III. Judicial Review Application
13 Each of the taxpayers is incorporated overseas, some in the United Kingdom, others in the Bahamas or Samoa. Lubbock Fine is a firm of chartered accountants in the United Kingdom. On 16 May 2012 Lubbock Fine received a letter from the UK Revenue Service. It informed Lubbock Fine that '[i]n response to a formal request that has been made by the Australian Taxation Office for an exchange of information I need some information from you'. The letter attached a detailed schedule of what was requested and sought any submission which Lubbock Fine might wish to make as to why the materials should not be produced.
14 The legal basis on which this letter rested under English law is not relevant. What is relevant is the undoubted fact that it was provoked by a request from the ATO. The parties were in agreement that the request which had been made by the ATO had been made under the auspices of a double-taxation treaty between the United Kingdom and Australia. That treaty is formally known as the Convention between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains [2003] ATS 22 ('the Treaty') and was signed in Canberra on 21 August 2003. The relevant article is Article 27 which is as follows:
ARTICLE 27
Exchange of information
1 The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information as is foreseeably relevant to the administration or enforcement of the provisions of this Convention or of the domestic laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes to which this Convention applies insofar as the taxation under those laws is not contrary to this Convention. The exchange of information is not restricted by Article 1 of this Convention. Any information received by a Contracting State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained under the domestic law of that State and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and administrative bodies) concerned with the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the determination of appeals in relation to, the taxes to which this Convention applies. Such persons or authorities shall use the information only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions.
2 If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this Article, the other Contracting State shall obtain that information in the same manner and to the same extent as if the tax of the first-mentioned State were the tax of that other State and were being imposed by that other State, notwithstanding that the other State may not, at that time, need such information for the purposes of its own tax.
3 In no case shall the provisions of paragraphs 1 or 2 of this Article be construed so as to impose on a Contracting State the obligation:
(a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws or the administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State;
(b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting State; or
(c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade process, or to supply information the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy.
15 Article 3 defines a 'Contracting State' to mean the United Kingdom or Australia. The same article defines a 'competent Authority' to mean, in the case of Australia, the Commissioner of Taxation or his authorised representative. It will be seen that, at least as a matter of first impression, the effect of Article 27(2) is to require the United Kingdom to respond to a request from Australia if the information sought in it is 'foreseeably relevant' to the administration or enforcement of the taxes to which the Treaty applies. By Article 2 the Treaty is concerned with a number of taxes including, relevantly, income tax.
16 The taxpayers point to the letter to Lubbock Fine and submit that from it may be inferred the fact that the ATO had made a request to the United Kingdom under Article 27. As I understand the way the case was run, it was not really disputed by the Commissioner that a request had been made. It was the decision by the ATO which preceded the request - that is, the decision to issue the request - that the taxpayers sought judicially to review.
17 A curiosity about the way in which the taxpayers pursued their case is that they did not seek to prove the nature of the request which had been made by the ATO. Instead they rested on the letter received by Lubbock Fine. At the conclusion of the trial of this action the consequence was that the evidentiary record did not disclose:
the terms of the request which had been made; or
the date upon which it was sent.
18 This might be thought something of an oddity in a judicial review proceeding directed at the decision to issue the request. For reasons which are not obvious the taxpayers appear to have eschewed making any determined attempt to extract the request from the Commissioner. During the course of the hearing the taxpayers did make some efforts, limited perhaps, to remedy this. On the first day of the trial, for example, after the evidence had closed and having been pressed on why the request was not in evidence, the taxpayers' counsel called on a notice to produce issued one clear working day before the hearing which sought a number of documents in a short date range but which did not, in terms, seek the request itself. The Commissioner's response was that he had not had sufficient time to respond to the notice and that nothing was produced. After the conclusion of the trial, and whilst the Court was dealing with a series of related but subsequent interlocutory applications (to which I will turn shortly), an application to issue a subpoena to the Commissioner was foreshadowed together with the suggestion that a reopening of the taxpayers' case would be sought at the same time. I do not know what the subpoena would have sought because, as events transpired, neither it nor the reopening application was ever pursued.
19 One has, therefore, the situation where the taxpayers seek judicial review of a decision to make a request whose nature the evidence does not disclose. I do not apprehend that there were any particular difficulties in obtaining the request. It is true that the steps which appear to have been taken at trial encountered resistance from the Commissioner's representatives but this, so it seems to me, was entirely foreseeable if garnering the evidence was left to the trial.
20 Turning to the substance of the matter, the taxpayers' basic submission was that the making of the request had the capacity to interfere with the Part IVC proceedings and was, therefore, a contempt of this Court. The statutory power which authorised the request did not, on its proper construction, authorise such conduct by the Commissioner and, in those circumstances, the issue of the request was said to be ultra vires.
21 An assessment of the correctness of the taxpayers' submissions begins with the identification of the statutory power under which the Commissioner was acting when he made the request. Article 27, of course, is part of a treaty and by itself did not authorise the Commissioner to do anything insofar as Australian domestic law was concerned. That is not to say that, as a matter of public international law, he could not make the kind of request envisaged by Article 27. It is instead simply to underscore the irrelevance of that source in circumstances where the taxpayers needed to identify a domestic statutory basis. This was because they put their claim for relief either under the provisions of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ('the ADJR Act') (which requires a decision 'under an enactment': s 3) or under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (which requires, at least in this context, an excess of domestic legal authority).
22 The Treaty was given 'the force of law according to its tenor' by s 5 of the International Tax Agreements Act 1953 (Cth). The taxpayers contended that this was the statutory source of the power to make the request. I do not think, however, that that submission should be accepted. This is not because Article 27 did not take effect as a Commonwealth law (as the Commissioner submitted) but because, even so, Article 27 does not, as a matter of its text, authorise the making of a request. Article 27 requires a response to any request which is made, that is, it requires under sub-clause (c) co-operation but it does not, in terms, authorise the Commissioner to make the initial request engaging the obligation of co-operation.
23 The taxpayers also submitted that the power to issue the request was conferred by s 23 of the International Tax Agreements Act. Section 23(1) provides that '[t]he Commissioner or an officer authorised by the Commissioner may use the information gathering provisions for the purpose of gathering information to be exchanged in accordance with the Commissioner's obligations under an international agreement' (emphasis added). An 'information gathering provision' is a provision of a 'taxation law' (as defined in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ('the 1997 Act')) that, inter alia, 'allows the Commissioner…to require or direct a person to provide information': s 23(4). Section 995.1 of the 1997 Act defines 'taxation law' to include any 'Act of which the Commissioner has the general administration (including part of an Act to the extent to which the Commissioner has the general administration of that Act)'. The International Tax Agreements Act does not explicitly confer a power of general administration on the Commissioner (cf. s 43, Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (Cth); s 3, Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986 (Cth)) and it was not submitted to me that such a power should be implied. I do not, in any event, need to decide any such question because of what follows.
24 The making of a request by the Commissioner is intimately bound up in his administration of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ('the 1936 Act'), the 1997 Act and the Taxation Administration Act. It was after all only his administration of those Acts which had occasioned the possibility of making a request. Those three statutes each confer upon the Commissioner a statutory power of general administration: see, respectively, ss 8, 1.7 and 3A. It was, in my opinion, those provisions which authorised the Commissioner to make a request, the response to which would be governed by Article 27.
25 As the taxpayers' argument was developed it was submitted that the Commissioner had no power to make the request. I shall treat this submission, in light of that conclusion, as one where it is submitted that the general power of administration does not authorise the request.
26 The taxpayers submitted that the Commissioner's authority to make a request did not run to doing so where his sole or dominant purpose was to use the proceeds of the request for the purpose of the Part IVC proceedings.
27 A variant of the argument was that the power would not arise where the making of the request had the effect of securing an advantage in the Part IVC proceedings even if the power was not being exercised for a purpose which conferred an advantage not able to be obtained by the procedures of the Court.
28 I accept the primary submission but not its variant. One would not read any of the three taxation statutes to which I have referred as authorising a contempt of Court in the absence of a clear statement that that was what Parliament intended: Commissioner of Taxation v De Vonk (1995) 61 FCR 564 at 585-586, 588 per Hill and Lindgren JJ. A power couched in terms of general administration (such as ss 8, 1.7 and 3A) does not reveal the clarity necessary to infer that a power to commit a contempt was contemplated. It follows that the Commissioner has no power to make the kind of request contemplated by Article 27 if to do so would constitute a contempt of Part IVC proceedings. I return below to the question of whether a contempt is, in fact, involved.
29 I reject the taxpayers' variant argument that the power of general administration would not authorise the making of a request that, although done without the purpose of securing an advantage, nevertheless had that effect. I do so for the reasons given by Spigelman CJ in NSW Food Authority v Nutricia Australia Pty Ltd (2008) 72 NSWLR 456 at 488-489 [140]-[145]. Mere effect will not suffice; there must be a contempt which constitutes a real risk of interference with the administration of justice: [143].
30 Does the evidence establish such a contempt? I think not. The taxpayer's case that it did had, in effect, two steps.
31 The first was the fact that the letter written by the UK Revenue Service to Lubbock Fine was dated 16 May 2012. This apparently innocuous matter was significant because it was very close to the time at which the Commissioner had issued, in the Part IVC proceedings, a subpoena to Mr Vanda Gould. That subpoena was issued on 28 May 2012. The closeness of the two dates was said to support an inference that the step of making the request under Article 27 was the result of the same episode of forensic industry that had given rise to the subpoena to Mr Gould.
32 The second step was allied to the first and directed attention to the terms of the subpoena and the letter to Lubbock Fine. There was some overlap between the two. The combined result of these matters was, so it was submitted, that an inference should be drawn that the predominant purpose for which the request had been issued was to assist the Commissioner in his defence of the taxpayers' Part IVC proceedings.
33 I do not accept this argument for a number of reasons. First, as I have already pointed out, perhaps exceptionally, there was no direct evidence of the request before me. The taxpayers' submissions proceeded on the assumption that there was an identity between that which the Commissioner had requested from the United Kingdom under Article 27 and that which the UK Revenue Service had requested from Lubbock Fine. In circumstances where there is nothing before me to explain (on a reasonable basis) why the step of placing the request before the Court has not been taken I am not minded to draw such an inference. Secondly, for similar reasons, I do not accept that the fact that the letter to Lubbock Fine is dated 16 May 2012 allows one to draw the inference that the request was made at around the same time. To the contrary, experience with bureaucracy means that it would not be surprising, particularly with matters involving two nations, if the request antedated the letter by many months. Thirdly, the overlap is partial and by no means complete. To the extent that one can deduce much from the letter to Lubbock Fine about the underlying request I would infer that the non-overlapping portions (which in my view predominate) show that the ends to which it was directed were substantially different to those which the subpoena to Mr Gould was directed. To make good the point it is necessary to refer to the text of the schedule annexed to the letter to Lubbock Fine and the subpoena to Mr Gould. The former is as follows:
Documents or information that we need to see
In this context 'document' means anything in which information of any description is recorded. This includes any records you hold on computer, magnetic tape, optical disk (CD-ROM/DVD), hard disk, memory stick, flash drive, floppy disk or other recording media.
[1] All documents relating to services provided by Lubbock Fine LLP to or in respect of the entities described in the schedule at 5 below. The services referred to include accounting, managerial, tax advice, company formation, invoicing and expense recording and banking and financial services. For the avoidance of doubt the term documents includes all correspondence including letters, memoranda, emails, faxes and other written media, notes of meetings and or telephone calls, contracts, accounts, agreements, financial and other projections, presentations that are in the power and/or possession of Lubbock Fine LLP and the parties to whom this request relates include the entities described in the schedule at [5] below, any agents, accountants, lawyers, advisers, banks or other financial institutions and any other person that has acted for the parties in either a direct or a fiduciary capacity in relation to the affairs of the described entities (but see paragraph 6 below). Without prejudice to the general description of the information required the term documents includes:
General legers
Financial statements
Cash books and other books of account
[2] For all purposes the documents required are those which were created at any time within the periods stated in section [5] below.
[3] Nothing within the proposed notice should be read as being a requirement for you to;
(a) provide information held in connection with the performance of functions as an auditor of any of the entities or to;
(b) produce documents which are the property of Lubbock Fine LLP and which were created for or in connection with the performance of those functions.
[4] Nothing within the proposed notice, should be read as being a requirement for you where acting in the capacity as a tax adviser;
(a) to provide information about relevant communications, or
(b) to produce documents which are the property of Lubbock Fine LLP and consist of relevant communications.
In this paragraph -
"relevant communications" means communications between the tax adviser and -
(a) a person in relation to whose tax affairs he has been appointed, or
(b) any other tax adviser of such a person, the purpose of which is the giving or obtaining of advice about any of those tax affairs, and
"tax adviser" means a person appointed to give advice about the tax affairs of another person (whether appointed directly by that person or by another tax adviser of that person).
[5] Schedule of entities to which this proposed notice relates;
NAME OF ENTITY PERIOD DOCUMENTS REQUIRED
UK ENTITIES
ABASUS INVESTMENTS LTD 01/01/2003 to 31/10/2010
ANGLO AUSTRALIAN CHRISTIAN AND CHARITABLE TRUST BARINGS ACCEPTANCE LTD 01/01/2002 to 31/10/2010
BARLEIGH WELLS LTD 01/01/2003 to 31/10/2010
CHEMICAL TRUSTEE LTD 01/03/1996 to 31/12/2010
CITY & WESTMINSTER LTD 01/01/2001 to 31/12/2010
DERRIN BROTHERS PROPERTIES LTD 01/01/2002 to 31/12/2010
FINE INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY LTD 01/01/2002 to 31/12/2010
HOUSE OF MAISTER FINANCIAL SERVICES LTD 01/01/2004 to 31/12/2010
INDO-SUEZ INVESTMENTS LTD 01/01/2002 to 31/12/2010
INTAPULSE INTERNATIONAL LTD 01/01/2001 to 31/12/2009
LLOYDS & CASANOVE INVESTMENTS LTD 01/02/2002 to 31/12/2011
NEWRIDGE ENGINEERS LTD 01/01/2005 to 31/12/2010
NORMANDY FINANCE & INVESTMENTS LTD 01/01/1998 to 31/12/2010
PENALTON LTD 01/01/2006 to 31/12/2010
POWER INVESTMENTS (UK) LTD 01/01/2005 to 31/12/2010
SEVINHAND COMPANY LTD 01/01/2002 to 31/12/2010
SOUTHGATE INVESTMENT FUNDS LTD 01/01/2000 to 31/12/2010
SOUTH SEA (AUSTRALIA) LTD 01/01/2006 to 31/12/2010
VYCROWN INVESTMENTS LTD 01/01/2002 10 31/12/2011