Hung v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 148

1. I will make orders dismissing the application with costs.

1. The applicant reads the affidavit of Ziaullah Zarifi, the solicitor for the applicant, affirmed 4 June 2025 subject to an objection as to the relevance of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Common Procedures) Practice Direction compilation dated 16 April 2025 which was annexed thereto. The relevance objection was predicated on the fact that the direction post-dated the commencement date of the proceeding in the Tribunal on 14 October 2024. Given that the status and date of issue of the practice direction was not in issue, I directed that the parties were free to make such submissions on the relevance and content of the direction as they chose without requiring it to be proved to be authentic by means of the solicitor's affidavit. In short, there was no utility in determining the relevance objection in relation to the affidavit.

1. The applicant is a Taiwanese national. He arrived in Australia in 2016 at about 15 years of age on a temporary student visa. He completed high school in 2019. He then commenced a degree in engineering. He has completed two years of his engineering degree. In doing so, he did not require or receive any special assistance with regard to examinations or assessments. The applicant was diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder and anxiety in the period after he was charged.
2. In June 2022, while he was still on a student visa and in the third year of his studies, the applicant was charged with obscene exposure in relation to an incident on public transport. He pleaded guilty and received a nine-month community release order and a conviction was not recorded. Following a further investigation, the police discovered a significant volume of child abuse material on a number of his electronic devices. In September 2023, the District Court of New South Wales found the applicant guilty on a charge of possession of child abuse material. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. The sentencing judge acknowledged the applicant's mental health conditions, including Autism Spectrum Disorder, anxiety, and social isolation, which were assessed as contributing factors.
3. On 22 September 2023, the applicant's visa was cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Act, the Delegate being satisfied that the applicant did not pass the character test due to him having a substantial criminal record on the basis of having been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months: ss 501(6)(a) and 501(7)(c) of the Act (the cancellation decision).
4. On 27 October 2023, the applicant made representations seeking revocation of the cancellation decision in response to an invitation to do so (which invitation was extended pursuant to s 501CA(3)(b), as required by s 501CA(4)(a) of the Act).
5. On 27 August 2024, the Delegate decided not to revoke the cancellation decision on the basis that the Delegate was not satisfied that the applicant passed the character test and further that there was not another reason to revoke the cancellation decision (the Delegate's decision).
6. On 30 August 2024, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate's decision. The Tribunal conducted a review hearing on 11 November 2024 at which the applicant gave evidence. The applicant was represented at the hearing. On 19 November 2024, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision.
7. The applicant then brought the present application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision.

1. The Tribunal assessed the applicant's case having regard to Direction No. 110 "Visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501 CA" dated 7 June 2024, in accordance with s 499(2A) of the Act. The Tribunal's statement of reasons comprises 295 paragraphs. It is detailed and logically structured. The Tribunal's reasons are arranged under a series of headings and subheadings that are arranged in broadly the following sequence.
2. A brief introduction is included in which the applicant's background is concisely stated.
3. The applicant's offending, sentencing in the District Court and psychological assessment are then addressed in detail.
4. The Tribunal then identifies and summarises, again in some detail, the statements of facts, issues and contentions lodged on behalf of the applicant and the Minister respectively.
5. The Tribunal then moves to set out the details of the review hearing on 11 November 2024 and gives a detailed account of the evidence given by the applicant and his father amongst other things. In this section of the Tribunal's reasons, the Tribunal has set out the oral evidence given at the review hearing taking care to include details of by whom each question was asked, the effect of the question posed and the answer given. The Tribunal distinguished between the evidence given in answer to the applicant's solicitor's questions and that given in answer to the Minister's solicitor or in response to the Tribunal's own questions. The transcript of the review hearing is not included in the materials on this application but there is no challenge to the detailed account of the evidence on the review hearing included in the Tribunal's reasons.
6. After completing the comprehensive survey of the oral evidence at the review hearing, the Tribunal then set out, again in detail, the closing submissions made by each party.
7. After the Tribunal completed its canvas of the material and representations that had been made to it, it moved to setting out the product of its consideration by reference to the statutory framework and the decision-making scaffold embodied in Direction No. 110. The Tribunal moved through the decision-making process setting out its process using a separate heading for each stage of that process, which closely correlated with the requirements of Direction No. 110, tracing through each of the "Primary Considerations" and then moving to the "Other Considerations".
8. In relation to Primary Consideration 1 (protection of the Australian community) the Tribunal addressed the topics of the nature and seriousness of the applicant's conduct to date and the risk to the Australian community in the event of further offending before concluding that this weighed "very heavily" against revocation but was not of itself determinative. Primary Consideration 2 (family violence) and Primary Consideration 4 (best interests of children) were not relevant. Primary Consideration 3 (strength and duration of ties to Australia) was given limited weight in the applicant's favour in view of the limited evidence of ties to Australia and the fact that both the applicant and his father each held only temporary student visas which were subject to strict conditions. Primary Consideration 5 (expectations of the Australian community) also weighed "very heavily" against the revocation of the cancellation decision, given the serious nature of the appellant's offending.
9. In terms of Other Considerations, the Tribunal structured its reasons under three headings: (a) legal consequences of the decision; (b) extent of impediments if removed; and (c) impact on Australian business interests. Under the first subheading, the Tribunal noted that there was no evidence of non-refoulement obligations and that the submissions made on behalf of the applicant confirmed that there were no grounds for the applicant to lodge a protection visa application and that he did not intend to do so. The Tribunal recognised that if removed the applicant would not be able to return to Australia without Ministerial approval which was unlikely to be forthcoming because of his history of offending. Under the second subheading, extent of impediments if removed, the Tribunal canvassed a broad range of issues before concluding that on balance this consideration be given "minor weight" in favour of revocation. The Tribunal found there was no evidence and no suggestion that the applicant's removal would impact on the third subheading, Australian business interests, and accordingly this consideration was not relevant.
10. The Tribunal synthesised the conclusions it had made in respect of the weight given to each of the relevant representations in accordance with the relative weightings specified in Direction No. 110.
11. Ultimately, the Tribunal found that the protection of the Australian community outweighed any other considerations, and it was not satisfied there was "another reason" under s 501CA(4)(b) of the Act to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the applicant's visa. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the decision to cancel the applicant's visa.

1. The issues raised for determination fall into two categories.
2. The first category is addressed to whether the Tribunal denied the applicant natural justice by failing to consider in the requisite way substantial, clearly articulated arguments based on established facts which the applicant had raised. Grounds 1 to 3 are in this category. Notwithstanding the use of the term "procedural fairness" in these grounds, the applicant confirmed at the hearing that grounds 1 to 3 were directed to a failure to exercise jurisdiction, and the case was advanced on that basis.
3. Each of these grounds raises a different aspect of the representations made by the applicant. In each case there is no dispute between the parties that the relevant argument was clearly articulated by the applicant. The dispute between the parties is limited to whether the Tribunal considered each of these representations in the requisite way so as to exercise its jurisdiction.
4. The first of the relevant representations related to the extent of impediments that the applicant would face if removed. It concerned the applicant's claim that he would not be entitled to receive unemployment benefits in Taiwan (the unemployment contention): ground 1.
5. The second relevant contention related to Primary Consideration 1 - Protection of the Australian Community. It concerned a claim that the applicant's visa cancellation and period in immigration detention had acted as a deterrent to future offending: ground 2.
6. The third relevant contention concerned a claim that one of the legal consequences of a non‑revocation decision would be that the applicant would be subject to ongoing immigration detention pending removal and that this constituted an infringement on the applicant's personal liberty: ground 3.
7. The second category of issues concern whether the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable, illogical or irrational. That contention is made by reference to three particulars of the Tribunal's reasoning. The first particular contends that the Tribunal assessed whether the applicant was at risk of reoffending by reference to a conclusion that the applicant's future behaviour in the community was untested: ground 4, particular (a). The second particular is directed to what was described as the Tribunal's assumption that the applicant's English proficiency would be an asset in the Taiwanese job market: ground 4, particular (b). The third particular is a generalised complaint that the Tribunal engaged in inconsistent reasoning: ground 4, particular (c).

Grounds 1 to 3 - failure to exercise jurisdiction

1. The applicant bears the onus of proving that the Tribunal failed to consider the matters identified in grounds 1 to 3: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; 241 CLR 594 at [67]- [68] (Gummow J, Heydon and Crennan JJ agreeing at [91]-[92]).
2. In Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17; 275 CLR 582, the plurality (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon and Steward JJ), stated the principles applicable to decision-making under s 501CA(4) of the Act at [23]-[27]. I will not reproduce that statement in full here. The principles which are of particular relevance in the present application may be briefly summarised as follows.
3. First, the plurality recognised that it is improbable that Parliament intended for the broad power conferred by s 501CA(4) of the Act "to be restricted or confined by requiring the decision-maker to treat every statement within representations made by a former visa holder as a mandatory relevant consideration": Plaintiff M1 at [23], citing Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Viane [2021] HCA 41; 274 CLR 398 at [13] (Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ).
4. Secondly, a decision-maker must "read, identify, understand and evaluate the representations" and must "have regard to what is said in the representations, bring their mind to bear upon the facts stated in them and the arguments or opinions put forward, and appreciate who is making them": Plaintiff M1 at [24].
5. Thirdly, the "weight to be afforded to the representations is a matter for the decision-maker" and the decision-maker is not obliged "'to make actual findings of fact as an adjudication of all material claims' made by a former visa holder": Plaintiff M1 at [24], quoting Viane at [14].
6. Fourthly, "[w]hat is necessary to comply with the statutory requirement for a valid exercise of power will necessarily depend on the nature, form and content of the representations" and the "requisite level of engagement ... will vary, among other things, according to the length, clarity and degree of relevance of the representations": Plaintiff M1 at [25].
7. Fifthly, none of the preceding principles detract from nor are inconsistent with the established principle that "if review of a decision-maker's reasons discloses that the decision-maker ignored, overlooked or misunderstood relevant facts or materials or a substantial and clearly articulated argument ... that may give rise to jurisdictional error": Plaintiff M1 at [27], citing amongst other things Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 197 ALR 389 at [24]- [25] (Gummow and Callinan JJ), [95] (Hayne J).
8. The Full Court has emphasised the following aspects of the decision-making process under s 501CA(4) of the Act following from the decision in Plaintiff M1: see ECE21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2023] FCAFC 52; 297 FCR 422 at [7]- [9] (Mortimer J (as her Honour then was), Colvin and O'Sullivan JJ); Jabari v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 98; 298 FCR 431 at [51]- [53] (Katzmann, Jackson and McEvoy JJ).

(1) There is a distinction between considering representations in the sense of averting to and understanding them, and considering them in the sense of evaluating their significance in the course of making the decision.

(2) It is for the decision-maker, acting reasonably and rationally and having demonstrably identified and understood the representations being made, to determine whether a particular matter is of significance.

(3) This means that a court undertaking judicial review must decide if a failure to refer to a particular matter in the reasons for the decision, including, a matter that was clearly articulated by the applicant or which clearly arose on the materials, may indicate that the decision-maker was not persuaded that it was of significance, or whether that failure is evidence that the decision-maker did not identify and understand the representations being made.

(4) Provided the decision-maker has averted to and understood the representations the applicant has made, the degree or quality of engagement they provide to a given representation is a matter for them, as long as they act within the bounds of rationality and reasonableness.

(5) The weight to be afforded to any particular representation is a matter for the decision‑maker, including forming a view that the representation should be given no weight. What is necessary is that the decision-maker be aware of and understand the representation.

(6) To approach the statutory task on the basis that the Court enquires into the degree or quality of consideration in the reasoning is likely to lead to error in that the Court is at risk of usurping the function of the decision-maker.

1. A lack of consideration may be inferred from a decision-maker not expressly dealing with a matter in their reasons but such an inference is "not too readily to be drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point": Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; 236 FCR 593 at [46]- [47] (French, Sackville and Hely JJ). The Court in undertaking the review must be alert to the fact that matters may be dealt with in findings of greater generality, or through the rejection of a factual premise upon which a contention relies.
2. In terms of whether any error identified is material, the role of the Court is to determine whether the decision that was in fact made by the Tribunal could realistically have been different had there been no error: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; 280 CLR 321 at [14] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ). The Court does not engage in a review of the merits of the decision, reconstruct a decision-making process, rework the apparent basis upon which a decision has been made, or rewrite the reasons for decision: LPDT at [29]. Materiality is an ordinary question of fact to be determined by inferences drawn from the evidence and in respect of which the applicant bears the onus: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 264 CLR 421 at [46] (Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ); MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17; 273 CLR 506 at [2], [39], [60] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ); Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; 276 CLR 80 at [1] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ).
3. To presage what follows, I am satisfied that on a fair reading of the Tribunal's detailed and carefully structured reasons, the Tribunal considered in the requisite sense each of the representations made by the applicant that are the subject of grounds 1 to 3. Before moving to consider grounds 1 to 3 in detail, I make a general observation about the applicant's submissions in relation to these grounds.
4. The applicant's submissions at different points flirted with a contention that the nature of the consideration required to be given by the Tribunal to the applicant's representations varied according to whether the representation was made directly by the applicant or by the applicant's legal representatives, with the latter requiring a more detailed level of consideration to be demonstrated in the reasons of the Tribunal. Ultimately, that line of argument appeared not to be pressed. It is incorrect to suggest that the level of consideration required of the Tribunal varies according to the author of the representation. The adequacy, or otherwise, of the consideration given to a representation that is substantial, clearly articulated and based on established facts is assessed by reference to the content of the representation. What is required is that when a representation is made, as here, that is substantial, clearly articulated and relies on established facts, the Tribunal must read, identify and evaluate it: Plaintiff M1 at [24]. From that point, as emphasised by the plurality in Plaintiff M1, it is for the decision-maker to sift and attribute weight or persuasive forces as the Tribunal thinks. The Tribunal is not required to make actual findings of fact as an adjudication of all material claims: Plaintiff M1 at [24], citing Viane at [14]; see also EXT20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 72; 291 FCR 55 at [120]- [121] (Wigney J), [168] (Snaden J).
5. Relatedly, the applicant's submissions in support of grounds 1 to 3 repeatedly use language which mischaracterises the Tribunal's function as an administrative decision-maker. The statutory task reposed in the Tribunal is not to "respond" to, "confront" and "resolve" each and every thread that forms part of the applicant's representations. Rather, the Tribunal must demonstrably identify and understand the representations made to it and then determine for itself the significance of the matters raised to the administrative decision that the Tribunal is called on to make. The Tribunal is not required to refer to and make specific findings on every representation made by the applicant in seriatim. In substance the applicant invites the Court to parse the Tribunal's reasons in a way that risks elevating every statement in the representations to being a mandatory relevant consideration for the Tribunal. To adopt that approach would be contrary to principle: see Plaintiff M1 at [23].
6. For the reasons which follow I am satisfied that grounds 1 to 3 must be dismissed.

1. It is common ground that the applicant made a representation in the written submissions that were before the Tribunal to the effect that under Taiwan's Labour Insurance regime, a person must: (a) have at least one year of insured employment within the preceding three years; (b) be involuntarily unemployed; (c) be registered with a public employment service; and (d) be under 65 years of age. Further, that he did not satisfy the first criterion and was therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits.
2. The gravamen of ground 1 is that the Tribunal did not "respond" to the applicant's unemployment benefits claim. Pausing there, the Tribunal was not required to respond to the unemployment benefits claim. It was required to consider it as part of its consideration of the extent of impediments if removed. In this context what was required was that the Tribunal identify, understand and evaluate the representation. The applicant contends that the Tribunal conflated general social security in Taiwan with the specific eligibility requirements for unemployment benefits. The applicant contends that because the Tribunal did not "engage with or refute" the detailed argument advanced in relation to the specific criteria for unemployment benefits it left the "applicant's specific claim unexamined".
3. The applicant submits that the alleged error was material, in that had the Tribunal properly considered his submission as to his ineligibility for unemployment benefits, the Tribunal may have given greater weight to its consideration of the impediments to his removal and if so, this could have altered the outcome of the overall balancing exercise.
4. A fair reading of the Tribunal's reasons does not yield support for the applicant's submissions regarding the unemployment benefits contention. The Tribunal's reasons are comprehensive and carefully structured. The Tribunal had clearly read the applicant's submission on unemployment benefits. It was expressly identified and recounted in the section of the Tribunal's reasons addressed to the applicant's statement of facts and issues in contention: T[35] to T[72], at T[67].
5. The applicant accepted that the Tribunal had accurately summarised the submission in relation to unemployment benefits but appeared to complain that the Tribunal had not comprehensively repeated in full the whole of the representation. The Tribunal relevantly noted that the applicant had submitted that he was not entitled to unemployment benefits in Taiwan. Further, that the applicant may not be able to avail himself of Taiwan's employment insurance which has strict criteria applicable to it: T[67].
6. The applicant complains that the Tribunal did not make findings about the "strict criteria" instead referring to the effect of the cumulative criteria. There is nothing in this submission. The Tribunal understood the import of the representation - to wit, that the eligibility criteria was strict - and apprehended the significance of the applicant's argument that he "is not entitled to unemployment benefits in Taiwan" as relevant to the extent of the impediments if removed.
7. The applicant submits that because the Tribunal said at T[284] that "[b]ased on the country information submitted with the Applicant's tender bundle, such as the ISSA Country profile for Taiwan, it is apparent that Taiwan offers social security benefits to its citizens and medical support systems to its citizens" and did not refer to the applicant's eligibility for unemployment benefits, the Court should infer that the Tribunal did not consider the unemployment benefits claim. I reject that submission.
8. The absence of a reference to unemployment benefits in this section of the Tribunal's reasons is readily explained by the findings made by the Tribunal as to matters going to the applicant's ability to obtain employment and familial support upon return to Taiwan, together with broader finding of social security benefits and medical support systems. On a fair reading of the Tribunal's reasons, I infer the absence of an express reference to unemployment benefits reflects that the Tribunal did not attach weight or persuasive force to the representation that had been made because of the view it had formed on the favourable circumstances attaching to the applicant's prospect of obtaining employment upon return to Taiwan. The Tribunal was not required to "resolve" a contention about access to unemployment benefits in circumstances where it did not find that the applicant was likely to be unemployed and without family support upon his return to Taiwan: Viane at [14] (Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ); EXT20 at [120]-[121] (Wigney J) and [168] (Snaden J).
9. Ground 1 will be dismissed.

1. It is common ground that the applicant raised a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying on established facts to the effect that his incarceration and detention had profoundly impacted him, allowing for reflection on his criminal conduct, and was likely to deter him from future offending.
2. The applicant submits that the Tribunal did not identify or address this argument. That submission must be rejected.
3. As mentioned, the Tribunal included in its reasons a detailed account of the oral testimony offered by the applicant at the review hearing. The applicant's answers to questions from his own solicitor at the hearing did not rise to support the contention that is the subject of ground 2. When asked what impact the cancellation of his visa had on his life, he said that he could not continue his university studies from prison and that the environment of incarceration was not ideal: T[109]. He did not say anything to suggest it had operated as a deterrent to future offending. When asked specifically about reoffending the applicant said "I am not sure how I could convince the Tribunal. I will get all the help I can": T[114].
4. The Tribunal also recounted the following aspect of the applicant's evidence given in answer to questions from the Minister's solicitor: T[131]

Ms Durham noted that the District Court judge in his sentencing comments noted that the Applicant said that he had a sexual interest in children and sometimes thought about this. The Applicant stated this was correct, but he does not seek it now because he has no access to this material. Ms Duffy enquired of the Applicant whether he had access to electronic devices and the Applicant stated that he does in immigration detention. Ms Durham asked the Applicant what has changed between sentencing and currently. The Applicant stated that he does not seek this material now and he does not know how he would feel if he viewed this material presently. Ms Durham asked the Applicant whether he was still interested in this material. The Applicant stated, "sometimes I think about it, but I am aware of the consequences, and it fuels demand for it is harming children."

1. The applicant does not refer in terms to the deterrent impact that his incarceration and detention has had on him. The applicant's reference to "consequences" is ambiguous. He may have meant the consequence he experienced in the form of imprisonment and visa cancellation, or he may have meant the consequence experienced by the children harmed in the production of child abuse material. It is not clear although the more natural reading is the latter. The latter reading appears to have been that which the Tribunal took from his evidence: T[240]. In any event, that was the height of his evidence in aid of the deterrence contention.
2. The applicant's oral evidence before the Tribunal thus provided at best faint support only for the submission made in his pre-hearing written statement and the statement of facts and issues in contention as to the deterrent contention. It is understandable having regard to the applicant's oral evidence why the deterrent contention was not given particular emphasis in his solicitor's closing oral submissions.
3. The Tribunal identified the submission that imprisonment and detention had a "profound impact" on the applicant and was a deterrent: T[45]. The Tribunal recognised that the applicant had expressed remorse for his offending: T[241]. The Tribunal nonetheless found that it could not be satisfied that the risk of reoffending had been ameliorated since his imprisonment and detention: T[212]. The Tribunal articulated logical reasons for its conclusion in that regard including that the dynamic risk factors which had contributed to his offending had not resolved and that as at the date of his sentencing he had acknowledged having an interest in children and in his evidence before the Tribunal he said "he sometimes harbours thoughts about child abuse material, and he does not know how he would feel if he viewed it": T[240].
4. On a fair reading of the Tribunal's reasons, it is plain that the Tribunal considered the deterrence contention in the way in which it was required to do but it was outweighed by matters which the Tribunal regarded as more significant in assessing the risk of reoffending and to which the Tribunal attached greater weight. That was squarely within the decision‑making process entrusted to the Tribunal.
5. Ground 2 will be dismissed.

1. Again, it is common ground that this argument was made.
2. The applicant argued that if the cancellation decision was not revoked he would remain in detention until physically removed and that would result in an interference with his rights to liberty, freedom of movement, family unity and humane treatment. The applicant submits that the Tribunal did not grapple with the contention as to the consequences of his detention on his human rights. I reject that submission. It does not accord with a fair reading of the Tribunal's reasons.
3. The Tribunal identified and understood this argument in direct terms at T[57] to T[58]. The personal liberty contention arose for consideration in the context where the applicant was not owed any non-refoulement obligations and conceded that he did not make any claims that might engage such obligations: T[279]. In those circumstances, the necessary consequences of a non-revocation decision is that the applicant would be removed from Australia as soon as reasonably practicable.
4. Relatedly, the Tribunal also identified and understood the Minister's submissions on this point, including that in the circumstances of this case, regardless of the outcome of the revocation application, the applicant would remain in detention pending the outcome of a future visa application as the applicant was in Australia as the holder of a temporary visa which had expired in March 2024. Further, that the applicant's ongoing detention in this context was an intended consequence of the legislative scheme and accordingly should not be given significant weight in favour of revocation: T[94].
5. A fair reading of T[279] to T[280] does not permit the inference that the Tribunal did not appreciate that prior to removal, there would be a further period of immigration detention until the applicant was removed. This prospect and the applicant's submissions with respect to the deprivation of his personal liberty in that period are set out by the Tribunal at T[57] to T[58] with the Minister's submissions set out at T[94].
6. For completeness, I note that the analogy the applicant seeks to draw with the decision in Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 1273 (Rangiah J) in the present circumstances inapt.
7. In Singh, neutral weight was attributed to a period of ongoing imprisonment and the Court considered that to demonstrate jurisdictional error on two bases. First, that the Tribunal's attribution of neutral (that is, no) weight was based on a misconstruction of s 501CA(4) of the Act. Secondly, that it was illogical and legally unreasonable. As to the second basis, Rangiah J opined that the Tribunal could not logically or reasonably have concluded that the continuing detention of the applicant did not weigh to at least some extent in favour of revocation: at [42]. By contrast, in the present case the Tribunal concluded that the legal consequences of the decision, which formed part of the Other Considerations under Direction No. 110, attracted minor weight: T[291(f)]. The Tribunal's reasons here reflect that the Tribunal read, understood and considered the argument and in doing so attributed minor weight to it as part of its assessment of the weight to be attributed to the legal consequences of the decision. No error has been demonstrated.
8. Ground 3 will be dismissed.

1. Irrationality or illogicality will only be made out if the Minister's decision "is one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence": Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611 at [130] (Crennan and Bell JJ).
2. Legal unreasonableness will only be made out if the decision has the character of being unreasonable based on some "underlying jurisdictional error in the decision-making process", for example, the decision lacks "an evident and intelligible justification" or if the decision is otherwise "plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious, or lacking common sense having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory source of the power, such that it cannot be said to be within the range of possible lawful outcomes as an exercise of that power": Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437 at [44] (Allsop CJ, Robertson J and Mortimer J (as her Honour then was)); Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1 at [11] (Allsop CJ).
3. The threshold for irrationality, illogicality and legal unreasonableness is high, noting that it is not enough that a question of fact may be one on which reasonable minds may disagree, and even emphatic disagreement is insufficient: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 at [28]- [30] (French CJ).
4. By ground 4, the applicant contends that the Tribunal's decision is infected by illogicality, irrationality and is legally unreasonable by reference to the following three particulars. First, that in assessing whether the applicant was at risk of reoffending, the Tribunal considered that the applicant's future behaviour in the community was untested. Secondly, that the Tribunal assumed that the applicant's English proficiency would be an asset to him in securing employment in the Taiwanese job market. Thirdly, that the Tribunal's reasoning was inconsistent.
5. In relation to the risk of reoffending, the Tribunal noted that the applicant had been in full time custody since being held on remand in 2022 and had not, since being convicted had an opportunity to spend any time in the community. The Tribunal stated that the applicant's future behaviour in the community remains untested: T[239]. The Tribunal's observations reflect the fact - they are uncontroversial. The applicant's contention that the Tribunal's factual observation encompassed a latent premise that because the risk of reoffending had not been tested, it necessarily carried with it an irrational assumption that the risk would manifest. That submission is rejected.
6. The Tribunal did not rely on the factual conclusions at T[239] to establish the existence of a risk of reoffending. The Tribunal's evaluation of information and evidence before it as "indicative of a risk offending" was rationally and logically open to it having regard to the matters it identified: T[243]. Those matters included the applicant's failure to address his behavioural and mental health issues, namely, his Autism Spectrum Disorder, intimacy deficits, sexual self-regulation, skills to enhance social interactions, training and empathy and strategies to manage anxiety associated with social activity, as well as the applicant's evidence on his sentence hearing that he did have a sexual interest in children, the applicant's social isolation and absence of support networks, and his evidence at the Tribunal hearing that he sometimes harbours thoughts about child abuse material: T[236], [237], [240], [242], [244]. Although the Tribunal acknowledged the difficulty of accessing such support while in detention, it also noted that the applicant had not sought information about community-based mental health services, despite having access to electronic devices in detention and having consulted both a psychologist and psychiatrist during his time in immigration detention - professionals who had recommended further engagement with such services: T[242]. The Tribunal's reasoning discloses a probative basis for concluding as it did on the future risk of reoffending.
7. The Tribunal's approach was informed by the facts and circumstances applicable to the applicant. The applicant's appeal by analogy to the decision in CKL21 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 70; 293 FCR 634 at [53] (Moshinsky, O'Bryan and Cheeseman JJ) is misplaced. In CKL21, the Full Court recognised that the necessary inquiry is fact-dependent, identification of which turned on a close analysis of the findings of the decision-maker and the evidence before them: [75], [87]. The Full Court at [78] found no error per se in the Minister's finding that the appellant's conduct was not tested in the general community, stating "[i]t was a fact that the appellant had not been released into the community and therefore his conduct had not been tested in the community". The Full Court continued, at [79]:

... a finding that the appellant's conduct has not been tested in the community does not establish that the appellant is a risk of reoffending. It is a negative finding about what is not known or established (because the appellant has not been living in the community), rather than a positive predictor of the appellant's future behaviour.

1. In CKL21, the Full Court found that there was an absence of probative evidence to support a finding that the applicant posed a risk of reoffending in the same manner as his previous offences, in circumstances where the relevant offence was murder. Unlike CKL21, in the present case there was a reasoned analysis for the finding, supported by probative evidence, including that dynamic risk factors for the offending had not been addressed in the period since the offending notwithstanding there was some opportunity to do so, and evidence of the applicant's admission that he still harboured thoughts in relation to child abuse material, albeit accompanied by a recognition of the harm occasioned by such material.
2. The Tribunal has stated that the applicant's behaviour has not been tested, which is correct as a matter of fact. The Tribunal's findings in relation to the risk of reoffending are based on a range of other factors, which are set out at T[234] to T[244], and which are supported by probative evidence. No error has been demonstrated and the Tribunal has not engaged in a logical fallacy by concluding that a fact has been proved because it has not been disproved: CKL21 at [79].
3. The next particular of ground 4 is directed to the Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant's "English language skills may well be transferable to job prospects in Taiwan": T[281]. The applicant contended that to reach such a conclusion was not within the Tribunal's personal or specialised knowledge and was not a matter of common knowledge. On this basis the appellant contended that the Tribunal's reasoning was irrational because it was not supported by any probative material. I reject the applicant's submission.
4. The Tribunal posited that the applicant's English proficiency may be transferable as a job skill, as a possibility, not as a certainty. The Tribunal's conclusion as to the possibility that the applicant's English language skills may be transferrable to his job prospects in Taiwan is not a finding that would attract a "no evidence" sanction: Viane at [17]. To the contrary, the Tribunal's conclusion as to that possibility is logically and reasonably open by reference to "personal or specialised knowledge" or ordinary human experience: Viane at [17], [24], [28]. The Tribunal's conclusion is no more than to acknowledge as a possibility, even a likelihood, that an ability to speak a second language may be an asset (and not a detriment) to a person seeking a job, including in Taiwan. The Tribunal did not find that the applicant would, as a certainty, have enhanced job prospects in Taiwan because of his English language skills. The finding was not based on the personal or specific circumstances of the applicant but rather to the applicant as a Taiwanese citizen who could speak English as a second language. No specific evidence was required.
5. In XRZG v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCAFC 131; 305 FCR 349 (Markovic, Cheeseman and Horan JJ), the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision not to revoke the cancellation of the appellant's visa. The Tribunal assessed the relative availability of drugs in detention and in the community, and the appellant's ability to obtain drugs once in the community. The Tribunal did "not consider that drugs are as readily available in detention as they are in the community": XRZG at [48]. The Full Court considered that the Tribunal's observation about the relative availability of drugs in detention and in the community may have been "the product of its personal or specialised knowledge from hearing and determining other reviews of visa cancellation decisions on character grounds": XRZG at [60]. In the present matter, I infer that the basis of the finding that the applicant's English language skills may be transferable to job prospects in Taiwan was the product of ordinary human experience and common sense, or the Tribunal's specialised knowledge. The Tribunal was not required to expressly disclose a source as such: XRZG at [60].
6. The final particular of ground 4 is the contention that the Tribunal's reasoning was inconsistent. The applicant makes this submission by reference to three examples. None of which on a fair reading of the Tribunal's reasons expose any inconsistency in the Tribunal's reasoning process.
7. First, the applicant submits that the Tribunal's reasoning criticises the applicant for failing to engage with rehabilitation and mental health services while in detention, as well as failing to make enquires regarding community-based support, but then inconsistently finds that once removed to Taiwan, the applicant "will have access to and will avail himself of" the very services he purportedly ignored in Australia: T[236] to T[244], T[283].
8. There is nothing inconsistent in the Tribunal's findings about which the applicant complains. In the context of the protection of the Australian community, the Tribunal found that the applicant had not addressed his dynamic risk factors or further engaged with mental health services while in detention. Separately, when considering the extent of impediments the applicant might face if removed to Taiwan, the Tribunal found that there were mental health services available to be accessed by the applicant in Taiwan as a Taiwanese citizen. The applicant misstates the effect of the Tribunal's findings. The Tribunal did not find that the applicant "will avail himself of" mental health services as the applicant submits. The Tribunal's finding was that services for Autism Spectrum Disorder were available and would be "able to be accessed" by the applicant as a Taiwanese citizen: T[283]. In any event, there is no irrationality in what the Tribunal did. The Tribunal was engaged in two distinct exercises. Consideration of the applicant's mental health services in detention is a backward‑looking exercise. Consideration of the extent of impediments if the applicant is removed is a forward‑looking, predictive assessment informed by the services generally available and within the framework set by cl 9.2(1)(c) of Direction No. 110 which refers to "what is generally available to other citizens" taking into account "any ... medical ... support available".
9. Secondly, the applicant points to the fact that the Tribunal found that the applicant experiences "extreme social isolation" and an "absence of a support network" before proceeding to find that the applicant would have access to a family network in Taiwan: T[240], T[244], T[286].
10. There is no illogicality or irrationality in these two observations in relation to the applicant's familial network in the two different countries. The Tribunal's observation in relation to social isolation pertain to the applicant's experience in Australia before his arrest. That is distinct from and not inconsistent with the existence of a family network in Taiwan which was a conclusion based on the evidence given by the applicant and his father.
11. Thirdly, the applicant submits that the Tribunal's findings regarding his functional capacity are manifestly illogical. The applicant's specific criticism of the Tribunal is the finding that he is unable to manage critical behavioural and mental health issues independently, yet also concluded that the applicant "had the ability to live independently": T[236] to T[244], T[287]. The applicant's submission may be disposed of on the same basis. The findings which the applicant seeks to connect to support a finding of irrationality are made in distinct and different contexts and are temporally separated. The Tribunal's findings made in respect of disparate matters does not evince any illogicality or irrationality in the Tribunal's reasoning that would render it legally unreasonable. No error has been demonstrated.
12. Accordingly, ground 4 will be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding ninety-one (91) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Cheeseman.