1. As a preliminary matter, HWL requested that written reasons be provided in this matter, that a direction be made protecting her identity, and that additional orders be made that no person or other party or representative of a party can inspect the file, unless ordered by the Tribunal.
2. In this case, the Magistrates' Court has made an interim order under the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic) ('FVP Act') protecting HWL.
3. Section 166 of the FVP Act prevents the publication of any particulars likely to lead to the identification of any person involved in the Magistrates' Court proceeding or the subject of such an order under that Act.
4. Accordingly, an order will be made anonymising the names of the renters in this matter, with additional directions for the file to be closed to any person without further order of the Tribunal, in accordance with sections 80 and 146(4)(b) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic).

1. The substantive issues in this case are:
   • Whether HWL was a person who had standing to bring an application under section 91V of the RT Act; and
   • If so, whether an order should be made under section 91W of the RT Act ending the existing rental agreement and requiring Homes Victoria to enter into a new rental agreement with HWL as sole renter.

1. Section 91V of the RT Act enables persons affected by family or personal violence to apply to the Tribunal for orders ending a rental agreement or, in the alternative, ending a rental agreement and ordering the rental provider to enter into a new agreement with the applicant (and any other persons named in the application).
2. Subsection 91V(2) specifies who can make an application. Relevantly, subsection (2) includes a party to an existing rental agreement who has been or is being subjected to family violence by another party to the existing rental agreement.
3. Subsection (3) provides that, for the purposes of subsection (2), a reference to a person who has been or is being subjected to family violence includes a protected person under a family violence safety notice, family violence intervention order or recognised non-local DVO. A 'family violence intervention order', under section 3 of the RT Act, has the same meaning as in the FVP Act. Section 11 of the FVP Act provides that a family violence intervention order means a final order or an interim order.
4. The practical effect of subsection 91V(3) of the RT Act is that, where an applicant under section 91V already has an interim or final intervention order in effect at the time of application, they are automatically a person who has standing to make the application, because they are deemed by virtue of the provision to be a person who has been or is being subjected to family violence.
5. On the other hand, where there is no such order in place, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the applicant is a person who has been or is being subjected to family violence, and the Tribunal needs to hear and assess the evidence before it, to make relevant findings.

1. Ms Breheny submitted that HWL had standing to make the application because she was a protected person under a family violence intervention order made against another party to the existing rental agreement. There was a family violence order in place, that was made to protect HWL's safety. Further section 91W(3) provides that, in determining an application under section 91V(1), the Tribunal must take into account the prescribed matters in relation to family violence.[1] Prescribed matters include any letter, report, written statement or other documentary materials from any support workers. In this case, letters of support were provided from family violence agencies who had assisted HWL.
2. Ms McKinlay submitted that HWL's standing is predicated on being subjected to family violence and the appropriate forum to make that determination is the Magistrates' Court at a final hearing, as the court deals specifically in family violence. The Tribunal should not make any findings on the issue of family violence.
3. Ms McKinlay also said that an interim intervention order was not predicated on findings of family violence; rather the criteria required for an interim order are that the order is necessary to preserve the safety or protect the property of the affected family member. Accordingly, there had not yet been any findings made in relation to family violence by the court.

Did HWL have standing to make an application under section 91V?

1. In the present case, HWL did not have an intervention order in place at the time of her Tribunal application. An interim order was made about two weeks later. As the applicant under section 91V must be affected by family violence in order to have standing to make the application, I am of the view that subsection 91V(3) does not apply in this case, and I must be satisfied on the evidence before me that HWL is a person who had been or was being subjected to family violence, as at the date of application.
2. I disagree with the submission made by Ms McKinlay that the Tribunal should refrain from making findings of family violence in order to establish standing, but should instead wait for a final Magistrates' Court hearing. While I agree that the Magistrates' Court has greater expertise in such matters, the legislation clearly requires me to turn my mind to this threshold issue.
3. Ms Breheny drew my attention to subsection 91W(3) in relation to findings related to family violence. I note that the circumstances in which subsection 91W(3) applies or becomes relevant is unclear, given the manner in which the legislation is drafted - that is whether it goes to the issue of standing to bring a section 91V application or whether the Tribunal should make the order sought under the application, or both.
4. Section 91W is headed 'Tribunal orders' suggesting that section 91W relates to the orders the Tribunal can make, once an application is properly made by a person specified in subsection 91V(2).
5. However, subsections 91W(1) and (2) set out the matters which the Tribunal must be satisfied about before making orders ending a rental agreement, while subsection 91W(3) then provides that in determining an application under section 91V(1), the Tribunal must take into account the following matters in relation to family violence -

(a) whether an application for a family violence safety notice, family violence intervention order, non-local DVO or personal safety intervention order has been made by or in respect of the specified person;

(b) if an application for a family violence safety notice, family violence intervention order, non-local DVO or personal safety intervention order has been made by or in respect of the person -

(i) whether there is a family violence safety notice, family violence intervention order, recognised non-local DVO or personal safety intervention order in effect; and

(ii) if there is a notice or an order in effect, whether a renter of the rented premises is excluded from the rented premises under the notice or order;

(c) any prescribed matters (the prescribed matters include a list of documentary evidence that may be provided to the Tribunal);

(d) any other matter the Tribunal considers relevant.

1. The Tribunal notes that the matters specified in subsection 91W(3) are most relevant to determining the issue of whether the applicant is a person who has been or is being subject to family violence, suggesting that the matters specified therein are mandatory matters for the Tribunal to consider when making findings in respect of standing.
2. Given the ambiguity identified above, I have considered the factors in section 91W(3) in relation to both the issue of standing and whether orders should be made ending the rental agreement in this case.

1. In support of her application under section 91V, HWL provided a copy of her signed application to the Magistrates' Court. That document stated:

...my housing is leased through DFFH and requires frequent gas and electricity checks. In early August 2025 safety and electricity checks needed to be done. The respondent refused access to these tradespeople despite knowing they were coming and how important it was for these checks to be completed.

In April 2025, the respondent purposefully blocked off the kitchen making it inaccessible and I was unable to cook for myself. The respondent refused me food for a week. This has been going on spasmodically.

The respondent has also made threats of suicide which has caused my daughter to have to call the police.

In the past, the respondent has also gained access to my RACV account which directly impacted my financial and physical access to my car and wheelchair.

The respondent has also stolen clothing including underwear from myself and my daughters and left me with little clean clothing, keeping them in his separate bedroom to deny access.

I have tried to remove the respondent's name from the housing lease however housing stated an IVO is helpful to do this. I am concerned for the safety of myself, my daughters and my pets. I feel I am at risk when he is in the household and that our mental and physical health is also at risk when he is around.

1. HWL also provided photographs showing the rented premises piled high with goods and mess.
2. A letter from Safe Steps Family Violence Response Centre dated 18 August 2025 stated that HWL had received support from them after she self-referred on 16 August 2025. A further letter from the Salvation Army dated 9 September 2025 stated that HWL had been a client with their service since 21 August 2025 with support closing on 8 September 2025. The letter stated that HWL had been displaced from the rented premises due to family violence. The letter requested that she be able to return to the rented premises safely with the other party removed.
3. Written submissions were also filed on behalf of HWL, in which it was stated that:
   • BGB had refused to call an ambulance for HWL when she had symptoms of meningitis in January 2025;
   • HWL was forced to purchase a microwave and kettle to prepare food in her bedroom after the applicant failed to prepare meals for her for a five-day period in April 2025 and blocked her access to the kitchen;
   • BGB made the house inaccessible to HWL by hoarding items and blocking the corridor and doorways;
   • HWL was forced to purchase a washing machine and keep it in her ensuite bathroom after the respondent refused to return washed clothes to her;
   • BGB threatened suicide in front of their youngest daughter when, in June 2025, HWL began to apply for an intervention order from the Magistrates' Court;
   • HWL and her two daughters fled the premises with the help of Safe Steps in August 2025 and sought crisis accommodation.
4. At the hearing, Ms Breheny also sought to make submissions setting out the alleged facts relating to family violence, stating that there had been emotional, financial abuse, control and manipulation before 2023, and that it had become worse since. In response to a question from the Tribunal, Ms Breheny stated that HWL did not propose to give any evidence at the hearing, as this would be retraumatising for her.

1. In response to the application, BGB filed a typed and undated, unsigned document stating:

The house has a gas and electricity safety check once a year. I did not refuse access to any of the tradespeople to do the safety checks. The safety checks had been done at the start of the year, but the company did not put the information in through right, so DFFH had no record of the safety checks being done. When the checks were done at the start of August the tradespeople found out that it had been done when they started their checks.

I do not recall if I did or did not block any part of the kitchen as HWL has her own kitchen stuff in her room. HWL has made her room into a flat, it has a fridge, food cupboard, microwave oven just to name a few items in there. HWL's room has an ensuite as well, [where] HWL has a small freezer and small washing machine. HWL has food in the fridge, freezer, cupboard so she was not without food... If HWL wanted any food, she would ask, and I would go get it or make it for her as up until the start of April, I was HWL's carer. I am not sure why HWL is saying that I am spasmodically as I'm not sure what that means.

I have had thoughts of suicide as HWL keeps saying for me to leave the house, that I'm not a good person. You would think your life is not worth anything, so you would think that the best thing would be suicide. I have never started anything to do with suicide. HWL has had a lot of suicide thoughts over the 20 years that I've been with her, and on at least once almost gone through with her threats. As to make plans but not gone [through] with them.

The RACV account I have been paying for. As this was our arrangement up until April this year. I would pay for food, bills, RACV and anything else we arrange for where HWL would pay the rent and phone anything else that was arranged. How did this impact her financial[ly] as I was paying her RACV? How did I physical[ly] impact HWL with access to her car and wheelchair?

I never stole her clothes. I would wash the family clothes. Once dried I would bring them in [from] outside and I was asked by HWL not [to] put them in the lounge room, so I had put them in my room. I did not have time to sort them out, so they were just in my room.

How is HWL concerned for her safety, the safety of our daughters and her pets? How is HWL's mental and physical welfare at risk when I am around?

1. BGB also provided a second typed, undated, and unsigned statement setting out a history of events from September 2023. However, the matters set out in this statement did not directly address the allegations made by HWL in relation to family violence.
2. BGB submitted bank statements from 27 September 2023 to 28 August 2025 setting out the RACV insurance payments that BGB had made on behalf of HWL, and a photograph showing that HWL has a fridge and freezer in her bedroom.
3. Written submissions filed on behalf of BGB stated that HWL's health issues made it difficult for her to walk into the kitchen and prepare food. As a result, she began purchasing household items for her room in late 2023 such as a microwave, hotplate and fridge to make these tasks easier for her to do food preparation. BGB provided a receipt for a Westinghouse induction cooktop and a nonstick pan that BGB purchased on behalf of HWL on 3 October 2023 to use in her room, items for which HWL subsequently repaid BGB.
4. The written submission stated that the parties engaged in verbal disagreements on or about 13 August 2025, when BGB left the premises. He returned on 15 August 2025, and another verbal argument ensued. HWL then left the premises with the two younger children and applied for an intervention order, which BGB contests.
5. BGB also chose not to give evidence at the Tribunal hearing.

1. I have before me the application that HWL made to the Magistrates' Court, which sets out various matters said to constitute family violence. Some of these allegations, such as refusal to allow a gas and safety check, require further explanation in order to understand the context and the reasons why such conduct on the part of BGB might constitute family violence against HWL.
2. Although the Magistrates' Court subsequently concluded that an interim family violence intervention order was warranted, I note that the court is not required to make findings of family violence, but may put in place an interim order if the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that an interim order is necessary to ensure the safety of the affected family member, or to preserve their property.[2] While it is quite possible that the Magistrate was also satisfied family violence had occurred, I am unable to rely on that possibility, as I must reach my own state of satisfaction based on the evidence before me.
3. I note that allegations of family violence are serious in nature and can have far reaching consequences. Where serious allegations are at issue, it is accepted that the Briginshaw principle[3] applies, and that a serious allegation requires a decision-maker to rely on cogent evidence to attain a reasonable state of satisfaction in respect of the relevant findings of fact.
4. The evidence presented by HWL included her application to the Magistrates' Court, some photographs demonstrating the state of the rented premises, and two support letters.
5. The last page of the application to the Magistrates' Court (being the page setting out the requested orders) is signed by HWL but no other page is signed and there is nothing in that document which required HWL to declare or affirm the truth of the information therein provided.
6. As noted, the photographs show the rented premises piled high with goods and mess, however it is not immediately evident, without further explanation, how these photographs are supportive of the matters set out in HWL's Magistrates' Court application.
7. The letters from the family violence support agencies indicate that HWL self-referred in August 2025, and was provided with agency support. However, the letters do not set out any details of the alleged family violence. Both letters assert that family violence has occurred, but the assertion appears to be based on the reports provided by HWL, rather than the first-hand knowledge of the authors of those letters.
8. Although BGB contests the allegations of family violence, he similarly provided only unsigned statements and limited documentary supporting material.
9. The evidence regarding family violence in this case is to my mind unsatisfactory and completely untested. I have no sworn material before me, and both parties declined to give evidence on oath or affirmation at the hearing.
10. Whilst I appreciate and understand the reasons for HWL's reluctance to give evidence on the day of the hearing, I do not consider that the strength of the evidence available to me was sufficiently cogent or of sufficient weight to enable me to make any findings of family violence in this matter.
11. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that HWL had standing to bring the application under section 91V on 29 August 2025.

WOULD IT OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE TO MAKE AN ORDER UNDER SECTION 91W?

1. Even if I had been satisfied that HWL had standing to bring the application, I would nevertheless have dismissed the application for the following reasons.

What matters must the Tribunal consider under section 91W?

1. Subsection 91W(2) of the RT Act empowers the Tribunal to terminate a rental agreement and order the rental provider to enter into a new rental agreement with a section 91V applicant, if satisfied of the matters set out in subsection (2). Those matters include:

(a) the specified person and other persons (if any) could reasonably be expected to comply with the duties of a renter under a residential rental agreement to which this Act applies; and

(b) the specified person or that person's dependent children would be likely to suffer severe hardship if the specified person were compelled to leave the premises; and

(c) the hardship suffered by the specified person would be greater than any hardship the residential rental provider would suffer if the order were made; and

(d) if a renter of the rented premises is excluded from the rented premises under a family violence safety notice, family violence intervention order, recognised non-local DVO or personal safety intervention order, it is reasonable to do so given the length of the exclusion under the notice or order and the length of the existing residential rental agreement; and

(e) it is reasonable to do so given the interests of any other renters (other than any excluded renter) under the existing residential rental agreement and, in particular, whether the other renters support the specified person's application.

1. The additional factors set out in subsection 91W(3) have already been set out above.

1. HWL submitted that she met the requirements of paragraphs 91W(2)(a) to (c). In relation to paragraphs 91W(2)(d) and (e) HWL submitted that BGB is an excluded renter, that the Magistrates' Court matter is not likely to be finalised for many months and that it is reasonable in those circumstances to remove BGB from the rental agreement. He will otherwise continue to be liable for rent and will be disqualified from applying for a place on the Victorian Housing Register or from seeking help from homeless services.
2. BGB submitted that he was not an excluded renter, as there was no clause within the family violence intervention order which expressly excludes him from the rented premises; rather the order prohibits BGB from remaining within 200 metres of where HWL lives. In any event, BGB submitted that it would not be reasonable to terminate the rental agreement, given that the rented premises have been his home for 8 years, his entire family lives there, and BGB contests the family violence intervention order.
3. BGB stated in written submissions that he would prefer to move back to the rented premises if the family violence intervention order is removed but he is also mindful of not causing distress to HWL. He has applied for a priority transfer to another Homes Victoria property. However, he will lose his place on the priority transfer list if his existing rental agreement is terminated. He continues to pay half the rent in relation to the current tenancy, and is also paying rent in a shared house on the private rental market. According to the written submissions, BGB is a Centrelink recipient, works part time in a chain store and has health issues. He has recently undergone heart surgery, after a heart attack in April 2025, and is still recovering.
4. The Homes Victoria representative confirmed that BGB is on a priority waiting list for a transfer, and that he could be eligible for help from Haven Homes if homeless, but there would again be a waiting list. There were few vacancies, and BGB may be waiting a considerable period for a transfer or housing under a homeless program.

Conclusions as to the application of the factors in section 91W

1. In relation to the issues set out in subsection 91W(3), I am satisfied that, at the time of the Tribunal application, HWL had applied to the Magistrates' Court for a family violence intervention order, and that subsequent to the Tribunal application, the Magistrates' Court put in place interim orders that have the effect of prohibiting BGB from living at the rented premises. There are also support letters from family violence agencies that I must consider when determining the issue of family violence. These letters support HWL's request for the rental agreement to be placed in her sole name.
2. Paragraphs 91W(2)(a) to (c) were not at issue in this proceeding and I am satisfied that HWL could reasonably be expected to comply with the duties of a renter, that she and the children would be likely to suffer severe hardship if compelled to leave the rented premises and that her hardship would be greater than any hardship Homes Victoria would suffer if the order were made. HWL has significant health issues, disabilities that make her current accommodation essential, and responsibility for children.
3. In relation to paragraph 91W(2)(d), I note that there is no definition of an excluded renter in the RT Act, only a definition of an exclusion condition, which means, under section 3 of the RT Act, an exclusion condition included in a family violence intervention order under section 82 of the FVP Act. Section 82 of the FVP Act specifically empowers the court to include in a family violence intervention order, a condition excluding the respondent from the protected person's residence. I accept that the family violence intervention order in this case does not include an exclusion condition under section 82 of the FVP Act.
4. However, I also note that paragraph 91W(2)(d) does not use the term 'exclusion condition'. Paragraph (d) instead states that it applies as a consideration 'if the renter of the rented premises is excluded from the rented premises' under the family violence intervention order. That is, in practical terms, the effect of the order in this case, given that HWL is living there and BGB is prohibited from being within 200 metres of any place where she resides. If BGB is excluded, the Tribunal must consider under paragraph (d) whether it is reasonable to make the orders sought by HWL, given the length of the exclusion under the order and the length of the existing rental agreement.
5. I note that even if not regarded as an excluded renter, BGB's interests would then be a relevant consideration under paragraph (e) which requires the Tribunal to consider the interests of any other renters (other than an excluded renter) and, in particular, whether the other renter(s) support the application.
6. In relation to paragraph (d), which I consider to be the applicable provision in this case, I am conscious that access to public housing is extremely limited. As a result, it is likely that if BGB loses his place on the priority transfer list, he will never regain access to public housing. Accordingly, to remove him from the lease has serious implications for him, in circumstances where he has limited income and health concerns.[4]
7. In the present case, both renters are long term public housing tenants, and have lived at the current rented premises for 8 years. The family violence order is an interim order only and no findings of family violence have been expressly made by the court. The order has been in place for a short period only, with a mention hearing set for 4 November 2025, and a likely contested hearing to take place in the first half of next year.
8. Meanwhile BGB is effectively excluded from the rented premises and HWL is able to remain living there, which is important given that the premises have been modified to suit her disabilities. She also has the benefit of the interim family violence orders until the Magistrates' Court proceedings are finally determined. BGB is continuing to meet his financial obligations in relation to the joint rental agreement, despite not being able to live there. Accordingly, HWL is not financially disadvantaged by the fact that there is a continuing joint rental liability or because the public housing rent rebate is calculated accordingly.
9. Taking into account all of these matters, in particular the significant consequences for a person who loses access to public housing, I do not consider it is appropriate to end the existing joint rental agreement on the basis of a short-lived interim family violence intervention order. Nor do I consider it would be appropriate to do so, in the circumstances of this case, before a final determination is made by the Magistrates' Court in respect of the application for a family violence intervention order.
10. For the reasons set out above the application is dismissed.

[1] Regulation 36, Residential Tenancies Regulations 2021 (Vic).

[2] Section 53(1)(a) FVP Act.

[3] See Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 where Justice Dixon stated at [361]-[362] 'The seriousness of the allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding, are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the Tribunal.'

[4] I note that the same concerns would arise on the alternative view, namely that BGB is not an excluded renter, and that paragraph 91W(2)(e) therefore applies.