Humphrey & Humphrey (No 8) [2026] FedCFamC1F 34 (28 January 2026)

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Humphrey & Humphrey has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. During the journey in this Court between the wife, Ms Humphrey ("the wife") and the husband, Mr Humphrey ("the husband") relating to property and financial issues, two discrete events cause the wife to seek an order for costs against the husband.
2. Before I deal with those events below, for context I note that:

(a) although I made final parenting Orders in respect of the parties' two children (with only their son now being under the age of 18 years), fresh parenting proceedings have now been recommenced and a trial is listed to commence before Curran J in February 2026; and

(b) after a number of applications, including a successful application to partially re-open the property proceedings (whilst judgment was reserved), on 23 October 2025, final Orders were pronounced (see Humphrey & Humphrey (No 7) [2025] FedCFamC1F 723); and

(c) in those Reasons for Judgment at [46]-[50], I sought to summarise what I understood were undecided costs applications. Whilst the husband indicated orally that he was contemplating an application for costs relating to the substantive property proceedings, which had been on foot since 2019, neither party had filed an application in accordance with the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) ("the Rules"), and therefore I proceed on the basis of the applications relating to the two discrete events only.

1. The provisions set out in s
2. 117 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") apply to the costs applications I am now deciding. I am aware s 114UB of the Act came into force in June 2025, however as the substantive proceedings had been heard, and were not finalised by that date, the previous legislative pathway applies.
3. Section 117(1) of the Act prescribes the starting principle that each party should bear their own costs in respect of family law proceedings, however if the Court is satisfied circumstances exist which justify an order for costs, the Court is empowered to make such order as to costs as it regards as just - and with an eye to the factors set out in s 117(2A).
4. The wife, at paragraph 24 of her submissions filed 7 April 2025, identified as not yet determined:

(a) her application for costs filed 12 February 2020 with respect to the adjournment of the trial in January 2020. In respect of that application, I have read and considered the wife's written submissions of 13 February 2020; and

(b) her oral application made on her behalf by Ms Oakley of Counsel of 18 August 2023 with respect to the adjournment of the re-opened trial in August 2023. In respect of that application for costs, I have read and considered:

(i) the wife's written submissions of 11 September 2023; and

(ii) the husband's submissions of 15 September 2023, prepared by his retained Counsel at the time, Mr Shoebridge (as he then was); and

(iii) the husband, in response to the wife's costs application filed and relied upon a Response filed 27 February 2020; affidavit filed 27 February 2020; written submissions filed 28 February 2020 supported by oral submissions on the same day delivered by the husband's Counsel, Mr Minnery.

1. In the discussion which follows, the fact that I may not mention every submission made is not to be construed as not having considered a submission. The broad discretion available to the Court for determining costs applications allows such an approach.
2. For completeness, the husband's self-prepared memorandum filed 8 September 2025 indicated the husband "would like to pursue" a number of "reserved costs orders" - seven in total between 21 January 2020 to 27 February 2025. In circumstances where the husband had made no applications nor filed any submissions, I do not propose to consider those reserved costs orders.

COSTS THROWN AWAY FOR ADJOURNED HEARING ON 29 JANUARY 2020

1. The wife contended, in support of her application for costs totalling $40,691 (indemnity costs) or $25,431.86 (standard scale basis), that:

(a) the husband failed to make full and timely disclosure in the financial proceedings;

(b) the husband indicating he had emails passing between himself and the children since 1 January 2017, and on 29 January 2020 (the second day of trial) produced, for the first, time "two folders" of printed emails;

(c) the husband said, through his Counsel, that he did not consider the emails to be relevant;

(d) the wife's application for an adjournment was founded upon the need for the wife to consider the voluminous material provided at the last moment by the husband and to determine whether the wife needed to file relevant responses;

(e) the adjournment was granted, and directions were made for discovery and the filing of further material - all arising from the husband's conduct in providing new evidence over the first two days of the hearing;

(f) primarily the wife contends that the husband's conduct justifies a costs order (s 117(2A)(c)) because:

(i) the husband had not provided financial disclosure between 22 May 2019 and November 2019 and then did so on 20 January 2020 (a week before the final hearing);

(ii) as a legal professional, the husband knew of his obligations "and actively ignored Orders" for discovery "simply to create an impact on the [m]other";

(iii) the husband's conduct was unfair to the wife (and those acting for her);

(iv) as asserted at paragraphs 30 to 38, the husband failed to file as directed a complete financial statement (actually filed late on 22 January 2020) and make discovery;

(v) the husband had been on notice, as a result of valid requests by the wife's solicitor that she required copies of emails passing between the husband and the children, knowing they existed, and to support, she felt, her belief that the husband was actively involving the children in the dispute;

(vi) the husband failed to comply with a valid Notice to Produce of 10 May 2019; and

(vii) following the s 93A interview of the parties' daughter being watched in open court on the afternoon of the first day of the hearing, the husband's "non-compliance with the Court's previous Orders was drawn into sharp focus";

(g) the other s 117(2A) factors are of limited relevance save for the parties' financial position. Both parties asserted they were receiving financial support from their respective parents to fund their legal costs in this litigation - but both parties had access to a reasonable income; and

(h) paragraphs 72 to 79 of the wife's submission filed 13 February 2020 relate to the claim by the wife that costs should be assessed on an indemnity basis, an issue to be considered only if the Court determines the circumstances justify a costs order at all.

1. In contending that the wife's application for costs should be dismissed, the husband's submissions (prepared by his solicitors and filed 28 February 2020) assert inter alia that:

(a) at paragraphs 3.4 to 3.13, sets out a chronology about the discovery he made on 22 May 2019; the notice to produce by 13 June 2019; and the interim Order made by consent on 23 May 2019. The husband gives a reason for why (the wife having issued a subpoena to the children's school) he "assumed" the wife had received all she wanted and was entitled to receive. His assumption was incorrect in my view and did not relieve him of his duty to disclose;

(b) despite Orders on 8 October 2019, and with trial dates allocated, the husband contends he not only felt all discovery required had been made but says he "overlooked" the wife's continual requests. Such a response does him no credit;

(c) the husband says he had prepared folders with emails between him and the parties' daughter, X, "the week prior" when the Court directed he do so - consisting of two folders, however he produced more material consisting of "5 large ring binders of emails" which he says "took about 50 hours to put together" on 5 February 2020;

(d) in response to the wife's complaint that the husband was late in producing updating disclosure, at paragraph 4 he gives a response - seeking to attribute some misconduct by the wife and her solicitors, but also "blaming" his accountants who completed draft 2018 tax returns for himself and particular entities for the year ended 30 June 2018 - only on 22 January 2019; and

(e) the husband submits (at paragraph 8) that the wife's conduct "has contributed to the difficulties in the case being ready for hearing" - saying (for example at 8.3 of the submissions) that the "wife has requested extensive disclosure, beyond what is obviously relevant" and says further at paragraph 9 that his disclosure was late and did not prejudice the wife in any way.

1. It was my clear view on 28 January 2020, and remains my view, that the husband was both dilatory and far from responsive to normal requests for discovery. Apart from the emails between the husband and X (in particular), it is to be recalled that the husband managed all the Suburb G properties held as an investment, and, perhaps most importantly, failed to provide timely and complete disclosure about the income and operation of his business. The level of both his income and earning capacity was highly relevant - as was the way he used funds he says was loaned to him by his parents. These issues continued to be opaque up to the time the Court delivered its final property Orders on 23 October 2025.
2. The husband, who at times clearly was preparing his own case and affidavits, whilst generally engaging solicitors and Counsel for in-Court events, constantly sought the Court's understanding about his efforts to prepare for this litigation, whilst maintaining a business. I regarded generally such pleas were without evidentiary foundation, in circumstances where such little information was provided as to how his business operated and the income he generated; the work in progress he accumulated and how he funded his business where he was required to often meet all expenses before his client was able to pay.
3. I am comfortably of the view that it was primarily the husband's conduct, as asserted by the wife, that caused the trial in January 2020 to be adjourned.
4. However, even though the wife asserts the husband's non-disclosure was both deliberate and tactical in nature, I am not prepared to so conclude. That he is a legal professional with over 20 years' experience, means he can hardly claim ignorance of his obligations to disclose. But with the complexity of both the parenting and financial issues and the emotional overlay, I am not satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist to justify costs being calculated on an indemnity basis - notwithstanding the well-constructed submissions which are set out at paragraphs 72 to 79 of the wife's written submissions.
5. The wife is entitled, in my view, to an order for costs on a solicitor and own client basis, calculated at scale rates. In this regard, the wife calculates costs at a figure (including disbursements) of $25,431.86 - for the period from 20 January 2020 to 29 January 2020.
6. The husband at annexure "A" to his written submissions provides a detailed critique of each item claimed by the wife. Most of the criticisms seem to be directed to a contention that the costs incurred for reading and considering the late disclosure documents "would have arisen whenever the documents were disclosed" - which I take it as a contention that those costs were not "thrown away". Furthermore, the husband says that some of the claims are excessive and, in respect of Counsel's fees, including spent negotiating and/or chambers work totalling 18 hours (between 25 January 2020 and 27 January 2020) was either reasonable or "thrown away". I think a complaint that the wife "chose to file in this location", in an attempt to support a view that claims for travel and parking (totalling $321), is somewhat childish. I accept that most of the further work in respect of late discovery would not be continued as totally thrown away, however the husband's conduct and the necessity for urgent attention to be given to the material did create additional costs.
7. I propose to fix costs as the Rules permit. I will order that the husband shall pay to the wife a contribution to her costs and disbursements caused by the trial being adjourned on 29 January 2020, in the sum of $15,000. Furthermore, I will allow a further component of $2,000 for the costs relating to the costs application.
8. Therefore, the order for his event in January 2020 will amount to the husband being required to pay to the wife $17,000 within 60 days.

1. The wife seeks an order that the husband pay her costs, on an indemnity basis, following the adjournment of the parties' final hearing of the competing property applications on 18 August 2023. I earlier noted that final parenting Orders were made on 31 August 2022. The wife seeks costs on an indemnity basis calculated at $32,784.17 and on a scale basis of $19,180.16
2. Regrettably, some of the tenor of the earlier reasons relating to the adjournment in January 2020 will be repeated now.

1. In summary, the written submissions filed 11 September 2023 contend that:

(a) the husband's disclosure of 638 pages of documents between 6.23pm and 6.43pm on 17 August 2023, being the first evening after the commencement of the final hearing, and before the husband was due to be cross-examined, caused the adjournment;

(b) the husband complied with a direction made 18 August 2023 by the Court in relation to his late disclosure. That affidavit was filed on 1 September 2023;

(c) the husband did not file an updated Financial Statement until the afternoon of the first day of trial;

(d) the husband "intended the proceedings to be adjourned by any means possible, including obfuscation as occurred";

(e) the further discovery is detailed at paragraph 10 of the submissions and was clearly relevant. All documents were in the possession, power and control of the husband, although the husband's evidence reveals that he did not elect to prepare schedules or bundles until late, I infer expecting to get an adjournment;

(f) the husband was aware of the Orders made 26 April 2023 to exchange financial disclosure - which can be seen as a continuing complaint directed to the husband's conduct. In circumstances where the husband was seeking reimbursement for alleged expenses he said he paid on the Suburb G investment properties, they were highly relevant;

(g) despite clear trial directions, the husband says he only gave priority to the preparation of trial material in the two weeks leading up to the trial - and it is submitted he only did so when his adjournment request on 28 July 2023 was dismissed;

(h) again, the Court should reject the husband's claims that many of the documents were in his trial affidavit;

(i) as the Court noted (at paragraph 40 of the submissions), the husband's late disclosure prejudiced the wife in running her case and preparing cross-examination; and

(j) the fact that the husband is an experienced legal professional, only makes the assessment of his poor conduct worse.

1. In summary, the husband's written submissions of 15 September 2023 (prepared by Counsel) and reliant on his affidavit filed 1 September 2023, contend that:

(a) the husband made two applications to adjourn the final property proceedings (28 July 2023 and 17 August 2023), both of which were dismissed. After the first adjournment refusal, the husband (again late) filed his updating trial affidavit;

(b) whilst the husband admits to the late production of material on the evening of 17 August 2023 (after the wife had completed her evidence), he seeks to ameliorate his poor conduct, because in part, the pages were indexed;

(c) in the husband's "explanation" affidavit he makes more excuses. To be fair to his Counsel at the trial, doing the best he could on the evidence, the submissions at paragraphs 16 to 20 state:

1. The Husband has said everything that he possibly could say on his own behalf in his Costs Affidavit. He points out for example at paragraph 23 of his affidavit that the tax returns comprising documents 1 to 6 were only provided to him on 11 August 2023.
2. The Husband has painted a fairly chaotic picture in relation to his own preparation of his case leading up to 17 and 18 August 2023. Largely whether or not the Court decides whether or not the Court accepts the Husband's explanations of not only that chaotic preparation, but the reasons that he offers for that chaos, which are primarily a combination of work pressures, the extent to which he has involved himself personally in the preparation of his court documents and the demands associated with managing the various properties owned by the parties including the sale of various properties.
3. The Husband says at paragraphs 33 and 34 of his Costs Affidavit that he did not intend to cause an adjournment, but rather he was confronted with the unsatisfactory timing of disclosure on the one hand versus his obligations to make that disclosure on the other.
4. There is a clear confusion on the part of the Husband in the sense that he thought he was offering the Wife and her legal representatives a "courtesy" by providing to them documents that supported the various assertions made in his Trial Affidavit about the quantum of expenses paid by him in relation to rental properties and the like.
5. His confusion appears to be that identifying those things in his Trial Affidavit would make the late delivery of the source documents less challenging. Whilst that is clearly wrong, if the Court accepts that that confusion or misunderstanding is genuine, then the Court would accept that the Husband did not in fact deliberately set out to cause the matter to be adjourned.

(d) the submissions acknowledge that "if the Court does not accept the husband's explanations, then it is difficult to resist the making of a costs order".

1. Sadly, it seems the husband learnt nothing from his conduct which caused the trial in January 2020 to be adjourned. In this event, I have formed the view that the husband was "playing the odds" - perhaps expecting an adjournment.
2. It is not reasonable to find that after the husband's adjournment application on 17 August 2023 had been rejected by the Court, and after his Counsel Mr Shoebridge (as he then was) had finalised his cross-examination of the wife, that the husband had time (after leaving Court) to compile the index and documents as he says he did, to produce them over the evening of 17 August 2023.
3. I am not satisfied the husband's lawyers were complicit in this tactic - which I find was designed by the husband to seek to obtain some advantage. To the credit of Mr Shoebridge, he did not seek to defend the indefensible.
4. The conduct of the husband justifies another costs order in favour of the wife. On this occasion, the submissions as to why costs should be payable on an indemnity basis are more plausible.
5. However, taking into account the submissions of the husband at paragraphs 41 to 46, in a close call, I am not ultimately satisfied costs on an indemnity basis are justified.
6. I have considered the criticisms of the claims for fees on a scale basis, identifiable at paragraphs 29 to 40 of the written submissions. I will slightly reduce the fees claimed when I decide as, I do, to fix the costs at a level of $11,000 and further allow costs of the application for costs at $1,500.

1. I will order that the husband pay a contribution to the costs of the wife in accordance with Reasons now delivered, fixed in the total sum of $29,500 payable within 60 days.

I certify that the preceding twenty-eight (28) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Baumann.