Huxley v Devietti Motors Pty Ltd & Anor [2025] QCAT 183

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal|2025-05-15

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)

[1] The first respondent, Devietti Motors Pty Ltd (Devietti Motors) has filed an application for directions seeking (the Application), in summary:

[2] The Application was filed pursuant to s 62(3) of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) (QCAT Act) in the context of a Complaint made by Ms Huxley which alleges she was subjected to sexual harassment[1] and discrimination in the provision of goods and services on the basis of her sex[2] by the second respondent, Mr Fantuz while employed by Devietti Motors. Ms Huxley claims Devietti Motors is vicariously liable for Mr Fantuz's conduct pursuant to s 133 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (AD Act). The conduct giving rise to the Complaint occurred when Mr Fantuz, the Spare Parts Manager, allegedly sent inappropriate texts of a sexual nature to Ms Huxley, including a photo of his penis.
[3] Ms Huxley seeks a number of orders, including, relevantly, an order that the respondents jointly and severally pay her compensation for hurt, distress and humiliation in the amount of $50,000 and an order for aggravated damages against Devietti Motors in the amount of $50,000.
[4] Ms Huxley opposes the Application for directions.

[5] Devietti Motors submits that Ms Huxley claims to have suffered an injury or illness as a result of the sexual harassment and that this constitutes a claim for personal injuries. It is submitted, 'trite', that an applicant cannot be compensated by the respondents for a pre-existing injury of illness and that the requested information is standard for claims seeking damages for a personal injury claim.
[6] Devietti Motors submits the information is relevant to establishing whether Ms Huxley has sustained an injury or illness arising from the alleged sexual harassment; establishing causation between the alleged injury or illness and the alleged sexual harassment; and, if it is determined that she had a pre-existing injury or medical condition, the nature and extent of any exacerbation of the pre-existing injury or medical condition. Further, that Tribunal Directions permit an application be made for Ms Huxley to undergo a medical examination for the purpose of obtaining a medical report but that a doctor could not properly examine her and provide an informed opinion without being aware of: any pre-existing injuries or medical conditions; the cause; the effect of pre-existing injury or medical condition upon her; and the treatment she received or was receiving from the pre-existing injury or medical condition.
[7] Ms Huxley opposes the Application on the basis the Application seeks information and documents about:

(a) whether she has any history of domestic abuse, which is wholly irrelevant to the question of whether Devietti Motors is liable for the actions of its employee;

(b) whether Ms Huxley had any personal injury, illness or disability pre- or post-dating the incident in circumstances where this claim is not one for personal injury but is a claim for damages relating to sexual harassment by Mr Fantuz and the liability of Devietti Motors for his actions; and

(c) information (without limitation) about Ms Huxley's Centrelink and litigation history, which is irrelevant to the current circumstances.

[8] Ms Huxley opposes the Application in its entirety on the basis the Application is:

(a) for the production of information and documents that are not relevant to the proceedings and are of a personal nature;

(b) improperly particularised;

(c) premature having regard to the stage of the proceedings; and

(d) a fishing expedition.

[9] Section 62 of the QCAT Act provides the tribunal may give a direction at any time in a proceeding and do whatever is necessary for the speedy and fair conduct of the proceeding. Subsection (3) provides that, without limiting subsection (1), the tribunal may give a direction requiring a party to produce a document or to provide information to the tribunal or to another party to the proceeding.
[10] There are also requirements to:

(a) 'act fairly and according to the substantial merits of the case';[3] and

(b) 'ensure, as far as practicable, that all relevant material is disclosed to the tribunal to enable it to decide the proceeding with all the relevant facts.'[4]

[11] Although the power in s 62 is expressed in wide terms, it can be inferred from s 62(1) (necessary for the speedy and fair conduct of the proceeding), s 28 (as far as practicable, all relevant material is disclosed) and the obligation of the Tribunal to deal with matters in a way that is 'economical, informal and quick'[5] that only documents relevant to the issues in the proceedings ought to be the subject of a direction to produce.

[12] I will consider the application by addressing the three categories in which information and documents are sought. In doing so I have taken into account the submissions filed by the applicant and first respondent in relation to the application. I generally accept the submissions of the applicant.

[13] The issue of whether Ms Huxley has been a victim of family or domestic violence is not a matter which arises on the Statement of Contentions provided or the Statement of Agreed Facts. It is simply not relevant to the existing proceedings and therefore any documents sought in relation to it fails to meet the threshold for disclosure.
[14] I accept that the existence of any pre-existing condition affecting Ms Huxley could be relevant to her damages claimed. However it is not the case that the precipitating cause of such injury is relevant to the assessment of damages. As the applicant submits, any contention that such personal history is relevant to the nature of Ms Huxley's damages in these proceedings is contrary to the 'egg-shell skull principle' and must be rejected.[6]
[15] There is no information on the face of the material filed that suggests any such history, which indicates the request is akin to 'fishing'.
[16] I refuse the application for disclosure of information and records relating to this category.

[17] I accept that pre-existing conditions may be relevant to damages assessed, as those damages relate to the harm suffered by Ms Huxley as a result of Mr Fantuz's conduct.
[18] However, the questions asked and information sought is very broad, not properly particularised and may be characterised as a fishing expedition.
[19] Evidence is likely to be led by the applicant tendering independent medical evidence in support of her claim for damages in these proceedings. The Tribunal has made directions to facilitate this.
[20] As the applicant submits, the respondents may cross-examine that witness at the hearing and/or exercise their right to apply for an independent medical examination, as already the subject of directions by the tribunal.
[21] Even pre-supposing a pre-existing condition, to require the applicant to answer an improperly framed question regarding her medical history and to supply records which are not in her possession or control regarding that medical history is an inappropriate use of resources, contrary to the objects of the QCAT Act and unnecessary for the speedy and fair conduct of the proceeding.
[22] I refuse the application for disclosure of information and records relating to this category.

[23] This category of information is not relevant to a fact in issue in the proceedings.
[24] The applicant does not seek any component for damages for economic loss, accordingly, any income or compensation that she has received from other sources is irrelevant to this matter. The substantive proceeding is not one for economic loss caused by a personal injury but for non-economic loss arising from the sexual harassment.
[25] This part of the application is unduly broad and may also be characterised as a fishing expedition noting it seeks information about the entirety of the applicant's history, and is not limited with reference to any connection to the current proceedings.
[26] I refuse the application for disclosure of information and records in this category.

[27] Section 48 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (HRA) provides that to the extent possible that is consistent with their purpose, all statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights. This of course applies to the QCAT Act.
[28] Ms Huxley relies on s 25 of the HRA, the right to privacy and reputation and s 26, the right to the protection of families and children.
[29] Ms Huxley submits that an order for disclosure of the nature sought would be to unlawfully limit her human rights by:

(a) in relation to her right to privacy and reputation, requiring the disclosure of, and therefore permitting an arbitrary interference with, information directly relevant to her privacy, family, home and correspondence which is not directly relevant to the substantive proceedings; and

(b) in relation to her right to protection of families and children, requiring the disclosure of information directly relevant to her home and family life, including that which may be relevant to her child and/or former relationships, which would fail to uphold the protection of the family unit required to be provided by the State, and which is also not directly relevant to the substantive proceedings.

[30] For the reasons refusing the Application above, any order for the disclosure of information or records in the categories above, would be an unlawful limitation on Ms Huxley's human rights to privacy and reputation and to protection of families and children under ss 25 and 26 of the HRA respectively.

[31] The Application for directions is refused.

[2] Ibid, s 9, s10, s 46.

[6] McCauley v Club Resort Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] QCAT 243, [176].

Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009

McCauley v Club Resort Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] QCAT 243

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