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Representation: Counsel:
Jessica Hughes-Mason (Plaintiff - Self Represented)
C Coventry (First, Second, Third, Fourth & Fifth Defendants)
Solicitors:
Jessica Hughes-Mason (Plaintiff - Self Represented) Gilchrist Connell Legal (First, Second, Third, Fourth & Fifth Defendants)

File Number(s): 2025/00498995

Publication restriction: Nil

ex tempore judgment - revised

1. This is a judgment on the application by the plaintiff for pro bono assistance under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”) r 7.36. The plaintiff, Jessica Hughes-Mason, commenced proceedings on 23 December 2025 by statement of claim. In that statement of claim she seeks damages for negligence and breach of statutory duty. She seeks damages in the nature of compensation for psychological injury, destruction of property and consequential economic loss, as well as aggravated and exemplary damages.

2. Ms Hughes-Mason pleaded that she was a resident in a caravan park known as the Roadrunner Caravan Park. The first defendant, SES Village Pty Ltd, is alleged to be the owner and occupier of the caravan park. There are four other named defendants. Their relevance is not articulated in the statement of claim.

3. Ms Coventry of counsel appears today on behalf of the defendants. At this stage no defence has been filed, although an appearance has been entered on behalf of all of the defendants.

4. Ms Hughes-Mason describes in the statement of claim that on 20 December 2022, her caravan on the defendant's premises was destroyed by fire. She alleges that there was inadequate firefighting infrastructure and water access at the premises, or that those items had been removed, or disabled, or were inadequate and as a result she suffered the loss of her home and the consequential losses that she has outlined. She alleges in the statement of claim that the defendants had a duty of care to take reasonable steps to ensure the premises were safe and had adequate firefighting systems and that that duty of care was breached. She also alleges that after the fire she and her child were exposed to hazardous materials and that the defendants engaged in oppressive conduct, including intimidation.

5. She claims damages for destruction of her property, economic loss, psychological injury, as well as "ongoing and future costs" which have not been specified.

6. The statement of claim makes reference to a decision of an NCAT appeal panel in December 2025, stating that there was a conclusion allegedly reached by that appeal panel that there was some conduct by the defendants which was questionable. I note there is no copy of the NCAT panel decision in any of the papers before the Court. I am not stating that by way of any criticism, I am just noting that.

7. The proceedings were listed for directions before the Common Law Registrar on 15 May 2026. At that directions hearing Ms Hughes-Mason said that she was aware that the statement of claim needed amendment and that she would engage in that process. She has not had lawyers acting for her and as at today, still does not have a lawyer.

8. On 29 May 2026, a proposed amended statement of claim was provided to the solicitors for the defendants. On 19 June 2026, the plaintiff filed a notice of motion for leave to amend the statement of claim and accompanied that motion with an affidavit authored by her.

9. On 1 July 2026, at a further directions hearing, the Registrar made orders for service of the notice of motion and affidavit, and service of written submissions. Listed before me today, initially, was the notice of motion filed by the plaintiff on 19 June 2026. Written submissions in support of that motion were provided by the plaintiff and helpful written submissions were provided on behalf of the defendants via their counsel, Ms Coventry, dated 2 September 2026, which pointed out a number of self-evident problems with the proposed amended statement of claim. An affidavit was filed by the solicitor for the defendant, dated 24 July 2026, which outlined the procedural history.

10. Subsequent to this material reaching the file, I became aware that on Monday 14 September 2026 the plaintiff had proposed an adjournment because she had not yet had her previously filed application for pro bono assistance determined. I was able to retrieve from the Registry the unfiled notice of motion for pro bono assistance and affidavit in support dated 28 August 2026, which Ms Hughes-Mason had sent to the Registry. It was in the process of being reviewed in the Registry, because there was an application to postpone, remit or waive the court fees associated with that notice of motion. I understand that neither the application for fee waiver nor the application for pro bono assistance had yet been formally actioned in the Registry. In the circumstances I considered it appropriate to consider the application for pro bono assistance in court today, given what has occurred to now. Matters associated with payment of fees are outside my discretion and will need to be determined by Registry staff later.

11. Ms Coventry, appearing for the defendants, has appropriately noted that her clients neither consent nor oppose Ms Hughes-Mason’s application for pro bono assistance.

12. The rules in respect of assistance of that kind are contained in r 7.36. That rule provides that if the Court is satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice, the Court may, by order, refer a litigant to the Registrar for referral to a barrister or solicitor on the Pro Bono Panel for legal assistance: subr (1).

13. Subrule (2) provides that for that purpose, the Court can take into account:

(a) the means of the litigant, and

(b) the capacity of the litigant to obtain legal assistance outside the scheme, and

(c) the nature and complexity of the proceedings, and

(d) any other matter that the Court considers appropriate.

14. Subrule (2A) provides:

The Court may not refer a litigant for assistance under this rule if the litigant has obtained assistance under a previous referral at any time during the immediately preceding period of 3 years unless the court is satisfied that there are special reasons that justify a further referral.

15. Subrule (6) provides:

A referral to a barrister does not prevent a referral also being made to a solicitor and a referral to a solicitor does not prevent a referral also being made to a barrister.

16. Ms Hughes-Mason has helpfully provided some documentation setting out her income and financial situation. She deposes in her affidavit of 28 August 2026 to her belief that although she has undertaken substantial work to organise her pleadings and evidence and procedural history, she is worried that she will be materially disadvantaged if she needs to conduct legal argument without legal representation. She stated in her affidavit that she seeks legal assistance, including advice, preparation and representation at the hearing today, (that being the hearing dealing with amendment to the statement of claim), and further assistance concerning the interlocutory application as any assisting legal practitioner considers appropriate.

17. In par 11 of her affidavit, Ms Hughes-Mason outlined the efforts she has made to get legal assistance. She stated, (and confirmed this today in response to questions from the Court), that she did have previous assistance from the Homeless Persons' Legal Service and they had assisted her with her NCAT proceedings, but she is not now eligible for assistance from them. She also deposed to having contacted many firms for assistance and having a Legal Aid application rejected. The current position is that there is only a slight - and I consider exceedingly remote - possibility that a firm of solicitors may assist her, but it seems from the answers to questions posed by the Court that firm will only act if some significant sum of money is first paid into trust.

18. Ms Hughes-Mason set out her current expenses and income. I note she has a dependant teenage daughter and is reliant for income on a supporting parent pension. I am satisfied, therefore, that she does not have the means to pay for a solicitor or barrister.

19. I am satisfied that she has exhausted her capacity to obtain legal assistance outside the scheme.

20. I am satisfied that the proceedings have some complexity to them, given the possibly novel basis for tortious duty and breach, the complexity associated with the breach of statutory duty claim, and some of the aspects of the potential damages claim.

21. I note that Ms Hughes-Mason is obviously an intelligent woman who has put a significant amount of considered and thoughtful work into preparation of her paperwork. That does not mean, however, that she does not need assistance in the nature of qualified lawyer support, and so I consider, despite those good efforts, she should be given pro bono legal assistance.

22. I accept Ms Hughes-Mason’s advice to me that she has not had pro bono assistance under this scheme in the last three years. I am satisfied that a referral to a barrister at this point would probably be sufficient to provide her with the necessary help with settling her amended statement of claim and arguing her application for leave, and so the referral is on that basis.

23. As a consequence of that referral, it also seems to me that her application filed on 14 September 2026 for an adjournment of today must be granted. That is because otherwise the referral for pro bono assistance would be of no effect if I took the view that Ms Hughes-Mason had to argue her application today for leave to amend the statement of claim without the help of a lawyer. To that extent, her notice of motion filed on 14 September 2026 for adjournment of today, is successful.

24. There are some concerns and considerations that may affect the question of costs. In particular, the defendants, acting responsibly, have retained counsel, Ms Coventry who has provided written submission and appeared today ready to argue the notice of motion for amendment of the statement of claim, in circumstances where notice of a potential application for adjournment only appeared in the last few days.

25. Ms Coventry has made an application for the costs of today. She argued that Ms Hughes-Mason knew from June 2026 that the defendants did not consent to the filing of the proposed amended statement of claim. The matter has been before the Registrar as recently as early August. Making an application for pro bono assistance on 28 August is too late, and has led to today's hearing being of no assistance in resolving the notice of motion filed back in June 2026.

26. In response, Ms Hughes-Mason argued that first, she has no money to pay costs, but also that she genuinely did not file documents in this way to cause any delay, and as a self-represented person, she was unaware of the processes.

27. In respect of that last submission I take it to mean that she did not understand what timeframes might be associated with her applications. This is not unreasonable. In many cases, an application for pro bono assistance does have to come before a judge and be determined, and that has occurred today. I do acknowledge, however, that the application was made quite late in the proceedings, given they were commenced in December 2025 and the defendants had objected in June 2026 to the proposed amendments.

28. I take the view, however, that it may have been that Ms Hughes-Mason commenced the proceedings with a certain amount of optimism that she would be able to manage the complications of the proceedings and has only more recently understood fully the difficulties and did not know the timeframes for approvals of her pro bono application. At this stage I am going to reserve the costs until the next directions hearing, at which time either Ms Hughes-Mason may be represented and there may be further matters that will be brought to the Court's attention or, alternatively, if nothing new is known, or no further submissions made, I will at that point make a determination as to costs of today.

ORDERS

29. I make the following orders:

30. I order that the plaintiff be referred to the Registrar for referral to a barrister on the Pro Bono Panel for advice in relation to the proposed further amended statement of claim and the proceedings generally and to appear at the application for leave to amend the statement of claim.

31. The question of costs of today is reserved to the next directions hearing.

32. The listing for directions before the Common Law Registrar on 13 October 2026 is vacated.

33. I list the matter for further directions before Lonergan J at 9:30am on 12 November 2026. If the plaintiff does not yet have a barrister secured to appear for her, she has leave to appear via AVL.

34. The plaintiff’s notice of motion filed 19 June 2026 is stood over for mention and/or directions to 9:30am on 12 November 2026 before Lonergan J.

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Amendments

24 September 2026

Page 1 - judgment heading corrected