Iason & Tausret [2025] FedCFamC1F 661 | Case summary

Iason & Tausret [2025] FedCFamC1F 661 | Case summary | Zoe

[9]

That assessment will accordingly require the court to look carefully at the various scenarios for the care of the child under consideration. The court must explore alternatives to restricting freedom of movement, especially where it is proposed to impose upon the primary caregiver the obligation to provide the care of the child in a place not of their choosing (Sampson & Hartnett (No 10) (2007) FLC 93-350).
The Full Court in Franklyn & Franklyn [2019] FamCAFC 256 gave more recent expression to that principle as follows:
1. There is an inherent tension between, on the one hand, separated parents being able to establish new homes wherever they like and, on the other, their restraint by injunction from living too far apart to avoid any impingement of their children's ability to retain meaningful relationships with both parents. The conflict is between the best interests of the children to know and have regular personal contact with each parent and the interests of the parents to enjoy a high measure of freedom of movement which is not lost by reason only of their parental responsibility for the children (see AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160 ("AMS v AIF") at 196, 206, 207-208, 210). The tension at the intersection of those conflicting interests is even greater when an order is sought, not just to restrain one parent's move further away, but to compel the parent who has already moved away to return and establish a new residence closer to the other parent.
2. While the children's interests are paramount, their interests are not the sole determinant of parenting orders under Part VII of the Act (AMS v AIF at 207, 225, 230; U v U [2002] HCA 36; (2002) 211 CLR 238 ("U v U") at 282). Parents enjoy as much freedom to live where they please as is compatible with their obligations pertaining to the children (see AMS v AIF at 223-224, 231-232; Sampson and Hartnett (No.10) [2007] FamCA 1365; (2007) FLC 93-350; Zanda & Zanda [2014] FamCAFC 173; (2014) FLC 93-607 at [132]- [136]). Only when the children's welfare would be adversely affected must a parent's right to freedom of mobility defer to the paramount consideration of the children's best interests (see U v U at 262).

[10]

I have read and considered all of the evidence. A range of documents were admitted into evidence and made exhibits in the proceedings, and I have had regard to those documents. I set out below the analysis of the various proposals, in the context of an evaluation of the evidence overall.
I have listened carefully and observed closely each of the parties and witnesses being cross-examined. If I do not refer to a particular issue or document in these reasons, that does not mean that it has been overlooked or not taken into account by me.
I received into evidence (without objection) and listened to two audio recordings of conversations involving the father and the maternal grandmother on 2 January 2024, and the father, the maternal grandmother, and the mother, on 7 January 2024. Exhibit 19 was a recording made by the maternal grandmother on 2 January 2024 and Exhibit 20 was a recording made by the mother on 7 January 2024. Transcripts of those recordings were made during the hearing and became Exhibit 32 (again, admitted without objection).
In each instance that the recording was made, the father did not know that the discussions were being recorded. He also did not know about the existence of those recordings at the time he completed and submitted his written evidence. However, by the time of the hearing, the father had received and had listened to the recordings, as confirmed during his oral evidence.
In certain instances, the father's affidavit evidence about what he said and, or, what he asserted other people said in those two discussions, is inconsistent with the audio recording and the transcript. To the extent of the inconsistencies, I take into account that the father did not have the benefit of the audio or typed transcript at the time he completed his affidavit and could not "refresh his memory" from those sources. However, as will be addressed below, the father maintained in cross-examination, his version of certain matters said by the mother and, or, her mother, that are not consistent with the independent records.
In addition, two short video recordings made by the father of the mother, were played into evidence (the first of which was recorded in November 2022 and the second on a date in August 2023). They became Exhibit 25. The father claimed that the videos were made with the consent of the mother. He said they had a "protocol" agreed between them that when the mother was distressed or dysregulated, she would put the child down (if she had her in her arms). He said the making of the video was in aid of achieving that outcome. The mother disputes the existence of a "protocol", but it is clear on the face of the recordings that the mother knew that she was being recorded.

[20]

The mother denied that she threw the child at the father.
The parties each give evidence about the events which occurred on an evening in June 2023. On the mother's account, she was attempting to settle the baby, and she was experiencing fatigue after prolonged care of the unsettled child. On the mother's evidence, the mother had spent hours trying to settle her and "nothing worked". The baby would not respond to further breastfeeding and was resistant and crying. The mother says that the father made a comment observing inconsistency in her engagement with the child. The mother describes feeling exhausted and being upset from being unable to soothe the baby. She says she experienced the father's comments to be critical and unsupportive of her efforts and as providing little actual support. She says she passed the baby to him.
On the mother's account, the father then accused her of violence to the child, accusing her of throwing the baby. He made similar comments to her the next day too, declaring that she was "a violent mother", distressing the mother again.
On the father's evidence, he does not describe the baby being unsettled or the mother fatigued by prolonged care of an unsettled infant. He describes having a discussion with the mother that night when he reminded her of the plan she had expressed to him about working to extend the time between the baby's evening breastfeeds. The father says that his comments were intended to remind the mother of that plan and that she became "unreasonably angry" at him. On the father's account, the mother threw the baby onto his back (he was lying in the bed with his back to the mother), from where she was standing, at the end of the bed (about "three feet" away). He says the baby was not injured but "started to cry". He says that he took the mother's actions seriously and the next day investigated things he might do to protect the child from the risk of violence from the mother.
The father did not remove the child from the mother's care and take her to another place that night. He did not call the police but says he later contacted maternal nurses to discuss his observations and concerns. He does not set out the particulars of how he recounted the events to those third parties. He includes hearsay statements about what he was apparently told by the third parties. There is no direct evidence before the court from those third parties. That evidence is of little probative value.
The mother said that the father returned the child to her that night. The mother said the father woke her sister (who was staying with them at that time) who came into the room and remained with the mother. The mother describes the father going to another room to sleep. The mother says that she and her sister sat together and eventually the child slept.
Ms R (a counsellor upon whom the parties attended during their relationship) reports in her notes (Exhibit 16) (for a joint session on 21 September 2023) that the mother "states she forcefully passed baby to [Mr Iason] in 'total despair, I just couldn't deal with the way he was talking at me so critically and so mean.'" She is recorded there as denying throwing the baby. Those notes suggest that the father maintained his version of what had occurred in that therapy session and said, "this is a pattern of behaviour" and (of the mother) that she cannot be trusted to tell the truth.
Each party was cross-examined about this incident.
I do not accept the father's contention that the baby was thrown by the mother. The evidence does not permit me to find that the action by the mother in passing the baby to the father occurred in the manner the father alleges nor that it was an act of family violence, for the reasons that follow.
I prefer the mother's account of the events that evening. The manner in which the mother responded to cross-examination about these events was calm and measured and nothing about the way she gave her evidence caused me to doubt the veracity of what she said. Her account fits more consistently with the wider evidence as to the context in which the event occurred (that over a period of time, managing to settle the baby was a continuing challenge; the mother was experiencing disturbed sleep and fatigue while managing parenting and her work responsibilities; and shortly after this event, the mother and child attended a residential maternal care centre, with the father's knowledge and support, to assist her in strategies relating to settling the child).
I accept the mother's evidence that her actions that night were those of a tired and depleted parent, struggling to manage the care of an unsettled infant, in circumstances where she experienced little real support from the father. The father's actions that evening, on his account, are not consistent with his assertion that the mother had thrown the baby at him. I am not persuaded that, should the events have occurred as he describes, he would have been content to leave the child in the care of the mother the following day and would not have sought the immediate intervention of welfare or other authorities.
The sequelae to these events have some importance. The father concluded that the mother had acted violently or abusively (both terms he has used to describe the mother's conduct) towards the child that evening and he has held rigidly to the accuracy of his view, despite the mother's objections and her distressed response to that characterisation.
He has repeated his view that the mother acted with violence towards the child in his evidence in these proceedings (written and oral) and in his engagement with the various experts appointed to prepare reports in the proceedings. He has also repeated, in April 2025, his concluded view about such to a medical practitioner engaged by the mother for the child.

[21]

The father asserts that the mother was abusive and manipulative of him and that such should also be accepted as evidence of family violence. His conclusionary statements were underpinned by some examples of the mother's dysregulated behaviour during the relationship.
The father says that he experienced the mother, during the relationship and especially after the birth of the child, to be at times, unreasonable, demanding, irrational, and dysregulated. The paternal grandmother also deposed to her observations of the mother's distress and dysregulation at times during the relationship. That part of Ms O's evidence was unchallenged.
The mother admits that there were occasions of distress and dysregulation by her. The mother says that such was the product of overwhelm, in part caused by the challenges of parenting an infant (including periods of sustained sleep disturbance), while maintaining high performance work responsibilities, coupled with the pressures and dysfunction of the father's engagement with her. The mother also accepts that, at times, she was struggling with the management of her mental health. She reported to Dr F, a history of depressive episodes, the second of which occurred (as summarised by Dr F) "during the coronavirus pandemic in response to multiple pregnancy losses and conflict" with the father (Exhibit 7 at [89]). Dr F repeats Dr H's diagnosis of the mother (in April 2024) as meeting the criteria for Major Depressive Disorder, moderate severity, in remission (as she was not at that time experiencing active symptoms).
The father alleged that the mother had threatened to make up false allegations against the father and to call the police. This was denied by the mother. When cross-examined about this allegation (that she falsely accused him of violence to the child and threatened to call the police), the mother was calm and responsive and again, nothing about the manner in which she gave that evidence caused me to doubt her truthfulness. She accepted that she had alleged that the father was violent and she maintained that such an assertion was truthful. She also readily accepted that she started to call the police on a particular occasion and disconnected the call before speaking with anyone. I accept her evidence about her conduct on that occasion. It appears that there was only one instance when this step was taken by the mother and she did not then communicate her views of the father to the police.
The father asserts that this is evidence of the mother being abusive and manipulative, and untruthful, as discussed below. I find that there is no sensible basis to criticise the mother as the father does, for taking those steps at a time of high conflict and distress in her engagement with the father and where she said (and maintains in these proceedings) she experienced aspects of his conduct to be abusive of her.
Aspects of the mother's engagement with the father would have been distressing and difficult for him to experience. In her written evidence and when being cross-examined, the mother made admissions as to some of her behaviour in the latter parts of the relationship. When certain examples of her distressed state and concerning behaviour (for example, scratching at her arm, in December 2023) were put to her, she accepted they had occurred (Transcript 29 July 2025, p.242, lines 16-23):

[36]

The father's elaboration did not assist me to understand how either video supports the contentions he has made about them.
The father seems to contend that the mother's assertion made in front of the infant child (at that time, eight months old), that he engaged in family violence and that he has been abusive to her, constitutes denigration of him (and possibly, abuse of the child by exposure to claims which he considers to be false).
In the video, the mother speaks calmly and continues to move from room to room, collecting and packing items. The baby appears settled. The mother rejects matters being said by the father while he films her. She says, "you are being abusive and violent, and I don't feel safe in this home anymore". The father then says, "Ok, that is evidence of some lies. When I say you lie to me, that is some evidence right there."
The mother says, "so, I need to protect her, I need to protect her" (in reference to the child) and moves back to the other room. The father follows, filming, and asks the mother to put the baby down saying, "that's what I always ask of you when you get in this mood. Put the baby down". The mother says she needs to protect the baby and herself from the father (again, calmly). He then says, "why don't you put the baby down and you will be able to protect yourself from these imaginary threats even better. You won't start throwing her or slamming car doors or throwing her at me like you have done before." The mother again says, calmly, "I am protecting her from you" and walks again to the next room.
The father says, "but she doesn't need protection from me" and the mother says, "yes she does" a couple of times, calmly.
The father again follows the mother and says, "so, what's the plan for looking after the health of our baby when you are kidnapping her from me. How are you going to feed her". The mother challenges the notion she is kidnapping the child ("now, I am kidnapping her?") and the father defends his use of the term. He again asks the mother to put the baby down while he declares that she knows he is "no threat to the child", he "takes good care of her" and he says that he "stays calm". The mother places the child on a playmat and continues packing. The father then declares "and you know you don't do those things", with respect to the care of the child.
In an email to the mother on 13 May 2022 (Exhibit 26) the father says (describing her conduct as "rants"):

[40]

I am satisfied that the father's actions in the second video are evidence of gaslighting. The narrative overlayed by the father while he films the mother, who is not acting in a dysregulated way, are gratuitous and is directed to a purpose other than responding to the events unfolding before the father at that time. His actions in adding his narrative of the mother's supposed past poor conduct while intrusively filming her (and which narrative has no link to the actions of the mother as she is being filmed), diminishes any suggestion that the video was intended to assist the mother. I agree with the observations of Senior Judicial Registrar Osmand and I also find that it was an exercise in the manufacture of evidence to suit the father's agenda, and it was not motivated by a desire to comfort the mother or to assist her in behaviour change, as the father has claimed.
I am comfortably satisfied that the father was engaged in an attempt to control the mother by making the videos, in that he sought to bolster his narrative as to the mother's conduct to assist his version of the parties' circumstances, with deliberate distortions by him.
I find that the father was putting to the mother, when he was filming the mother and recording his narrative, his version of historical events, as if they were established facts and rejecting her comments in protest. I also find that the father's description of what was occurring in both his written and oral evidence about the making of the videos to be inconsistent and I prefer the evidence of the mother about these events and the father's engagement with her.
The father's actions in making the videos reflect poorly upon him. I find that in doing so, he was insensitive to the mother's circumstances and disregarded her desire and request not to be filmed. His conduct was likely to add to her distress and, or, discomfort (as the mother has described in her written evidence). Contrary to the father's evidence, I do not find that either video suggests that the child was at risk from the mother (she had not been born at the time of the first video) or that the mother denigrated him in the second video, as he contends.

[41]

The father also relies upon his experience of the mother making threats of suicide as a manifestation of risk. The mother's mental health and functioning is addressed in further detail below. The mother disputes the father's characterisation of the frequency and intent of her comments and disclaims (to Dr F) any intention to act (Exhibit 7 at [89]).
In cross-examination of the mother, she was asked about saying to the father that she would kill herself and that it would be his fault. The mother accepted that she may have said something like that to the father but that she never meant to end her life (Transcript 29 July 2025, p.237, line 18). She said, "it was just a poor choice of words, of showing frustration to him" (Transcript 29 July 2025, p.237, line 24).
The father maintains in his written evidence that the mother also threatened to kill herself in a joint session with their counsellor, Ms R (described by him in his written evidence as a "tactic" used by the mother in the counselling process). The joint session notes of 23 November 2023 (being their last joint session) (Exhibit 16) suggest that both parties were heightened in this session. The notes report that the mother accepts the father's account of her dysregulated behaviour on a particular occasion and expresses shame and describes her feelings of desperation and distress in the face of the father's conduct to her. Ms R notes that the mother refers to certain conduct by the father which, at the time, the mother felt was "manipulative". The record suggests that the father asserted that the mother's behaviour was suggestive of mental instability and that he required a diagnosis from Ms R of the mother's mental health. The records suggest that when Ms R declined to do so, the father became angry. The notes record that Ms R is accused by the father of siding with the mother (in trying to explore the mother's comments about feeling "gaslit"). The mother is reported as then yelling at the father, "What do you want from me? What do I need to do? Do you need me to be dead?" Ms R advises the parties that she will not continue therapy with them given the high volatility and lack of safety.
While the comment made by the mother is not a direct "threat" to kill herself, it is clearly suggestive of emotional distress and vulnerability. Ms R clearly regarded it in that fashion, as did Dr F when considering these notes in the preparation of her report.
The mother accepts that she has experienced mental health vulnerability. She also says that she has taken necessary steps to address these vulnerabilities, including now, by seeking orders which will see her living closer to people who are of significant support to her. As is addressed further below, the mother's health has stabilised, as assessed by Dr H in April 2024 and which was consistent with Dr F's observations later that year.
I accept that it may have been distressing for the father to be exposed to aspects of the mother's vulnerability and her comments about wanting to be dead or considering suicide. I accept such may have had an adverse impact upon him. However, as is detailed below, the father has also asserted in his evidence that the mother's threats about suicide were deliberately manipulative of him or a tactic.
As is set out in more detail below, the evidence does not suggest that the mother is at risk of expressing such sentiments at this time.
I do not find that the mother's behaviours (as described by the father) present a risk to the physical, psychological, or emotional safety of the child.

[44]

The mother sets out other examples of the father's conduct to her and describes the father engaging with her in a "cold and detached way", that he told her repeatedly that she was an "emotionally unstable woman" or a "sick woman", that she was a "liar", a "manipulator" and "emotionally fragile". The mother describes their relationship deteriorating during the Covid-19 pandemic and after the mother joined the father to live in Sydney in 2022. She says that he would "push her" (in a non-physical way) in their arguments until she became upset and then he would make comments critical of her emotional state. The mother said that she felt frightened of him at times, and felt unheard, misunderstood and disrespected.
The mother describes regularly experiencing distress at the father's method of communicating with her, that he was at times cold and detached, and at times such was frightening to her. She describes the father as "rarely raising his voice" but speaking to her "in a monotone, flat and matter of fact" manner. The mother describes his mode of communication as making her feel "worthless".
The mother describes in her written evidence, her experience of apologising to the father about an issue, only to be met with his rejection of her apology, and his declaration that her apology was not "genuine". In his written evidence, the father describes the mother apologising for her conduct "a day or two or a week of sulking later". He adds, "I was aware that this was a common tactic of psychological abuse at the time but believed my role was to support my wife despite this". The father provided the mother with a document (taken from a counselling website) called "The 9 Rules for True Apologies" (Exhibit 12).
The father's evidence is consistent with the mother's descriptions of this process and the predicament she faced, where even her attempts to apologise were considered inferior and inadequate and he sought to correct those deficiencies.
The father generally denied the mother's characterisation of his engagement with her (including about the videos he made). In his oral evidence, he accepted that the mother was mentally fragile in 2023 but did not accept that she found it "impossible" to deal with his criticisms of her behaviour. The father maintained that he did not criticise the mother "and certainly not daily as [Ms Tausret] claims" (Transcript 28 July 2025, p.64, line 42). When examples of his criticisms of the mother were put to him (including as reported by Ms G) the father said (Transcript 28 July 2025, p.65, lines 9-13):

[68]

The maternal grandmother did not accept that, on that occasion, the father was "trying his best" but instead observed that "he was trying to break her" (referring to the child). The maternal grandmother's evidence of her own observations of the father's engagement with the baby and his negative and critical comments to the mother, corroborate the mother's evidence about the nature of the father's attitude to, and communication with, the mother.
The evidence as a whole (summarised previously) readily satisfies me that the father was routinely highly critical of the mother and that the nature and the frequency of that criticism was experienced by the mother as denigration.
I accept the mother's evidence about her experience of feeling "constantly" criticised and denigrated by the father. The mother's unchallenged evidence about this was substantially corroborated by the father's own evidence about his conduct towards her and by the evidence of his mother.
I find that the father frequently told the mother that her behaviour was unforgivable (and, or, similar descriptors) and that she did not need to be a bad person (the implication being that she was a bad person). I am persuaded that he frequently expressed highly critical views to her, about the alleged deficiencies in her behaviour (noting he declared he had done so for 1000s of hours). I find that the father has engaged in sophistry in seeking to justify his frequent criticism of "bad behaviour" by the mother, while refusing to accept that such would have been experienced by the mother as criticism of her.
I am comfortably satisfied that the mother's evidence of these experiences and their impact upon her, accurately reflects what was occurring in her relationship with the father. The mother says that she experienced this constant criticism as undermining her well-being and contributing to her distress. In circumstances where the father accepts that the mother was emotionally fragile in 2023, and given her underlying mental health vulnerability, I accept her evidence about the impact of these experiences upon her.
I also accept, as the mother deposes, that this would have contributed to her vulnerability and challenges in managing her own health, particularly following the birth of the child and the mother's return to work. I readily infer that regular exposure to such criticism would have been experienced as denigration (as the mother deposes) and would have impacted the mother as she grappled with caring for an infant and her mental health vulnerabilities.
The Full Court (McClelland DCJ, Aldridge, Austin, Carew & Williams JJ) has extensively considered the definition of family violence as set out in s 4AB of the Act in Pickford & Pickford [2024] FedCFamC1A 249 ("Pickford").
In their joint judgment (in which they largely agreed with Austin and Williams JJ), Aldrige and Carew JJ eschew any limitation upon the definition of family violence under the Act. Their Honours observe, at [44], as follows:

[70]

The intention to coerce or control the other party need not be established and while intention may be relevant, their Honours observe at [46], that "it is not dispositive". Their Honours also observe that a key feature of coercion and control is that a person is induced to do as the other person wishes or requires, but the focus under the legislation must be on the behaviour, which is alleged to coerce or control, rather than the intention of the alleged perpetrator (see Pickford at [51]).
Similarly, Austin and Williams JJ in Pickford, observed that:
1. The first form of family violence, which entails coercion or control, essentially captures one family member's domination of the other family member. That the victim may subjectively feel coerced or controlled is not enough. The coercion or control must be an objective actuality. The alleged perpetrator's inferred intention to exert influence over and to dominate the alleged victim will very often be decisive of the issue, but it is not an essential ingredient of a finding of family violence taking the form of coercion or control.
2. If it be the case that, on the whole of the available evidence, the judge is unable to find the perpetrator's conduct does amount to family violence in the form of coercion or control, such unsatisfactory conduct will still likely be relevant in other ways. If the conduct induced the victim's fear, then it will be family violence under the second limb of the definition. Alternatively, the unsatisfactory conduct might not amount to family violence at all, but will still influence the overall exercise of discretion under Pt VII of the Act if, for example, it demonstrates lack of insight or stunted parenting capacity.
I am satisfied that the father engaged in family violence to the mother, given the frequency and the persistently negative nature of his comments to her and the impact that this had upon her, such that she felt compromised and vulnerable and at times, fearful. I am satisfied that the father intended to influence and direct the mother's conduct and that he frequently expressed highly critical comments to the mother about his views of her conduct. The mother describes changing how she engaged with the father to try to appease his requirements, including frequently apologising to him for her "failures". The dynamic between them, as described by the mother, and as found by me, was such that the father was seeking to exert control over the mother and to shape her conduct to meet his preferences and requirements.
While I take into account the context in which this was occurring and allow that each parent was grappling with changes in their relationship and in their world (including the onset of the pandemic and then later, the birth of their child), the father was highly critical of the mother and imposed his will and preferences upon the mother, by repeated criticisms of her behaviour.
I am satisfied in these circumstances that the father's conduct was psychologically abusive of the mother.

[76]

The father's opposition persisted even when the mother had proposed that she would provide $50,000 to be held by way of security, to reassure the father that she would return with the child. The father instructed his solicitors to advise the mother's lawyers in correspondence, sent during September 2024, that he would not consider further proposals for international travel.
That persistent opposition to travel for the child outside of Australia was again expressed in the final orders sought by the father (until his late amendment), as discussed previously.
It appears from the father's oral evidence that he opposed the travel proposed by the mother as he did not trust or believe her representations about returning.
Justice Bennett observes in Carter & Wilson [2023] FedCFamC1A 9, in a discussion about behaviour which may coerce or control, that an assessment of the context in which the impugned behaviour has occurred is necessary:
1. Section 4AB of the Act is drafted in very wide terms in order to catch behaviour which is thought to be undesirable. In so doing, the section also catches behaviour which is both acceptable and necessary (for example, exerting control over child in the exercise of the parenting powers). Therefore, in practical terms and save for blatant acts of family violence, an evaluation of evidence to ascertain the context in which alleged behaviour took place may be a precondition to the Court characterising behaviour as family violence within the meaning of s 4AB. Contextualising the behaviour calls for findings of fact.
The father's opposition to overseas travel may have been perceived by the mother as the father exercising control over her and limiting the exercise of her reasonable preferences (through his power to withhold agreement to the child travelling). The father implicitly maintains that his opposition to overseas travel by the child was in some way necessary (including given his belief that the mother may not return with the child) and in her best interests. The context in which the father has imposed this control upon the mother is relevant; the parties were separated and the mother had not had an opportunity to travel with the child to Country D or other places (relating to her work commitments).
The father instructed his solicitors to declare in September 2024 that he would not entertain further discussions about the possibility of future travel. That refusal to contemplate the child travelling internationally was maintained by the father until the conclusion of the evidence in the final hearing.
There were, however, avenues available to the mother to secure orders for travel, despite the father's opposition. I am not persuaded that the father's uncooperative attitude to international travel should properly be described as a manifestation of family violence, notwithstanding that aspects of the father's opposition to such travel may have been unreasonable.
I am however satisfied that the father's attitude to, and actions in refusing to contemplate international travel, falls into the category of "unsatisfactory conduct" as identified in Pickford at paragraph 112 and which is discussed further below.

[84]

The parties have each lived and worked in countries other than their country of birth. This suggests a curiosity about other cultures which places each of them in a good position to recognise and nurture the child's cultural heritage.
On the mother's part, she is attentive to the child's Country D heritage and she wishes for the child to experience that culture directly and more deeply. The mother speaks Country D Language with the child and the maternal family and speaks Country D Language at home unless there are English speakers present, when the mother said she swaps to English.
While her parents and sister have visited the child in Australia, the mother identifies opportunities for the child to more deeply experience her culture by living in, or visiting, Country D.
The father suggested that the child's Country D heritage would be encouraged and supported by engagement with the Country D diaspora and community in Sydney.
The father's evidence about his appreciation of the benefits for the child of exposure to her Country D culture is somewhat inconsistent with his refusal to permit the mother to take the child to Country D and his failure (until the conclusion of the evidence) to propose orders permitting the mother to travel to Country D (or elsewhere). The crafting of the father's original final orders sought, in which he, in effect, sought to restrain the mother from leaving Australia (or if she left, the child would stay with him) while also refusing any international travel, was particularly concerning. That remained his attitude until day four of the hearing.
When questioned about this omission, the father did not suggest it was an oversight. He instead maintained that the mother's dishonesty and manipulation was such that she could not be trusted to travel and return with the child.
I find that the father's declaration that he would foster and support the child's connection to her Country D culture rings hollow given these matters.
As is addressed elsewhere, the concerns I have with respect to the father's attitude to the mother include reservations about his preparedness to properly value and support the cultural heritage of the child derived from her mother's line.
On the paternal side, the child is Australian, with Country S heritage. She has important connections to her father and his family, and she will draw many benefits from her Australian and Country S cultural links being supported and maintained. If she remains living in Australia, those connections are readily maintained by her ongoing engagement with the father and his family. If the father lives near to the child in Europe, that will also assist in ensuring her Australian heritage is a central part of her life (primarily through her engagement with her father).
The mother said that if the child lives with her in Europe, she will facilitate the child continuing to learn English and that the schooling system in Country C and Country D included teaching English as a second language.
I am satisfied that the mother will do all she is able to do to ensure that the child is aware of, and appropriately exposed to, her Australian and Country S cultural heritage. I accept that the mother is respectful of the father's relationship with the child and will take steps to support that (as is addressed later in these reasons), including by encouraging the child's understanding of her Australian and Country S heritage from her paternal family.
I recognise however, that each of the final orders being sought by the parties will create challenges and have disadvantages with respect to the ability to maintain the child's connections with aspects of her cultural heritage.

[90]

I am comfortably satisfied that both parties (before separation) were involved significantly in the care of the child. They were each important to her care and nurture and each contributed to providing the foundation for the child's continuing development.
The evidence as a whole makes clear that whatever may have been the "plan" before the child was born, after her birth, the mother wanted more time away from work to be with the child.
The father maintained that he had a superior capacity to provide care for the child on an ongoing basis now, given (on his case) he had done so prior to separation. In comparison, he said the mother's parenting of the child suffered from certain deficits, relating to risk of poor mental health, her sometime dysregulation, her inconsistency in parenting approaches and the risk she may engage in family violence.
The other risk considerations as asserted by the father, informing parenting capacity, are addressed below. I have not found that the mother engaged in family violence to the father or to the child.
The father also argued that the mother's capacity to provide care of the child, was reduced given her commitment to her employment, which included the requirement for some international travel. It was submitted on the father's behalf, that he, on the other hand, was more available to care for the child (given the more limited extent to which he was engaged in employment outside of the home).
The child has lived with her mother since separation in January 2024 and she has benefitted from that care, along with the benefits of spending time with the father.
I am comfortably satisfied that each parent is able to provide for the child's day-to-day physical needs and her present developmental needs. They have some differences in their approaches to certain aspects of parenting. For example, the mother sees benefits to the child in engaging in a daycare environment where she has exposure to other children and to assist her in developing her socialisation skills. The father would prefer the child is cared for by family, a loving "tribe".

[93]

A range of concerns arise in response to the father's actions in videoing the mother as addressed previously. Dr F in her report identified that the father did not appear to understand how his actions might be experienced as unhelpful and would not assist someone to regulate (Exhibit 7 at [34]).
The mother told Dr F (Exhibit 7 at [63]) that she considered the father to lack empathy and had an inability to tolerate alternative perspectives. The mother "stated that when she became 'emotionally upset' during arguments, Mr Iason would 'criticise in a calm monotone voice', calling her 'emotional' or 'irrational'...". The mother's account of the father's engagement with her (as reported to Dr F and as set out in her written evidence) when she was upset appears to be consistent with the contents of the second video and of the accounts given by Ms P of her engagement with, and observations of, the father with the child (including that he appeared "cold blooded" and "emotionless"). I refer to my previous findings made about the nature of the father's engagement with, and conduct towards, the mother.
The father confirmed in his oral evidence that he continued to hold highly critical views of the mother including of her parenting style and aspects of her conduct. He accepted that he maintained his view that the mother's parenting style was characterised as anxious, inexperienced, controlling, abusive, violent, manipulative, and dependent. He agreed that he told the court child expert (Ms G in April 2024) that the mother was violent, manipulative and a liar and "loose with the truth". When invited to indicate any other criticisms he held of the mother, he added that the mother had been violent with the child and that she was manipulating the court system.
When asked what responsibility he took for the deterioration in the relationship and conflict with the mother, he answered "I take responsibility for asking things of [Ms Tausret] that she was not able to provide". Eventually he offered that at times he had lost his temper, but he had always apologised for doing so.
When asked why he had not mentioned that he had lost his temper and then apologised in his affidavit, he said (Transcript 28 July 2025, p.27, lines 11-15):

[95]

The father maintained that the child remains at risk of being harmed by the mother (Transcript 28 July 2025, p.27, line 20). That statement of current risk to the child was also made by his mother.
The father indicated that he did not accept the mother's evidence to the effect that she would not move overseas without the child (he said because she was untruthful and could not decide what country she wanted to live in).
The father maintained that the child was presently being alienated against him by the mother in her pursuit of the current care arrangements and refusal to return the child/or increase the child's care with "her primary carer" and his family.
The father asserted that he was the victim of financial coercion and control (as the mother had retained their property and savings and because he could not arrange his working life as he had to be available to have further care of the child).
The father maintained in his oral evidence that the mother had engaged in psychological abuse of him when she expressed suicidal thoughts to him. However, that contention sits inconsistently with his other contention (as set out earlier in these reasons) that the mother's previous suicidal ideation was indicative of mental health vulnerability (and by implication, that it was genuine). The conflict between the two contentions made by the father was not resolved.
In his oral evidence about the mother, the father was overwhelmingly critical, and he was rigid in his observations and the conclusions he drew from experiences between them. He revealed no insight to, nor allowance for, the possibility that his engagement with the mother may have in some way contributed to their difficulties or that his interpretation of her conduct and, or, motivations might have been misplaced. I find that he was not insightful nor was he self-aware. I find that the father's rigidly held and highly critical views of the mother create additional risks for the child, as is expanded upon below.
Earlier this year, the father attended upon the child's GP upon becoming aware that the mother had taken the child there. In his discussions with the GP that day, [...], he shared his highly critical views of the mother, adding in his oral evidence that "I'm aware of [Ms Tausret] misrepresenting [X]'s conditions to myself and the court". The document of his attendance upon the GP is Exhibit 10. The GP notes record:

[107]

Those observations are consistent with the mother's evidence about the father's mode of engagement with her and the findings I have made about aspects of the father's engagement with her.
In the conclusions expressed in her report, Dr F observed of the father (Exhibit 7 at [130]) that he may have some areas of personality dysfunction, which are relevant to his parenting capacity. In addition to her observations and discussions with the parties, Dr F had them each undertake certain psychometric testing.
Dr F opined:
1. ... suggest that [Mr Iason] has some areas of personality dysfunction, which are relevant to his parenting capacity. I do not see traits typical of one of the DSM 5 personality disorders, however [Mr Iason] shows some dysfunction in three of the four domains of personality outlined in the DSM 5 category of "General Personality Disorder". These areas are Cognition (ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people and events), Affectivity (the range, intensity, lability and appropriateness of emotional response) and Interpersonal functioning. The fourth domain, Impulse control is not relevant for [Mr Iason].
2. I have outlined areas of disturbed cognition (e.g. inability to differentiate between his intentions and their reception in p34, his difficulty seeing his own responsibility in p65), affectivity challenges (e.g. difficulties with empathy for [Ms Tausret], clinical levels of paranoia) and interpersonal functioning (e.g. loss of friendships, difficulties engaging in therapeutic process, difficulties accommodating to social norms) in my discussion above. These challenges were also outlined by the parties' couples' therapist, [Ms R] and in a limited manner by [Ms G] (Child Impact report writer). I also note that despite these difficulties, [Mr Iason] showed some areas of strength, including moments of empathic attunement with [X] (e.g. noticing and responding appropriately to her interest/disinterest and hunger cues) and limited ability to self-reflect.
Dr F in her report at paragraph 133, expressed concern that these areas of personality dysfunction:

[118]

The evidence revealed that the people about whom the father made reference in this letter are family members. [Ms T] is the partner of the paternal grandfather, and she works as a nurse in a hospital which administered Covid-19 vaccines. Mr U is the father's brother and there was disagreement between the brothers about Mr U having his own children vaccinated. Ms V is the father's sister and similarly, it appears she was electing to vaccinate her son. The father had communicated to his family (and more widely) his views about the impacts of the response to the Covid-19 vaccine (including his reference to genocide).
The father's views about Covid-19 impacted his relationship with the mother. In his oral evidence he stated, in reference to the Covid-19 vaccine, that the mother's "unwillingness to discuss it reasonably" caused conflict between them. He described in his oral evidence that the mother had not treated him "like a human being" as he considered she made decisions that "had zero input from me". He accepted that he told Ms R that the Covid-19 vaccine response was genocide.
The mother said that the father has been highly critical of her choice to be vaccinated and about her continuing employment with an international company.
The father determined not to receive the vaccination and sought to persuade the mother to move to live in places other than Country E (including Country Y), because of his concerns about the "human rights' abuses" occurring in Country E. The father returned to live in Sydney partly in response to those tensions. He felt aggrieved that the mother had not fully supported him in the grief he experienced about the loss of fundamental rights.
The father's strongly held beliefs and values framework, the mother says, may pose additional risks for the child. As noted above, this was identified as a possible risk by Dr F; and as identified previously, has already had some impact in the post-separation period for the mother, in his engagement with the child's doctor.
One domain of risk relating to the father's more extreme views relates to long-term decision making, particularly with respect to the child's medical care and education. The mother seeks orders that would give her sole decision making with respect to the child on the basis that she would seek the father's input before making a decision, save for medical matters. The mother proposes that she would make medical decisions solely, without input from the father.
Some additional examples illustrate the foundations for the mother's concerns. While the mother was pregnant with the child, the father communicated with her about an obstetrician she had contemplated engaging. In a text message exchange with the mother (Exhibit 14), he expressed his critical views of that obstetrician and the use of paracetamol by pregnant women:

[122]

Ultimately, now that the parties are no longer living together, the mother will be less impacted by the consequences of conflict between her values and choices and those of the father. However, I find that the father's adherence to his own views and philosophies is rigid and that he is not open to contrary perspectives, at least in terms of the mother's experiences with him (summarised above), and which is consistent with Dr F's evidence as to his possible personality dysfunction traits. The evidence satisfies me, and I find, that the father's strongly held unorthodox views have impacted his relationships with adult members of his own family. The evidence makes clear that even to the extent of close family relationships, the father's adherence to his own views has created some pressure on the maintenance of those relationships.
The mother has her own experiences of managing the conflict of views and values with the father, which informs her apprehension about this process for the child in the future. I am satisfied that the father's rigid belief system, including with respect to certain medical matters, may pose an additional risk for the child in her relationship with the father. Those risk considerations inform a number of orders to be made in this matter, including as to long-term decision making for the child.
Dr F agreed in her oral evidence that the father's conduct and attitude to the mother was undermining of the mother's parenting of the child and would be destabilising for the mother. Dr F maintained (as she had in her report) that the mother moving to live closer to her family in Europe was protective of the mother's mental health and accordingly, protective of the child.
I find that aspects of the father's personality (and possible dysfunction) and how he engages with others about his strongly held views, may create additional risks for the child in that she may experience conflict with him in the future about her own views and values; there is a risk she may experience him to be rigid and uncompromising about those matters (as the mother said has been her experience). The mother, as an adult, has struggled to manage those experiences (admittedly within a framework of her own mental health vulnerabilities). The mother expressed her concern that the child, in the event she experiences similar points of discord between her views/experiences and those of the father, may find that conflict to be a source of confusion and distress (in addition to the risks flowing from exposure to his negative views of the mother).
I find that aspects of the father's thought framework and engagement with others, makes clear that there are some risks to the child from exposure to this in the future.

[135]

The mother has been diagnosed with a moderate Major Depressive Disorder, in remission, as reported by Dr H in April 2024 (and as summarised in Exhibit 7). Dr H also found that such did not adversely affect the mother's capacity to fulfil her parenting role, provided "she continues to monitor and manage her mental health" (as summarised in Exhibit 7 at paragraph 17(k)).
The fact of that diagnosis, of course, does not disqualify the mother from continuing to parent the child.
The father has placed evidence before the court of his observations of the mother during the relationship, suggestive of the mother's mental health deterioration at that time. Some of that evidence is corroborated by the mother's account of certain events and her own descriptions of her functioning. The mother accepted in cross-examination some of the father's characterisations of her conduct and behaviour. I refer to previous discussion and findings about these matters. The evidence makes clear that the mother experienced a second depressive episode during the latter part of the relationship, while grappling with the pressures of Covid-19 responses, infertility and pregnancy loss, and changes to the relationship between the parties.
To the extent that the father asserts the mother expressed thoughts of suicide (also addressed previously), I find that his reliance upon these events to suggest risk of actual mental health decline or vulnerability is undermined by his declaration that he considers the mother's comments about suicide to be a "tactic" used by her in their counselling sessions. The father's maintenance of those inconsistent and conflicting contentions about aspects of the mother's conduct when unwell, is not suggestive of an empathetic response.
Dr F summarised the mother's mental health functioning at the time she wrote the report as follows:
1. [Ms Tausret]'s presentation during this assessment is in line with [Dr H]'s psychiatric assessment in April 2024. She presents as someone in remission (not actively depressed), with a history of Major Depressive Disorder. Her experience of infertility, in combination with the coronavirus pandemic and [Mr Iason]'s associated response were detrimental to her mood. The added stressors of first-time motherhood, poor sleep and escalating conflict with [Mr Iason] were further destabilising and impacted her ability to assert herself. She presents with some insight into the need to protect [X] from the impact of her disorder, noting that she was careful to ensure [X] was not neglected.

[139]

There are continuing stressors being experienced by the mother given her current living circumstances and she seeks to address some of those stressors through the relief sought in these proceedings. These stressors include (paragraphs 181 to 187 of the mother's affidavit):
1. When my mother is not in Australia, I feel very lonely and isolated as I have no support network here.
2. I am unhappy in Australia and feel detached from my family and friends. It makes me sad to consider [X] being detached from her maternal family, particularly when [X] has had the opportunity to connect so heavily with my parents due to them spending so much time in Australia.
3. I devote as much time as I possibly can to [X] and I love being her mum. [X] fills me with pride and joy, and I connect with [X] every moment that I can. I know however, that having a lack of family and friends around me is negatively impacting me as when I am not spending time with [X], I feel isolated and sad. I know I could be a better mother to [X] if I was around a strong support network, where I felt accepted as me and had social connections to rely upon. I appreciate that moving to [City Z] or [City AA] with my current employer would be a change for me, but my role in those locations won't be so high pressured. I won't be leading such a large team as I am here in Australia and my travel for work would be significantly less noting that the distance between European countries is not as significant as the distance and flight time between Australia and Asia. The role they have asked me to consider requires travel across [City AA], [Country BB] and [Country CC]. The flight time from [City Z] to [Country CC] is 1 hour, 10 minutes and the flight time from [City Z] to [City AA] is approximately 45 minutes.
4. Although I am feeling better in my mental health since separating from [Mr Iason], I do still live with constant fear and stress associated with the uncertainty of remaining in Australia. I am always worried about what will happen if I cannot get another visa, or if I lost my job and cannot get another role to sponsor me. I am seeking the Orders that I am seeking because I say that not having these stresses will allow me to be a better mother to [X] as I would be inherently happier and more relaxed given I have a [Country D] passport, I can work and live anywhere in the European Union.
5. I continue to have a lot of pressure on me in Australia, being [X]'s primary carer and sole financial support. It is clear to me, I cannot rely on [Mr Iason] to assist me with financially supporting [X]. Given my responsibilities, I would feel better in myself by having my support system readily available to me as right now I feel as though I am constantly in survival mode. The financial pressure on me in Australia is significant and it means that every moment that I am not working I am spending with [X]. This means I do not have any time for any of my own personal interests, noting I used to be a very keen off reader, traveller and [recreational sportsperson]. I am not permitted right now to take [X] travelling and any leave I take is for [X] and for court hearings.
6. Even though I have significant work commitments, the nature of my current role means that I cannot perform in it to the highest level, as I am unwilling to undertake the significant travel requirements of the role, as this would see me travelling extremely regularly and I am not prepared to be away from [X] for that length of time, as her primary carer. This means that I am working extremely hard, but I am unlikely to get a promotion as it would require me to travel more.
7. I feel lost and disempowered in Australia.
The father and his family are not viable alternative sources of support for the mother, as addressed previously.
The mother has experienced aspects of these proceedings and the ongoing uncertainty about her future as a source of some additional stress. She has obtained strategies from Ms Q to assist her. The notes make clear (arising from attendances ranging from 5 May 2024 to 17 May 2025, Exhibit 28) that the mother reports being worried about:

[140]

(a) Her perception of the father's lack of empathy and how that might impact the child.

(b) Feeling trapped and fearful about her future (expressed at several points across the period captured by the notes in evidence).

(c) The uncertainty of the outcome of the proceedings is compounding her anxiety and her fear of the father's reaction.

(d) The father's "habit" of denigrating her and the potential long-term impact on the child.

(e) How she would manage without her parent's support and their presence with her, which has been critical to her ability to cope.

(f) Seeing the father at changeovers and how that "triggers" her, observing his angry facial expressions and experiencing flashbacks of past experiences of verbal abuse and emotional intimidation (Ms Q notes that the mother was emotional and teary when reporting these experiences, and Ms Q makes notes identifying possible PTSD profile).

(g) She expressed feeling emotionally drained and overwhelmed and feeling fearful about engagement with the father and his mother.

(h) She expressed feelings of frustration and emotional burden about the father's lack of effort to increase his work to help contribute to the financial responsibility for the child.

(i) She expressed concern that neither the father nor his family have demonstrated concern for her well-being, and she expressed worry that they may be similarly unavailable to the child in the future.

(j) While welcoming the support of her parents in their extended stays, the mother expressed feeling guilt and stress about the long-term burden on them.

(k) The lack of emotional safety in her interactions with the father and his family was a continuing source of psychological strain.

(l) Feeling overwhelm with mounting work pressures and the expectation to travel abroad for business and emotional distress at the prospect of leaving the child, conflicting deeply with her values around providing consistent and nurturing care; concern for her daughter's wellbeing.

(m) Frustration at the father' refusal to allow her to take the child with her for a short trip abroad.

(n) Fear and anxiety about court attendance and seeing the father there; experiencing flashbacks and overwhelm when thinking about him.

(o) Grieving the loss of her life in Country E and the emotional and professional costs of that decision.

(p) Sadness and loss relating to the IVF process, enduring the physical and emotional pain of five miscarriages, with minimal support from the father.

(q) Fears about the psychological impact on the child if coached to withhold information (about things happening when with father); lack of transparency and information from him.

[141]

If the mother lives elsewhere, her evidence was that she will make inquiries of other counselling providers, depending on where she is based.
The mother has been frank both as to her mental health challenges and the steps she has taken to manage her health.
I am persuaded that the mother feels lonely and isolated in her current living circumstances and notwithstanding the happiness she derives from her role in parenting the child, she continues to experience challenges in presenting her best self in the performance of her parenting duties. She was not substantially challenged about these matters (and she rejected the suggestion that she could rely upon the father and his family to care for the child more to enable her to access social engagement).
The mother's management of her mental health has also been sufficient that she has been able to maintain her high-performance employment responsibilities, despite the very clear pressures of such (including those created by her geographic location and the pressures of travel, which she has been required to undertake, imposing unwelcome separation from the child). The mother's evidence about the way she has managed her travel demands to minimise her time away from the child (including taking red-eye flights), reflects her willingness to place the child's interests first. However, I accept that this has been at some additional cost to the mother's general wellbeing and functioning.
I do not find that the mother's mental health functioning presently impacts her ability to provide safe and appropriate care for the child, given the steps the mother has taken to shield the child from this, as identified by Dr F. I do not find that the mother's mental health functioning presents a risk to the child while in her care. I find that the mother has established, over an extended period, that she is capable of identifying the need for, and then obtaining, assistance and supports when her mental health becomes vulnerable. I find that she is likely to continue to be pro-active in engaging necessary mental health supports for herself into the future. However, I do not underestimate that the mother's current situation includes her engagement in these proceedings, in which she remains hopeful of obtaining relief from certain of the pressures which she identifies as impacting her (and the child).
The mother has been significantly supported by her mother who has spent extensive time living with the mother in Australia. The evidence of the mother and her mother was however, that such support (on the ground) is creating financial strain and also strain upon the family remaining in Country D. The mother feels the burden of responsibility for keeping her mother from her life in Country D, including being with the maternal grandfather and the mother's grandfather (and that burden is another stressor for her). While the support of the maternal grandmother has been generously given, I am satisfied that it is a finite resource. The maternal grandmother said in her written evidence that she could not continue, indefinitely, to provide the level of support she has been providing to her daughter in Australia. She deposes to other caring responsibilities in Country D (including for her own aged father) and to the burdens of living for extended periods away from her husband and other family members. She also deposed to the impact of extended travel, given her age and her vulnerability in not being able to access free medical assistance in this country. I accept that evidence and find that the maternal grandmother's ability to continue to support the mother in Australia is limited.
The risk that the father identifies as relating to the mother's health cannot be assessed in isolation from consideration of the factors which have contributed to periods of decline in her health. Dr F identified aspects of the relationship with the father, and its deterioration, as sources of stress for the mother (and relationship breakdown more generally as a risk factor for the mother's mental health functioning), contributing to her previous episode of mental ill health. I accept that evidence.
The mother's ongoing anxiety and stress, I find, is contributed to by factors, including her separation from her family of origin and her desire to receive their comprehensive support, and to have the pressures of her employment terms eased. For the reasons outlined previously, I find that engagement with the father, aspects of his conduct, and his rigid belief system, have also contributed to the mother's previous mental health decline.
I find that the separation from the father and reduced exposure to aspects of his functioning are protective of the mother's safety and future mental health functioning, with the attendant benefits for the child. Having certainty in the resolution of the proceedings is also likely to assist.

[151]

I have regard to the father's Financial Statement (Exhibit 24). The father's current employment commitment generates income of $640 per week. He is working part time. The most recent orders about his time caring for the child were made in December 2024, with orders having been previously made in May 2024 providing for the child to live with the mother. His evidence that he needed to keep time available so that the child could return to his care "even if the courts wouldn't support that return" is puzzling.
The father suggested that benefit to the child did not arise from his payment of more money, "[X] wants time with me. She doesn't want extra cash" (Transcript 28 July 2025, p.33, lines 4-5).
I accept the mother's evidence (about which she was not challenged) that before separation, she repeatedly asked the father to reconsider his work arrangements and to increase his work so that she could have more time with the child and he could make a further contribution to meeting the costs of their household.
I accept the mother's evidence that in the post-separation period, the pressures felt by her in being solely responsible for the financial support of the child have weighed heavily on her.
The father could not have been ignorant of those matters given the pre-separation requests made by the mother. On 20 February 2025, the mother's lawyers wrote to the father's lawyers and asked him to make an additional financial contribution (noting the property he held and his under-utilised earning capacity as an educator) (Exhibit 23). The request in that letter does not appear to have been answered until 2 July 2025, when the father's lawyers indicate that their client has no intention of changing his employment (that letter is also part of Exhibit 23). No additional financial support was provided by the father.
The father has sold certain property and holds crypto currency which he accepted was worth $428,362.
The father's Costs Notice reveals that he has spent around $370,000 from his own resources, on legal representation in these proceedings.
I am satisfied that it is appropriate and relevant to the particular circumstances of this child, that I consider the extent to which the parents have met their financial responsibilities to the child. The father could have increased his engagement in the paid work force and increased his financial contribution to the child by increasing the child support he pays to the mother; or he could have directed some of the funds he had at his disposal from his investments, towards that support.
The father's right to exercise his choices about his employment preferences occurs at the same time that he has refused to agree to the mother travelling internationally with the child, including in support of her employment (for example to attend a work conference with the support of her parents, such that she would not have been separated from the child).
I find that the father's attitude to his employment and financial support of the child has been another source of indirect pressure upon the mother (as his actions made clear that she could not rely upon him for assistance in meeting the financial needs of the child, beyond his modest child support contribution).

[159]

(a) Country C has a similar short stay/tourist regime to that of Country D - a visitor may travel to Country C for up to 90 days in any 180-day period (without taking up employment). The entry requirements include holding a valid passport. Australians are not required to have a visa to enter the country.

(b) In the event that the father desired to remain in Country C for a period longer than 90 days, he would be required to obtain a temporary residence permit. Mr K's evidence suggests that there are two options available to the father - to apply as the parent of a European citizen (in circumstances where the child holds Country D nationality) or to obtain a temporary work permit.

(c) With respect to the parenting option (an application for family reunification), Mr K suggested that the father would be required to provide evidence to the Country C federal immigration authorities (which may include an enforceable judicial decision about parental authority and custody, records of financial support, attestations from third parties including family members, and photographs) to confirm that he is exercising parental authority for the child, including "custody rights", and that he is actively involved in the day-to-day care and education of the child. Mere biological parenthood or mere financial support is not sufficient. The father would also be required to demonstrate his ability to meet his basic needs without relying on public assistance.

(d) Mr K notes that such an application is to be made upon arrival in Country C, and the father would be granted a provisional right to remain in Country C (and take up employment) while the application is being processed - typically five to six months. If successful, the father would be issued with a residence permit, valid for five years, allowing for the father to live in Country C and work without restriction.

(e) Mr K was unable to confirm if one particular care scenario over others would, with certainty, satisfy the relevant authority. When cross examined by counsel for the father and when left to grapple with the proposition similarly put to Ms J - to the effect of whether the father caring for the child two nights a fortnight would be sufficient to meet to the necessary conditions - Mr K stated (Transcript 30 July 2025, p.366, lines 4-9):

[166]

I am persuaded, given the findings made previously, that the relationship between the parties is such that joint decision making is not viable. The parties do not have a trustful co-parenting relationship and could not safely navigate the obligations expected under s 61DAA of the Act; further conflict and dispute is likely to follow any attempts to reach a joint position on long-term decisions for the child, which would be contrary to the best interests of the child.
I have made findings as to the mother's ability to properly support the child's relationship with the father. I have also made findings adverse to the father with respect to aspects of his conduct to the mother and as to his attitude to the mother.
The ICL sought orders which provide the mother with sole decision-making responsibility for the child. Dr F also recommended that the mother hold sole decision making for the child. The ICL proposes a consultation framework within which the mother would seek the father's input about long term decisions, before she ultimately makes the decision. That appears to be a sensible framework, and those orders are similar to those sought by the mother in any event. I will make orders which reflect proposed Orders 1 and 2 from the ICL's amended minute of orders sought (Exhibit 37) subject to a further addition. I will include a provision that in the event the father does not provide feedback to the mother in the specified time frame, then the mother is at liberty to make the decision without further notice to the father.
The mother proposed a separate carve out order, such that she ought not be required to consult with the father about long term medical matters relating to the child. Save for emergency situations, where I find it is appropriate that the mother make any necessary medical decision for the child, I am not persuaded that the mother should not also follow the same consultative framework with respect to medical decisions. The framework as proposed by the ICL will require the mother to advise the father of long-term matters about which she seeks to make a decision and to invite his input. There is no principled reason why that should not include (non-urgent) medical matters.
I am otherwise satisfied that these parents do not have the capacity to make long-term decisions together. The rigid views of the father, particularly about the mother, and his rejection of medical orthodoxy, readily permit my finding that the mother is best placed to make long-term decisions on behalf of the child and that such will be in the best interests of the child. The findings I have made as to the mother's child-focussed approach and respectful attitude to the father, support a decision-making regime that is ultimately determined by the mother, with input from the father, before the final decision is made by the mother.

[169]

I have found that the mother has been the child's primary carer since separation in January 2024 and was significantly involved in the child's care prior to separation. The mother deposes to a properly based and reasonable desire to live in a location in Europe which will permit her to have more immediate access to the important support of her family and to better meet the obligations of her employment. It was not suggested by the father or counsel for the ICL that the mother's proposals about living in Country C or Country D were not bona fide (AMS & AIF at [189]).
The mother seeks the continuing support of her parents and extended family. I have found that the absence of that support is a factor which informs the mother's mental health vulnerability (and as opined by Dr F). While the mother has striven to ensure that she has provided a very high standard of care to the child, despite living in a place not of her choosing, Dr F observed at paragraph 138 that the mother's "own mental health is likely better supported by a closer connection with her family and friendship networks in Europe, as well as a reduction in financial stressors relating to living in Sydney". I accept that evidence.
While the maternal grandparents and, to a lesser extent, the mother's sister, have been able to spend blocks of time with the mother in Australia, the mother deposes to the strain upon her parents of that continuing. I accept the mother's evidence about these tensions and the evidence of the maternal grandmother about the limits on her ability to continue to provide this support.
The mother wants to live in a country of her choosing. Her right to determine where she lives is an important freedom. The exercise of that freedom should only be curtailed by this court to the extent that the best interests of the child require it. Dr F observed that the child will derive benefits if her mother is functioning well and feels supported (see for example B & B: Family Law Reform Act [1997] FamCA 33; 1995 (1997) FLC 92-755 at [9.66]). The mother deposes, and I find, that she has experienced considerable strain and unhappiness in being required to parent under the circumstances which followed the separation between the parties (which include the strains relating to the father's rigid and highly critical attitude to the mother). The continuing strain upon the mother's mental health is evident and she has required continuing reliance upon her family and professional advisors to assist her in the management of her mental health, over an extended period of time.
I am persuaded that the mother would benefit from more immediate access to family support. Dr F identified that support as being important to the mother's future mental health and well-being. While her parents have provided important care and support to her while she has lived in Australia, I accept that her parents have commitments in Country D and that it is unsustainable for the mother to expect them to continue travelling to Australia to assist her. The mother deposes to experiencing guilt about the demands she has placed upon her parents (and that feeds into the matters about which the mother has sought continuing professional help). I accept that evidence and find that such is an additional stressor being experienced by the mother.
The mother is also juggling significant obligations to her employer and is experiencing continuing strain in meeting her performance requirements. The mother also deposes to her expectation that her ability to meet her employment requirements will be better achieved if she lives in Europe - that the travel requirements will be reduced (her oral evidence was to the effect that it would be day trips only, most of the time) and that she would have the assistance of her parents if needed, who would only be a short flight away (if she was living in Country C and of course, much closer if she was living in Country D). I accept that evidence.
The mother said in her written evidence that her employer has indicated that they are not able to continue to accept her non-attendance at various international conferences and workshops. That evidence was unchallenged, and I accept it. Given the responsibility the mother carries to support herself and the child, I find that her fears about these workplace pressures are of some substance and are also contributing to the stressors she is presently experiencing. Her requests of the father, since the birth of the child, to increase his workplace participation so that she might consider reducing her own, were rejected by the father. I also refer to the findings I have made as to the father's opposition to the child's international travel with the mother which has also added strain to the mother's employment performance.
I refer to my previous findings with respect to the circumstances around which the mother chose to move to Australia and that she had not intended to remain in Australia for the long term.
Other advantages of the mother and child living in Europe include the mother being able to reconnect with old friends and to allow the child to experience, more directly, her Country D culture.
I acknowledge that there are clear disadvantages to the child living in Europe with her mother, most particularly, given it will mean that the opportunities for the child to spend time with the father (if he chooses not to follow the child or is unable to live in the same location) and the wider paternal family, may be limited. There are also additional benefits to the child living in Australia and continuing to access the benefit of her Australian culture, more directly.
The father indicated in his oral evidence that he would do all he could do to live near the child and to ensure the greatest opportunity to be with her. While his counsel maintained in submissions that there was some uncertainty about the extent to which that would be "possible", the evidence makes clear that it is an option that remains open to the father for him to pursue. The father has lived or holidayed in many countries during his adult life. He has professional qualifications which previously assisted him in securing employment in other countries (including most recently in Country E). Those qualifications may assist him in pursuing skilled employment and visa opportunities in either Country C or Country D, as applicable. I am persuaded that he will be highly motivated to ensure he is living proximate to the child to ensure he is able to avail himself of additional opportunities to experience and be involved in her care and development. I also take into account that the father has completed two language courses in Country D.
Even if a residency application was not successful, the father's circumstances are such that he may still avail himself of blocks of time in the country in which the child is living (given his financial circumstances and presently limited employment), using the applicable tourist visa terms. The father has certain personal financial reserves he may call upon to assist in meeting his costs and expenses should he choose.
The father does not have commitments which might make it more difficult or unlikely that he could move to live in another place, close to the child. He has converted his real property interests to cryptocurrency; he has limited employment ties to, or commitments in, Australia; he has not re-partnered; he is renting his home with his mother; as recently as August 2023 he had contemplated living in Country Y; and before that, of becoming a "freedom fighter".
Orders which promote and support the mother's ability to continue to parent the child and which minimise the pressures upon the mother, are in the child's best interests, especially when I have made findings about challenging aspects of the father's functioning and attitude to the mother.
These considerations weigh in favour of the mother being able to determine the place in which the child will live, which will enable the mother to continue to act in her role as the child's primary carer, in a location of the mother's choosing. I am satisfied that such an outcome is in the best interests of this child. On the evidence relied upon at the hearing, this will be either Country C (if the employment opportunity in that country remains open to the mother) or Country D. I will make orders to that effect. I will also make an order requiring the mother, as soon as practicable, to provide to the father written confirmation of the intended country of residence for the child and when such relocation is to occur.
My decision is informed by my findings that there are significant risks to the mother's functioning in the event she was to remain living in Australia (being subject to an implicit restraint, in the event I made the orders as sought by the father and which had been expressed by the mother, in the alternative, if she was "not permitted" to relocate), which, may impact adversely upon the child. It is avoidance of those risks which has in part informed Dr F's support of the mother's proposed relocation and which also informs my determination.
The father's contention that the supports on offer by him and his family for the mother in remaining in this country, as being of real assistance to her, ignores the serious deficits in the relationship between the mother and the father. I refer to my findings about those matters and have concluded that those offered supports are not a substitute for the support the mother seeks from her family, more readily available to her in Country C or Country D. I remain concerned that if the mother was compelled to remain in this country, there is a risk of a decline in her mental health and well-being. In that event, it is likely that the child will then experience a deterioration in the mother's functioning and ability to parent. That is a risk not to be contemplated lightly.
In coming to this conclusion, I have considered and weighed the advantages to the child of the mother (and child) remaining in Australia. Those benefits include the better opportunity for the child to continue relationships with the father and the wider paternal family and continuing connection to the child's Australian culture. Such an outcome would also shield the child from the rupture of loss of her proximate relationship with the father (if he did not follow her to another country). However, the possible loss of the relationship of the child with the father does not arise in the event the father determines that he will live in proximity to the child. That outcome remains open to the father.
I have also made findings as to aspects of the father's functioning which pose some risk for the child and those considerations are also weighed by me in the assessment of the best interests of the child.
In final submissions, the father's counsel expressed concern that the mother, if unrestricted in decision making about where the child lives, may choose to move the child in the future, regardless of the father's circumstances and the impact of such upon his relationship with the child. The mother was not cross examined about this possibility.
Counsel for the father submitted that it would be of concern if the court was to make an "open cheque" order providing for the mother to go anywhere in the world in circumstances where such may cause the father greater difficulty in potentially relocating to those other countries. Counsel for the mother submitted that such a risk was not likely and that the evidence, taken as a whole, did not suggest that the mother was likely to move from place to place (including that this was not consistent with her work history).
No additional or alternate orders were sought by counsel for the father to address this perceived risk - indeed, the father placed no proposed orders before the court about what should apply, in the event that the mother and the child were living in a country outside of Australia. The submission was accordingly made, on the basis of a perceived risk, but offering no remedy.
For the reasons set out previously, I have determined that it is in this child's best interests that the mother solely hold responsibility for long-term decision making for the child, with the consultation framework with the father, as set out above.
I am satisfied, given the findings I have made as to the mother's capacity and child focussed approach to the care of the child, that she will discharge her responsibility to the child and make decisions in the future, which are focussed upon the best interests of the child.
I decline to engage upon a speculative process about a series of longer term and uncertain "what ifs", untethered to evidence, especially in circumstances where I do not have the particulars of orders sought by the father to remedy the risk which he belatedly identifies.

[172]

While Dr F had, in her report, expressed support for the child living with the mother out of Australia, she had expressed views about the benefits to the child of delaying that departure. That was in part informed by the benefit of the child having a longer period with her father to develop closer connections. However, almost a year has passed from the date of those observations, so some additional time has been afforded for that to occur in any event, and the child has been having overnight time with the father since December 2024. Dr F's view about the benefits to the child of delaying her departure was somewhat changed in her oral evidence, as a result of her understanding of the import of aspects of the father's evidence.
Dr F also recognised that one challenge for the court was identifying the "tipping point" in this matter - where the possible benefits to the child of having more time living proximate to her father and engagement with him and his family, are outweighed by the risk of the mother's continuing exposure to the adverse aspects of the father's functioning. I am satisfied, having listened to and observed the parties in giving their evidence, that the "tipping point" has been reached - the risks to the mother's health and functioning (and therefore to the child) are appreciable, serious and present at this time. The father's rigidly negative attitude to the mother is already impinging upon the mother's engagement for and on behalf of the child (for example, his negative conduct at changeover and his engagement with the child's GP).
The evidence from the father in his cross-examination makes clear that the passage of time has not resulted in a softening or abatement of his negative views of the mother. I have found the father's views to be unreasonably held.
I am persuaded that those aspects of the father's functioning create some additional risks for the child. Those matters weigh against compelling the mother, as the child's primary caregiver, to remain living in a location against her wishes and where she will be exposed to the father's highly negative attitude to her and her parenting. If the father chooses to live in the same country as the child, the mother will be better equipped to support the child's ongoing relationship with the father in that country, given the mother will then have access to the additional supports, important to her, which I have identified elsewhere in these reasons.
I value and place weight on the opinions expressed by Dr F. However, in assessing and weighing different considerations as to the child's best interests, I place greater weight on the benefits the child will likely derive from her mother's improved mental health functioning and happiness.
Counsel for the ICL also argued against delaying the mother's departure from Australia, on the basis that such might in fact add to conflict and dispute between the parties. There is weight to that submission and identification of that additional risk.
In any event, I am not persuaded that the possible benefits to the child of having additional time in Australia, with her father and extended family, are outweighed by the burdens upon her mother in that event and the concomitant risks for the child. I find that the mother has provided excellent care of the child under difficult circumstances, in the post-separation period. She has been compelled to compromise her preferences and endured additional challenges (including separation from her family of origin and the support they provide, and achieving the requirements of her employer in order to provide financially for the child). I am not persuaded that the possible benefits to the child of experiencing additional time with the father and his family in Australia at this time, outweighs the benefits to the child of experiencing her mother functioning more fully and from a position of greater contentment (which I am confident will occur once the mother is able to live where she wishes to live). There are also risk considerations which have some influence in this assessment - risk posed by the father's rigid and highly negative views of the mother and his other unorthodox views, that may impact upon the child's development. There is some risk too that the mother does not continue to function well if she is not able to live where she chooses.
I have found the mother to have greater capacity to meet the various needs of the child. I do not propose to impose upon her a continuing requirement and burden of performing her duties and responsibilities to the child without the supports which I have found she reasonably seeks.
I also have regard to the possibility that the father may decide, in due course, to live in Europe. I propose to make orders which provide for the father's time with the child in the event he lives in the same location and in the alternative, in the event he remains in Australia. The father is clearly devoted to the child. I accept his evidence that he will do all he can to ensure that he is able to continue to play an active part in the child's life.
There is a Watch List Order in place. That order will be discharged. I will make an order as sought by the mother that permits the mother to remove the child from the Commonwealth of Australia.

[174]

There are clear risks identified in the findings I have made as to aspects of the father's engagement with the mother and with the child. Those findings inform some caution with respect to the spend time arrangements between the child and the father. Dr F accepted that in light of matters illuminated in the evidence (now confirmed by findings I have made), some further limitation on the father's time with the child might be required.
The father did not propose orders to apply in the circumstances where I was to make orders which would see the child living outside of Australia.
In this instance, where it remains possible (and the mother's preference) that the father will also choose to live in Country C or Country D (as applicable) and proximate to the child, I propose to consider what spend time orders would be in the child's best interests in that event, and then those which I am satisfied ought to apply in the event the father does not live proximate to the child. That is the approach taken by the mother and the ICL.
The ICL proposed certain spend time orders at the conclusion of the evidence which would result in the child having quite extensive time with the father, even before she commences primary school (moving to five nights per fortnight). I am not persuaded that the evidence supports that outcome as it does not sufficiently address the risks to the child of longer periods of engagement with the father and is not responsive to the additional cautions arising from the evidence revealed in the hearing and as expressed by Dr F in her oral evidence.
There was nothing inherently flawed in the approach taken by the mother in her orders sought and given the findings I have made, I propose to largely adopt the framework proposed by the mother. I have found the mother to be child focussed and her assessment of the benefits and risks associated with the child's relationship with the father was found by me to be balanced.
The mother proposed orders to apply pending the child moving to live in Country C or Country D. It is sensible to contemplate the possibility that some time may pass before the mother is able to complete all the necessary preparations for her move. I will largely adopt the orders sought by the mother in paragraph 7 of her minute of orders sought, save that I will order that the father shall care for the child for an additional day time period once each fortnight, between 9.00 am and 4.00 pm as agreed, and failing agreement on Thursday (in the week that the father does not care for the child on Saturday) pending that move. That arrangement will allow the child the benefits of some additional day time with her father and members of the paternal family, while still acknowledging the matters addressed previously in this judgment which inform a cautious approach to the father's time with the child.
Additionally, the mother sought orders, pending relocation, for extended international travel which would thereafter see her facilitate make up time between the father and the child following any such travel which would impede upon the father's ordered time with the child (the mother's proposed Order 30). No submissions were made with respect to this proposed order nor was there any evidence to suggest that the mother had a trip planned prior to her relocation to either Country C or Country D. As above, I have expressed the benefits to the child of spending time with the father and his family pending relocation. I decline to make the order as sought by the mother in these circumstances but note (as outlined below) that the mother will have further opportunities to travel internationally with the child.
The mother has included certain special occasions which may occur pending the child's departure. I note that it is possible that the child's change of residence may occur prior to those special occasions occurring. It is only if the mother and child remain in Australia that compliance with that order is required (unless another order is applicable with respect to special occasion time, to occur when the child is not in Australia). I will make orders that reflect those sought by the mother.

[176]

I find that the spend time arrangements as proposed by the mother in this event, are on balance, better aligned to the best interests of this child given the matters addressed in these reasons as to the process of balancing risk.
Those orders include special occasion time and holiday time.
Guided by the concerns identified about the risk to the child in extended exposure to aspects of the father's functioning and his adverse and rigid views of the mother, I find that it is appropriate that the father's care of the child should be for shorter periods, such that the experiences for the child may be balanced by then returning to the mother's care. As stated previously, I am not persuaded that the orders for time as proposed by the ICL adequately address the state of the evidence about those matters.
The mother's proposed orders in the event the father also relocated to live proximate to the child are set out in paragraphs 8 to 11 inclusive of Exhibit 39. I address them below. Those proposed orders were expressed under a sub-heading purporting to limit their application only "if the father relocates to the jurisdiction where the mother and child are residing within 4 months of the child relocating". No explanation was provided about this purported limitation in the mother's evidence, and it was not addressed in submissions. In those circumstances, I disregard that purported qualifier.
While proposed Order 8 is expressed in terms to take effect from the making of the orders, and provides for a proposed initial phase of time, it is appropriate that the first phase commences upon the father taking up residence in a location proximate to the child's residence. I will make orders consistent with paragraph 8 of Exhibit 39, to commence from the date of the father's relocation. These orders will apply in circumstances where the child is not yet attending primary school, and they provide for the continuation of weekly overnight time.
Proposed Order 9 provides for the next phase of care to continue until the child commences her primary schooling. I propose to adopt that framework which provides for the father to care for the child for three nights per fortnight.
Proposed Order 10 sets out the care regime to apply once the child has commenced primary schooling and provides for the continuation of three nights of care per fortnight, but with more time occurring on the weekend, to include two consecutive nights on every second weekend. I will make those orders.
However, I am not persuaded that the child's time with the father should progress no further and be limited to only two nights every second weekend and one night on the alternate week (during the week). As the child matures, I recognise there may be additional benefits to her in having more time in the father's care, while recognising, as found by me, the need to balance those benefits against the risks identified elsewhere in these reasons. The child will also be experiencing changes and adjustments (with her mother) in living in another place and in due course, beginning school there. Once the child has had some time to settle and adjust to those changes, I determine that having an additional night of time in her father's care per fortnight may serve the child well. If the child remained with the father on Sunday evening, that may also assist in the transition between the adults (noting the challenges in their relationship identified elsewhere in the reasons). Having the child transition back to the mother's care via school on Monday has a number of benefits, which were addressed by counsel for the ICL in her submissions.
This addition of one additional night per fortnight will mean that the child will experience a three-night block of time with her father on a weekend every second week. That arrangement will still see the child returning to the mother's care after what is still a relatively short block of time such that the mother may continue to provide the "counterbalance" to time with the father, which my findings identify are in the best interests of this child. I determine that the additional night of care, every second Sunday, will commence 12 months after the child has commenced her primary schooling. This also makes some allowance for the process of adjustment expected of children commencing their formal education. The child will have completed a full twelve months of primary schooling before this additional night commences with the benefits of that additional age and development.
I will make the special occasion time orders as proposed by the mother in paragraph 11(a) to 11(g) of her amended minute of orders sought, save that I propose to alternate the arrangements for Christmas day - such that the child may wake in the care of the father on Christmas day every second year. Such will similarly be the case on Easter. I will also make orders that ensure that in the event the child is in the father's care on a day which is otherwise "special", that child also spend time with the mother on those occasions.
The school holiday orders proposed by the mother in paragraph 11(h) (and as set out in paragraphs 24 (b) and (c)) provide for blocks of three nights of time in school holiday periods from when the child commences primary school until she turns 10 years of age, when it is then proposed that the time will increase to blocks of five nights.
In circumstances where ultimately, I do not know where the mother will choose to live with the child (between Country C and Country D) and I do not have evidence of the school holiday regime for either of the proposed locations, I am guided by other general principles. I accept that school holiday time offers the child the opportunity for other experiences with both parents and other people important to the child's care and development. School holiday time is also free of the strictures associated with school attendance (including attendance times and schedules). There are clear benefits to the child in experiencing this less regimented time with both of her parents.
The concerns expressed elsewhere in these reasons however are not displaced when consideration of school holiday time occurs. Consequently, I will accede to the mother's cautious approach as set out in paragraph 24 (b)(i), such that in the first year of the child's schooling in any school holiday period which is not more than 14 days, the father shall have one three-night block of time with the child. In the event the holiday period is longer than 14 days, then it is appropriate that the child should have a second period of holiday time with the father. I have determined that this may be expressed in general terms, allowing that in any 14-day period of school holiday time, the father may care for the child for a three-night block. Necessary notice will be required by the father to the mother about preferred dates and to the extent of any dispute, the orders provide for when such time shall occur.
The mother then proposes that the next phase of block time in school holidays not occur until the child has turned 10 years of age. I am not persuaded that such delay is necessary nor in the best interests of the child. The protective considerations which have informed these reasons are not such that it cannot be contemplated that the child could have a longer period of time with the father, noting the "special" qualities of school holiday time set out above and allowing time for the child to have settled into her new life and with the benefits of some additional maturity.
Once the child is spending regular three-night blocks on weekends with the father (commencing from her second 12 months of primary schooling), I propose to extend the above holiday framework to allow for five nights of school holiday time in each 14 days of holiday time. The above holiday framework shall apply to each school holiday period - in the event of such continuing for more than 14 days, then the above arrangements will repeat.
In circumstances where the school holiday periods which may be applicable to the child are not known, I have set out a regime to apply in different scenarios, including for holiday periods of up to seven nights, allowing for the father to have some block school holiday time in each scenario. In the event the holiday period is only up to seven days, then I will order that the child will be in the father's care for a block of two nights and in the mother's care for the balance of any such holiday period, to ensure the child has holiday time in that instance, with each of her parents.
The mother proposed that once the child turns 10 years of age, the father would care for the child for block periods of seven nights on two occasions (non-consecutive) in the Christmas holidays at the end of the fourth term. This was predicated with reference to the Australian school holiday scheme where the long holiday occurs over the summer period commencing in December. The school holidays which may apply in Europe may see an extended holiday period occurring during the European summer. I propose to adopt the mother's orders sought (paragraph 24(c)(ii)) to extend the school holiday periods of care upon the child turning 10 years of age, such that in the longer holiday period, whenever that occurs, the father will care for the child for two blocks of seven nights of time in any holiday period that continues for 28 days or more.
At the same time, the father's care of the child in shorter holiday periods will increase to be up to seven nights in each 14-night period of holidays. While this was not an order sought by the mother, I consider that these orders will operate in the future when the child is older and may be better able to manage longer periods of holiday care with her father. This will ensure that the child has the opportunity to experience longer holiday periods with the father, in which to enjoy other experiences, such as travel, which can only occur with more extended time. These orders still ensure that the child returns soon thereafter to her mother's care, as the counterbalance to the time spent with the father.
I am persuaded that certain of the vulnerabilities identified in these reasons with respect to the father's engagement with the child and "leakage" of his highly negative views of the mother, may be better managed by the child when she is a little older and commencing in the latter primary school years. These orders will also allow for the child and the father to have other experiences together which more extended block time permits, while still allowing sufficient time for the child to be back in the mother's care, as the counterbalance to the child's time with the father.
I will include an order which requires the father to facilitate the child communicating with her mother when she is in the father's care for extended periods of time - on one occasion when with the father on weekends and on two occasions when with the father for any period of time extending beyond three nights. I expect this will also assist in ensuring that the child is able to settle into new arrangements for her care. The father will be required to facilitate the child speaking with the mother on those occasions.
I decline to make the father's proposed Order 16 requiring the parties to be "flexible and try to accommodate" family functions. The orders allow the parties to make arrangements by agreement, but I am not persuaded to make an order that implicitly requires the parties to "try" to reach an agreement about something in the future. The order as proposed by the father would be unenforceable.

[177]

As the child will be living in Europe with her mother, in addition to the order permitting the child to leave the Commonwealth of Australia, I will make an order which more generally recognises that the child may travel internationally with her mother. The father's time with the child is limited under these orders. Any international travel that he may contemplate with the child will need to be the subject of agreement reached between he and the mother or otherwise limited to the holiday periods provided for in these orders. Given the child will be living in Europe, international travel may be a more frequent reality for the child and her parents. I will include orders providing for the provision of information relating to such travel by the mother to the father, so that the father at least knows that the child is travelling to a particular location. The mother is not required to seek the father's agreement to that travel, but it may assist the father's relationship with the child, by being aware of the travel that the child has experienced. That knowledge will facilitate the father being able to talk with the child more fully about those experiences. However, a more structured approach is sensible for any international travel by the father with the child, given the totality of findings I have made including as to the decision-making framework for the child. In those circumstances, the father will be required to give prior written notice to the mother of the proposed international travel, within 42 days of the proposed travel and to provide what might be described as the "usual" information about the proposed travel (including flights, destinations and providing travel insurance). To this end, I have largely adopted part of the orders sought by the ICL about international travel.
The child's passport will be held by the mother, but I will make orders which require the passport to be provided to the father, if he is travelling with the child (and then for it to be returned to the mother). The time for the exchange of the passport in each instance, has been shortened by me in circumstances where the parents will need to meet to facilitate the changeover of the child in any event and that process can occur promptly.
The ICL proposed an order which limited the mother and father to international travel every second year. I do not propose to apply that limitation given the child will be living with her mother in Europe and the opportunity to travel to other countries will be more immediately available to the mother (and the father, should he live proximate to the child) and child in those circumstances.
I am not persuaded that such travel should be limited to those countries which are signatories to the Hague Convention. There was no evidence to support any limitation upon travel destinations, and I accept the parents will make the necessary and appropriate assessments of risk before making travel arrangements.
The ICL, in the proposed minute of orders sought, sought a range of other orders relating to international travel. I decline to make proposed Order 20 with respect to the supervision of the child while travel occurs (they are matters for the parents) and orders about communication between the child and her parents have already been made.
I also decline to make the ICL's proposed Order 24 in those terms. If the father requires the passport in order to book international travel (as opposed to simply using the information contained within the document), the mother will be required to provide the document to the father at his request (and the father will be required to return the passport to the mother upon completion of the booking process). In order to actually travel with the child, the passport will need to be made available to the father no later than at the time of departure and I will order that such is handed over by the mother for that purpose, no later than when changeover of the child occurs.

[179]

The orders proposed by the mother, in the event the father continues to live in Australia, provide an appropriate framework for time, with the mother facilitating the child to travel to Australia every second year, at the mother's expense.
I have made clear that such is not required to occur until 2027 on the basis that the child will have moved to Europe, on the mother's evidence, by early 2026. This pattern will shield the child from another lengthy period of international travel so soon after having moved from Australia.
In the alternate year, commencing 2026, the mother will meet the cost of an adult economy return airfare from Australia to the place in which the child lives (until the child is 12 years old). That is a sensible scheme which does not limit the father's ability to seek to spend other time with the child in the country in which the child lives.
I was not addressed as to the basis upon which the mother proposed to limit her obligation to pay for the father's flights every second year but only until the child turns 12 years of age. I am content to make orders which express that time limitation in circumstances where the mother has offered this additional financial assistance and noting the limited financial support she has received from the father for the care of the child.
I will make orders which reflect broadly the scheme of time proposed by the mother in her document as to the time between the child and the father to occur in Australia, when the mother brings the child to visit. In circumstances where the father's time may be occurring only once a year (if he does not otherwise travel to the country in which the child lives) I accept that additional caution may be sensible as the child will not have had the benefit of ongoing and regular time with the father.
I will make orders in accordance with the mother's proposed paragraph 12. However, I propose to make an additional order for more time to occur between the father and the child in Australia, upon the child attaining 10 years of age. Again, this additional order is made in circumstances where it is possible that the father may only be seeing the child in person on one occasion each year. I expressed elsewhere in these reasons, the child's additional maturity is likely to act as a protective consideration against the risks of the father's personality traits and adverse views of the mother.
The orders make clear of course that the parties may agree to other or additional arrangements from time to time.
When the father travels to the child's country of residence (in the circumstances set out in paragraph 481 above), the mother had proposed that he spend time with the child in the same manner as would apply in the event he was living there. I will make that order given it will allow the child to experience the father being involved in her regular routine - and allows the scaffolding of her home environment as additional support.

[183]

It is appropriate that the child communicate regularly with her father and other family members who are important to the child.
During cross-examination, Dr F endorsed the significance of communication for relationship maintenance (Transcript 30 July 2025, p.352, lines 18-27), particularly in the event the child was not living proximate to the father and was experiencing "long gaps" between spend time occasions.
I will make the communication orders as proposed by the ICL for such to occur on one occasion each week if the father lives in the same country as the child. I propose to make the default day (if not otherwise agreed) Wednesday, to ensure that the communication occurs each week and is not absorbed in one of the father's spend time periods each second week.
In the event the father remains living in Australia, I propose to make orders which increase the frequency of the communication to two occasions each week.
As the child will be living in Europe, the time of communication needs to reflect the applicable time zone in which the child lives. The mother had proposed that communication occurs at 9.00 am on Sunday and I have made that order. I have included the father communicating with the child on another occasion each week and have provided that such occur on a Wednesday morning.
The process by which the communication occurs, as set out in paragraph 7 and 8 of the ICL's minute are suitable.
I will also make an order which requires the parents to facilitate the child communicating with the other parent at any reasonable time requested by the child (largely adopting that proposed in paragraph 17 of the mother's orders sought). I am not persuaded that the father's additional requirement (in his proposed Order 22) would assist the child. It is a matter for the child's parents to support the child in her communication with the other parent, subject to compliance with the requirements of the orders made.
The parties will benefit from particularity in these orders to shield against future disagreement.
I will make the order proposed by the ICL at paragraph 9 of the ICL's proposed minute of order sought (permitting the father to send cards, gifts and letters to the child). I do not propose to limit that to only special occasions, as proposed by the ICL. Where I have found the mother to be respectful of the father and supportive of the father's relationship with the child, this order will provide the father and the paternal family with an additional means of connection with the child. I will accede to the ICL's proposal that the mother be at liberty to open that communication, prior to giving it to the child. That is a modest intrusion into the written communication between the father and the child but I expect, will serve as some reassurance to the mother against the prospect that the father's unorthodox views might be shared with the child.
As addressed elsewhere, I will also make provision for the mother to communicate with the child when she is spending extended blocks of time with her father.

[184]

The child's passport should be maintained, and I will make orders about that process, allowing the mother to progress this.
The child's passport/s will be held by the mother given the child will live with her and she holds long-term decision-making responsibility.
In circumstances where the child will live with the mother and the mother will exercise long-term decision making, I decline to make Order 21 as proposed by the ICL (about the father obtaining a passport for the child).
The mother sought an order directing the father to ensure the child attends her pre-school, early learning centre, playgroup or education facility (proposed Order 32) during any time the child is in his care. Submissions were not made about this proposed order. I propose to make this order but express the obligations as being subject to the parties otherwise agreeing, in writing. There may be occasions, if the father is only visiting the child, where the parties agree that the child spending time with the father ought to be given priority rather than her attendance at pre-school, early learning or playgroup.
It is appropriate that each parent has access to information from any school attended by the child. Orders will be made, reflecting paragraph 37 of the mother's minute of orders sought, to this effect. The father will have received information from the mother as to any school she proposes the child to attend (in the exercise of the decision-making scheme provided in the orders I make).
I propose to make orders which will ensure that each parent notifies the other of any urgent medical issue for the child and any relevant follow up care (the ICL's proposed order 13). In circumstances where I have found that certain of the father's unorthodox views also intrude into medical matters, and where the mother will make decisions about the child's medical care, I will make the order proposed by the mother which directs the father to comply with and provide to the child any medication prescribed for her.
As indicated to the mother's counsel during submissions, I do not propose to make an order restraining the father from permitting his mother to provide counselling services to the child. The evidence does not support such a restraint and its imposition may create an artificial barrier to this child receiving loving guidance and wise counsel from her paternal grandmother.
The father also sought an order (proposed Order 21) about notice to be provided in the event a party is unable to spend time with the child. Where the child will live with the mother, it is the father who will be impacted by that order. I expect that the father will strive to be available to spend time with the child as provided in the orders. The father is capable of communicating to the mother respectfully as to any impediment which may prevent that occurring. I decline to make the order.
I decline to make paragraph 39 of the mother's proposed orders. No submissions were made in support of this proposed order, and I am not aware of an evidentiary foundation for this restraint.
I will make an order requiring the parties to keep the other advised of their address, email addresses and telephone numbers, and propose that such be provided within 48 hours of the change occurring. Each party sought such an order, imposing the obligation but with different timeframes. Nothing turns on the difference between them.
I determine that it is in the child's best interests that both of her parents be at liberty to attend school and extra-curricular events that are important to her, where parental attendance is permitted and, or, invited. I will make an order that reflects that sought by the father at proposed Order 23.
The mother and the ICL each proposed orders about the parties using the 2Houses App for their communication. The father proposed the use of a different application. I have no evidence nor submissions about the efficacy of one platform over the other. I will adopt the wording proposed by the ICL but will qualify that the parties shall use such communication application as they agree, and failing agreement, the 2Houses App.
Each party and the ICL sought certain orders imposing restraints upon the conduct of the parties. I prefer the wording proposed by the ICL (paragraph 25) given its brevity. The father had sought the inclusion of an order restraining the parties from discussing the proceedings with the child (which is included in the restraint proposed by the ICL) but also sought to restrain any discussions as to the implementation of the orders. It is foreseeable and appropriate that in due course, the parents will wish to, and need to, discuss with the child arrangements being made for her that arise from implementation of these orders. In those circumstances, I decline to include that additional restraint. I also decline to make the father's proposed Order 19 (about the conduct of third parties) where I am of the view that such is covered by the order I make restraining the parties from engaging in various conduct.
As noted previously, I will make an order in accordance with paragraph 43 of the mother's proposed minute. The mother receives the benefit of these orders and it is appropriate that she take reasonable steps to secure the registration of the orders, or the making of mirror orders, in the country in which the child lives in the future. That responsibility should be borne by her, but to the extent that the father's co-operation may be required, I will add that requirement. The costs of the process of registration and, or, making of mirror orders should be borne by the mother.

Iason & Tausret [2025] FedCFamC1F 661 (8 October 2025)

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (186 paragraphs)

Legislation Cited (4)

Cases Cited (4)