Holinski & Holinski (No 4) [2025] FedCFamC1F 967 (24 December 2025)

1. Pursuant to s 68L(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), N born in 2012 and L born in 2010 ("the children") be independently represented on an urgent basis AND FOR THIS PURPOSE IT IS REQUESTED that Legal Aid NSW appoint Ms DD or such other solicitor as nominated by the Director of Legal Aid NSW and:
   1. forthwith upon appointment by Legal Aid NSW or otherwise, the Independent Children's Lawyer file a notice of address for service;
   2. the solicitors for the respective parents (or, if unrepresented, then the parent themselves) provide forthwith to the Independent Children's Lawyer copies of all applications and affidavits upon which that party relies together with any existing orders and copies of any relevant reports;
   3. the Independent Children's Lawyer fulfil the requirements set out in 'Guidelines for the Independent Children's Lawyer' as published on the website of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, and in particular carry out the tasks set out in clauses 5, 6.2, 6.3, 6.5 and 6.7; and
   4. the Independent Children's Lawyer prepare a minute of the orders they will recommend be made as interim orders.
2. Leave is granted to the Independent Children's Lawyer to inspect and copy:
   1. Subpoena material produced by all relevant persons or organisations in these proceedings to date;
   2. Material produced by NSW Department of Communities and Justice and New South Wales Police in response to the notification made under s 67ZBD;
   3. Documents produced by the Department of Communities and Justice and New South Wales Police in response to the order to provide documents or information (s 67ZBE Order).
3. Pursuant to s 68LA(5D)(b) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the Independent Children's Lawyer is required to meet with the children or provide them with an opportunity to express their views prior to final orders being made in this proceeding.
4. The hearing listed before Senior Judicial Registrar Neilson on 12 February 2026 is vacated.
5. The matter is otherwise listed before the Honourable Justice Anderson on Monday, 2 February 2026 at 4.00pm for consideration of the question of the children's schooling and the programming of the competing applications for a further defended hearing.

1. The Judicial Associate to the Honourable Justice Anderson had telephone communications with Ms DD on Friday, 19 December 2025 informing her of the Orders made by the Court which sought to reinstate Ms DD as the Independent Children's Lawyer on the file. Ms DD confirmed with the Judicial Associate that she would comply with such an Order once the ICL Order Form had been provided to Legal Aid NSW. Subsequent correspondence from Legal Aid NSW notified the Court that Ms DD was unavailable for re-appointment. Given the urgency of the matter before the Court, Legal Aid NSW was then requested to appoint such practitioner as the Director of Legal Aid NSW may consider appropriate. Regrettably, the Chambers of the Honourable Justice Anderson was again notified that this request was unable to be fulfilled in time for hearing on 24 December 2025.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym of Holinski & Holinski (No 4) has been approved pursuant to subs 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. At the outset of these reasons, I indicate as follows:

(a) I intend to give shortform reasons pursuant to s 69ZL of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (as amended) ("the Act"), given that these are interlocutory proceedings;

(b) I have had regard to all material, which has been filed in the interim proceedings; and

(c) Where necessary to do so, I incorporate my exchanges with counsel during the course of the interim defendant hearing today, and the transcript will reveal those matters, and they are incorporated into my reasons.

1. On 8 August 2025, I delivered primary judgment with respect to proceedings under Part VII of the Act, namely Holinski & Holinski (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 530. I have regard to and incorporate my reasons for that judgment in these reasons. On 3 September 2025, I delivered a judgment in relation to the mother's application for a stay in my primary reasons, namely Holinski & Holinski (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 603. I have regard to and incorporate my various reasons for judgment in these reasons.
2. My primary judgment related to two children, namely, N, born in 2012, and L, born in 2010 ("the children"). The children are now aged 15 years and 13 years respectively. My orders delivered on 8 August 2025 provided for the children to live with the father from the delivery of my judgment to the commencement of the Christmas school holiday period in 2025/2026. In effect, there was to be a moratorium with respect to time between the children and their mother for the reasons set out in my primary judgment.
3. By his (Amended) Initiating Application filed on 16 December 2025, and on an interim basis, the father seeks to suspend certain provisions of the orders made by me on 8 August 2025, and that the mother otherwise be restrained from spending time with the children or communicating with them by any means whatsoever. That application is opposed by the mother. Particularly, and by her Response filed on 22 December 2025, the mother seeks orders that the children be delivered to her at 4.00pm today.
4. In effect, the mother seeks a continuation of the orders made by me on 8 August 2025. Orders made in parenting proceedings are never unequivocally final because the Court is empowered by s 65D(2) of the Act to discharge, vary, suspend or revive some or all parenting orders. Parenting orders can be varied by consent of the parties or by a Court determination. Parenting orders are only "final" insofar as they determine an existing cause of action brought under Part VII of the Act.
5. Prior to the commencement of amendments to the Act on 6 May 2024, common law principles were applied to applications which sought a variation of final parenting orders in contested proceedings. A threshold test was applied, which required a material change of circumstances since the making of the final orders prior to a Court considering whether to permit such an application, whilst always taking into account the best interest considerations.
6. The threshold test is referred to by the Full Court in Rice & Asplund, where Evatt JJ, with whom Pawley SJ and Fogarty J agreed, stated the rule in the following terms at page 78,905:

The Court should not lightly entertain an application to reverse an earlier custody order. To do so would be to invite endless litigation for changes in an ever-present factor in human affairs. Therefore, the Court would need to be satisfied by the applicant that ... there is some changed circumstance which would justify such a serious step, some new factor arising, or in any way some factor which was not disclosed at the previous hearing which would have been material.[1]

1. The rule in Rice & Asplund has been routinely followed ever since its enunciation and has been the subject of judicial consideration, elaboration and clarification. The requirement to make a finding of changed circumstance, however variously described, has been approved of and followed in decisions subsequent to Rice & Asplund. Warnick J said in SPS & PLS [2008] FLC 93-363 at [84], that the essential question to be asked is, assuming the evidence of the appellant is accepted, are there "new events" sufficient to provoke a new inquiry.[2] Subsequent to the commencement of s 65DAAA of the Act in May 2024, there was divergent opinion about the possible conflict between the statute and the common law rule. Section 65DAAA(1) of the Act is in the following terms:

(1) If a final parenting order is in force in relation to a child a court must not reconsider the final parenting unless:

(a) the court has considered whether there has been a significant change of circumstances since the final parenting was made; and

(b) the court is satisfied that, in all the circumstances (and taking into account whether there has been a significant change of circumstances since the final parenting order was made), it is in the best interests of the child for the final parenting order to be reconsidered.

1. In Radecki & Radecki [2024] FedCFamC1A 246; (2024) 70 Fam LR 172, the Court determined that there is no discernible difference between the threshold to be applied under the new statutory regime and the common law principles espoused by the rule in Rice & Asplund.[3]

(a) An (Amended) Initiating Application filed on 16 December 2025;

(b) Affidavits in his name filed on 15 December 2025 and 19 December 2025;

(c) A Notice of Child Abuse, Family Violence or Risk filed on 15 December 2025;

(d) An Outline of Case Document filed on 23 December 2025; and

(e) Some tendered documents.[4]

(a) A Response to an Initiating Application filed on 22 December 2025;

(b) An affidavit in her name filed on 22 December 2025;

(c) A Notice of Child Abuse, Family Violence or Risk filed on 22 December 2025;

(d) An Outline of Case Document filed on 23 December 2025; and

(e) Some tendered documents.[5]

1. I have carefully considered the materials returned by New South Wales Police pursuant to a

s 67ZBE order. Those materials now add context to the matters the subject of my judgment in relation to the stay application. Particularly:

(a) It is now beyond contest that the mother arranged for a friend to attend on the children when they were hospitalised in early August 2025. That action was in breach of the injunctive orders made on 8 August 2025, and particularly paragraph 10. That action required the intervention of hospital staff; and

(b) The mother caused two mobile telephones to be delivered to the children in breach of injunctive orders made on 8 August 2025.

1. The mother concedes that she contacted New South Wales Police on [...] August 2025. In fact, on that occasion, the mother said to the police that she had given the children mobile phones to use whilst in the custody of the father.[6] She complained that the children were no longer using those specific phones. She then asserted that this was as a result of the father "controlling the children and their activities". The notes of police go on to say that the mother "had given the children the phones and has since not had contact, and therefore, is not able to comment on the exact reasons for not using the phones".[7] The provision of telephones to the children is, as I say, a direct breach of paragraph 9 of my orders, which restrains the mother from communicating with the children by any means whatsoever, including by email communication, telephone, SMS text message or any form of social media.
2. On the following day, the children were hospitalised overnight. The involvement of police and the subsequent hospitalisation of the children appears, in part, to be in response to a request from a welfare check made by the mother on the day she contacted police. The police record the following with respect to the mother's complaint:

At 12.50 pm, [date redacted] August 2025, the victim (namely the mother) attended [suburb V] Police with .... She told police that she had given the children phones to use whilst in the custody of their father. She stated that the children no longer use these specific phones as they were given new phones by the father. The mother was essentially reporting to police that she wanted these phones back as she paid for them and she does not want the father to go through the phones and have access to certain information.[8]

The mother stated that she believed that this was as a result of the father controlling the children and their activities.

...

The mother advised Sergeant [surname] that she had given the children the phones and has since not had contact and therefore is not able to comment on the exact reasons for the children not using their phones.[9]

1. Whatever the scenario, the police entries of the complaint evidence a desire on part of the mother to breach the injunctive orders made on 8 August 2025.
2. On the following day at 3.30pm, police responded to a concern for the welfare of the children as expressed by the mother the previous day.[10] I accept the submissions of the mother's counsel that the father behaved in a less than ideal way on that day. I also accept that the father behaved in a manner which would have increased the children's anxiety. However, I accept that the father's behaviour was in part caused by what has been extensive litigation in this court since 2013. That is, and even with the benefit of my judgment, it appears that the father continues to find it necessary to defend himself to third party agencies such as New South Wales Police and the Department of Communities and Justice.
3. Further, and with respect to the children's reaction that day, and whilst I accept that the children's reaction was distressing, I note that the children's complaints and threats with respect to the father's conduct represent a continuation of the children's behaviour as expressed in my primary judgment. In this regard, I refer to and repeat the concerns expressed by Dr AA at [37] of my stay judgment; Holinski & Holinski (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 603. I refer to and repeat that paragraph.
4. The police records identify that on the same day, or the following day, a priest from the K Church attended on the children.[11] That priest is from the mother's church. She denies having contacted the priest, or pastor as he is described. Whatever the scenario, it is clear from paragraph 26 of the mother's affidavit filed on 22 December 2025 that the mother contacted her friends Mr EE and Ms FF to express concern about the welfare of the children. They, in turn, contacted the pastor.
5. The mother says today, through her counsel, that she did not ask the pastor to attend on the children. Instead, and by her affidavit, she says that the pastor chose to offer pastoral care and support to the children. I reject that explanation. On balance, I consider it is more likely than not that the mother and/or her agents arranged for the attendance of the pastor in breach of Order 10 of the orders made on 8 August 2025. Such a conclusion might be derived from Annexure B to the father's affidavit filed on 19 December 2025,[12] which has been marked as an exhibit to the proceedings. The letter appears to have been prepared by the child, L. The letter, among other things, thanks the mother for calling police. Clearly, someone advised L that his mother did so.
6. The mother's counsel warns me against placing weight on the document prepared by L, which is marked as an exhibit in these proceedings. I disagree. On several occasions throughout my primary judgment, I refer to my concern that the mother has cemented a narrative in the minds of the children that the father was a person who presented a risk to the children's wellbeing. Dr AA expressed concern about the enmeshment of the children with the mother. In my view, the note created by L is simply a continuation of that narrative. On [...] August 2025, the mother attended at the suburb GG Police Station. An extract of the mother's attendance that day is in part replicated below, namely

[The mother] spoke to the station constable in relation to the possibility of sending police to conduct a welfare check of the children, given that they had been returned to the custody of their father despite their unwillingness to stay with him after they were discharged from hospital following their treatment for self-harm threats.

[The mother] did not disclose to police whether any new incidents occurred or any other information to suggest that the children were at risk of harm. [The mother] merely wanted police to go to the residence and check on the children.

The mother expressed to police her frustration as to why the hospital and DCJ allowed the children to return to the father's residence after the incident six days prior and demanded the police should remove the children.

After consultation with Inspector [surname], the decision was made not to attend the children's address and not conduct a welfare check. This is largely due to all stakeholders aware of the situation and their arrangement to have the children remain in the father's custody. Police are also aware the mother saw the children the day before (at the hospital) and were aware of the plan.[13]

1. I place limited weight on that extract in circumstances where I have no evidence before me that the mother did, in fact, attend at the hospital as police record. However, the notes clearly identify that the mother continues to believe that the children are at risk of harm in the care of the father. That much is made clear by her demand of New South Wales Police to remove the children from the father. The note in respect to that issue was not subject to challenge by the mother's counsel. To this extent, I disagree with the submission made by the mother's counsel that the mother is prepared to abide by my orders and does not otherwise consider that the father represents a risk to the children.
2. On [...] September 2025, it appears that someone has made a report to the effect that the father has sexually abused L.[14] The notes, as they appear in a narrative created on [...] September 2025, identify that it had been reported that the father had sexually abused L "when he was little by tickling his genitals to make him have an erection".[15] It is noted that similar information was reported and assessed in September 2015. On the making of what appears to be a fresh report, "tri agency partners" assessed that the referral does not meet the Joint Response Unit criteria for sexual abuse and was referred for response by local police.[16] The mother says that the fresh allegation of sexual abuse was not one made by her. I do not know. However, I find it difficult to understand why anyone, apart from the mother or those that support her, would be making the said allegations to New South Wales Police. Whether or not the mother made those reports will need to be the subject of final hearing and I do not place any weight on it for the purposes of this decision.
3. If I am correct, however, the report of [...] September 2025 identifies that the mother and/or her agents have participated in a drastic escalation in the steps which the mother is prepared to take to cause a rupture in the children's relationship with the father.
4. Around the same time in 2025, the mother made a request for a further welfare check expressing concern about the children's welfare some eleven days after their hospitalisation.[17] Specifically, the mother said that she had concern for the children's welfare "as they were released from hospital back into the father's care after not wanting to live with him".[18] That, of course, has been the mother's narrative across the course of the proceedings. That entry also undermines the mother's assertion through her counsel that she is prepared to comply with my orders and abandons an assertion that the father represents a risk to the children. The narrative from the police entries of [...] September 2025 is in the following terms:

Police attended the location to conduct a welfare check on the children requested by the mother. The CAD job states, "Police to attend and conduct a welfare check on [the children]. Concerns for their welfare as they were released from hospital back into the father's care after not wanting to live with him. The father is...[19]

1. The narrative highlights the impact of the mother's behaviour on the children. It also defeats the purpose of paragraph 10 of the orders made on 8 August 2025. That purpose being to provide the children with an opportunity to develop a new narrative of their father. The mother's behaviour on [...] September 2025 undermines the intended effect of my orders. The distressing effect of the mother's behaviour is identified by the children's assertions to police that they required their help, and they started crying and became emotional.[20]
2. On 16 September 2025, an unknown person contacted police, advising that since 9 August 2025, the mother had arranged for a Christian pastor to attend at the HH Hospital on two occasions, acting as the mother's agent, and tried to have the children receive a mobile device so that they might call the mother. Allegedly, the pastor also tried to have the children write a letter to the mother, which he would then deliver.[21] Naturally, the children were distressed by this action, and the police records identify that the children were distressed. I say nothing more about that police entry, because I do not know who made the report.
3. At 11.00am on [...] November 2025, the mother requested that New South Wales Police undertake a welfare check.[22] She allegedly said that she wished the police to attend on the children and sight them. Discussions between the mother and New South Wales Police reads as follows:

Police informed [the mother] to contact DCJ, and police asked the mother what was the concerns the [mother] informed police that she has no major concerns for the children's [sic] only that she cannot get in contact with them.[23]

1. Again, it highlights the steps which the mother was prepared to undertake to undermine the operation of my orders. I do not agree that this extract alone identifies that the mother has turned a page. Instead, in combination with the previous entries of police, it identifies that since the time I delivered Final Orders on 8 August 2025, the mother has subjected the children to:

(a) several attendances by police which have been unnecessary, in circumstances where, by my primary judgment, I identified that the children are not at risk of harm in the father's care;

(b) potentially subjected the children to hospitalisation; and

(c) subjected the children to the influence of third parties, in an effort to interfere with my orders.

1. It appears that the police are well aware of the situation between the parties.
2. Indeed, on [...] September 2025, a constable at suburb V Police Station said as follows:

At this stage there is no need for police to go back and do a welfare check on the kids, as this may cause more distress. DCJ are heavily involved with the children, with an open case.[24]

1. Other notes of police describe concern that the parties are using police as a "tool" in the dispute between the parties.[25] I agree with that assessment. At paragraph 28 of the father's affidavit filed on 15 December 2025, the father identifies that an email was circulated, which contained a draft letter addressed to a member of parliament by the name of Ms JJ. The mother, at paragraph 74 of her affidavit, which she filed on 22 December 2025, provides a curious explanation.
2. The mother denies, through her counsel, creating the letter. However, a number of matters in relation to that letter concern me. Firstly, it would seem that having become aware of the circulation of the letter, the mother took no steps to have the letter withdrawn from circulation. Certainly, the mother knew about the existence of the letter, because she makes an assertion that the father hacked her email system and was able to locate the said letter. Further, the letter contains reference to matters which only the mother or her agents, or persons close to her could have known. For example, it refers to the operation of my orders, made on 8 August 2025, and the children's hospitalisation in the paediatric ward of the Y Hospital.
3. The letter also refers to other matters, which only the mother or those closely associated with her could have known. I find it difficult to believe that the mother did not have a hand in drafting the letter, or at the very least, a hand in its distribution. I also note that at various places in the letter, references are made to the children's "trauma and isolation", and references are also made to a failure of the family law system, due to the children's inability to see their friends, attend at school or have any contact with their mother. Those criticisms might be a matter for another day.
4. I also refer to the events of 22 August 2025, wherein it appears that a friend of the mother or an agent of the mother was communicating with children via social media in breach of my injunction.[26] The effect of the communication dated 22 August 2025 is that the children can do whatever they wish so as to, for want of a better phrase and escape the operation of the orders made by me on 8 August 2025. In fact, the communication provides the children with tangible steps, which they might be able to take to avoid living in the primary care of the father.
5. For all these reasons, I consider that the orders made on 8 August 2025 must be reconsidered, and that such a reconsideration is in the children's best interests. In any event, and even if I had not arrived at that conclusion myself, the mother's counsel advised me today that by reason of the application brought by the father and the father's breach of orders made by me for parental responsibility with respect to the children's schooling, it behoved the court to revisit the competing applications in any event.
6. When making parenting orders, the best interest of the children is the paramount consideration. When considering the best interest of the children, I am required to have regard to the matters set out in s 60CC of the Act. I am also required to apply s 60CG of the Act, which provides:

(1) In considering what order to make, the court must, to the extent that it is possible to do so consistently with the child's best interest being the paramount consideration, ensure that the order:

(a) is consistent with any family violence order; and

(b) does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence.

1. Significant risk issues are raised on the evidence before me.
2. The approach to be taken to contentious issues of risk at an interim hearing is summarised in the following authoritative extracts, which make clear that serious allegations cannot be ignored at an interim hearing just because they are contested and untested, and that a cautious approach must be taken when considering issues of risk. As the Full Court observed in Franklyn & Franklyn [2019] FamCAFC 256:

In interlocutory hearings, to the extent it is possible, judges are enjoined to make decisions about interim orders based on agreed facts, less contentious evidence and inferences which fairly arise, but decisions must still be made despite contentious evidence. Judges are obliged to act on the strength of the evidence presented, and, if it is relatively weak or entitled, to treat it as so.[27]

(citations omitted)

1. I refer to similar extracts in SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 wherein it was observed that:

The intuition involved in decision-making concerning children is arguably of even greater importance when a judge is obliged to make interim decisions following a hearing at which time constraints prevent the evidence being tested. Apart from relying upon the uncontroversial or agreed facts, a judge will sometimes have little alternative than to weigh the probabilities of competing claims and the likely impact on children in the event that a controversial assertion is acted upon or rejected. It is not always feasible when dealing with the immediate welfare of children simply to ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue.[28]

1. I also refer to the decision of the Full Court in Deiter & Deiter [2011] FamCAFC 82 at [61]:

The assessment of risk is one of the many burdens placed on family law decision makers. Risk assessment comprises two elements - the first requires prediction of the likelihood of the occurrence of harmful events, and the second requires consideration of the severity of the impact caused by those events. In our view, the assessment of risk in cases involving the welfare of children cannot be postponed until the last piece of evidence is given and tested, and the last submission is made. We accept, however, that it is always a question of degree depending on the evidence that is before the Court.[29]

1. And I further refer to the Full Court in Marvel & Marvel (No 2) [2010] FamCAFC 101; (2010) 43 Fam LR 348 at [120] wherein the Court said as follows:

As has frequently been emphasised interim parenting proceedings, and orders made as a consequence, are a necessary but temporary measure until all the evidence can be tested, evaluated and weighed at a final hearing by the making of final parenting orders. Decisions judicial officers have to make in interim proceedings are difficult and, often for very good reason, a conservative approach, or one which is likely to avoid harm to a child is adopted. This is often to the understandable distress of a party who may not achieve the outcome he or she desires, or thinks to be in the best interests of their child or children.[30]

1. I have summarised above my concerns in relation to the mother's behaviour. Insofar as the mother's counsel asserts that the father represents a risk to children, and insofar as the mother continues to believe that the father represents such a risk, I note that the Department has, by letter addressed to the parties dated 10 October 2025, identified that the children are safe in the care of the father.[31]
2. Indeed, the letter attached to the father's affidavit of 15 December 2025 says as follows, in part:

Department of Communities and Justice began working with your family in August 2025 after reported concerns for psychological harm, sexual harm and parental risk factor and mental health were received for [the children]. As part of the process, a field assessment was completed, which included three safety assessments, a family-based assessment, and an in Need of Care and Protection Assessment. The outcome for all three assessments was safe, and the outcome of the family-based assessment indicated that [the children] are not in need of care and protection, and that intervention by the Department of Communities and Justice is not necessary.[32]

1. It is important to me that when determining whether the children were safe in the care of the father, the Department made efforts to include the voices of the children. That much is clear from the following extract:

The priority throughout any child protection assessment is the welfare of the children, as such maintaining a child focused, fair and balanced approach to reports received. DCJ believe that, at this time, this has been conducted in the most appropriate way to include the voices of [the children] as well as the voice of [the father], the mother, the network and information from trusted sources.[33]

1. The Department went on to say that "there is necessary support in place for [the children] to receive emotional supports".[34] I have also had the benefit of reading materials returned by the Department of Communities and Justice pursuant to a s 67ZBE order, which again identifies that the children, at this juncture, are safe in the care of the father.[35] I am very concerned that if I allow the children to transition to the mother's care as so sought by the mother and as permitted by the operation of my primary orders, the mother will again inculcate in the minds of the children a narrative that their father presents a risk to them.
2. Indeed, there is nothing from the mother's actions since 8 August 2025, as I have summarised above, which might cause me to conclude that the mother has reflected on her behaviour. As I say, and if anything, I am concerned that the mother's behaviour has escalated. I am also concerned, given the mother's apparent inability to comply with my orders, that the mother's behaviour will further escalate such that the children are not returned to the father's care in one weeks' time as Order 11 of the orders made on 8 August 2025 would permit.
3. Clearly, it is not in the children's best interest to be subjected to litigation or to be subjected to a recovery order, which would likely issue if the mother found herself unwilling or unable to comply with the terms of my orders. I also have regard to a report which was prepared by Ms M, namely, the psychologist assisting the children and the father to repair and reunify their relationship[36] Her potential involvement with the children was subject of extensive consideration at trial and on balance, I formed a view that the father would be able to take a child-focused approach to family therapy.
4. The effect of my judgment is that the father had the necessary skills and ability to engage an appropriate professional. He has done so. It is regrettable in the extreme that Ms M was unable to commence her therapy until 1 November 2025. The reasons why she has not done so have been inadequately explained. In any event, Ms M's report causes me concern for two reasons. Firstly, the expert expresses concern that the children and the father will not be able to "solidify their learning if the therapy program is not completed before they return into their mother's care".
5. The expert says:

Doing so will put them at risk of returning to influences and beliefs that are not in their best interest. It would countermand the positive work they have done and could undermine the court's orders.[37]

1. The expert also raises concern that if the mother does not seek therapy or engage with the expert in the way that the Family Report and the Court have recommended, it will put the children's well-being and progress in repairing their relationship with the father at risk. Ordinarily, I might have been prepared to ignore the warnings of an expert. However, the warnings of the expert cause me alarm when I have regard to the chronology identified above and the steps which the mother has taken in the period subsequent to the delivery of my judgment to interfere with and undermine my orders.
2. If I did not say so in my primary judgment, it was my impression that the mother is a very smart lady. She must have understood the terms of my orders. They are written in plain English. I do not understand why the mother considers it is appropriate to continue to act in the manner which she does.
3. I am not able to deal with the issues in relation to the children's schooling today given my competing commitments in a final defended hearing and noting that it is now 5.40pm on Christmas Eve. I have done the best I can in the short time frame in which these applications have come to my attention. The question of the children's schooling will need to await further determination. With respect to the topic of parental responsibility, my orders of course provided that from the commencement of the Christmas school holiday periods, the mother was to have sole decision-making for all major long-term issues as defined in s 4(1) of the Act except for matters pertaining to the children's health and the children's name. Given the orders I am about to pronounce, I no longer consider that order to be feasible.

I certify that the preceding fifty-three (53) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Anderson.

[1]. Rice & Asplund (1979) 6 Fam LR 570; [1978] FamCA 84.

[2] SPS & PLS [2008] FLC 93-363, [84].

[3] Radecki & Radecki [2024] FedCFamC1A 246; (2024) 70 Fam LR 172 at [126].

[26] Father's affidavit filed 15 December 2025, paragraph 22.

[27] Franklyn & Franklyn [2019] FamCAFC 256, [73].

[28] SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 at [100].

[29] Deiter & Deiter [2011] FamCAFC 82 at [61].

[30] Marvel & Marvel (No 2) [2010] FamCAFC 101; (2010) 43 Fam LR 348 at [120].

[36] Report dated 10 December 2025 and referred to at Annexure E to the Father's affidavit filed on 15 December 2025.

[37] Report dated 10 December 2025 and referred to at Annexure E to the Father's affidavit filed on 15 December 2025.