austlii:qld/QBCCMCmr/2025/125
General information, not legal advice.
QBCCMCmr
2025-04-14
Original judgment source is linked above.
Hope Island Resort Principal Body Corporate [2025] QBCCMCmr 125
The Principal Body Corporate for Hope Island Resort GTP 107068 (first )
The Proprietors - Villa Casablanca GTP 107004 (second respondent)
Section 77 of the Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980 (Qld) (BUGT Act); Section 179A of the Integrated Resort Development Act 1987 (Qld) (IRD Act)
BY-LAWS - whether a residential body corporate may revoke automatic access over a primary thoroughfare relating to an alleged breach(es) of parking by-laws - whether a body corporate can or should be compelled to notify a proprietor of a lot of the processes it employs for by-law enforcement.
Subject to the application of any primary thoroughfare by-law or any secondary thoroughfare by-law, every person who lawfully occupies any land within the site has a right of way over the primary thoroughfare and that part of the secondary thoroughfare that is within the stage occupied by the person.[6]
... shall have the powers, authorities, duties and functions conferred or imposed on it by or under this Act or the development control by-laws ...[14]
... revoking the use of remote gate access equipment until such time as the process is fully documented and ratified via a vote at an EGM or AGM
... introduces a process that clearly spells out the process that will be followed in the event of By-Law breaches.
Upon the recognition of three (3) identified, qualified and communicated offences pertaining to a vehicle or Lot Owner, all access devices (card swipe, Gallagher and/or remote control) registered to that household, will be suspended for a period of one (1) week.
Please note, the household will have access, however this will be facilitate by calling HIR Security via the Gate Entry System.
Following the one (1) week access device suspension period, all access devices will be reactivated by HIR Security. A six (6) month probation period will immediately follow the one (1) week access device suspension period and any further identified and qualified offence within the probation period, will result in an immediate one (1) month suspension of access devices registered to that household.
The decision to revoke or modify the use of remote gate access equipment was made by the Villa Casablanca Body Corporate (VCBC) independently. This decision was not a directive from the PBC.
Villa Casablanca chose to adopt a PBC initiative, for their own common property. Noting the PBC initiative came into effect across all PBC secondary thoroughfare common property, 1 March 2024.
Therefore, the PBC has no orders to respond to or intervene in, regarding this matter
.... it hopes to be in a position to present to the body corporate at the August AGM a motion to alter the existing by-laws regarding parking and the process to deal with visitor parking breaches.
[1] For a comprehensive explanation of the development and the structure and functions of the various bodies corporate in the Hope Island Resort, see The Proprietors - Rosebank GTP 3033 v Locke & Anor [2016] QCA 192 at [4] - [6], and at [102]-[109].
[2] Those lots are registered on six different plans, with the applicant's lot registered on GRP107025, which is a group title plan of re-subdivision.
[4] See The Proprietors - Rosebank GTP 3033 v Locke & Anor [2016] QCA 192 at [102]
[5] Section 3(1)(a) and (b) of the IRD Act
[6] See Section 100(1) of the IRD Act, and see section 100(2)
[8] See Sections 102(5) and 116(1) of the IRD Act. The primary thoroughfare includes roads and may also include facilities.
[9] See Section 178(1) of the IRD Act. Such primary thoroughfare by-laws have no effect until they have been approved by the Minister responsible for the IRD Act and notification of the approval has been published in the gazette. See Section 178(2) of the IRD Act
[15] See Section 179(1) of the IRD Act. ST By-laws have no effect until they have been approved by the Minister responsible for the IRD Act and notification published in the gazette. See id. at Section 178(2)
[16] See Section 179(5) of the IRD Act
[18] See Section 179(4) of the IRD Act
[22] See Section 30(2) of the BUGT Act
[23] The introduction of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (BCCM Act) meant the earlier BUGT Act no longer applies to many bodies corporate. However, there are some exceptions. Relevantly here, the BUGT Act continues in force for plans registered thereunder in relation to a "specified" Act such as the IRD Act. See Sections 325(2) and 326 of the BCCM Act
[24] See Section 73(1)(c) and (d) of the BUGT Act
[25] See Section 73(1)(f) of the BUGT Act
[26] See Section 75(6) of the BUGT Act
[27] I also note the outcomes sought against Villa Casablanca have not changed. I did not consider the application has been amended such as to require notice of the amended application (either pursuant to natural justice or by the BUGT Act) to be given to each proprietor of a lot in Villa Casablanca.
[31] It appears the PBC changed mangers several times during 2024. Cambridge Management Services (Cambridge) was the BCM for the PBC through to around 25 March 2024, and was replaced by Stratacare but later reinstated as the BCM from about November 2024.
[32] For example, the applicant's 13 June 2024 email to Stratacare asking about communication with both the PBC and the Villa Casablanca committees about breaches of the BUGT Act relating to remote access.
[33] See e.g., Sanctuary Cove Principal Body Corporate v Nakahara and Ors (QMC, unreported, Magee, 56211-19, 12 February 2020); Warren v Hope Island Resort Principal Body Corporate (QMC, unreported, Bentley, 2461-24, 2 May 2024) (applicant owner of a lot in residential scheme naming PBC as respondent)
[34] The applicant did not clarify whether this area was part of the secondary thoroughfare or another part of the resort.
[35] I believe this is the PBC Initiative referenced by the executive committee of the PBC.
[36] See PBC 25 March 2025 response at [45]. I infer by "its by-laws", the PBC is referring to the ST By-laws.
[37] I considered that, on its face, the application raised issues that might implicate sections 100 and 179(5) of the IRD Act. Although I made initial inquiries of the PBC of its position about the applicability of those sections, given my findings of fact, I did not need to consider the issue any further.
[38] Even assuming Villa Casablanca was so empowered, I note the decision to deactivate the device arguably alters the rights or privileges of proprietors and could be a decision about a restricted matter the committee was not permitted to make. See Sections 46(1)(b) and 46(2) of the BUGT Act
[39] See The Proprietors - Rosebank GTP 3033 v Locke & Anor [2016] QCA 192 at [48] and [69]. I consider any attempts to do so would likely be inconsistent with the legislation and impermissibly extend the ambit of powers given to the Villa Casablanca Body Corporate.
[40] See Sections 139(6) and 151(1) of the IRD Act
[41] See Section 46(3) of the BUGT Act
[42] Had I determined there was a live dispute with the PBC, to afford procedural fairness, I would have afforded the PBC an opportunity to respond to the orders sought against it.
[43] See Sections 182-188 of the BCCM Act
[44] Also, unlike the BCCM Act, neither the BUGT Act nor the IRD Act contain an exclusive jurisdiction provision. As such, a body corporate seeking to enforce a by-law pursuant to the BUGT or IRD Acts may make an application to a referee or commence proceedings in another competent jurisdiction.
[45] See Section 27(4) of the BUGT Act
[46] See Section 27(3) of the BUGT Act
[47] See _Body Corporate For Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backsha_ll [2016] QCATA 177 at [34]. Although Beaches was concerned with a body corporate governed by the BCCM Act, I consider Villa Casablanca is also a body with the power to "administratively affect the rights, interests and reasonable expectations" of proprietors and occupiers, by the choices it makes. As such, in my view, it is subject to the same general law obligations referred to by Carmody J in Beaches.
[48] Clause 15 did provide that occupiers in "continual breach" would be informed and placed on notice they would no longer be permitted to park on the common property of Villa Casablanca or on the Secondary Thoroughfare. It did not define what would amount to a "continual breach" nor for how long an occupier might be banned from parking on the parcel. While it is unclear how the Villa Casablanca can make by-laws about the Secondary Thoroughfare, that question is beyond the scope of this application.
[49] See e.g., Washingtonia [2024] QBCCMCmr 272 at [26]