Huang v Octec Limited

1. This is an interlocutory judgment in the matter of Huang and OCTEC Limited.
2. I have before me both an Application in a Proceeding filed by Ms Huang on 29 August 2025, together with an application for the hearing dates of 24 and 25 November 2025 to be adjourned.

1. This matter has had a long and troubled history. The matter first came before me on 7 March 2025, where I listed the matter for a final hearing on 16 and 17 June 2025. Very precise and detailed orders were made as to what was necessary to prepare the matter for hearing.
2. The matter next came before me on 29 May, at the instigation of the respondent, when it became apparent that there had been a failure by the applicant to comply with the Orders that I had previously made on 7 March 2025. Accordingly, the hearing date of 16 and 17 June were vacated.
3. On 15 August 2025, the matter came before me again, where I listed the matter for a final hearing on 24 and 25 November 2025. At that listing, I also made very detailed orders in relation to what the applicant was to do in order to prepare the matter for hearing.
4. The matter was listed before me today, being 14 November 2025, in order to ensure that the matter was ready to proceed to hearing on 24 and 25 November 2025.

1. The Application in a Proceeding seeks two orders.

1. The first order sought by the applicant is an order for her be allowed to serve subpoenas to relevant parties in this case. As pointed out by counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, very detailed orders were made in relation to what the applicant was required to do should she wish to issue further subpoenas. Order 10 of the Orders of 7 March was that "any further subpoenas sought to be issued by the applicant will need to be made by way of application to the Court with an accompanying affidavit setting out why any further subpoenas should be issued". It was noted in those Orders that I would deal with that matter in Chambers, however, it is appropriate that I deal with the matter now in open Court.
2. The applicant's affidavit dated 22 August 2025 simply states that "I still need subpoenas to get important and relevant documents for this case". I note that some twelve subpoenas have already been issued. I am advised that the respondent has voluntarily provided further documentation to the applicant, notwithstanding the fact that it was under no obligation to do so. No convincing case has been put to me as to what forensic purpose would be served by allowing the applicant to issue further subpoenas. In my view, the application for the issue of further subpoenas, noting that no information has been provided as to who the subpoenas would be issued to, what documents would be sought, and the forensic purpose of those documents, is such that there is no compelling case for the issue of further subpoenas. Accordingly, the application for the applicant to be allowed to serve subpoenas to relevant parties in this case should be refused.

1. The second order sought by the applicant is an order for the Orders of Registrar Morgan made on 27 October 2022 be lifted. I interpret that to be an application for a review of a Registrar's decision. That application is, in fact, made virtually three years after the Orders were made by Registrar Morgan. The relevant rules of the Court at that time are contained in rule 21.02 and 21.03 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (the Rules), which required that any application for a review of a Registrar's order must be made within seven days. Accordingly, the applicant requires an extension of time.

1. While an extension of time can be granted, the relevant law in relation to an extension of time contains the following matters. First, I need to be aware of the extent of the delay, which in this case is approximately three years. The longer the delay, the more persuasive the reasons for the delay must be. Second of all, I need to consider the reasons for the delay. No adequate reason has been produced when I look at the applicant's affidavit as to why the orders of Registrar Morgan that the notices to produce issued by the applicant should be set aside. Thirdly, I have to look at the merits of the matter. There is no material put before me which would indicate that there was any unlawfulness or error in the orders of Registrar Morgan. In those circumstances, in my view, the application that the orders of Registrar Morgan of 27 October 2022 be set aside or even heard should be refused.

1. I now turn to the email that Chambers received from the applicant dated 13 November, which seeks an adjournment of the trial dates of 24 and 25 November 2025. Four matters are set out as to why the matter should be adjourned.
2. The first issue concerns the application for subpoenas. I have dealt with that above. That is not a reason for this matter to be adjourned. Second, the applicant states that she needs additional time due to health issues and limited legal knowledge. This matter has been listed before me since March of this year. There is no evidence before me that the applicant has taken positive steps to seek legal advice. This is notwithstanding the fact that, as far back as March this year, and whilst I do not recall completely, I am reasonably certain that I would have urged the applicant to seek legal advice at the first directions hearing before me. Even if that is not the case, to make an application to seek legal advice less than 10 days prior to the hearing date, given the history of this matter, is disingenuous.
3. The applicant should have taken steps months ago to seek legal advice and representation if she was genuinely seeking assistance. The applicant states that, as a self-represented litigant, she lacks legal knowledge. However, it appears that, from the documents that have been filed, the applicant is quite capable of filing documents, drafting subpoenas, drafting and swearing affidavits, and making applications in a proceeding.
4. Regrettably, it is not unusual in this Court for there to be unrepresented applicants. The Court is under an obligation to provide proper assistance to an unrepresented applicant as to procedural matters, but that cannot extend to providing legal advice. Should the hearing proceed, the Court will endeavour to comply with its obligations to properly instruct the applicant on relevant matters that it can. It was the applicant who commenced these proceedings, and in so doing, she should have appreciated what would be required of her to present her case.
5. The final matter that the applicant relies upon is health concerns affecting trial readiness. The applicant states with her ongoing health problems and an upcoming trial, "I'm [she is] not sure I [she] could go to trial". No evidence whatsoever, by way of medical report or certificate, has been provided to the Court. In the absence of medical evidence, in a form that would satisfy the Court that the applicant was unfit to attend Court for the purposes of a trial, given the history of this matter, including at least one prior vacated court date, mere assertions of the applicant as to her health concerns is not an adequate reason for the matter to be adjourned. I note and bear in mind that the respondent in this matter is ready, willing, and able to appear and to defend the case.
6. In so doing, I am also conscious of what the High Court said in Aon Risk Services v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; (2009) 239 CLR 175, where Chief Justice French explained at paragraph 30 of that decision the following:

It might be thought a truism that "case management principles" should not supplant the objective of doing justice between the parties according to law. Accepting that proposition, JL Holdings cannot be taken as authority for the view that waste of public resources and undue delay, with the concomitant strain and uncertainty imposed on litigants, should not be taken into account in the exercise of interlocutory discretions of the kind conferred by r 502. Also to be considered is the potential for loss of public confidence in the legal system which arises where a court is seen to accede to applications made without adequate explanation or justification, whether they be for adjournment, for amendments giving rise to adjournment, or for vacation of fixed trial dates resulting in the resetting of interlocutory processes.

1. In my view, Ms Huang's application for an adjournment is without merit. The matter has been set for trial for some months after it was previously adjourned, and it is in the public interest that this trial be finalised as soon as possible. In my view, it would also be grossly unfair to the respondent for a second trial date to be adjourned due to the cost and the inconvenience that that would cause.
2. Court resources are a public good, limited in nature, which behoves parties who seek the intervention of the Courts to act in an expeditious and efficient manner, thereby allowing this Court to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law, as quickly, inexpensively, and as efficiently as possible.
3. Rule 1.04(1) of the Rules states the following:

The overarching purpose of these Rules, as provided in section 190 of the Act [the _Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 202_1(Cth)], is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible.

1. In my view, any further delay in this matter could only result in inappropriate delay and expense, both in terms of the Court's time and the time and expense of the respondent in defending the proceedings.

1. The application for an adjournment of the proceedings is refused. I refuse to grant the orders sought in the Application in a Proceeding. The Hearing dates of the 24 and 25 November 2025 at 10 AM are confirmed.

I certify that the preceding twenty-two (22) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge D Humphreys.