alternatively, its duty to the Plaintiff to act fairly. AND THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMS:- 1. A declaration that the Direction is not a valid and lawful direction in writing pursuant to Section 15(2) of the Act and is void. 2. Costs." 3. In effect, the applicant submits that since under s.15(1) of the Casino Licensing and Control Act no person has a right to enter or remain in a casino except with the express or tacit approval of the licensee, a direction in writing prohibiting a person from entering or remaining in a casino and a direction complying with s.15(2) admits of no defence. 4. Section 15 provides:- "15.(1) No person has a right to enter or remain in a casino except with the express or tacit approval of the licensee. (2) A direction in writing prohibiting a person from entering or remaining in a casino may be given to that person by the licensee or a person acting under his supervision or by the Commissioner within the meaning of the Police Administration Act. (3) A direction given under sub-section (2) by the Commissioner is of no effect until notice in writing of the direction has been given to the licensee. (4) Where a direction has been given under this section to a person, a licensee shall exclude or remove that person from the casino or have him so excluded or removed from the casino. (5) A person shall not enter or remain in a casino contrary to a direction in writing given to him under sub-section (2). Penalty: $500 or imprisonment for 3 months. (6) A licensee or an employee or agent of the licensee acting in connection with the casino, shall not knowingly allow a person to enter or remain in the casino contrary to a direction given under sub-section (2). Penalty: $500 or imprisonment for 3 months. (7) This section does not prevent a person from exercising a power conferred on him by this or any other law of the Territory to enter, or to do any other act in relation to, a casino." 5. The applicant says that sub-section (7) does not derogate from the effectiveness of a direction given under sub-section (2) unless the person receiving the direction can bring himself within its purview; and as he has not pleaded any entitlement there under, he has no cause of action. Moreover, it is submitted that a claim simply for a declaration is not available to the plaintiff unless a cause of action is disclosed. 6. On the other hand, the plaintiff submits that no cause of action need be pleaded when a declaration is sought, especially, as here, it is claimed (inter alia) that he has been denied natural justice. 7. As tenuous as the plaintiff's claim might appear to be at first sight, I am not persuaded that the rules of natural justice may not arguably have application here despite the words of the section. (cf. Heatley v Tasmanian Racing and Gaming Commission [1977] HCA 39; (1977) 137 CLR 487 and Kioa and Others v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and An other [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 62 ALR 321). 8. In any event, the claim is still open on the simple ground that the defendant may not have complied with the provisions of s.15. In particular, it is noted that in annexure "B" to the affidavit of Roger Hugh de Lima, sworn on 11 February 1987, the substantive notice is unsigned except in aid of proof of service. This omission may not be fatal; but it does provide room for argument. 9. The power of this Court to make binding declarations of right is contained in s.18 of the Supreme Court Act which provides:-

"18.(1) The Court may, in relation to any matter in which it has jurisdiction, make binding declarations fright, whether or

not any consequential relief is or could be claimed. (2) A proceeding is not open to objection on the ground that a declaratory order only is sought." 10. The relevant test to be applied to an application of this sort is that posed by Barwick C.J. in General Steel Industries Inc. v Commissioner for Railways (N.S.W.) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125, namely, whether the plaintiff's case "is so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly succeed." Applying that test to the circumstances of this case, I am unable to concede that the plaintiff cannot possibly succeed." 11. Accordingly I dismiss the present application but out of respect for the argument presented by the applicant's counsel, I order that the costs of this application be costs in the cause.