1. Idrizi was born in Australia on 4 October 2004. In July 2024, he pleaded guilty, before the Ringwood Magistrates' Court, to three charges of affray, and two charges of recklessly causing injury. He also pleaded guilty to charges of possession of a controlled weapon without excuse, dealing with property suspected of being proceeds of crime, and possession of diazepam. He was convicted on each charge and placed on a community correction order for 16 months, a condition of which was that he perform 120 hours of unpaid community work. The charges of affray and recklessly causing injury arose from three separate incidents which occurred between February and November 2023.
2. Idrizi's parents, who are of Albanian descent, migrated to Australia from Kosovo. Idrizi has a twin brother.
3. Idrizi was raised in a close and supportive environment with his mother and father. However, his childhood, and teenage years, were marked by behavioural issues. When he was in grade 3 in primary school, he developed a close rapport with the male janitor of the school, with whom he spent a significant amount of time. The janitor engaged in sexually inappropriate conduct to Idrizi, including touching his genital area. Subsequently, when Idrizi was 10 years of age, an older male cousin also engaged in several instances of sexually inappropriate conduct with him.
4. In his secondary education years, Idrizi attended Years 7 and 8 at Fountain Gate Secondary College. However, his persistent defiance and misconduct resulted in his expulsion from that school. He then attended Gleneagles Secondary College for Year 9, but discontinued his education after the commencement of Year 10. Having left school, Idrizi had a period of unemployment. Subsequently he engaged in brief employment periods of approximately six months each in carpentry and then in truck parts manufacturing. His employment in both of those capacities was terminated as a result of his absences from work and also his involvement in verbal altercations. The applicant's most consistent employment was for a period of six months in 2024 with his father, who worked in the caravan industry.
5. From an early age, Idrizi manifested behavioural and psychological problems. In February 2010, he was referred by his general practitioner to Dr Peter Forrest, a paediatrician, for assessment relating to his behavioural issues. Dr Forrest noted that Idrizi presented as a boy with difficult behaviour and possible speech delay, and that he might also have cognitive impairment with attendant difficulties. Dr Forrest was of the opinion that those issues were suggestive of an underlying pervasive developmental disorder.
6. In January 2012, Idrizi was diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD), Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). He was medicated with Ritalin between the ages of eight years and 13 years. In 2020, he was assessed by Ms Natalie Beebe, a speech pathologist, to have a mild expressive language disorder that was associated with his ASD. In June 2020, he was assessed by Ms Rachael Yeo, a psychologist, to have a full scale IQ score of 80, which placed him in the low average range. Notably, his performance in the verbal comprehension domain was in the very low range.
7. Idrizi has a history of alcohol and substance abuse. He commenced consuming alcohol at the age of 10 years. By the age of 15 years, he consumed binge-oriented amounts of alcohol. At the age of 16 years, he commenced using cannabis. He also commenced methamphetamine use at the age of 18 years. He used that substance in increasing quantities in the period leading to his arrest and incarceration.
8. Following Idrizi's remand in custody in Ravenhall Correctional Centre, he completed three sessions of the Motivating Affect Self-Control (MASC) program. That program provides strategies that contain steps to assist recovering addicts, and other persons with offending backgrounds, to self-regulate their emotions within a motivational framework.
9. While in custody, Idrizi was assessed by Ms Andrea McNeill, a consultant psychologist, in March 2025 and April 2025. Ms McNeill took a detailed history, which included details relating to his mental health and substance abuse history. Ms McNeill concluded that Idrizi's clinical presentation and psychometric results demonstrated a pattern that was consistent with a diagnosis of ADHD, ASD, and Borderline Personality Disorder. She also diagnosed Idrizi to have a Stimulant Use Disorder. In her report, Ms McNeill noted that Idrizi had a history of childhood sexual abuse which had had a profound and lasting impact on his emotional development, interpersonal functioning, and behavioural responses. Idrizi demonstrated to Ms McNeill strong emotional reactions and elevated arousal and response to individuals who he identified or perceived as paedophiles. She recommended that he undergo therapeutic support that focused on trauma processing, emotional recreation, and the development of safe coping mechanisms.
10. In her first report dated 8 May 2025, Ms McNeill expressed the view that a term of imprisonment would probably weigh more heavily on Idrizi, who would be a vulnerable individual within the custodial environment due to his mental health vulnerabilities. She also considered that the volatile and unpredictable nature of the prison environment could lead to an exacerbation of Idrizi's symptomatology and a deterioration of his mental health. She advised that as a result of the applicant's current level of need, he required immediate psychological support, which could be appropriately attended by the MASC program.
11. On 11 May 2025, Ms McNeill responded, as an addendum to that report, by email to three questions asked of her by Idrizi's legal practitioners. The second question was whether Ms McNeill believed that the Verdins principles had any applicability to Idrizi's 'lack of judgment in his decision‑making' in committing the offences. Ms McNeill answered that question in the positive. She expressed the following views:

... In addition to the previously mentioned limbs 5 and 6 [of Verdins], Mr Idrizi demonstrated impaired judgment during the offence. He suffers from several co-existing mental health and neurodevelopmental issues, including ASD, ADHD and traits of BPD, compounded by a history of complex trauma particularly childhood sexual assault. These factors are acknowledged under principle 1 of R v Verdins as possibly limiting an individual's capacity for reasoning and sound judgment. Such conditions likely diminished his ability to think clearly, control impulses, and evaluate the moral and legal ramifications of his actions, particularly in emotionally charged or triggering situations. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Mr Idrizi's mental functioning was compromised in a way that contributed to his offences; therefore, this is relevant when assessing moral culpability and sentencing.

1. Subsequently, in her second report dated 8 June 2025, Ms McNeill noted that Idrizi had successfully completed the three full rounds of the MASC program. She noted that, albeit in a brief timeframe, Idrizi demonstrated notable improvements in confidence and trust, and that he exhibited remarkable progress in articulating and confronting his challenging emotions. In particular, after the third round of the MASC program, Idrizi displayed a rapidly expanding understanding of the emotion regulation tools presented to him. Ms McNeill stated that Idrizi required ongoing psychological support to continue processing the traumatic events to which he had been subjected in his childhood.
2. Ms McNeill gave evidence on the plea. She said that the applicant now has a deeper understanding of the associations between his drug use and his behaviour, and an understanding that resort to violence is not a solution and not acceptable. Ms McNeill noted that Idrizi had a history of sexual abuse combined with a diagnosis of ASD, and that, as a consequence, he had struggled to make social connections. She considered that when he was exposed to a person who he believed to be a paedophile, he would become dysregulated, and the trauma from the sexual abuse, that he had suffered, would have influenced his behaviour. Ms McNeill also expressed the view that, as a result of his condition, the applicant would be a 'vulnerable target to the wrong people' in prison.
3. On the plea, counsel for Idrizi placed particular reliance on the opinions expressed by Ms McNeill, and contended that the applicant should be released on a community correction order with conditions which would address his mental health and drug and substance abuse issues. At the time of sentence, the applicant had spent more than eight months on remand. It was submitted that the appropriate disposition would be to adjourn the sentencing for a period of three months, during which Idrizi would remain on parole, and at the conclusion of that period impose the CCO. Equally, it was submitted that, pursuant to s 5(2H)(e) of the Sentencing Act, there were substantial and compelling circumstances that were exceptional and rare that would justify the making of such an order.

1. Bloch was born on 1 June 2004. On 17 September 2024, he was convicted by the Melbourne Magistrates' Court, and placed on an 18-month community correction order, on two charges of robbery, and one charge each of possession of a controlled weapon without excuse and possession of a drug of dependence.
2. Bloch has an older brother and an older sister. When he was two years of age, his parents separated, and since then Bloch has only had intermittent contact with his father. Bloch's mother worked in two or three jobs at a time in order to support her young family. He had a history of stable housing throughout his childhood, growing up in Cranbourne.
3. Bloch attended five separate high schools, from each of which he was expelled, due to his involvement in physical altercations with his peers. Having completed Year 10, he undertook Year 11 at home, but he did not complete his education for that year. He completed a one-year carpentry apprenticeship at TAFE, and then completed a certificate in security operations. However, his plans to pursue a career in security were undermined by his arrest on the charges which relate to his previous convictions. Subsequently, Bloch had employment in a number of different occupations, including pick and packing, cabinetmaking and warehouse work.
4. At the age of 16 years, Bloch commenced to smoke cannabis. As a result of his drug use, he struggled to maintain consistent employment, often losing motivation after a couple of months in a particular role.
5. Bloch has had two previous intimate relationships. The first relationship deteriorated, and subsequently ended, after he and his partner engaged in drug use. He subsequently had a relationship with another young woman for about six months. The relationship was initially stable, but it deteriorated after Bloch learnt that his partner had been sexually assaulted by two or three males. The relationship ended in August 2024.
6. When Bloch was nine years of age, he was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder. In 2016, he was diagnosed also with Bipolar Affective Disorder, and in November 2023 he was diagnosed with Generalised Anxiety Disorder. Since the age of 19 years, he had been prescribed medication, that included antidepressant prescriptions (Avanza and Effexor) and anxiolytic medication (Temazepam and Lyrica). Following his remand, he was prescribed antidepressant medication (Zoloft) and medication to assist him with sleep.
7. Bloch was examined by Ms Daniella Kocic, a psychologist, on 22 April 2025, for the purposes of his plea. Ms Kocic noted that at the time of the offending, the applicant had been unemployed. His intimate relationship with his ex-partner had ended in difficult circumstances. His mental health had also been exacerbated by health problems affecting his mother. At the time, he had become consumed by homicidal ideation, in which he experienced a strong desire to find and confront individuals whom he associated with paedophiles and rapists, those feelings being driven by emotions of betrayal and mistreatment of his ex-partner. Bloch had increased his use of Xanax, he was consuming cannabis, and he had also experimented with methamphetamine.
8. Ms Kocic, in conclusion, noted that Bloch presented with a history of an unstable childhood in the context of witnessing family violence, parental separation, accommodation instability and perceived neglect. She considered that Bloch's destabilising childhood experiences had led to a decline in his psychological functioning, which contributed to the onset of persistent and recurrent Major Depressive Disorder and Generalised Anxiety Disorder. Ms Kocic expressed the opinion that due to Bloch's low self-esteem and need to belong, he had sought comfort and connection in association with group-affiliated individuals, which was a motivating factor of his offending. In addition, Bloch's exposure to substance use among adolescent peers normalised and desensitised him to unconventional behaviour.
9. Ms Kocic considered that a number of factors had contributed to his offending behaviour. They included the fact that he was unemployed, he was experiencing psychosocial stressors, his former partner had disclosed that she had been sexually assaulted, and he had feelings of anger and frustration as a result of learning of that assault. Ms Kocic also considered that Bloch's violent offending was probably predisposed by his early life experiences, which had desensitised him to violence, and contributed to the development of cognitive distortions. Ms Kocic considered that Bloch's capacity to engage in rational decision-making, and to appreciate the wrongfulness and consequences of his conduct, were likely impaired due to his use of cannabis, Xanax and methamphetamine. She concluded that Bloch's risk of reoffending would be perpetuated if he were to reaffiliate with antisocial peers, relapse to substance abuse, and not access appropriate intervention to manage his alcohol and other drug disorder.
10. On the plea, in mitigation, counsel submitted that as Bloch was a young offender, his rehabilitation was more important than the sentencing purpose of general deterrence. Counsel also relied on the fact that Bloch had pleaded guilty at the committal mention, so that the plea had significant utilitarian value. In addition, the present case was the first occasion on which Bloch had been detained in custody. It was submitted that the judge should impose a term of imprisonment on the charge of armed robbery, and a community correction order on the remaining charges. In that respect, it was contended that the community correction order would have a punitive component, while at the same time addressing Bloch's mental health issues, his drug and alcohol addiction, and his issues with anger management.

1. The judge commenced his sentencing reasons[5] by summarising the circumstances of the offending, and the matters relied on by each of the three accused in mitigation. The judge then considered the issues relating to the gravity of the offending. His Honour expressed the view that the conduct of each of the three offenders (Idrizi, Bloch and Nowruzi) constituted serious examples of armed robbery, in particular. His Honour noted that the offending against RJ was organised, planned and in company, and that the offending in each of the three incidents was repeated against different victims.[6] The circumstances that were the subject of charges 3 and 4 constituted a prolonged attack on RJ that resulted in significant injuries to him, and which involved threats, actual violence and substantial humiliation to RJ.[7] Accordingly, the judge considered that the moral culpability of each of the three offenders was high, and that they had each played a relatively equal role in the offence.[8] His Honour qualified that conclusion by noting that Idrizi was solely responsible for the injury to RJ's eye socket, which elevated his culpability 'somewhat'.
2. The judge rejected Ms McNeill's view that Idrizi's moral culpability was reduced by the application of limb 1 of the Verdins principles.[9] He also rejected Ms McNeill's view that a term of imprisonment would more likely weigh heavily on Idrizi. His Honour assessed that the degree of hardship, which Idrizi would suffer in custody, would be 'mild'.[10] His Honour also did not accept that there was a risk that a term of imprisonment would have a significant adverse effect on his mental health.[11]
3. Similarly, the judge rejected the submission, made on behalf of Bloch, that a term of imprisonment would result in a deterioration of his mental health. His Honour considered that the evidence did not demonstrate that there was such a serious risk of deterioration in Bloch's health.[12]
4. The judge noted that Idrizi, Bloch and Nowruzi had each sought to explain their offending as an example of mistaken vigilantism against men who they suspected to be sex offenders. The judge considered that each offender had no reasonable basis for holding any such view.[13] In respect of the offending that was the subject of charges 3 and 4, his Honour stated:

I find that your offending can only be understood as a horrific example of group‑think and immature misguided mutual peer pressure aimed at attacking individual men in vulnerable circumstances which you had brought about in order to make 'easy money'.[14]

1. The judge also considered that the repeated and offensive comments, which the three offenders made relating to their victims, were designed to denigrate and humiliate them, which was a consideration that made their offending more serious. Further, insofar that those views were deeply held, they rendered the three offenders' prospects of rehabilitation worse.[15]
2. The judge noted that the three offenders were each young, and he accepted that rehabilitation was an important sentencing consideration.[16]
3. In that respect, the judge considered that Bloch's and Idrizi's prospects of rehabilitation were each 'guarded to moderate'.[17] His Honour noted that Idrizi had reported to Ms McNeill that he no longer had views marked by hostility towards the men against whom he had offended, and that that factor indicated some insight and remorse by Idrizi, which was not present in the case of the other two offenders.[18]
4. The judge noted that Idrizi's counsel had submitted that a community correction order was an appropriate disposition in the circumstances of the case. However, he concluded that the only appropriate sentence in the case of both Idrizi and Bloch was the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment with a non-parole period.[19]

1. Based on the evidence of Ms McNeill, counsel for Idrizi contended, under ground 1, that the judge erred in refusing to apply the principles in Verdins to find that the offending by Idrizi was directly attributable to, and causally connected with, Idrizi's mental condition, so that his moral culpability for the offending was reduced, and that both specific and general deterrence should be moderated.
2. Counsel noted that Idrizi's diagnoses of ADHD and ASD were longstanding. Counsel noted the views expressed by Ms McNeill that, as a result of those disorders, Idrizi's capacity to regulate his behaviour and organise daily responsibilities effectively had been compromised. In particular, Ms McNeill expressed the opinion, in the addendum report, that Idrizi had demonstrated impaired judgment during the offending, and that his compromised mental functioning had contributed to his offending. Counsel noted that the judge accepted the submission, by the prosecution, that limb 1 of the Verdins principles did not apply, because there had been a level of planning and premeditation before the offending, and a period of time had elapsed between the planning phase and the commission of the armed robbery, that was the subject of charges 3 and 4. In that respect, counsel relied on the dictum of Maxwell P and Weinberg JA in BBA v The Queen,[20] that the principles in Verdins are capable of applying to offending which has been premeditated.
3. In support of ground 1, counsel relied on the evidence of Ms McNeill that the applicant's condition would be activated each time he met someone who he thought could be a paedophile, and that each time he was potentially exposed to such a person, he would enter into an emotional dysregulated cycle. Based on that evidence, counsel submitted that, in respect of each of the offences, Idrizi's decision to participate in the offending had been enlivened by the consideration that the potential victim would be a paedophile, which in turn activated his psychological condition.
4. Counsel further submitted that although the offending in each case involved some management, planning and implementation, it was not sophisticated, nor was it protracted.
5. In response, counsel for the respondent submitted that, although it is accepted that the principles in Verdins may apply to premeditated offending, nevertheless the evidence of management, planning and implementation of an offence is relevant to the application of those principles in two ways. First, planning and management can indicate the level of the severity or otherwise of the particular offender's mental condition and the extent to which it affected the offender's capacity to function. Secondly, management and planning may be relevant in an assessment of the existence or strength of any causal link between the offender's psychological condition and the offending.
6. In the present case, counsel noted that Idrizi did not give evidence on his plea, and he exercised his right not to respond to questions in the record of interview. Accordingly, the applicant was solely reliant on the evidence of Ms McNeill to establish the requisite nexus between the applicant's psychological condition and his offending. Counsel submitted that Ms McNeill's opinion must be assessed in light of the circumstance that the offending was proactive, planned, organised and repeated. Further, it was submitted, in view of Idrizi's recent criminal history, he must have understood the seriousness of the offending in which he was becoming engaged.
7. In that context, counsel noted that Ms McNeill had described Idrizi's conduct, during the offending, as 'dysregulated'. However, it was submitted, on analysis, Idrizi's offending could not properly be so described. Counsel noted a couple of instances in which Idrizi had demonstrated some restraint during the assaults in which he participated, and he only became actively involved in them when he perceived that the particular victim became non-compliant with instructions given to him. Counsel also noted, in this respect, that, during the offending that constituted charges 3 and 4, Idrizi told his co-offenders to permit RJ to retain enough money to enable him to return home.
8. Counsel further submitted that the severity and degree of Idrizi's psychological condition was not clear. Information available to Ms McNeill suggested that he had advanced adequately at school. Idrizi himself denied having learning deficits or challenges. In addition, Idrizi was using methamphetamine at the time of the offending. In those circumstances, it was submitted, the judge was entitled to reject the opinion of Ms McNeill concerning the connection between Idrizi's mental condition and the offending.
9. Counsel noted that the judge did accept that Idrizi's experience of imprisonment would be more burdensome, notwithstanding that Idrizi had reported to Ms McNeill that he had adjusted to custody, that he appreciated the routine and structure in the prison environment, and that he had been able to engage in treatment with Ms McNeill. In those circumstances, it was submitted that the judge's consideration of the principles of Verdins was considered and open on the evidence.

1. It has been emphasised in a number of cases that there must be an appropriate evidentiary basis upon which to conclude that any of the sentencing principles, summarised in Verdins, apply to a particular case. In addressing that question, it is necessary that the sentencing court exercise intellectual rigour in determining whether such an evidentiary basis has been established, and, if so, how and to what extent it may affect the fundamental sentencing purposes of general deterrence, denunciation, specific deterrence and community protection.
2. As this Court stated in Director of Public Prosecutions v O'Neill:[21]

Clearly, there must be an established evidentiary basis for moderating the principles of general deterrence in a particular case. For that to occur, it is not sufficient that the offender suffer from a particular mental impairment. There must be proper, and informed, consideration of how that impairment might have either materially diminished the capacity of the offender to reason appropriately at the time of the offence concerning the wrongfulness of his or her offending, or of how the offender's condition might make the full application of the principles of general deterrence repugnant to the underlying sense of humanity which guides proper sentencing.

1. In a further passage, the Court in O'Neill, stated:

Fourth, the fifth and sixth limbs of Verdins may operate where the existing impairment will make prison more onerous, or where prison may exacerbate the mental condition, if the expert evidence establishes the significance of the impairment to the imposition of a prison sentence.

Fifth, cogent evidence, normally in the form of an expert opinion, is necessary to establish the existence of the mental impairment, either at the time of the offence, or at sentence, or both, and the nature, extent and effect of the mental impairment experienced by the offender at the relevant time.

Sixth, the assessment by the sentencing judge must be undertaken with rigour, as was made clear in Verdins itself and has since been repeatedly emphasised by this Court on appeal.[22]

1. In accordance with those principles, it is clear, in the present case, that the judge was correct to conclude that the evidence, concerning Idrizi's psychological disorders, was not a sufficient basis to conclude that his moral culpability for the offending was reduced in accordance with the first limb of Verdins.
2. In each instance, the particular incident in which Idrizi was involved, and which was the subject of the charges, was plainly premeditated, preplanned and organised by those who attended and participated in the incident. On this application, it was not suggested that Idrizi was not involved in each of those preliminary stages, even if only by agreeing to them. The preparatory stages for each incident included making contact with the particular victim, arranging to meet that victim at a specific location, and travelling to the location. It is clear that Idrizi, in joining and adopting the preparatory stages of each incident, did so with the purpose and intention that the victim, who was to be met at the specific location, be subjected to physical assaults and intimidation.
3. There was no evidence adduced on the plea as to how Idrizi's psychological conditions affected his involvement in each of those steps which were a necessary precursor to the commission of the offences to which he pleaded guilty. In her first report, Ms McNeill did not record discussing with Idrizi the circumstances in which he came to be involved in the offending, or his conduct in the course of the offending.
4. As we have noted, in response to three questions put to her by Idrizi's legal practitioner, Ms McNeill, in an addendum email, addressed those questions. However, the views expressed by Ms McNeil, in that email, did not give any consideration to the circumstance that each of the two incidents, which are the subject of the charges, involved premeditation, organisation and preplanning which we have discussed.
5. In the addendum email, Ms McNeill expressed the opinion that principle 1 of Verdins might have been enlivened because Idrizi's psychological conditions, including ASD, ADHD and traits of BPD, '... likely diminished his ability to think clearly, control impulses and evaluate the moral and legal ramifications of his actions, particularly in emotionally charged or triggering situations'. Importantly, there was no evidence, or suggestion, that the circumstances, in which Idrizi agreed to become involved in the offending, which itself was the subject of preplanning and organisation, were such an 'emotionally charged or triggering' situation. The views thus expressed by Ms McNeill, in the addendum, did not provide any basis upon which to determine that Idrizi's decision to engage in each of the two incidents was, in a material sense, mediated in some way by his psychological conditions.
6. In her evidence on the plea, Ms McNeill, when asked whether Idrizi's cognitive limitations impacted his mental functioning and compromised him in the actions he performed, responded in the affirmative. She stated:

I think that ... with the trauma that he's experienced - in a moment of being exposed to a paedophile which is in the instance at which his aggression has been demonstrated, in the moment of that instance, what would happen is he would become dysregulated ... he would become dysregulated and purely behavioural ... so his trauma would influence his behaviour without him even putting it all together.

1. Ms McNeill, later in cross-examination, expressed the same view, that he would become emotionally dysregulated each time that he met someone who he thought might be a paedophile. She stated:

... so what happens is every time that he's potentially exposed to, what would happen is that he would go into that emotional dysregulated cycle ...

1. As we have noted, those views, as expressed by Ms McNeill, might have some application if the offending in the present case had occurred in different circumstances, in which Idrizi had happened to come into contact with a person he believed was a paedophile. In such circumstances, Ms McNeill's explanation might apply, to provide a basis for concluding that Idrizi's reaction in such a case might have been affected by his psychological disorders. However, the view expressed by Ms McNeill, in those passages of her evidence, does not explain how Idrizi's disorders in any way, and to any extent, affected his decision to join with his co-offenders, to travel to the location at which the victim had agreed to meet, and to then engage in the offending that ensued.
2. Further, as was submitted by counsel for the respondent, during the offending itself, there were instances in which Idrizi exercised restraint, or attempted to temper the actions of his co-offenders. In particular, in the third incident (the subject of charges 3 and 4), Idrizi insisted that he and his co-offenders leave RJ with $1,000, to enable him to return home. Idrizi was also recorded, on a co-offender's mobile phone, giving RJ directions as to how to return to Carrum Downs.
3. In those circumstances, the judge was correct to determine that the evidence did not support a conclusion, on the balance of probabilities, that Idrizi's psychological disorders diminished Idrizi's capacity to form a rational judgment in relation to the offending that is the subject of charges 2, 3 and 4 so as to materially reduce his moral culpability for that offending.
4. It follows that ground 1 of the application for leave to appeal against sentence must fail.

1. Under ground 2, counsel for Idrizi noted that on the plea, it was submitted on behalf of Idrizi that his ASD and ADHD had impaired his mental functioning to the extent that it was causally linked with the commission of the offence, and substantially and materially reduced his culpability, so that the exception in s 5(2H)(c)(i) of the Sentencing Act applied. In addition, it was submitted, on an alternative basis, that there were substantial and compelling circumstances that were exceptional and rare, pursuant to s 5(2H)(e) of the Act and which justified not making an order of imprisonment pursuant to div 2 of pt 3 of the Sentencing Act. In his written case in support of his application for leave to appeal, counsel submitted that the judge erred in failing to conclude that those two exceptions to s 5(2H) of the Sentencing Act applied. In oral submissions, counsel confined his arguments to the proposition that the judge erred in failing to conclude the exception, prescribed by s 5(2H)(e), applied.
2. In the written case, it was submitted the judge erred in failing to conclude, pursuant to s 5(2H)(c)(i), that at the time of the offence Idrizi had impaired mental functioning that was causally linked to the commission of the offence and substantially and materially reduced his culpability for it. In particular, counsel submitted that not only did Idrizi have a longstanding diagnosis of ASD and ADHD, but also Ms McNeill expressed the opinion that his conditions diminished his ability to think clearly, control his impulses, and evaluate the moral and legal ramifications of his actions. It was submitted that, in the circumstances of this case, it would have been in the best interests of the community for the Court to impose a disposition, namely a community correction order, which would be best suited to enhance Idrizi's rehabilitation.
3. In oral submissions, counsel for Idrizi relied solely on the exception provided by s 5(2H)(e). Counsel submitted that the judge ought to have concluded that there were substantial and compelling circumstances that were exceptional and rare and would justify the imposition of a sentence that combined a shorter term of imprisonment with a community correction order. In support of that submission, counsel relied on the acceptance by the judge of the opinion expressed by Ms McNeill that Idrizi's experience of sexual abuse as a child had profoundly impacted his emotional development, interpersonal functioning and behavioural responses, and that his unresolved trauma from those experiences probably contributed to his offending.[23] Counsel further relied on the circumstance that Idrizi, subsequent to the offending, had undertaken counselling and psychological treatment, based on which Ms McNeill had concluded that he was on the path to reform. In addition, counsel relied on Idrizi's youth at the time of the offending, and his psychological conditions of ADHD and ASD. It was contended that the combination of those circumstances constituted substantial and compelling circumstances that are rare and exceptional and which would justify the imposition of a combination sentence of a short term of imprisonment and a community correction order.
4. In response, counsel for the respondent noted that although the judge did not expressly refer to s 5(2H)(c)(i) of the Sentencing Act, nevertheless his Honour had regard to the material that gave rise to the potential application of that provision, in his consideration of the applicability of the Verdins principles. It was submitted that the hurdle specified in s 5(2H)(c)(i) is higher than that which attracts the principles of Verdins. In view of the findings of the judge relating to the Verdins principles, clearly s 5(2H)(c)(i) did not apply in the present case.
5. Counsel further noted that the requirement in s 5(2H)(e), that the circumstances be 'substantial and compelling' and 'exceptional and rare', is a very high hurdle. In the present case, the circumstances relied on by Idrizi, as matters in mitigation, comprised principally his youth, that this was his first time in custody, his guilty plea, his steps to rehabilitation, his legacy of suffering sexual assault as a minor, and his mental health diagnoses. It was submitted that those circumstances are matters in mitigation which are commonly seen in the courts. Taken together, they are not sufficient to constitute substantial and compelling circumstances that are exceptional and rare.

1. The offences of armed robbery, and intentionally causing injury, which were respectively the subject of charges 3 and 4, are each defined in the Sentencing Act as category 2 offences. Accordingly, s 5(2H) of the Sentencing Act provides that in sentencing the applicant in the present case, the judge was required to impose a sentence of imprisonment (and not a sentence of imprisonment in addition to ordering a community correction order) unless one of the exceptions, prescribed by that sub-section, applied. Section 5(2H)(c)(i) provides such an exception in a case in which, at the time of the commission of the offence, the applicant had impaired mental functioning that was causally linked to the commission of offence and that 'substantially and materially' reduced the applicant's culpability for the offence.
2. Section 5(2H)(e) provides another exception, in a case in which there are 'substantial and compelling circumstances that are exceptional and rare and that justify not imposing a sentence of imprisonment' (that is not a sentence of imprisonment imposed in addition to making a community correction order).
3. Significantly, in order that s 5(2H)(c)(i) apply, it must not only be established that the offender had impaired mental functioning that was causally linked to the commission of offence, but, in addition, it must be demonstrated that that impaired functioning 'substantially and materially' reduced the offender's culpability. In that way, the availability of the exception provided by that sub-section is more limited, and the pre-requisite for its application is more stringent, than for the application of the Verdins principles in mitigation of sentence.[24]
4. As we have concluded, under ground 1, the judge was correct to determine that Idrizi's psychological conditions were not causally linked with the commission of the offences that were the subject of charges 2, 3 and 4. Accordingly, the judge did not err in declining to conclude that s 5(2H)(c)(i) applied to this case.
5. By its plain terms, the requirement, in para (e) of s 5(2H), that the circumstances be not only 'substantial and compelling', but also 'exceptional and rare', is clearly designed to be particularly stringent. As this Court observed in Farmer v The Queen,[25] the exception constitutes a '... residual category of limited scope' which '... is a very high hurdle that will not often be surmounted'.[26] Accordingly, the requirement, that the circumstances be 'exceptional and rare', will only be met where it is demonstrated that the circumstances are 'wholly outside the run of the mill' factors occurring in offending of the relevant kind.[27]
6. As the judge correctly accepted, there were a number of mitigating circumstances that were relevant to the determination of the sentences imposed on Idrizi. It may be accepted that, taken in combination, those mitigating factors were of quite significant weight. Indeed, in the absence of those considerations, and in view of the gravity of the offending in each case, it might have been expected that significantly longer terms of imprisonment would have been imposed on Idrizi.
7. As counsel for Idrizi noted, the mitigating factors include his youth, the fact that this was his first time in custody, his guilty plea, his mental health diagnoses, the legacy of the sexual assaults which had been inflicted on him when he was a minor, and his positive steps to rehabilitation. Those circumstances, taken together, might be characterised as being substantial, and possibly quite compelling. However, both individually and collectively, they could not be properly characterised as being 'exceptional and rare'. Specifically, it could not be concluded in this case that the judge erred in failing to determine that those circumstances were such as to fulfil the preconditions for the application of s 5(2H)(e) of the Sentencing Act.
8. For those reasons, ground 2 does not succeed.

1. In support of ground 3, counsel for Idrizi noted that in concluding that his prospects of rehabilitation were 'guarded to moderate',[28] the judge took into account factors, that included his repeated and offensive comments during the two incidents in question, his age, and the fact that he was on a community correction order at the time of the offending. Counsel noted that the judge came to the same conclusion in respect of Bloch's prospects of rehabilitation, who was the same age as Idrizi, and who, like Idrizi, had contravened a community correction order. However, counsel noted, Bloch had not engaged in any treatment while he was on remand, he had only displayed limited insight into his offending and had continued with the belief that the victims got what they 'deserved', and he had not previously been the victim of sexual assault as a child. Further, counsel noted that Bloch had been involved in three separate incidents, whereas Idrizi was only involved in two.
2. Counsel relied on the opinion expressed by Ms McNeill in her report, after Idrizi had completed three rounds of MASC. In particular, Ms McNeill expressed the view that Idrizi had demonstrated a vast improvement in his emotional control, that he was less likely to act out his emotions and had greater control over his behaviours, that he was starting to retain a measure of emotional regulation, that he recognised an improved understanding of his traumatic past, and that he had expressed regret for his actions.
3. In those circumstances, it was submitted that it was not open to the judge to conclude, as his Honour did, that Idrizi's prospects of rehabilitation were 'guarded to moderate'.
4. In response, counsel for the respondent submitted that Idrizi's relevant criminal history, and his contravention of the corresponding community correction order which had been imposed only two months before the offending in the present case, justified the judge's assessment of Idrizi's prospects of rehabilitation. Counsel noted that the judge did accept the evidence of Ms McNeill and acknowledged that Idrizi's insight and remorse was more positive than that of the other offenders. However, the judge concluded that he was not assisted by the opinion of Ms McNeill relating to Idrizi's prospects of rehabilitation.[29] Counsel further noted that although Idrizi had engaged positively with the MASC program, nevertheless that program was focused on 'readiness for treatment, capability and preparedness for change'. Counsel further noted that Ms McNeill's conclusion, as to Idrizi's progress at that point, was qualified, and was expressed in terms that Idrizi was then 'beginning' to demonstrate insight and judgment.
5. Counsel further submitted that the contention by Idrizi's counsel, that the judge's finding on his prospects of rehabilitation increased the weight to be given to specific deterrence, was not borne out in the sentencing reasons. While the judge gave appropriate weight to specifically deterring Idrizi, his Honour also considered that specific deterrence was not the major sentencing consideration in the case.

1. The authorities have emphasised that a ground of appeal, or a proposition advanced on appeal, that insufficient or excessive weight was given to a particular sentencing factor, must be approached with considerable caution. As the Court observed in Director of Public Prosecutions v Terrick,[30] such a proposition is almost always untestable, because, in the exercise of the sentencing discretion, quantitative significance is not assigned to individual considerations.[31]
2. In R v Bernath,[32] Callaway JA (with whom Winneke P and Brooking JA agreed) stated:

A ground of appeal may complain that a sentencing judge failed to give due weight or, alternatively, gave excessive weight to a relevant factor, but that stands in contrast with a ground that asserts that the judge disregarded such a factor altogether or took an irrelevant factor into consideration. Where the complaint is made in terms of weight, an appellate court must be especially cautious not to substitute its own opinion for that of the judge in the absence of identifiable or manifest sentencing error.[33]

1. In the present case, the judge clearly had an appropriate basis upon which to express some reservations concerning Idrizi's prospects of rehabilitation, so as to regard them as being 'guarded to moderate'. Two months before the offending in the present case, Idrizi had been convicted, and released on a community correction order for 16 months, on charges that included three charges of affray, two charges of recklessly causing injury, and one charge of possession of a controlled weapon without excuse. Those charges concerned three separate episodes of offending engaged in by Idrizi between February 2023 and November 2023. After the first set of offending, Idrizi had been released on youth justice bail. The second and third episodes of offending were committed by Idrizi while he was subject to such bail.
2. After the community correction order was imposed on Idrizi on 11 July 2024, he only engaged in limited compliance with the conditions of the order. He discontinued all engagement on 29 July 2024.
3. Idrizi's involvement in the offending that was the subject of charges 2, 3 and 4 in the present case constituted serious breaches by him of the terms of the community correction order. They involved two instances of premeditated serious violence committed by Idrizi, in company, against two separate defenceless individuals. His commission of the offences manifested a blatant disregard for the conditions of the community correction order, which had been designed to further his rehabilitation.
4. In addition, as submitted on behalf of the respondent, the views expressed by Ms McNeill as to Idrizi's prospects of rehabilitation were qualified.
5. In her first report (dated 8 May 2025), Ms McNeill stated that during consultations with her, Idrizi displayed 'some insight and judgment', but that he appeared to lack insight regarding mental health symptoms and anger management.
6. In her subsequent report dated 8 June 2025, Ms McNeill expressed the opinion that Idrizi required ongoing psychological support to continue processing the traumatic events to which he had been subjected in his earlier years. In evidence on the plea, Ms McNeill expressed the view that Idrizi was 'developing more of an understanding' about how he had become involved in the offending.
7. Taking those matters into account, it could not be concluded that the judge, in some way, erred in characterising Idrizi's prospects for rehabilitation as 'guarded to moderate'. As the principles, to which we have referred make clear, such an assessment was quintessentially a matter for the sentencing judge. It could not be maintained that the judge, in some material way, erred in that assessment. It was not to the point that the judge also regarded Bloch's prospects of rehabilitation as 'guarded to moderate'. The two assessments by the judge were similar, but not identical; in respect of the assessment of Idrizi's prospects for rehabilitation, the judge accepted that his insight and remorse was more advanced than that of his two co-offenders.[34]
8. For those reasons, ground 3 of the application for leave to appeal against sentence must fail.

1. In support of ground 4, counsel submitted that the individual sentences, the total effective sentence, and the non-parole period are manifestly excessive because they failed to give adequate weight to the following mitigating factors: Idrizi's youth; the fact that it was Idrizi's first time in custody; Idrizi pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity; Idrizi had undergone rehabilitation while in custody; Idrizi's personal circumstances and Bugmy[35] considerations; the legacy of sexual assault that Idrizi had endured while a minor; and Idrizi's diagnoses of ASD and ADHS and the application of Verdins.
2. In response, counsel for the respondent submitted that the judge properly characterised the objective gravity of the offence that was the subject of charge 3 as a 'serious example' of that offence.[36] It was submitted that the judge was correct in considering that Idrizi's moral culpability for the offending was high, with his responsibility for the injury caused to RJ elevating his culpability in relation to the offence that was the subject of charge 4. Counsel further submitted that the offending by Idrizi was properly described by the judge as proactive, planned, organised and repeated. It involved a prolonged attack involving threats, violence and humiliation to the victims.
3. Counsel submitted that the judge properly took into account all of the matters relied on in mitigation on behalf of Idrizi, but those matters had to be balanced against the need to impose a sentence that adequately reflected the gravity of the offending, and which sufficiently served the sentencing purposes of general deterrence and denunciation.

1. In order to sustain the proposed ground of appeal, that the individual sentences, the total effective sentence and the non-parole period, are manifestly excessive, the applicant must demonstrate that those sentences were wholly outside the range of sentencing options available to the judge. By its nature, such a test is, necessarily, a stringent requirement. It is not sufficient for the applicant to demonstrate that the sentences, either individually or the total sentence, were longer than this Court might have imposed in the circumstances of the case. Rather, the applicant must establish that the sentences were so excessive as to bespeak error by the judge in the exercise of his sentencing discretion.[37]
2. The starting point, for a consideration of ground 4, is that the offending, in respect of which Idrizi was to be sentenced, was committed in circumstances of particular seriousness. As we have discussed in considering ground 1, the two incidents, in which the offending occurred, were clearly premeditated and preplanned. The offending occurred in circumstances of significant violence and intimidation directed to each victim, in which it was intended that they each be humiliated. Significantly, Idrizi was involved in the offending with three other co-offenders, in circumstances in which each victim was plainly outnumbered and totally defenceless and vulnerable. The offending could be properly described as a form of vigilante conduct, committed by Idrizi, and his co-offenders, in circumstances of gross cowardice.
3. In those circumstances, the objective gravity of the offending, and Idrizi's moral culpability, must be characterised as significant. The conduct, in which Idrizi decided to engage, with his co-offenders, was totally unacceptable. It contravened basic principles of a civilised society.
4. As a matter of aggravation, Idrizi, at the time of the offending, was subject to the community correction order, which had been imposed on him only two months previously. His decision to engage in the offending in the present case constituted a flagrant breach by him of the terms of the community correction order, and demonstrated a total disregard by him for the opportunity that had been given to him to rehabilitate.
5. At the time of the offending, Idrizi was young. Ordinarily, in such a case, youth is to be accorded significant weight in mitigation, with a view to ensuring that the sentence be directed to the rehabilitation of the offender. However, in a case such as this, where the offending was plainly serious, the weight to be attached to the mitigating effect of Idrizi's youth was necessarily reduced.[38] Further, it is an unfortunate fact that young offenders are responsible for a significant proportion of the type of offending engaged in by Idrizi. In such a case, it is necessary that the sentencing purposes of general deterrence and denunciation be given adequate weight in order to discourage other young persons from engaging in similar offending.[39]
6. Certainly in the present case, Idrizi had available a number of relevant mitigating circumstances that were relied on in the plea and on this application. Idrizi pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity, so that his plea had genuine utilitarian value. Idrizi's remand in custody in the present case was the first occasion upon which he had spent time in prison. He had commenced to undergo rehabilitation while in custody. Further, his personal circumstances, including the long-term effects of being a victim of sexual assault when he was a minor, together with his diagnoses of ASD and ADHD, were relevant sentencing considerations. In that respect, it should be noted that Ms McNeill made a qualified finding that a term of imprisonment would bear more heavily on Idrizi, based on which the judge assessed that Idrizi's degree of hardship while in custody, as a consequence, would be 'mild'.[40]
7. Taking those matters into account, and giving them appropriate weight, it could not be determined that the individual sentences, the total effective sentence and the non-parole period imposed by the judge were manifestly excessive. On the contrary, in view of the gravity of the offending, the sentence imposed by the judge reflected that his Honour did accord appropriate weight to the mitigating circumstances to which we have referred. In the absence of those mitigating circumstances, it might fairly have been expected that the sentence imposed on Idrizi should have been significantly more substantial.
8. For those reasons, ground 4 of the proposed grounds of appeal does not succeed.

Idrizi's application for leave to appeal - summary of conclusions

1. For the foregoing reasons, we have reached the conclusion that Idrizi has not succeeded on any of the proposed grounds of appeal. It follows that the application for leave to appeal against sentence must be refused.

1. In support of ground 1, counsel for Bloch submitted that the judge failed to meaningfully distinguish between the respective roles of Bloch and his co-accused in the offending.
2. Counsel noted that, in the course of the plea hearing, counsel for Bloch had contended that, consistent with the evidence of Ms Kocic, Bloch was, by nature, susceptible to external influence and easily led. It was submitted that the videos, that were played during the plea, and tendered in evidence, supported that proposition. Counsel for Bloch had submitted to the sentencing judge that Bloch had clearly been in the background during the offending against RJ, that was the subject of charges 3 and 4.
3. Counsel noted that, in the course of the plea, the judge rejected that contention, noting that Bloch had been 'willingly' present, and that he could have left at any time. The judge also observed, in the course of the plea, that each of the three accused offenders had played a relatively equal role. It was contended, on this application, that that proposition ignored significant differences in the roles of the various participants.
4. In that respect, it was submitted that, in the offending that was the subject of charge 2 (on 22 September 2024), Nowruzi (together with another co-offender, Masoumi) was responsible for most of the menacing conduct towards AP.
5. Counsel further submitted that, during the course of the incident on 27 September 2024 (which was the subject of charges 3 and 4), the co-accused were more aggressive and violent than Bloch. In particular, Idrizi was the most prominent participant, over an extended duration: standing over RJ; speaking to him in an intimidating manner; placing his hand in RJ's jeans and removing a box of condoms; holding a large metal pole and demanding the password for his mobile phone; informing RJ that they had his address; and kicking RJ in the eye socket.
6. Further, it was submitted, Nowruzi was observed engaging in activities that included striking RJ with a pole, threatening to break his legs, simulating a kick to his head, jumping on RJ, placing him in a chokehold and forcing RJ to apologise.
7. Counsel accepted that Bloch did play a role in the offending, but he submitted that it paled in comparison to the brutal and frightening actions inflicted by the co-accused. In those circumstances, it was submitted that the evidence did not permit the judge to conclude that the roles of Idrizi and Bloch and Nowruzi were relatively equal.
8. In response, counsel for the respondent noted that this Court has recognised that it should only interfere with a sentence on the basis of disparity, where the disparity is so marked or manifest it would produce a legitimate and justifiable sense of grievance in the mind of an objective observer. It was submitted that in the present case, having regard to the material distinctions identified by the judge, and his relevant findings with respect to each participant's roles and circumstances, the conclusion by the judge, concerning the relative responsibility of each participant for the offending, could not give rise to a justifiable sense of grievance.
9. In particular, counsel noted that Bloch had unhesitatingly participated in the offending. He was an active participant, who was vocal in his support for the offending. In the offending, that was the subject of charge 3, Bloch was the person who demanded that RJ open his banking app, and who ultimately transferred $8,000 from RJ's account into his own account. Counsel further noted that, in the course of the plea, the judge observed, and counsel for Bloch accepted, that the conduct of the participants (including Bloch) was not disordered, but was purposeful, and that they had acted together in engaging in gross violence to their victims.
10. Counsel for the respondent submitted that, in the upshot, the roles and actions of each of the three offenders were, for all practical purposes, equal. Further, if there was any relevant distinction in their roles, there were other differences between the co-offenders to justify the slight disparity in the ultimate sentences imposed. In particular, Bloch was sentenced for an additional assault charge (charge 1). An aggravating feature of Bloch's offending in relation to charges 2, 3 and 4 was the fact that, at the time of the offending, he was subject to a community correction order which had been imposed only a few days earlier. Bloch's prospects for rehabilitation were less promising, as he had not demonstrated appropriate insight into his offending. By contrast, Idrizi had positively engaged in the MASC program while in custody.
11. In those circumstances, it was submitted that the modest disparity in the sentences in the present case was entirely justified and did not involve error by the sentencing judge.

1. Ground 1 of the Bloch application for leave to appeal is directed to one aspect, or relevant consideration, that relates to the sentencing principle of parity. It is also noted that while ground 2 contends that the sentences imposed on Bloch are manifestly excessive, the submissions advanced on behalf of Bloch in support of that ground in his written case were based on the proposition that the disparate sentences imposed on Idrizi and Bloch were such as to contravene the parity principle.
2. The basis and content of the principle of parity in sentencing have been well established since the decisions of the High Court in Lowe v The Queen[41] and Postiglione v The Queen.[42] The principle is based on the proposition that equal justice requires that, all things being equal, like co-offenders should be treated equally, subject to the qualification that relevant differences between the culpability of the offenders, and matters personal to them, be properly accommodated in the exercise of the sentencing discretion.
3. Sentencing error, on the basis of disparity, may occur where, taking into account the differences between the roles of the offenders in the offence, their respective levels of culpability, and their personal circumstances, there is such a marked discrepancy between the sentences passed on co-offenders as would produce a justifiable sense of grievance in the mind of the objective bystander. As such, the application of the principle is not confined exclusively to a consideration of the respective roles of the co‑offenders. It necessarily also takes into account the different circumstances of the co-offenders, their different levels of culpability, and other relevant sentencing considerations.
4. As Dawson and Gaudron JJ explained in Postiglione:

The parity principle ... is an aspect of equal justice. Equal justice requires that like should be treated alike but that, if there are relevant differences, due allowance should be made for them.

...

Discrepancy or disparity is not simply a question of the imposition of different sentences for the same offence. Rather, it is a question of due proportion between those sentences, that being a matter to be determined having regard to the difference circumstances of the co-offenders in question and their different degrees of criminality.[43]

1. The imprecise nature of sentencing in each case, and the discretionary nature of sentencing, involving the balancing and synthesis of relevant considerations, is such that it may only be concluded that sentencing error has occurred, on the basis of disparity, where the appellate court considers that it was not open to the sentencing judge to differentiate in the sentences of the co-offenders in the way the judge did so.[44]
2. In applying those principles, the starting point is that, in each of the incidents in which he was involved, Bloch was clearly an active and engaged participant in the offences to which he pleaded guilty. Each of the members of the groups of offenders, who committed those offences, played an equal role in the offending, insofar as they intentionally combined together with a purpose of outnumbering their victims, and thus intimidating and overcoming them.
3. Further, it is quite evident that Bloch was no mere passive onlooker during the incidents in question. In each of them, he intentionally encouraged and supported the acts of violence and intimidation perpetrated by his co-offenders. In respect of charge 3, it was Bloch who demanded that RJ open his banking app and who then transferred from RJ's account the sum of $8,000 into his own account. Further, when the proceeds of the armed robbery were distributed, Bloch was an active and willing recipient of an equal share of those moneys.
4. In considering the moral culpability of the respective offenders, it was relevant for the judge to take into account that Bloch had already participated in a previous armed robbery on 1 September 2024, that was the subject of charge 1. The offending that was the subject of charges 2, 3 and 4 were, in substance, a repetition of the conduct which Bloch had engaged some two or three weeks previously.
5. Further, and significantly, on 17 September 2024, Bloch was convicted by the Melbourne Magistrates' Court on two charges of robbery, one charge of possession of a controlled weapon without excuse and one charge of possession of a drug of dependence. He was placed on a community correction order which required him to attend the Cranbourne Justice Service Centre by 19 September, and to perform 150 hours community work. The offending that was the subject of charge 2 was committed by Bloch just five days after the imposition of the community correction order, and the offending that was the subject of charges 3 and 4 was engaged in by Bloch a further five days later. Those circumstances aggravated the moral culpability of Bloch for the offending that was the subject of charges 2, 3 and 4, and gave further weight to the requirement that the sentences imposed on him be sufficient to fulfil the purpose of specific deterrence.
6. In addition, it is notable that, in her report, Ms Kocic considered that Bloch had limited insight into his offending, expressing the view that the victims of the offending 'deserved it'. On the other hand, Idrizi had, since being remanded in custody, taken some positive steps towards rehabilitation. As discussed, the judge considered that, as a consequence, Idrizi's insight and remorse was 'somewhat further' advanced than that of his co-offenders. That consideration was relevant to the role of specific deterrence in sentencing Idrizi and Bloch.
7. Taking those matters into account, it could not be concluded that the respective differences between the sentences imposed on Bloch, on the one hand, and Idrizi, were such as would produce a justifiable sense of grievance in the mind of the objective bystander arising from the sentences imposed on Bloch. Accordingly, the different sentences imposed on Bloch and Idrizi were not such as to contravene the parity principle.
8. For those reasons, ground 1 of the Bloch application for leave to appeal against sentence does not succeed.

1. In his written case in support of ground 2, counsel for Bloch based his submissions, primarily, on a comparison of the sentences imposed on Bloch, on the one hand, and on Nowruzi and Idrizi, on the other hand, in support of the submission that the sentences imposed on Bloch were manifestly excessive.
2. In those submissions, counsel for Bloch accepted that Nowruzi had more compelling matters in mitigation, including that he had no previous criminal history, he had suffered childhood deprivation, and he had moderate to good prospects of rehabilitation. However, it was submitted that, on the other hand, Idrizi's circumstances were very similar to those of Bloch. He also had a relevant criminal history, was on a community correction order at the time of the offending, had a history of substance abuse, and was entitled to rely on the fifth limb of Verdins. It was submitted that there were no relevant differences between the personal circumstances of Bloch and Idrizi. On the other hand, it was submitted, Idrizi had a more substantial role in the offending against RJ, and he was solely culpable for the injury to RJ's eye socket. However, and despite that important difference, counsel noted that Bloch was sentenced to a period of three months more than Idrizi for charge 3 (armed robbery) and he received the same sentence in respect of charge 4 (intentionally causing injury).
3. In his written case counsel submitted that Bloch's involvement in the first incident (charge 1) did not justify a total effective sentence that was eight months longer than that imposed on Idrizi. Bloch was 20 years of age at the time of the offending and sentence, he had one previous conviction, and this was the first time in custody for him. It was submitted that youth remained an important mitigating circumstance. In addition, Bloch's pleas of guilty, at an early stage, had significant utilitarian value. In those circumstances, it was submitted that the sentences imposed on Bloch were manifestly excessive.
4. In oral submissions, counsel placed particular emphasis on the mitigating factors available to Bloch. In particular, counsel relied on Bloch's young age, the fact that the offending was the first time that he had been retained in custody, Bloch's pleas of guilty, the Bugmy considerations that were relevant to Bloch's upbringing, his psychological disorders, and the steps that he had taken in rehabilitation. It was submitted that, taking those matters into account, the sentences imposed on Bloch, and in particular on charges 3 and 4, were manifestly excessive.
5. In response, counsel for the respondent noted that the judge appropriately acknowledged, and took into account, the mitigating circumstances relied on by Bloch, which included: his early pleas of guilty; the evidence of Ms Kocic that his experience in prison would be more burdensome; his youth; and the importance of promoting his rehabilitation.
6. Counsel for the respondent noted, however, that the weight to be attributed to youth, and the importance of rehabilitating young offenders, is reduced in cases such as the present in which the sentencing purposes of general deterrence and denunciation must be given prominence. In particular, it was necessary that the sentences imposed on Bloch be sufficient to reflect the nature and gravity of his offending. His offending was protracted, occurring on three separate occasions against three separate victims. Each incident was proactive, planned and designed. The offending was committed by Bloch in company. Each of the three incidents involved a prolonged attack involving threats, actual violence and substantial humiliation of the victims. The conduct in each of them was a gross form of violence, and the impact on all the victims was profound.
7. In the circumstances, it was submitted that Bloch came to be sentenced for serious offending, and he relied on relatively modest matters in mitigation. In those circumstances, it was submitted, the sentences imposed on Bloch could not be considered to be wholly outside the range of sentencing options available.

1. As earlier discussed, in order to succeed on the proposed ground of appeal that the individual sentences, the total effective sentence and the non-parole period are each manifestly excessive, it must be demonstrated that those sentences imposed on Bloch were wholly outside the range of sentencing options available to the judge, taking into account the gravity of the offending and the mitigating circumstances relied on by Bloch.[45]
2. For the reasons that we have already explained in considering ground 4 of the Idrizi application, the offending that was the subject of each of the charges involving Bloch was quite serious. On each of the three occasions, Bloch chose to become involved with a group of other offenders to participate in preplanned and premeditated violent assaults on three separate victims who were each quite defenceless and outnumbered in the circumstances. On each occasion, as we have discussed, Bloch was actively involved in the offending that was the subject of the charges on which he was sentenced.
3. It was necessary that the sentences imposed on him, and his co-offenders, be such as to fulfil the sentencing purposes of general deterrence, denunciation and specific deterrence. In particular, it was necessary that the sentences express the opprobrium of the community, and the Court, of the conduct in which Bloch chose to become involved on each of the three occasions of the offending.
4. Further, and most importantly, it was necessary that the sentences be sufficient to send a message to the community that other persons, and in particular young persons, who choose to become involved in such violent and cowardly conduct, will, on being apprehended, lose the right to remain at liberty in society for a substantial period of time. It is only in that way that the courts can properly fulfil their important function of upholding fundamental legal principles that underlie a civilised society.
5. In addition, as we have already noted, it was important in the case of Bloch that the sentences be sufficient to specifically deter him from engaging in any further such offending. The circumstance, that the offences that were the subject of charges 2, 3 and 4, were committed by him only a few days after he had been placed on a community correction order for serious offences, including robbery, gave particular emphasis for the need for proper weight to be attributed to the sentencing purpose of specific deterrence.
6. Certainly as discussed, Bloch did have available a number of important mitigating factors. As we have noted when considering the sentences imposed on Idrizi, the weight to be given to his young age at the time of the offending, and at the time of sentence, was qualified by the consideration that the kind of offending, in which Bloch chose to become involved, is commonly committed by young offenders. Nevertheless, his youth, pleas of guilty, psychological disorders, and background, all were relevant mitigating factors. In the absence of those considerations, it might fairly be expected that the sentences imposed on Bloch, on each of the charges, would have been materially more substantial.
7. For those reasons, it could not be maintained that the individual sentences, the periods of cumulation, the total effective sentence or the non-parole period were manifestly excessive, that is, being sentences that were wholly outside the range of sentencing options available to the judge. On the contrary, as we have noted when discussing the sentence imposed on Idrizi, we consider that the sentences were quite appropriate and, indeed, moderate.
8. For those reasons, ground 2 of the Bloch application must fail.

Application by Bloch - summary of conclusions

1. For those reasons, we are not persuaded that, if the application for extension of time were granted, the application for leave to appeal by Bloch would succeed. It follows that the application by Bloch for an extension of time within which to apply for leave to appeal against sentence must be refused.

[1] R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269; [2007] VSCA 102 ('Verdins').

[5] DPP v Bloch, Nowruzi & Idrizi [2025] VCC 893 ('Reasons').

[9] Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269, 276 [32] (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA).

[20] [2010] VSCA 174.

[21] [2015] VSCA 325; (2015) 47 VR 395, 410 [59] (Warren CJ, Redlich and Kaye JJA); [2015] VSCA 325 ('O'Neill').

[22] O'Neill [2015] VSCA 325; (2015) 47 VR 395, 415 [76]-[78] (Warren CJ, Redlich and Kaye JJA). See also O'Connor v The Queen [2018] VSCA 72, [40]-[41] (Weinberg and Coghlan JJA); Brown v The Queen [2020] VSCA 212; (2020) 62 VR 491, 507-8 [60]-[62] (Maxwell P, Niall, T Forrest, Emerton and Osborn JJA); [2020] VSCA 212; Langton (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2022] VSCA 79, [32]-[33] (Maxwell P, McLeish and Macaulay JJA); Alessawi v The King [2025] VSCA 23, [105]-[109] (Emerton P, Taylor JA and Kidd AJA); Hu v The King [2025] VSCA 60, [62]-[65] (Walker, Boyce and Kaye JJA); DPP v Raux [2025] VSCA 258, [94] (Priest, Osborn and Kaye JJA).

[24] Peers v The Queen [2021] VSCA 264 [52] (Niall and Sifris JJA).

[25] [2020] VSCA 140.

[26] Ibid [51] (Maxwell P, Kaye and Niall JJA).

[27] Ibid [47]-[48]; Director of Public Prosecutions v Lombardo [2022] VSCA 204 [63], [70] (McLeish, Niall and Kennedy JJA).

[30] (2009) 24 VR 457; [2007] VSCA 220.

[31] Ibid 459 [5] (Maxwell P, Redlich JA and Robson AJA).

[32] [1997] 1 VR 271.

[35] Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37 ('Bugmy').

[37] Clarkson v The Queen [2011] VSCA 157; (2011) 32 VR 361, 384 [89] (Maxwell ACJ, Nettle, Neave, Redlich and Harper JJA); [2011] VSCA 157 ('Clarkson'); Leimonitis v The Queen [2018] VSCA 198, [32] (Priest JA) ('Leimonitis').

[38] Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372; (2011) 35 VR 43, 57 [44] (Redlich JA with Nettle JA agreeing [26]); [2011] VSCA 372.

[39] DPP v Lawrence [2004] VSCA 154; (2004) 10 VR 125, 132 (Batt JA); [2004] VSCA 154.

[41] [1984] HCA 46; (1984) 154 CLR 606, 610 (Gibbs CJ), 613-14 (Mason J) 623-4 (Dawson J); [1984] HCA 46 ('Lowe').

[42] [1997] HCA 26; (1997) 189 CLR 295, 301-2 (Dawson and Gaudron JJ), 309 (McHugh J), 323 (Gummow J), 338 (Kirby J); [1997] HCA 26 ('Postiglione').

[43] Postiglione [1997] HCA 26; (1997) 189 CLR 295, 301-2; see also 314 (McHugh J), 325 (Gummow J), 338 (Kirby J); Lowe [1984] HCA 46; (1984) 154 CLR 606, 609 (Gibbs CJ).

[44] See, for example, Anthony v The Queen [2016] VSCA 22, [12] (Redlich and Beach JJA); Ryan v The Queen [2016] VSCA 255, [42] (Weinberg, Whelan and Priest JJA); Moresco v The Queen [2018] VSCA 336, [44] (Kaye, Hargrave and Weinberg JJA).

[45] Clarkson [2011] VSCA 157; (2011) 32 VR 361, 384 [89] (Maxwell ACJ, Nettle, Neave, Redlich and Harper JJA); Leimonitis [2018] VSCA 198, [32] (Priest JA).