Hong & Lai [2025] FedCFamC2F 1833 (4 December 2025)

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

1. The oral application for an adjournment is refused.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These are property proceedings that were commenced on 5 December 2023 by the applicant de facto husband ("de facto husband") against the respondent de facto wife ("de facto wife"). A central issue in the case is the date of separation with the de facto husband contending separation on 9 April 2011, and the de facto wife contending separation occurred in October 2022. This Court made orders fixing the matter for a final hearing that commenced on 25 September 2025. The matter proceeded with evidence being taken, and the de facto husband is currently in cross-examination. The de facto husband on that occasion was represented as a result of orders made by this Court on 16 May 2025 pursuant to s 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"). Note B expressly identified that should either party not obtain representation, they will not be permitted to cross-examine the other.
2. At the hearing in September 2025, this Court had to proceed with an urgent parenting matter and was not able to conclude this property matter, and it was stood over to today's date. The Court received an email from the de facto husband seeking an adjournment because of the termination of his Legal Aid representation. It is apparent from exhibit C that it was the de facto husband who decided to terminate his legal representation. Legal Aid declined to accommodate the de facto husband's request for transfer to another representative. The de facto husband, on 4 December 2025, sought a review of the decision made on 25 November, asserting that there were issues in respect of the legal representatives.
3. Whether or not there were issues in respect of the legal representatives, it was the de facto husband's voluntary decision to terminate his representation that gave rise to him being unrepresented in these proceedings. The Court does not regard, in those circumstances, the de facto husband being now unrepresented as a proper basis to justify a further adjournment of these property proceedings that should have concluded back in September. The de facto husband has submitted that he wants an adjournment so that he can pursue the review application or alternatively obtain independent legal representation.
4. If the de facto husband was able to obtain independent legal representation, he should have done so already. In circumstances where it was the de facto husband who decided to take the voluntary role of terminating his legal representation, the Court is not satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to grant a further adjournment of these proceedings. The Court has also taken into account in that regard that a further adjournment would potentially incur further costs for the de facto wife, and that this is a further factor that weighs against granting an adjournment.
5. Further, as the proceedings were part-heard and the de facto husband was in cross-examination, it was patent that his legal representation was a matter of importance. The disagreement with his practitioners and voluntary decision to terminate the same is not a satisfactory explanation for his failure to obtain independent legal representation if he wished to do so. In all the circumstances, the oral application for an adjournment is refused.
6. It is for these reasons the Court makes the above order.

I certify that the preceding six (6) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of Judge Street.