death from Mr Iiga's unlawful road behaviour.
It then addressed a previous psychological report which suggested a lower risk of violent offending: T [50]. However, it was noted that, despite that assessment, Mr Iiga went on to commit numerous further offences, including violent offences. This was obviously a consideration of the likelihood that Mr Iiga might reoffend. The prior assessment of him being a low risk was evidently misplaced.
The Tribunal then noted a number of rehabilitative courses undertaken by Mr Iiga relating to the consumption of alcohol and drugs: T [52]. It was observed that those courses and treatment did not prevent him from subsequently consuming drugs and alcohol. It also found that, despite the applicant receiving a formal warning letter in 2007 that any further offending might result in the cancellation of his visa, it did not prevent his continued offending: T [53]. Again, the Tribunal's consideration of these matters is a clear indication of it addressing the question of the likelihood that Mr Iiga will reoffend in the future.
The Tribunal then turned its attention to the evidence of the applicant's assertions that he will not offend in the future, and that he had a strong reason to fulfil that indication by reason of his relationship with his son: T [55]. In this regard, the Tribunal noted that on 5 December 2019, at a sentencing hearing, both the applicant and his barrister directly addressed the Court indicating that there would be no further offending: T [56]. As the criminal history shows, he continued to offend.
The Tribunal, thereafter, noted that in all the circumstances of his offending, and of the evidence relating to the likelihood of his reoffending, it was unable to accept that the applicant was unlikely to reoffend: T [57]. Given his history and his illicit drug addiction, and failed rehabilitation attempts, it considered that "there remains a real risk that the applicant will return to taking illicit drugs and return to the types of crimes that he has committed in the past": T [58].
In these circumstances, there is no basis for suggesting that it did not assess the likelihood of Mr Iiga engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct. Since all that Direction 110 requires is that the issue be considered, the Tribunal's assessment of the relevant factors - which were obviously directed to the likelihood of reoffending and served no other purpose -was sufficient. Ultimately, the Tribunal identified the likelihood was one of there being a "real risk". It was not obliged to formulate any precise identification of the likelihood of reoffending, even less was it required to identify some percentage chance. All that Direction 110 demands is the assessment of the risk that might be posed to Australian citizens, and that it include consideration of the likelihood of reoffending. It was not shown that the Tribunal failed to address that requirement in this case.
No error appears from the reasons of the Tribunal.

It follows that neither of the articulated grounds of review can succeed. The result must be that the application for review be dismissed.
There is no reason why the applicant should not pay the Minister's costs of the application and an order should be made accordingly.

I certify that the preceding fifty-nine (59) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Derrington.

By an amended Originating Application filed 30 January 2026, the applicant, Mr Iiga, seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 29 July 2025, which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, not to revoke an earlier mandatory cancellation of Mr Iiga's Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) Visa (the visa) made under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act): Iiga and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Migration) [2025] ARTA 1918 (T).
Mr Iiga's application is advanced on two grounds. By each, he asserts that the Tribunal's decision is infected by a jurisdictional error as a result of it failing to comply with Direction 110, Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA (Direction 110), as is required by s 499 of the Act. In particular, he claims that the Tribunal failed to take into account (a) certain mandatory considerations relating to the assessment of the seriousness of domestic or family violence found to have been engaged in by him, and (b) the risk to the Australian community should the applicant commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct.

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