Huang v Octec Limited

(a) The Application is dismissed.

(b) The Applicant to pay the Respondent's costs of the proceedings, as assessed or agreed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

1. This matter was listed before me today, 25 November 2025, for a directions hearing as a consequence of a decision I made on Friday, 21 November 2025, to vacate the scheduled final hearing dates of 24 and 25 November 2025.

1. The substantive matter concerns allegations of human rights violations by the respondent.
2. As I said on the last occasion on 14 November 2025, the matter has had a long and troubled history. The previous final hearing dates of the 16 and 17 June 2025 were vacated as a result of the applicant's failure to comply with the very detailed Orders that I had made to prepare the matter for hearing. On 15 August 2025, when the matter next came before me, I listed it for final hearing on 24 and 25 November 2025. At that listing, I again made detailed Orders in relation to what was required to prepare the matter for hearing.
3. When the matter was listed for a directions hearing on 14 November, the applicant sought to have the final hearing dates of 24 and 25 November 2025 vacated. The applicant relied upon four matters, which I dealt with in my previous judgment dated 14 November 2025, these included an application for the issue of further subpoenas, the fact that she was unrepresented, and further, that she was suffering from some health issues. I determined that the matter should not be adjourned and confirmed the final hearing dates of 24 and 25 November 2025.
4. On 19 November 2025, the applicant provided a Medical Certificate that indicated she was unable to attend Court. That Medical Certificate was provided despite the Court having made it very clear to the applicant on previous occasions what was required for a certificate to be considered adequate. Accordingly, that same day, Chambers advised the applicant that the provided Medical Certificate was insufficient.
5. Late afternoon on Friday, 21 November 2025, the applicant provided a Medical Certificate, which was sufficient in that it indicated she was medically unfit to attend Court. The listed causes of the applicant's medical unfitness were sleep apnoea and bilateral below-the-knee oedema. That Medical Certificate suggested that the applicant might be drowsy in Court and would be uncomfortable as a result of her oedema. Notwithstanding my considerable doubts about the sufficiency of the rationale advanced for the applicant's alleged unfitness to attend Court, I determined that the safest course of action was to vacate the final hearing dates so as to relieve the respondent of the unnecessary burden of continuing to prepare for the final hearing over the weekend.
6. The Medical Certificate indicates the applicant needs to see a cardiologist. The applicant has indicated it is unlikely that she will be able to see a cardiologist until the New Year (2026). I note that this is not a condition that is listed as a reason for the applicant's inability to attend Court. In my view, had there been sufficient time, I would have been open to making an order that the applicant be examined by an independent medical practitioner so as to provide a proper basis for the Court to determine whether or not she was fit or unfit to attend Court. Unfortunately, time did not allow for that to occur. Had the respondent sought such an order at any point in time, I would have been inclined to grant it.

1. The respondent now seeks an order that the costs thrown away as a result of the adjournment of the final hearing dates be paid by the applicant. In support of this application, the respondent relied upon the affidavit of Mr Grant Watley, a solicitor of HWL Ebsworth, affirmed on 13 November 2025.
2. The respondent submits that the costs thrown away, arising from the vacation of the final hearing dates set for yesterday and today, amount to $10,240.40. This figure represents 50% of the respondents' solicitor-client costs, calculated at $12,652.00, together with counsel's fees of $6,059.90 incurred in preparing for the final hearing. What is, in fact, sought is 50 per cent of the costs thrown away. That amount does not include further disbursements incurred in the printing and carrying of Court Books or other material provided in advance of the final hearing.

1. I now turn to the question of whether a costs order should be made. In my view, having regard to the history of this matter including the following: (a) that the matter has already been adjourned once, (b) that I confirmed the final hearing dates on 14 November 2025, (c) that the medical evidence was provided very late after initially being inadequate, and, (d) in my assessment, the medical evidence is not of the standard that ought to have been presented to the Court.
2. I note that on 14 November 2025, I said the following:

The matter has been set for trial for some months after it was previously adjourned, and it is in the public interest that this trial be finalised as soon as possible. In my view, it would be grossly unfair to the respondent for the second trial date to be adjourned, with the cost and inconvenience that would cause. Court resources are a public good, which is limited in nature, that behoves parties to seek the intervention of the courts to act in an expeditious and efficient manner which allows this court to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law as quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently as possible.

1. Sadly, my exhortation has fallen on deaf ears with the applicant again, effectively leaving the Court with no option but to vacate the final hearing dates. Given the history of this matter, in my view, it is appropriate to make a cost order. I am conscious of the time and effort that has been placed on the respondent in bringing this matter to readiness for trial. The failure of this matter to go to trial on the first and second occasions lies entirely at the feet of the applicant. While I am conscious that amendments have been made in relation to costs in human rights matters, which this proceeding broadly falls within, I do not consider those amendments to preclude a costs order in this case for the following reasons: firstly, the proceeding predates those amendments, and secondly, the overall conduct of the applicant has been, in my view, unreasonable.
2. I am satisfied that I should make a cost order in all of the circumstances, and that the amount sought by the respondent is, in all of the circumstances, reasonable. I am satisfied that the applicant ought to be given a reasonable period in which to pay that amount. In my view, a deadline of 2 February 2026, being approximately nine to ten weeks from today, is an appropriate and reasonable period. Now, the issue then becomes as to whether I should grant a self-executing order: rule 5.21 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court Acts of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth), and rules 5.08(b), 5.10(a) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

Whether a Self‑Executing Order Should Be Made

1. In my view, failure to make a self-executing order would allow the applicant to avoid the consequences of non-compliance by simply failing to pay the amount ordered, which would cause significant damage to the respondent. I note that I previously ordered the applicant to pay costs of $1,000.00, which, as of today's date, has not been complied with. Had the applicant complied with that Order, I may have been minded not to grant a self-executing order.
2. In my view, given the totality of the history of this matter, it is appropriate that I make a self-executing order such that if the applicant fails to pay the costs that I have ordered, the entirety of the proceedings will be dismissed, and the applicant is to pay the respondent's costs as assessed or agreed. Whilst I am very conscious of the gravity of the Orders I have made, I am satisfied that it is, overall, in the interests of justice that I make the Orders. Those who come to Court cannot expect to walk away scot-free from the consequences of failing to comply with Court orders, even in matters such as this. That is the risk parties take when they commence Court proceedings.

I certify that the preceding fifteen (15) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge D Humphreys.