[2025] FWC 1164
General information, not legal advice.
Fair Work Commission
2025-04-28
Original judgment source is linked above.
s.394 - Unfair dismissal
Application for relief from unfair dismissal - failures to isolate - valid reason for dismissal - dismissal not harsh, unjust or unreasonable - application dismissed
(a) Mr Sneddon's application for unfair dismissal was made within the period required by s 394(2) of the Act;
(b) Mr Sneddon was a person protected from unfair dismissal;
(c) the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code did not apply to Mr Sneddon's dismissal; and
(d) Mr Sneddon's dismissal was not a genuine redundancy.
Was the dismissal harsh, unjust or unreasonable?
Unreasonable refusal to allow a support person (s 387(d))
Warnings of unsatisfactory performance (s 387(e))
Size of enterprise and absence of human resource specialists or expertise (s 387(f) and (g))
"[41] Nevertheless, it remains a bedrock principle in unfair dismissal jurisprudence of the Commission that a dismissal may be "harsh, unjust or unreasonable" notwithstanding the existence of a "valid reason" for the dismissal": Australian Meat Holdings Pty Ltd v McLauchlan (1998) 84 IR 1; J Boag & Son Brewing Pty Ltd v John Button [2010] FWAFB 4022; Windsor Smith v Liu [1998] Print Q3462; Caspanello v Telstra Corporation Limited [2002] AIRC 1171; King v Freshmore (Vic) Pty Ltd [2000] Print S4213; Dahlstrom v Wagstaff Cranbourne Pty Ltd [2000] Print T1001; Erskine v Chalmers Industries Pty Ltd [2001] PR902746 citing Allied Express Transport Pty Ltd (1998) 81 IR 410 at 413; Qantas Airways Limited v Cornwall (1998) 82 IR 102 at 109; ALH Group Pty Ltd T/A the Royal Exchange Hotel v Mulhall [2002] PR919205. That principle reflects the approach of the High Court in Victoria v Commonwealth and is a consequence of the reality that in any given case there may be "relevant matters" that do not bear upon whether there was a "valid reason" for the dismissal but do bear upon whether the dismissal was "harsh, unjust or unreasonable".
[42] Broadly speaking, circumstances bearing upon whether a dismissal for misconduct is harsh, unjust or unreasonable fall into three broad categories:
(1) The acts or omissions that constitute the alleged misconduct on which the employer relied (together with the employee's disciplinary history and any warnings, if relied upon by the employer at the time of dismissal) but otherwise considered in isolation from the broader context in which those acts or omissions occurred.
(2) The broader context in the workplace in which those acts or omissions occurred. [This may include such matters as a history of toleration or condonation of the misconduct by the employer or inconsistent treatment of other employees guilty of the same misconduct.]
(3) The personal or private circumstances of the employee that bear upon the substantive fairness of the dismissal. [This includes, matters such as length of service, the absence of any disciplinary history and the harshness of the consequences of dismissal for the employee and her or her dependents.]
[43] The determination of whether there was a "valid reason" proceeds by reference to the matters in category (1) and occurs before there is a consideration of what Northrop J described as "substantive fairness" from the perspective of the employee. Matters in categories (2) and (3) are then properly brought to account in the overall consideration of the whether the dismissal was "harsh, unjust or unreasonable" notwithstanding the existence of a "valid reason".
[47] In Bostik (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gorgevski (No 1) (1992) 41 IR 452 Sheppard and Heerey JJ observed (at p 460):
"Employers can promulgate polices and give directions to employees as they see fit, but they cannot exclude the possibility that instant dismissal of an individual employee for non-compliance may, in the particular circumstances of an individual case, be harsh, unjust and unreasonable."
[48] Thus, a finding that an employee has failed to comply with policies and procedures does not mean that a dismissal is not harsh, unjust or unreasonable. The Commission has consistently applied the proposition that instant dismissal of an employee for non-compliance with her or her employer's policies may, in the particular circumstances of an individual case, be harsh, unjust and unreasonable: Kangan Batman TAFE v Hart [2005] PR958003, Ross VP, Kaufman SDP and Foggo C at para [51]; Fearnley v Tenix Defence Systems Pty Ltd [2000] Print S6238, Ross VP, Polites SDP and Smith C (Fearnley) at [61]); Atfield v Jupiters Ltd (2003) 124 IR 217 (Jupiters) at [12]-[13]."
"12. The scale and nature of the machinery worked on in the workshop at the Bengalla mine mean that there are a range of risks, including risks of exposure to hazardous energy sources such as high voltage electricity, significant pressures in hydraulic systems, extreme heat and unplanned movement. This means that maintenance technicians need to be highly vigilant. Hazardous energies are very real and the risk associated with these energies are heightened as maintenance technicians are working with their hands a lot and often in tight spaces. Accordingly, there are several rules that apply to the maintenance workforce more than other employees of Bengalla, to protect workers from serious harm.
"Whilst Mr Sneddon acknowledged that he had breached the isolation procedures, it appeared to me as though he did not fully appreciate the seriousness of his conduct or take ownership of it. He was very relaxed about the breaches and seemed more interested in telling me about his long history with Hunter Valley Operations, rather than addressing the breaches. He treated the breaches as a simple lapse, which wasn't reflective of the dangerous situation he placed himself and others in."
"66. ... Mr Sneddon has over 40 years in the mining industry. He knows too well that isolation is one of the most important safety rules that everyone must adhere to. There is no excuse for Mr Sneddon to show little regard for his own safety and that of others, on multiple occasions, during this incident. His lack of respect for critical safety processes is unacceptable.
"24. If an employee is feeling fatigued and not fit to return to work, it is their responsibility to let Bengalla know (see Table 1 of section 3.0 and section 4.0 of Bengalla's PRO-0319 - Fatigue Management). If Mr Sneddon had said that he was concerned about returning and could not sufficiently prepare for a night shift for any reason, including for reasons of fatigue, I would have told him that it was an important matter to discuss with his supervisor. I would never require an employee to return to work if they are sharing concerns of fatigue."
(c) Mr Sneddon responded in the following way in his reply witness statement to this comment by Ms Jones:
"23. At PN 24, where issues of fatigue are mentioned. I am not an operator of plant and equipment. My duties were training. I believed I was fit for work and attended, even though I had not had the sleep preparation I normally would have and so, while performing my training role which was principally paperwork, I was tired."
"44. When employees of Bengalla sign in through our workforce management system, DAMSTRA, they confirm that they are fit for work. Pursuant to section 3.0 of Bengalla's Fatigue Management Policy (PRO-0319), the duty rests with the technician themself throughout the shift to:
2. Stop their task and assess their fatigue risk (e.g. Personal Fatigue
4. If required, notify, and seek support from their Supervisor
A copy of Bengalla's Fatigue Management Policy (PRO-0319) is annexed to this statement and marked BE-05.
(e) Mr Sneddon did not respond to paragraph [44] or [45] of Mr Edwards' witness statement in his reply witness statement.
(f) If Mr Sneddon had truly discussed fatigue with his supervisor, Mr Martin, on 11 November 2024, it is very difficult to believe that he would not have raised that matter in his witness statement in reply when he was replying to paragraph [24] of Ms Jones' statement or paragraphs [44]-[45] of Mr Edwards' statement.
(h) Mr Sneddon gave oral evidence that he was aware of Bengalla's Fatigue Policy, including the requirement for an employee to declare that they are fit at the start of the shift and to raise any issues about their fitness.
"[21] The issue of differential treatment of employees in respect of termination of employment was considered by Vice President Lawler in Sexton v Pacific National (ACT) Pty Ltd. In Sexton's case, his Honour said:
"[33] It is settled that the differential treatment of comparable cases can be a relevant matter under s.170CG(3)(e) to consider in determining whether a termination has been harsh, unjust or unreasonable ...
[36] In my opinion the Commission should approach with caution claims of differential treatment in other cases advanced as a basis for supporting a finding that a termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable within the meaning of s.170CE(1) or in determining whether there has been a 'fair go all round' within the meaning of s.170CA(2). In particular, it is important that the Commission be satisfied that cases which are advanced as comparable cases in which there was no termination are in truth properly comparable: the Commission must ensure that it is comparing 'apples with apples'. There must be sufficient evidence of the circumstances of the allegedly comparable cases to enable a proper comparison to be made."
[22] Section 170CG(3)(e) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) was relevantly similar to s.387(h) of the FW Act.
[23] Similarly, in Daly v Bendigo Health Care Group, Senior Deputy President Kaufman said:
"[62] I am troubled by the apparent disparity in the treatment of Mrs Daly and the other nurses concerned. However, on balance I have concluded that this factor does not render the otherwise justified termination of her employment into one which is harsh, unjust or unreasonable. There was no evidence led as to why the other three nurses were treated differently to Mrs Daly. The fact that none of them was sacked does not of itself render the treatment of Mrs Daly unjust. Although differential treatment of employees can render a termination of employment, harsh, unjust or unreasonable, that is not necessarily the case. I agree with Lawler VP's observation in Sexton that 'there must be sufficient evidence of the circumstances of the allegedly comparable cases to enable a proper comparison to be made.' There is not, in this case, sufficient evidence to enable a proper comparison to be made. Having regard to Mrs Daly's years of experience, her direct involvement with the patient to a greater extent than that of the other nurses and her refusal to acknowledge that she had acted inappropriately, I am not prepared to find that because the employment of the other nurses involved was not terminated, Mrs Daly's termination of employment was harsh, unjust or unreasonable."[Footnotes omitted]
"Mr Martin: engaged in several isolation breaches during this shift (including as indicated above at paragraphs 40.b and 40.c alongside Mr Sneddon). Mr Martin was stood down immediately and accordingly Mr Jason Taylor was the Supervisor for the next night shift on 12-13 November 2024. A decision was made to terminate Mr Martin's employment and he was informed as such on 10 December 2024. Mr Martin asked if he was able to resign in lieu of a termination. I advised Mr Martin that I would accept a resignation letter. Mr Martin subsequently provided a resignation letter effective immediately. A copy of Mr Martin's termination letter (although I cannot recall whether I ultimately provided the letter to Mr Martin) and resignation letter are annexed to this statement and marked JC-23, and JC-24, respectively;
b. Mr Sallows: engaged in one isolation breach by following Mr Sneddon into the footprint of TR031 after asking Mr Sneddon for an explanation of the fault with TR031. Due to his relative inexperience, and the fact that he only engaged in one breach, in addition to the clear appreciation for what he had done that he demonstrated, he was given a final written warning. A copy of his final written warning is annexed to this statement and marked JC-25;
c. Mr Jake Gurtman (Maintenance Technician): Mr Gurtman engaged in one breach of the live testing procedure which is distinct to the breaches engaged in by Mr Sneddon. Mr Gurtman was given a final written warning. A copy of his final written warning is annexed to this statement and marked JC-26; and
d. Mr Russell Close (Contracted Maintenance Technician): engaged in multiple isolation breaches. Mr Close was resultantly banned from site."
"22:43pm Stuart Moore deisolated TR031 and started it. You and Russell Close entered the footprint of TR031 between pos #1 and pos #3/4 tyres..."
S Mueller, Legal Officer of the MEU, for the Applicant
J McLean, of counsel, with B Tannenbaum, solicitor, for the Respondent
[1] Shepherd v Felt & Textiles of Australia Ltd (1931) 45 CLR 359 at 373, 377-8
[2] Selvachandran v Peterson Plastics Pty Ltd [1995] IRCA 333; (1995) 62 IR 371 at 373
[4] Walton v Mermaid Dry Cleaners Pty Ltd [1996] IRCA 267; (1996) 142 ALR 681 at 685
[6] King v Freshmore (Vic) Pty Ltd (unreported, AIRCFB, Ross VP, Williams SDP, Hingley C, 17 March 2000) Print S4213 [24]
[17] Hearing Book at p 739; Ex A1 at [45]-[46]
[20] Ex R4 at [24]; see also similar comments by Mr Campbell at Ex R2, [28]-[32]
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
Hugh Sneddon
Bengalla Mining Company Pty Ltd [2025] FWC 1164
(1998) 81 IR 410
(1998) 82 IR 102
(1992) 41 IR 452
(2003) 124 IR 217
(1931) 45 CLR 359
(1995) 62 IR 371
(1996) 142 ALR 681
(1998) 84 IR 1