HUTCHINSON -v- (ANZ) AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED [2026] WASC 128 (14 April 2026)

(a) striking out either the entire Amended Statement of Claim filed on 25 March 2025 (the Amended Statement of Claim) or parts of it pursuant to O 20 r 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (Rules of the Supreme Court);

(b) summary judgment pursuant to O 16 the Rules of the Supreme Court; and

(c) leave to bring these applications out of time.

1. Ms Hutchinson is representing herself in these proceedings. She is not a lawyer. The Amended Statement of Claim is confusing, contains submissions, fails to clearly plead the material facts relied upon, and pleads a number of causes of action not mentioned in the indorsement to the writ and which are misconceived and have no prospects of success. For the reasons that follow, I will strike out the Amended Statement of Claim with leave to re-plead. I will not grant summary judgment. I will give the Bank leave to bring both applications out of time.

1. The Bank has applied to strike out the Amended Statement of Claim pursuant to O 20 r 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c) of the Rules of the Supreme Court.
2. Order 20 r 19(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides that the Court may, subject to subrule (3), order to be struck out any pleading, or anything in any pleading on the grounds that -

(a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action (O 20 r 19(1)(a)); or

(b) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action (O 20 r 19(1)(c)).

1. Order 20 r 19(3)(a) provides that an application made under O 20 r 19(1) must be made within 21 days or such further time as the court may allow.
2. The principles governing strike out applications were considered by Smith J in Vantage Holdings Group Ltd v Donnelly [No 4].[1] Those principles include that:

(a) the essential functions of a pleading are to define and limit the issues for decision, to provide the basis for determining discovery and the admissibility of evidence for trial, and to ensure a fair trial by putting the other side on notice of the case it must meet;

(b) a statement of claim must not plead allegations at too high a level of generality. A pleading must be sufficiently particular to conform with one of the primary objects of pleadings, to inform the opposing party of the case that it must meet;

(c) in considering a strike out application, it is now necessary to consider the role of pleadings in the context of case management techniques. Case management considerations are not, however, necessarily antithetical to the observance of pleading rules. The objects of O 1 r 4A and 4B of the Rules of the Supreme Court are often promoted by a clear and precise statement of the issues for decision;

(d) pleadings may be struck out on the ground that they may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action because they are evasive, they conceal or obscure the real questions in controversy, they are ambiguous or not reasonably intelligible, they raise immaterial or irrelevant issues or they fail to confine the issues or state the case of the party in question with reasonable particularity, or they raise a case in terms which are simply too general; and

(e) irrelevant or unnecessary pleas in a statement of claim will be struck out on grounds that they will prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action where the defendant must traverse the allegations and, thereby, raise false issues.

1. The Bank has applied for summary judgment pursuant to O 16 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.
2. Order 16 r 1(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides that any defendant may apply for summary judgment within 21 days after appearance, or at any later time by leave of the Court.
3. Order 16 r 1(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides that an application under O 16 r 1(1) shall be made by summons supported by an affidavit verifying the facts upon which the application is based.
4. The principles to be applied in determining an application for summary judgment are well established and were summarised by the Court of Appeal in Zaghloul v Bayly[2] as follows:[3]

The principles to be applied on an application for summary judgment are well established. The critical issue is whether it is clear that there is no real question to be tried. The issue is framed in this manner as it is only in the clearest of cases, where there is a high degree of certainty about the outcome if the proceedings were allowed to go [to] trial, that summary judgment ought properly to be granted. The exercise of powers to summarily terminate proceedings must always be attended with caution.

There are cases where the court has considered it appropriate to determine questions of law on a summary judgment application. There should be summary judgment if the facts are undisputed and the law is clear. In general, however, an application for summary judgment is not the occasion to dispose of difficult or substantial questions of law which cannot be determined without full argument. It will usually be appropriate to leave the determination of such questions for trial.

(footnotes omitted)

1. These proceedings were commenced by way of a generally indorsed writ of summons. The indorsement on the writ read as follows:
   1. The Plaintiff, Sharree Grace Hutchinson, trustee and unit holder of the Bremer Bay Investment Unit Trust, brings this claim against the Defendant, ANZ, for negligence, breach of duty, and procedural failures.
   2. On 14 December 2022, the Plaintiff, alongside co-trustee Sean Spence, instructed staff at ANZ Joondalup to open a two-signature authority account for the Bremer Bay Investment Unit Trust. ANZ's staff, including a trainee, confirmed the account would require two signatures for any transactions.
   3. Contrary to instructions, it was later discovered ANZ failed to establish the account as a two-signature authority account. This error enabled co-trustee Sean Spence to misappropriate $1,986,000 without the Plaintiffs knowledge or authorisation. 4. After the Plaintiff discovered the loss, the Plaintiff requested ANZ the Defendant to send all documentation as the Plaintiff was not given any copies or confirmation that the account was established. ANZ the Defendant sent the 'Company/Formal Trust Account Authority' form which was used to create the account.

Some mistakes discovered by Plaintiff:

- Missing essential details such as the trust name, ABN, and address.

- Incorrectly listing the account purpose as accounting services instead of development purposes.

- The Plaintiff contacted ANZ and raised concerns through a complaints process.

The Case Manager at ANZ Michael Hobbs concluded that there was no evidence a 2-signature authority account was requested and over the amount. Despite the form used to create the account not having the box ticked where it states 'anyone to sign', this indicated that it was a 2 -signature authority account. 5. The Plaintiff became aware of ANZs negligence in March 2024 when reviewing the accounts documentation, it was very difficult to access since ANZ Trainee never sent details to the Plaintiff to enable the Plaintiff to set up her side. By then, co-trustee Sean Spence had used the funds for unauthorised purposes, including personal expenses and transferring trust assets to unrelated entities. 6. ANZ Defendants breach of duty, negligence and failure to supervise trainee staff and adhere to the Plaintiffs explicit instructions, has caused significant financial harm to the Plaintiff who acts on behalf of the unit trust made up of 15 unit holders. Additionally, Sean Spence has made threats against the Plaintiff and family, resulting in emotional distress and safety concerns. 7. The Plaintiff claims $1,986,000 in financial losses, which is made up of her personal contribution of $150,000, as well as damages for emotional distress and associated consequential losses. 8. The Plaintiff seeks full reimbursement of the misappropriated funds, damages, and systemic reforms to ANZs account setup processes to improve their risk due-diligence framework to prevent similar incidents in the future. The Plaintiff has a witness who had similar experience at the same branch.

Ms Hutchinson's earlier attempts at preparing a statement of claim

1. Ms Hutchinson has struggled for some time to prepare a satisfactory statement of claim. The Amended Statement of Claim is the third time that Ms Hutchinson has attempted to prepare a statement of claim.
2. Ms Hutchinson first filed a statement of claim on 12 February 2025.
3. The Bank sought orders striking out the statement of claim or for summary judgment.
4. On 4 March 2025, Ms Hutchinson filed an amended statement of claim.
5. On 6 March 2025, Registrar Alison ordered that the amended statement of claim be removed from the court file.
6. On 25 March 2025, Ms Hutchinson filed the Amended Statement of Claim.
7. On 3 April 2025, the Bank's solicitors wrote to the court requesting that the matter be referred to mediation and indicated that if mediation was unsuccessful, they proposed to apply to strike out the Amended Statement of Claim and to apply for summary judgment. The mediation was unsuccessful and the Bank made the present applications on 11 September 2025.

The Bank should have leave to bring the applications out of time

1. I will give the Bank leave to bring the applications out of time. It was reasonable for the Bank to attempt to mediate Ms Hutchinson's claim before pursuing these applications.

Whether the Amended Statement of Claim should be struck out

1. Rather than being divided into numbered paragraphs like a conventional pleading, the Amended Statement of Claim is divided into 20 parts.

1. Part 1 refers to the fact that Ms Hutchinson is the plaintiff and says:

Acting in her capacity as trustee of the Bremer Bay Investment Unit Trust, as trustee the Plaintiff has the right to seek remedy for the loss, damage and harm to Property.

Black Laws Definition of 'Property' :

Property (Black's Law Dictionary Definition)

'That which belongs to a person or entity; the right of ownership or a legal title to something. Property may be tangible (physical assets such as land or goods) or intangible (such as rights, intellectual property, or financial interests). '

It further distinguishes between:

• Real Property - Land and anything permanently attached to it.

• Personal Property - Movable assets, including money, stocks, and personal belongings.

• ose [sic] in Action - A right to recover money or property through legal action.

• Equitable Property - Interests recognized by courts of equity, including trust property.

'The trust property, as defined in Black's Law Dictionary:

Financial contributions, investment interests, and other assets lawfully belonging to the trust. The Defendant's actions resulted in the misappropriation of this Trust property, giving rise to the Plaintiffs legal right to seek remedy as [sic]

1. In my view this part should be struck out. This part makes submissions and does not plead material facts as required by O 20 r 8(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

The Plaintiff Sharree Grace HUTCHINSON, in their capacity as trustee of the Bremer Bay Investment Unit Trust, claims against the Defendant ANZ for facilitating the wrongful misappropriation, dissipation, and unauthorised use of Oust property. The misappropriation of trust property were unauthorised and unrelated to the purpose outlined in loan agreement, resulting in loss to the trust.

Additionally, the Plaintiff claims against Defendant ANZ for its role in enabling and facilitating the loss of trust property through its failure to exercise due diligence and adhere to proper banking procedures.

The Plaintiff asserts that:

1. The Oust property, both legal and equitable property, was held for the benefit of the trust and its unit holders Beneficiaries.
2. The Defendant ANZ, the financial institution responsible for setting up and managing the trust's banking arrangements, breached its duty of care and banking obligations by failing to correctly establish a two-signature authority account as requested by plaintiff and as it appears on ANZ 's forms used to create the account. This allowing unauthorised access to trust property.
3. ANZ 's negligence and failure to act in accordance with its banking and fiduciary obligations facilitated the Defendant's ability to misappropriate Trust property, thereby making Defendant ANZ liable for the loss of property held in Trust.
4. As trustee, the Plaintiff has standing to seek remedy for the loss of trust property, whether legal or equitable, to ensure its restoration or full compensation.
5. The Plaintiff has not made claims against the Defendant as yet regarding the potential risk to Plaintiffs life which was a result of ANZ facilitating a now desperate co-trustee's life.
6. The Defendant ANZ also owed a direct duty of care to the plaintiff as a consumer
7. under the Banking and consumer protection laws. [sic]
8. This part should be struck out as it fails to properly plead the facts said to give rise to the conclusions of law asserted. It is pitched at too high a level of generality.
9. Further, to the extent that Ms Hutchinson is seeking to pursue a claim that the Bank held property on trust, or breached fiduciary duties, such a cause of action is not mentioned in the indorsement to the writ of summons.
10. Order 20 r 2(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides that a statement of claim must not contain any allegation, or claim in respect of a cause of action, unless that cause of action is mentioned in the writ or arises from facts which are the same as, or include or form part of, facts giving rise to a cause of action mentioned in the writ.
11. If Ms Hutchinson seeks to pursue this claim, she will need to either seek to amend the writ or explain how the matters alleged arise from facts which are the same as, or include or form part of, facts giving rise to a cause of action mentioned in the writ. This matter is best considered if and when the facts said to give rise to the conclusions of law asserted are properly pleaded.

1. Part 4 alleges that Ms Hutchinson has standing 'as Trustee and direct consumer of ANZ' or a 'trustee of the Bremer Bay Investment Unit Trust 1 ('the Unit Trust'), responsible for protecting the Trust property'.
2. In my view, when this part of the pleading is read in isolation it is tolerably clear. The difficulty emerges when it is read in the context of the pleading as a whole and with the indorsement to the writ. Read in that context, it seems that Ms Hutchinson is claiming both in a personal capacity and as trustee.
3. For example, part 6 refers to the Bank's liability to its customers and says that Ms Hutchinson 'is an injured party due to the Bank's conduct which caused financial harm to both the trust and the Plaintiff who is an individual, consumer of the Bank, unit holder and beneficiary of Bremer Bay Investment Unit Trust 1'.
4. The difficulty is that the pleading fails to clearly identify whether the various claims made are advanced in a personal capacity or as trustee.
5. For this reason, I consider that parts 4 and 6, and the pleading as a whole, should be struck out.

1. Part 5 states that due to threats from her co-trustee, Ms Hutchinson 'is unable to take civil action against co-trustee at this stage without risking her safety and the safety of her family and children'.
2. The Bank argues that this part does not identify any material facts relevant to the claims made by Ms Hutchinson but appears to be in the form of an assertion as to why Ms Hutchinson did not take separate action against a co-trustee. The Bank contends that the paragraph is irrelevant and raises false issues.[4]
3. As I discuss below in the context of the Bank's summary judgment application, the Bank contends that the Amended Statement of Claim fails to plead facts capable of establishing that Ms Hutchinson has the standing to bring these proceedings without the participation of her co-trustee. Once this is understood, it may be seen that this paragraph is intended to address standing by explaining why it was not possible for Ms Hutchinson to commence proceedings with the participation of her co-trustee. The relevance of the plea is evident from the Bank's summary judgment application.
4. Although I would not otherwise strike out this paragraph alone, as I have concluded that most of the statement of claim should be struck out, I consider that the best course is to strike out this part also. A new, hopefully more coherent, pleading might then be prepared.

1. Part 7 refers to the Bank's conduct and says that the Bank processed an account that was:

(a) incomplete and incorrect, 'but processed it regardless of it clearly not being compliant'; and

(b) lacking required due diligence checks 'under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth), Section 36'.

1. I consider that this part should be struck out.
2. The plea that the Bank processed an account that was incomplete and incorrect, and processed despite being non-compliant, is pitched at too high a level of generality. It fails to plead any material facts to support the stated conclusion, or to refer to where those material facts are pleaded.
3. I also have doubts about whether s 36 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (Anti‑Money Laundering Act) gives rise to any cause of action that Ms Hutchinson may pursue, and she has failed to explain how it does. Nor is such a cause of action mentioned in the indorsement to the writ.

1. Part 8 refers to the Bank's alleged misleading or deceptive conduct and states as follows:
   1. The Plaintiff was asked to sign page 3 of 3 without knowing there were 2 other pages which were not provided. The plaintiff was deceived as to what they were signing. As well as the form itself being incomplete missing critical information such as ABN, Business address, as well as incorrect stating that the purpose of the account was for accounting purposes Despite this an account was still established regardless.
   2. ANZ denying the Plaintiff requested a Two-signature authority account later even though the form itself indicated it was a two-signature authority account with the box left unticked which labelled 'any one to sign'. This indicated the trainee did understand a two-signature authority account was intended and requested.
   3. Processing a legal document used to create a financial instrument which was not complete is a deliberate negligence and breach.
   4. ANZ's previous denial when the form itself clearly indicates that a two signature authority account was meant to be established and it was or was not, either way money the Trust property was misappropriated and now it is lost as a direct result of ANZ's failures and breaches, laws and rules they publicly publish to the public claiming to adhere.
   5. ANZ's failure to disclose key account setup information before processing the account was misleading and deceptive, further supporting the Plaintiffs claim.
   6. The Plaintiff was not given full disclosure of the account setup details before execution
   7. MISLEADING AND DECEPTIVE CONDUCT. Under Section 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)).
   8. Providing Misleading or Deceptive Information About the Account Setup
      • LEGAL BREACH:
      • Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Section 1041H - Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in Financial Services Prohibits financial institutions from providing false or misleading information to customers.
      • ANZ's Breach: Represented to the Plaintiff that the account met unit mast requirements, when it did not.
      • Australian Consumer Law (ACL) (Competition and Consumer Act 2010 - Schedule 2), Section 18 - Misleading and Deceptive Conduct
      • Prohibits misleading omissions and conduct that creates a false understanding of a financial service.
      • ANZ's Breach: Did not disclose that the account was incorrectly set up, causing the Plaintiff to believe proper safeguards were in place.
2. Part 9 refers to a failure to provide complete and accurate documentation before requiring a signature. It refers to this as 'a second breach of the above Providing Misleading or Deceptive Information' and to s 1041 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) and s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (ACL).
3. Reference is also made to s 17 of the Banking Code of Practice (Code) which it is claimed requires all banks to provide full disclosure of set up details to customers. It refers to the Bank's breach as being that it did 'not provide all pages of the account setup forms, removing the opportunity to verify errors'.
4. I will strike out both parts 8 and 9.
5. Section 131A of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (Competition and Consumer Act) provides that the ACL has no application to the supply of financial services. Ms Hutchinson has not explained how the case advanced might be arguable.
6. Insofar as a claim under s 1041H of the Corporations Act is being advanced, this part is expressed as submissions and fails to properly plead the relevant material facts or identify where they may be found. To the extent that this is an attempt to plead material facts, they are pleaded at too high a level of generality.
7. In relation to the allegation of a breach of the Code, it does not seem to me that a breach of the Code, even if it were established, would give rise to any cause of action on the part of Ms Hutchinson. She has failed to explain how it would.
8. None of these causes of action are mentioned in the indorsement to the writ.

Part 10

1. Part 10 refers to the Bank breaching its duty by:

FAILING to Establish a Two-signature Trust Account as Instructed & PROCESSING AN INCORRECTLY CLASSIFIED ACCOUNT DESPITE KNOWING IT WAS FOR A UNIT TRUST AND INCOMPLETE.

• Legal Breach:
• Banking Act 1959 (Cth), Section 8 - Compliance with Prudential Standards
• Requires banks to ensure proper governance and risk control when setting up financial accounts.
• ANZ's Breach: Failed to implement dual-signatory security, directly increasing the risk of loss which could have been otherwise avoided.
• Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Section 180 - Duty of Care and Diligence
• Imposes a duty on financial institutions to act with reasonable care in all banking operations.

1. I will strike this part out.
2. It does not seem to me that the allegations made about breaches of s 8 of the Banking Act 1959 (Cth) (Banking Act), or s 180 of the Corporations Act disclose any reasonable cause of action on the part of Ms Hutchinson. The part is otherwise pitched at too high a level of generality and fails to plead the relevant material facts with sufficient clarity.

Part 11

1. Part 11 states:

ANZ'S BREACH: ALLOWED AN ACCOUNT CLASSIFICATION THAT RESULTED UNAUTHORISED TRANSACTIONS

• Legal Breach:
• Banking Act 1959 (Cth), Section 9 - Conditions for Carring [sic] on Banking Business. Requires that accounts be properly classified and aligned with customer needs and risk requirements.
• Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Section 912A - Obligation to Act Efficiently, Honestly, and Fairly. Requires that financial services be provided fairly and transparently.
• ANZ's Breach: Created a false impression that the account had been set up correctly, when it was incomplete and incorrect which directly resulted in allowing unauthorised withdrawals.

1. I will strike this part out.
2. Again, this part is pitched at too high a level of generality and fails to plead the relevant material facts with sufficient clarity. The pleading asserts a conclusion without properly pleading the facts supporting that conclusion.
3. It also does not seem to me that the allegations made about breaches of s 9 of the Banking Act or s 921A of the Corporations Act disclose any reasonable cause of action on the part of Ms Hutchinson. Nor are such causes of action mentioned in the indorsement to the writ.

Part 12

1. Part 12 refers to the Bank allowing an unsupervised trainee to handle the setup of a high-risk financial account. This is said to be a breach of s 10 of the Code which required banking services to be provided with due skill and care.
2. It is also said to be a breach of s 180 of the Corporations Act which it is said places an obligation on banks to ensure their staff are adequately trained to handle complex financial transactions. It is alleged that the Bank did not provide adequate oversight, allowing a misclassified account setup to proceed incomplete, incorrect, and unchecked.
3. I will strike this part out.
4. This part is pitched at too high a level of generality and fails to plead the relevant material facts with sufficient clarity. That work might have been performed by a trainee does not establish a lack of skill and care.
5. Again, it does not seem to me that the allegations made of breaches of s 10 of the Banking Act or s 180 of the Corporations Act disclose any reasonable cause of action on the part of Ms Hutchinson. Nor are such causes of action mentioned in the indorsement to the writ.

Part 13

1. Part 13 refers to a 'failing to monitor unauthorised transactions and prevent misappropriation of funds'. This part alleges a 'legal breach' of:

(a) section 36 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act because the Bank allowed unauthorised withdrawals exceeding $10,000, which should have been flagged for review; and

(b) section 20 of the Code which it is claimed requires banks to ensure that customers understand their financial products before activation. It is alleged that the Bank breached this because it activated an incomplete and incorrect account.

1. I will strike this part out.
2. Again, this part is pitched at too high a level of generality and fails to plead the relevant material facts with sufficient clarity. It also does not seem to me that the allegations made of breaches of s 36 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act or s 20 of the Code disclose any reasonable cause of action on the part of Ms Hutchinson. Nor are such causes of action mentioned in the indorsement to the writ.

1. Part 14 refers to 'ANZ's fiduciary duty and the public's vulnerability'.
2. It is alleged that the Bank's position as a public bank imposes a higher duty of care. It referred to the Bank being regulated under the Banking Act and the Corporations Act and it being subject to strict legal, regulatory, and ethical obligations designed to protect consumers.
3. It is alleged that banks owe fiduciary duties because they act as custodians of public funds and customers rely on their professional competence and regulatory compliance when engaging in financial transactions.
4. It is alleged that banks owe fiduciary duties when handling customer funds and structuring accounts to safeguard against mismanagement or fraud. It was claim that this duty was recognised under s 912A of the Corporations Act. It is alleged that the Bank 'failed to act fairly by misclassifying a Gust account, increasing financial risk to unit holders'.
5. Part 14 also referred to s 181 of the Corporations Act and it was claimed that the Bank failed to ensure that the account setup aligned with the trust's fiduciary obligations, leading to misappropriation of funds.
6. It is also alleged that the Bank breached s 3 of the Code by allowing an improperly set-up trust account to function outside its intended security parameters, and that the Bank failed to uphold basic professional banking ethics and misclassified a trust account, allowing a co-trustee unilateral access to trust funds.
7. Reference was again made to allowing an unsupervised trainee to handle a high-risk financial setup, demonstrating a lack of institutional oversight. It was also stated that there was a failure to provide full disclosure of account details, which meant that Ms Hutchinson lost the opportunity to identify the error.
8. I will strike this part out.
9. Insofar as this part intends to advance a claim that the Bank owed fiduciary duties, I do not consider that the matters alleged would be sufficient to establish any reasonable cause of action that they owed such duties.
10. Nor do I consider that the allegations made of breaches of s 181 and s 912A of the Corporations Act or s 3 of the Code disclose any reasonable cause of action on the part of Ms Hutchinson. Again, none of these causes of action are mentioned in the indorsement to the writ.
11. The part is also pleaded at too high a level of generality.

Part 15

1. Part 15 refers to Ms Hutchinson's 'status as a consumer of ANZ and ANZ providing unsolicited goods and services when establishing the account'. Reference was made to s 18 of the ACL. It was alleged that the Bank's breach was that:
   • Misrepresented the nature of the Banking product by failing to provide the correct two-signature authority account.
   • Withheld key documentation (Pages I and 2 of the account setup form), preventing the Plaintiff from verifying the correct details before signing.
   • Gave assurances that the Plaintiff's instructions were followed when they were not. Australian Consumer Law (ACL), Competition and Consumer Act 2010 - Schedule 2, Section 29 - False or Misleading Representations About Services or Prohibits financial institutions from making false or misleading claims regarding services provided. 0 ANZ's Breach:
   • Falsely represented that the account setup was being handled correctly. removing the Plaintiffs opportunity to verify the error before financial harm occurred.
2. This part then states that the Bank did not disclose the failure to establish the correct account type, misleading Ms Hutchinson into believing the necessary safeguards were in place. Reference was made to s 21 of the ACL and it was alleged that the Bank knowingly processed incomplete and incorrect documents and allowed a supervised trainee to handle a high-risk financial account.
3. I will strike this part out. As I have already said, the ACL has no application to the supply of financial services and Ms Hutchinson has failed to explain how the case advanced might be arguable.

Part 16

1. Part 16 is titled 'gross negligence and financial harm'.
2. It is stated that the Bank's failures amount to gross negligence, as it facilitated unauthorised withdrawals that would not have been possible had the Bank followed banking regulations and customer instructions. Reference is made to Ms Hutchinson's safety being threatened by her co-trustee and others being harmed by stress.
3. I will strike out this part. This part is expressed as a conclusion or submission, without properly pleading the material facts to support the conclusion asserted.

Part 17

1. Part 17 is titled 'background'. This part states:

1.The Plaintiff, Sharree Hutchinson, is a trustee and unit holder of the Bremer Bay Investment Unit Trust 1, the unit holders are harmed third parties who transferred funds into the Bremer Bay Investment Unit Trust 1 because they trusted that ANZ could competently create the requested account and carry out their due diligence with due care.

2.The Defendant, Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ), a financial institution that provides banking services. ANZ was responsible for establishing the Bremer Bay Unit Trust 1 two-signature authority account at the time they were requested to do so, but instead of a two-signature authority account, ANZ created another product which was not requested. This negligent mistake was carried out by an unsupervised Trainee as well of lack of due diligence which could have prevented, it has resulted in loss to 15 unit holders.

3.Co-Trustee an accountant (accountant) created a Guaranteed loan agreement with a guaranteed 30% interest after 24 months with a First Mortgage Security through a Loan agreement between co-trustees development PTY.LTD company and Bremer Bay Investment Unit Trust 1.

The loan agreement Co-trustee provided us had terms and conditions which clearly prohibited unit trust funds to be spent on anything other than the development of 9000 Barnes Drive Bremer and the loan agreement terms and conditions stated, it would be considered a breach in the event this happened which would allow us to request our funds back if not rectified immediately.

4. On 14 December 2022, the Plaintiff, along with co-trustee, attended the ANZ Joondalup Branch to open a two-signature authority unit trust account for the Bremer Bay Investment Unit Trust I.

The Plaintiff was to authorise related expenses to be paid during civil construction once civil construction started in 12 months.

The Plaintiff explicitly instructed ANZ to create a 2-signature Authority account was required due to the nature of the account. The Plaintiff was assured by ANZ staff, including a trainee handling the setup, that the request would be implemented.

Contrary to the instructions provided, ANZ established an ordinary business account which allowed single-signature authority allowing, the co-trustee to access and transfer funds without the required authorisation from the Plaintiff.

A clear explanation by co-trustee was provided to ANZ staff explaining that the bank account was required so investors could deposit their investment for a development project, to deposit money and receive their money back plus 30% interest after 24 months. ANZ bank staff were provided a trust deed and the loan agreement at the time and asked the Plaintiff for her points of identification. ANZ have denied ever being given a copy of the loan agreement.

5.As a direct result of ANZ's failure to follow instructions and the laws, acts and statutes which govern their industry, this facilitated the co-trustee to misappropriate all funds without the Plaintiff's knowledge all funds were transferred to co-trustee's personal accounts and other company accounts, to people who had nothing to do with the unit trust, to lawyers for personal disputes with an ex, power bill and to pay unrelated invoices not addressed to the Bremer Bay Unit Trust 1.

There is no evidence any of the funds were used to pay for legitimate development of the project.

Co-trustee was able to freely make unauthorised withdrawals, transfers, and personal transactions, in direct violation of the intended use of funds as explicitly stated on the loan agreement between the unit trust and Sean Spences Bremer Bay Investments PTY.LTD and Bremer Bay Unit Trust.

6.The Plaintiff only discovered the error in March 2024 with the assistance of ANZ Bank staff in accessing the Bremer Bay Investment Unit Trust.

When The Plaintiff asked co-trustee to rectify, co-trustee started threatening to harm the plaintiff

The plaintiff asked unit holders to vote prior to sending formal notices on behalf of unit holders which they all viewed prior to sending. The notices asked for the misappropriation to be rectified within a specific date.

co-trustee responded by not only threatening the Plaintiff, but also threatening innocent third parties who are children.

1. The Bank submits that to the extent that the pleading is attempting to plead a negligence claim, it should be struck out as failing to disclose any reasonable cause of action. It argued that no general duty of care is imposed on a lender by the contractual relationship between a lender and customer and it referred to Bank of Western Australia v Phil Zhanming Luo & Anor and National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd.[5]
2. Further, the Bank submitted that there is no general common law duty upon a lender to advise or protect a borrower against fraud and it referred to Perpetual Trustee Company v Burniston.[6]
3. The Bank contended that the authorities support the proposition that a lender does not owe a general duty of care to its customers, but that a lender may be under a duty of care when it undertakes a role of providing advice beyond the mere provision of finance and reference was again made to Bank of Western Australia v Luo.[7]
4. The Bank argued that to the extent that the pleading sought to claim on behalf of third parties, it failed to disclose the basis upon which Ms Hutchinson had standing to do so. The Bank also submitted that paragraphs 2 to 6 were vague, failed to plead any material facts, and raised false issues.
5. It may well be that, as the Bank submits, the principles articulated in the cases it refers to may make it difficult for Ms Hutchinson to succeed in a negligence claim at trial. Whether the Bank owed Ms Hutchinson a duty of care, however, will require consideration of all of the relevant circumstances, including the scope of the contractual relationship between the Bank and Ms Hutchinson. The precise scope of that contractual relationship is unclear to me on the evidence currently before me.
6. Further, it may well be that the question of whether the Bank owed Ms Hutchinson a duty of care raises a difficult or substantial question of law. In Zaghloul, the Court of Appeal said that it will usually be appropriate to leave such questions for determination at trial. I note that none of the cases relied upon by the Bank seemed to be cases in which summary judgment had been granted.
7. Consideration of whether the matter may be determined summarily is also made more difficult by the poor quality of the current pleading, which makes it difficult to properly understand Ms Hutchinson's case.
8. Although this is one of the only parts of the Amended Statement of Claim in which Ms Hutchinson seems to attempt to plead material facts, it is still confusing when read in the context of the pleading as a whole. Parts of it are also pitched at a high level of generality.
9. In my view, the appropriate course is to strike out this part together with the pleading as a whole with leave to re-plead, so that a more coherent pleading may be prepared. A more clearly pleaded case may crystallise some of the issues raised by the Bank and permit them to be considered on a surer footing.

Part 18

1. Part 18 is titled 'discoveries once ANZ provided the document requested in formal complaint'.
2. It is alleged that the 'Anyone to Sign' box was left unticked which it was claimed indicated that the account was set up as a 2‑signature authority account. It is alleged that this confirms that the account was not explicitly authorised for single-signatory transactions but a single-signatory account was created.
3. It is claimed that the stated account purpose was incorrectly recorded as 'Accounting Services', despite the Bank being informed that the account was for property development and that critical information was missing in the form of and ANC/ARBN/ABN and the full name of the Company/Trust registered office.
4. It is also again alleged that Ms Hutchinson did not receive confirmation that the account had been established, preventing her from verifying the set up.
5. When this part is read together with the previous part, it seems to me to be a continuation of the apparent negligence claim. Given this, it should be struck out for the same reasons.

Part 19

1. Part 19 is titled injured parties and identified 15 different parties.
2. This part fails to properly explain the relevance of the loss sustained by third parties, particularly when it is considered in the context of the pleading as a whole. I will strike it out.

Part 20

1. Part 20 is entitled 'relief sought' and indicates that the following relief is sought.

a) Restoration of trust property - The Defendant and ANZ are jointly and severally liable for the return or full compensation of the misappropriated property.
>
> b) S 1,986,000 Compensatory damages - The trust is entitled to recover losses directly resulting from both the Defendant's wrongful dealings and negligence in failing to safeguard the trust's banking arrangements. .
>
> c) $95,800 Equitable relief - Full remedy and reimbursement of initial property misappropriated and loss of 30% interest in promised gains from loan agreement and any further relief necessary to ensure the trust's property is restored in full.
>
> d) $2,581,800 Total Property loss paid to Beneficiaries who prove their property loss and claim to remedy as injured parties, or as per Court's orders and direction on or before 20th April.
>
> e) The Plaintiff seeks the costs of proceedings Up to $500,000,000 in Legal costs and interest.
>
> f) Additional interest charges of 1 % per day on total loss of property, if Defendant ANZ causes any further delay past the April 2025.
>
> g) Up to $50,000,000 in unknown losses such as additional damages Defendants delay tactics may cause on mental health of injured third parties.

2. This part concludes by indicating that Ms Hutchinson seeks an order requiring the Bank to recall, review, and amend its internal policies and various matters are identified.
3. Although the Bank did not make any complaint about this part, in my view it should be struck out together with the rest of the Amended Statement of Claim. Why Ms Hutchinson would be legally entitled to the relief claimed is not properly explained. Precisely what is meant by some of the relief sought is also obscure.

Conclusion: the pleading should be struck out with leave to re-plead

1. Although my reasons above have focused on the individual parts of the Amended Statement of Claim, the conclusion that the pleading should be struck out is reinforced when the various parts are considered as a whole, together with the indorsement to the writ. Read as a whole, the Amended Statement of Claim is incoherent and unclear.
2. It is notable that the claims advanced in the Amended Statement of Claim seem to have evolved well beyond the claims made in the indorsement to the writ. The Amended Statement of Claim has introduced a variety of new causes of action not mentioned in the indorsement. As I have explained above, many of those causes of action appear misconceived and they have introduced unnecessary complexity and confusion.
3. Ms Hutchingson acknowledged having used ChatGPT to prepare some of her documents at the hearing before me. If it was used to prepare the statement of claim, this may explain many of the difficulties that have arisen.
4. Although this is not the first time Ms Hutchinson has attempted to prepare a statement of claim, I consider that Ms Hutchinson should have leave to re-plead on this occasion. I appreciate that she is self-represented and she is obviously having difficulty preparing a proper pleading.
5. I have emphasised to Ms Hutchingson that she should seek the assistance of a lawyer. She will not be afforded unlimited opportunities to re-plead her case. At some point (and that point may be reached soon) if a satisfactory pleading is not prepared and it is struck out, leave to re-plead will be refused.

Why the defendant says summary judgment should be entered

1. The Bank contends that summary judgment should be granted because Ms Hutchinson lacks standing to pursue the present action.[8]
2. The Bank argued that Ms Hutchinson was bringing the claim in her capacity as trustee of the Bremer Bay Investment Unit Trust and that she lacked the standing to do so without her co-trustee.
3. The Bank relied upon the terms of the Bremer Bay Investment Unit Trust deed and argued that under the deed the 'trustee' was both co‑trustees acting jointly.
4. The Bank argued that although cl 21.3 empowers the 'trustee' to commence proceedings, as the trustee is defined jointly, both must be involved to commence the proceedings.
5. Further, the Bank argued that Ms Hutchinson has not pleaded, and there does not appear to be, any relevant section in the Trustees Act 1962 (WA) which of itself, in the absence of any further step by the court prior to commencement of the proceedings, empowers a co‑trustee to exercise powers given to, or vested, in two or more co‑trustees jointly, other than where one of the co-trustees has died.
6. The Bank contended that Ms Hutchinson has not pleaded, and there is nothing before the court that establishes that prior to commencing the proceedings, the court conferred any power on Ms Hutchinson individually or otherwise directed her to have commenced these proceedings as a co-trustee.
7. The Bank submitted that where a court has determined that the plaintiff had no standing to commence the proceeding, the court has dismissed the action or struck out the claim, and reference was made to Willoughby v Clayton Utz.[9]
8. It was also contended that to the extent that Ms Hutchinson seeks to bring the proceedings in her alleged capacity as one of the unit holders of the Bremer Bay Investment Unit Trust, ordinarily a beneficiary of a trust cannot sue directly to enforce a legal right of a trustee in the absence of extraordinary or special circumstances. It was argued that at the very least, it must be established that the relevant trustee is unwilling to commence the proceedings and all of the beneficiaries must be joined as parties to the proceeding.
9. The Bank's application was supported by an affidavit that sought to verify the matters upon which the application was based.
10. I am not prepared to grant summary judgment at this stage for two reasons.
11. First, the Bank's application seemed to proceed on the assumption that all of the claims advanced by Ms Hutchinson were advanced in her capacity as trustee. When the statement of claim is read as a whole and read with the writ, it seems that at least some of the claims advanced by Ms Hutchinson are advanced in a personal capacity. It is not clear which claims are made a trustee and which personal. On the current state of the pleadings, it would be difficult to disentangle the claims.
12. Secondly, at the hearing before me, Ms Hutchinson asserted that her co‑trustee had been removed by the unit holders. There is also some reference to this in part 17 of the pleading. While the Bank disputes the validity and effectiveness of any attempt to remove Ms Hutchinson's co-trustee, in my view, Ms Hutchinson should be accorded a fair opportunity to plead a case based on her co-trustee's removal. To the extent that there is a dispute of fact about whether the trustee has been removed, consideration might need to be given to whether such an issue needs to be resolved at trial.
13. I do not consider that the refusal of summary judgment based on the present statement of claim would preclude the Bank applying for summary judgment again if Ms Hutchinson continues to press a claim brought on behalf of the trust. Any such application would need to be considered in light of any further amended statement of claim filed.
14. It is relevant to note, however, that such an application would involve the summary determination of the proper construction of the trust deed. This is because the Bank's argument proceeds on a particular construction of the trust deed, that construes the deed as requiring the powers of the trustee to always be exercised jointly. One outcome of the Bank's construction might be that Ms Hutchinson in her capacity as trustee might only be able to sue (on behalf of the trust) her co-trustee for any breach of trust on his part, if he agreed to those proceedings being commenced. It seems unlikely that the authors of the deed would have intended such an outcome.

1. For these reasons, I will strike out the statement of claim with leave to re-plead.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] Vantage Holdings Group Ltd v Donnelly [No 4] [2019] WASC 398 [60].

[2] Zaghloul v Bayly [2021] WASCA 125 (Zaghloul).

[4] Defendant's Outline of Submissions in support of Application dated 11 September 2025 (Defendant's Submissions) [61].

[5] Bank of Western Australia Limited v Phil Zhanming Luo & Anor [2010] NSWSC 733 [71] - [72] (Bank of Western Australia v Luo); National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd [2002] VSCA 18; (2002) 4 VR 252 [45] - [46] (Nemur Varity).

[6] Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v Burniston (No 2) [2012] WASC 383 [331] (Burniston).

[7] Bank of Western Australia v Luo [71] - [74].

[8] Defendant's Submissions [32] - [48].

[9] Willoughby v Clayton Utz [2005] WASC 47; (2005) 193 FLR 373.