1. GFJ, [Redacted], is appointed administrator for IGD.
2. GFJ has power to make decisions about all financial matters.
3. The administrator has powers given under the Guardianship and Administration Act 2019 (Vic) section:

1. Administrators must comply with the Guardianship and Administration Act 2019 (Vic), which outlines their powers and duties.
2. The administrators must continue to submit an annual Account by Administrator (ABA) for each financial year by no later than 30 September each year to be examined by State Trustees Limited, who may charge the estate an approved examination fee.

VCAT makes this order because it is satisfied that:

- due to a disability, IGD does not have capacity to make decisions about the financial matters listed in this order,

- IGD needs an administrator, considering the factors set out in section 31 of the Act, including their will and preferences (what's important to them), and

- this administration order will promote the personal and social wellbeing of IGD.

1. This order applies until VCAT makes another order.
2. Anyone can apply for VCAT to reassess this order at any time.
3. VCAT is due to reassess this administration order by 31 December 2027.

VCAT will automatically schedule a hearing and notify the parties and interested persons when the reassessment hearing can be scheduled. Unless VCAT makes a new order that cancels (revokes) this order, this order does not expire, even if a reassessment does not take place until after the above date.

1. If GFJ or IGD changes contact details (email, phone or address), GFJ must immediately inform VCAT in writing.

The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) is providing these reasons on a confidential basis. Clause 37(1) of Schedule 1 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) provides that unless VCAT orders otherwise, a person must not publish or broadcast any report of a proceeding under the Guardianship and Administration Act 2019 (Vic)that identifies or could lead to the identification of a party to the proceeding.**

1. In these written reasons for decision, I refer to the person who is the subject of the order of administration as IGD. The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) has given the person that anonymised name to protect their identity and the confidentiality of their personal information.
2. For the same reason, to protect the identity of the represented person, VCAT has allocated initials to describe the members of IGD's immediate family who attended the hearing:

NQT - daughter who nominated to be appointed instead of GFJ; and

YXN - son who nominated to be appointed instead of GFJ.

Wherever possible, for the sake of easier reading, I shall refer to individuals by their relationship with the represented person.

1. IGD is a retired medical doctor diagnosed with Alzheimer's dementia in 2023 on a background of mild cognitive impairment diagnosed in 2021. He divorced some 30 years ago and is father to four adult children. I was satisfied all four children were aware of the hearing but three only chose to be involved.
2. By order dated 21 September 2023, VCAT had appointed GFJ as the administrator for IGD with responsibility to manage all of IGD's financial matters. By the order of appointment, the administrator was required to lodge a Financial Statement and Plan (FSP) as well as Accounts by Administrator (ABA) for the period from the date of appointment to 30 June 2024. GFJ had lodged with VCAT the FSP and ABA within the times specified within the order of appointment. The FSP had been formally approved by VCAT order dated 23 May 2024 and the ABA had been independently examined and been found to be in order.
3. I note that the appointed administrator was also appointed under two separate personal instruments made by IGD when he was competent - as guardian for personal matters and as medical treatment decision maker under valid enduring appointments.
4. Under the order of administration made on 21 September 2023, VCAT stated that the order of administration would:
   1. be reassessed no later than 30 September 2024; and
   2. the order applied until VCAT makes another order.
5. In August 2024, the administrator (GFJ) made a formal application for VCAT to reassess the administration order. He stated that 'some family members' were applying pressure 'to cede the administration to their control'. The administrator described urgent financial matters that needed to be decided for his father and petitioned for VCAT to settle, without delay, the question of who would be the administrator required to manage such matters.
6. VCAT subsequently received an application made in the name of Ms E. Rothschild, solicitor, acting on behalf of NQT and YXV, under which they nominated to be appointed as administrators in place of GFJ. In an attached statement, NQT and YXV stated 'under the current administration, we understand that IGD receives no therapy, no particularised medication, no exercise, no neurologist, no dietician assessment, an inappropriate diet and is locked in a dementia ward'. The application did not seek orders about the enduring appointments made by IGD nor the appointment of a guardian. The proceeding before VCAT was limited to the questions of whether IGD continued to qualify for and need an administration order and, if so, who the administrator for IGD should be.
7. The administrator son and the applicant son and daughter both filed with VCAT the material they relied upon ahead of the hearing. The administrator son claimed that his siblings had failed to serve upon him all of the material they had filed.
8. The material filed in this proceeding demonstrated the animus and distrust between the siblings.
9. The hearing to reassess the administration order was heard by me via videoconference on 5 December 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, I made a three-year administration order reappointing GFJ as administrator, to be reassessed by 31 December 2027. I gave oral reasons for my decision. GFJ has asked for written reasons and I set out below a written version of the reasons I gave at the hearing with some explanation of the matters considered and the weight attached to the evidence.
10. As administrator, GFJ has power to make decisions about all financial matters for IGD and can exercise all the powers of an administrator in the Guardianship and Administration Act 2019 (Vic) (the Act).
11. I further ordered that the administrator continue to lodge with VCAT annual accounts for independent auditing.

1. When VCAT is conducting a reassessment, section 165 of the Act says the represented person must attend the hearing. There are exceptions: the hearing can go ahead without the person if the VCAT member is satisfied either that the person does not wish to attend or that their attendance is impracticable or unreasonable despite any arrangement VCAT can make.
2. At the commencement of the hearing before me, IGD was initially distressed - he wanted a named person, who he said was his lawyer to be present. I was told, and I accepted, that the person who IGD named as a lawyer is, in fact, a geriatrician. It was not possible to have the named person attend the hearing and IGD subsequently settled, and the hearing proceeded.
3. Based on the report of Dr I. Sotthivej and the presentation of IGD at hearing, together with the material filed and views expressed by all family members at hearing, I was comfortably satisfied that IGD lacked the capacity to manage his financial affairs because of his diagnosed disability.
4. I was also satisfied that IGD:
   1. had not appointed an attorney with authority to manage financial matters; and
   2. had appointed an enduring guardian/decision maker to make decisions about personal matters and medical treatment.

1. A person (including VCAT) exercising powers functions and duties under the Act must have regard to the principles set out in section 8 of the Act. In summary, they are:
   1. a person with a disability should be given practicable and appropriate support to make and participate in decisions, express their will and preferences and develop their decision-making capacity;
   2. the will and preferences of a person with a disability should direct decisions made for the person, as far as practicable; and
   3. powers, functions and duties must be used in the way which is the least restrictive of the ability of the person with a disability to decide and act as is possible in the circumstances.
2. Section 9 of the Act sets out further principles which apply to a person making a decision 'for' a represented person. These apply to a guardian, administrator, supportive guardian or supportive administrator who is making a decision for a represented person. They would also apply to VCAT when it is advising an appointed decision-maker about their powers and duties.

1. The term 'will and preferences' is not defined within the Act but is taken to mean the things that are important to the represented person.
2. When appointing an administrator, VCAT must apply the principles in section 8, including that IGD's will and preferences should direct the decision 'as far as practicable'.
3. IGD's will and preferences are relevant also when VCAT decides whether a person needs an administrator (section 31) and whether a proposed administrator is a suitable person to be appointed (section 32(3)(a)).
4. GFJ stated in submissions that his siblings were estranged from their father and 'had not seen him in years'.
5. At hearing, I asked NQT when she had last seen her father. She responded that she had not seen him since before COVID, but that she had spoken with him, by telephone, 'every couple of months' and had spent an hour with him on the telephone the previous night when he had said that he wanted her to be his administrator.
6. The file of VCAT proceedings in relation to IGD revealed that in 2023, when the administration order was first made, IGD was able to express his wishes about who should be appointed and nominated GFJ. That nomination was consistent with IGD having appointed GFJ as his enduring guardian in 2013.

1. Section 30(2)(a) of the Act says VCAT may only appoint (or reappoint) an administrator for a person if satisfied that because of the person's disability, the person does not have decision-making capacity in relation to the financial matters which are the subject of the application.
2. At the time of the original application, VCAT had received a report from Dr I. Sotthivej which report stated IGD lacks decision-making capacity as a result of Alzheimer's dementia.
3. I note that no member of the family disputed that IGD lacked capacity. In seeking to be appointed, each of the three children involved in the proceeding were, in effect, acknowledging that IGD continues to lack decision making capacity to manage his finances and that he needed someone to do so on his behalf
4. Based on Dr Sotthivej's report and the progressive nature of the disability, my own observations and the views of family members at the hearing, I was comfortably satisfied that IGD continues to lack the capacity to make decisions about the management of all of his estate.

IS A SUPPORTIVE ADMINISTRATION ORDER APPROPRIATE?

1. Appointing a supportive administrator would be less restrictive than appointing an administrator. A less restrictive order would be consistent with the principles in section 8 of the Act.
2. VCAT has power to appoint a supportive administrator whenever an application is made for appointment or reappointment of an administrator, as provided by section 87 of the Act.
3. However, to appoint a supportive administrator for a person, the person must consent and must have decision-making capacity when practicable and appropriate support is provided, as set out in section 87(2) of the Act.
4. In the present case, this less restrictive alternative was not available because Dr Sotthivej's evidence was that IGD lacks decision-making capacity because of his disability. I was satisfied that there was no likelihood IGD would have decision-making capacity even when supported.

1. Section 30 (2)(b) of the Act says VCAT may only appoint an administrator for a person if satisfied that the person needs an administrator.
2. Section 31 of the Act sets out a number of matters VCAT must consider in determining whether a person needs an administrator. VCAT must consider the person's will and preferences (as far as they can be ascertained) and whether decisions about the relevant financial matters could be more suitably made informally or could reasonably be made by mediation, negotiation or some similar method. VCAT must also consider the wishes of any primary carer, relative or other person with a direct interest in the application and must also consider the desirability of preserving existing relationships important to the person with a disability.
3. In this case, IGD needs an administrator because he did not execute an enduring power of attorney for financial matters and according to the medical report, his memory, understanding and lack of insight are all affected by his disability. The effect is such that he is unable make decisions about how to manage his income and expenses and such matters are not able to be managed informally.
4. Each of IGD's children who participated in the hearing were of the view that their father needs an administrator. Each sought to be appointed.
5. Taking all this into account, I was satisfied that IGD needs an administrator and that such an appointment would promote his personal and social wellbeing as required by section 30(2)(c) of the Act.

1. This was the issue which most exercised the family members who attended the hearing. GFJ sought to be reappointed and NQT and YXN sought to be appointed to replace their brother.
2. When I asked NQT and YXN why they should be appointed as administrators for her father, they both told me that being appointed administrator would enable them to secure accommodation for their father in a different aged care facility and to ensure that he received appropriate medical treatment for known medical conditions - matters they alleged GFJ was neglecting.
3. GFJ alleged that the application made to replace him as administrator was misconceived and made in bad faith by his siblings who were estranged from their father and who were unsuitable to be appointed by reason of matters alleged, including: mental illness; convictions for fraud against family members and theft from IGD. I note that IGD detailed such allegations in his written submissions which were served upon his siblings and which neither contradicted.
4. In their submissions, NQT and YXN said they should be appointed as administrators because their father was not in a suitable aged care facility and was being denied appropriate care and medical assessment and treatment. Neither denied the submissions made by GFJ as to their suitability to be appointed, rather they doubled down on their criticism of GFJ, however their criticism related to matters managed by GFJ in his role as guardian and/or medical treatment decision maker for IGD. When it was explained that decisions about where a person lives and medical treatment are not matters decided by an administrator, NQT and YXN submitted that GFJ had failed to use the represented person's funds to secure appropriate healthcare. That allegation was unsubstantiated by any material filed or submissions made and denied by GFJ.
5. NQT told me that she had spoken by telephone for 60 minutes with her father the night before the hearing and that he wanted her to be appointed as administrator to replace GFJ. NQT also submitted on the day of the hearing, an unsigned form in which she purported to record the telephone conversation with her father. Further, NQT told me she had recorded the discussion with her father.
6. While not a party to the proceeding, IGD's brother had clearly encouraged NQT and YXN to believe that GFJ was unsuitable and that they should nominate to replace him. GFJ submitted that it was his uncle who had arranged for Ms Rothschild to represent NQT and YXN. Both IGD's brother and Ms Rothschild submitted that GFJ was unsuitable to be the administrator on the basis of things alleged to have been done or not done by GFJ, but which were not within the authority of an appointed administrator. IGD's brother submitted, without any evidence to support the claim, that the administrator (GFJ) had failed to secure appropriate medical treatment for IGD and that GFJ was motivated to have his father die prematurely leaving GFJ to 'get the money'.
7. While Ms Rothschild and IGD's brother claimed GFJ was unsuitable to be reappointed as administrator, neither provided any relevant evidence of his unsuitability. The submissions in opposition to the reappointment of GFJ as administrator, all focussed on matters beyond the authority of an appointed administrator.
8. I was satisfied that GFJ should be reappointed as administrator for his father for the following reasons:
   1. GFJ had complied with the terms of the order under which he had been appointed as administrator - it was apparent that he had complied with section 55 of the Act and he had lodged the FSP and ABA which had been examined and found to be in order;
   2. As a lawyer, GFJ had demonstrated a good understanding of the obligations on him as an administrator appointed under the Act.
   3. I attached little weight to the claim by NQT that her father had stated that he wanted her to be his administrator. While NQT was evasive when I asked her when she had last seen her father, I was satisfied that they were estranged. Further, I could not be sure what NQT had said to her father in their telephone conversation the evening before and what he said in response, but NQT summarised it as:

My weighting of NQT's evidence on this point was affected by matters including NQT's lack of understanding that administration was limited to managing finances and the likelihood that IGD did also not understand NQT to be putting herself forward to manage his finances.

1. NQT also said that when the order of administration was first made, her father had wanted GFJ to be appointed and she had been accepting of that. NQT said that she had since received 'alarming reports' from her uncle 'about everything that [GFJ] is not doing'. NQT then went on to explain that 'the main point of contention' related to the fact that IGD had been placed into an aged care facility which was not aligned to her father's culture/religion.
2. While not relevant to the proceeding, I allowed GFJ to respond and he explained that the facility which other members of the family wanted IGD to reside in had no vacancies and a lengthy waiting list.
3. I accepted the claim by GFJ that NQT and YXN were effectively estranged from their father and had been for some time. I noted correspondence referred to by GFJ, and purportedly written by NQT, where she acknowledged both her estrangement and that her father would not want her as the administrator. NQT did not dispute that evidence.
4. Neither NQT nor YXN demonstrated that they understood what an administration order was about. Both criticised and sought to have GFJ removed as administrator for not having done things that he could not legally do as an administrator.
5. I noted the serious allegations made by GFJ as to the suitability and character of NQT and YXN, and that neither denied the allegations at hearing. I explained in my oral reasons that I had not tested the allegations so it was not appropriate for me to attach weight to the allegations. Instead of finding that NQT and YXN were unsuitable by reasons of character, I formed the view that GFJ was suitable and appropriate to be reappointed as administrator and I based that view on GFJ's performance as appointed administrator.
6. I was satisfied that GFJ as administrator was available to his father and responsive to his needs.
7. While not directly relevant to the matters before me, no evidence was produced to support the claim by NQT and YXN that IGD had unmet needs for medical treatment. I noted that IGD lives in a facility where residents are provided with 24-hour care overseen by staff some of whom will be trained as nurses. In any event, the hearing before me did not relate to GFJ's role as enduring guardian or appointed medical treatment decision-maker. I was considering whether GFJ was suitable to be reappointed as administrator.

1. The order says that the administrator can make decisions about all financial matters and exercise all the relevant powers in the Act (sections 46 and 52). That is because IGD owns property, receives income and has expenses which must be paid.
2. The Act gives guidance for the administrator about how to exercise their financial decision-making power. The principles in section 8 and section 9 of the Act apply to those decisions.
3. Section 9 of the Act sets out the principles applying when a decision is made for a represented person. It says the administrator 'should give all practicable and appropriate effect to the represented person's will and preferences'. It also says that IGD's will and preferences 'should only be overridden if it is necessary to do so to prevent serious harm' to him.
4. Section 55 sets out further requirements of the administrator. Some of the requirements, most relevant in this case, are that the administrator must act as an advocate for the represented person, must act in such a way as to protect him from neglect abuse or exploitation and must avoid any conflict of interest.

1. This order will be reassessed before the end of three years, as required by the Act. IGD or anyone else can apply for the reassessment to be sooner if that is necessary.