Caravan Parks and Camping Grounds Regulations 1997 (WA), s 34(1)(b)(ii)

Residential Parks (Long-stay Tenants) Act 2006 (WA), s 3, s 5, s 68(2)

State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 9, s 46(1), s 87, s 87(1), s 87(2), s 87(3), s 88, s 88(1), s 88(2), s 89, Div 5

Chew and Director General of the Department of Education and Training [2006] WASAT 248

McLerie and Koleszko [2014] WASAT 160 (S)

Medical Board of Western Australia and Kyi [2009] WASAT 22

Western Australian Planning Commission v Questdale Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 32

1. Holiday Park Pty Ltd (Holiday Park)[1] is the park operator of the Collie River Valley Tourist Park[2] (Collie River Park) pursuant to s 3 of the Residential Parks (Long-stay Tenants) Act 2006 (WA) (RP Act), and as such, is the grantor of the right of occupancy to Mr Martin. There is a long-stay agreement in place between Holiday Park and Mr Martin, as is required by s 5 of the RP Act.
2. On 6 November 2025, Holiday Park commenced proceedings in the Tribunal under s 68(2) of the RP Act seeking an order for the vacant possession by Mr Martin of Property Location L36454 Porter Street. The reason for seeking intervention by the Tribunal is because, after conducting an audit of on-site structures and hard annexes at Collie River Park, Holiday Park found they did not have a copy of the relevant permit issued by the Shire of Collie for Mr Martin's caravan annexe as required by s 34(1)(b)(ii) of the Caravan Parks and Camping Grounds Regulations 1997 (WA) (Caravan Park Regulations). That section relevantly requires:
   1. Annexes

(1) A person may attach an annexe, or cause an annexe to be attached, to a caravan in a facility only with the prior written approval of -

(ii) the local government, in accordance with regulation 35.

1. At the first directions hearing, Mr Martin informed the Tribunal that he has a copy of the permit/authority issued by the Shire of Collie for his caravan annexe (permit). Orders were made for Mr Martin to file a copy of that permit with the Tribunal and to provide a copy to Holiday Park. On 17 December 2025, Mr Martin filed the permit (building licence 2010186 dated 9 November 2010).
2. Subsequently, on 29 December 2025, having received the permit, Holiday Park sought leave of the Tribunal to withdraw its application. Leave was granted by the Tribunal on 30 December 2025 and the proceeding was withdrawn pursuant to s 46(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act). In addition, Holiday Park seeks an order from the Tribunal requiring Mr Martin to pay its costs of $166 being the filing fee of the application to the Tribunal.
3. On 30 December 2025 the Tribunal made orders for Holiday Park to file a schedule of costs claimed in sufficient detail to enable the Tribunal to assess and fix any costs which might be awarded, together with any supporting documents and written submissions addressing the basis upon which they contend costs should be awarded. Mr Martin was invited to file written submissions opposing the application for costs by 30 January 2026. Mr Martin did not file any written submissions with the Tribunal.

1. The only issue for my determination is whether, in the particular circumstances or realities of this case, it is fair and reasonable that the party claiming its costs, Holiday Park, should be reimbursed for the expenses claimed, and if so, in what amount? Holiday Park has the burden or onus of establishing that it is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the case for it to be awarded an amount against Mr Martin.
2. For the reasons set out below, it is fair and reasonable in all of the particular circumstances or realities of this case to make a final order under s 87(2) of the SAT Act that requires Mr Martin to pay to Holiday Park costs fixed in the amount of $166 within 30 days of the order, or some other timeframe as agreed in writing by the parties. The orders are set out later in these reasons (see below following [36]).

1. In its application, Holiday Park states:[3]

We have lodged [a] withdraw form against Mr Martin as he has finally produce[d] the [S]hire permit for the hard annex that is attached to his caravan on the 16/12/2025.

We asked Mr Martin in writing for a [S]hire permit 12/08/2025 in which he did not produce.

He responded to our breach notices dated 12/09/2025 & 01/10/2025. Mr Martin responded with an email dated 12/08/2025 but still failed to produce a [S]hire permit.

We then issued Mr Martin with a termination notice dated 27/10/2025 in which he failed to produce the [S]hire permit.

Mr Martin failed to produce the permit to the office and or by email until after the SAT [directions] hearing.

We feel Mr Martin had the permit the entire time and just played us by not either emailing, posting the permit to us or coming to the office and giving us the permit.

We are seeking our costs/fees from Mr Martin that we paid for the SAT application which is a total of $166.00.

We feel we are entitled to the application fees as Mr Martin had more than ample time to produce the [S]shire permit.

1. In summary, Holiday Park submits that it is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this case for Mr Martin to be ordered to pay them $166.
2. No written submissions were filed with the Tribunal by Mr Martin.

1. Division 5 of the SAT Act is comprised of s 87 to s 89 and is headed 'Costs'.
2. As a starting point, each party should expect to pay their own costs in the proceeding before the Tribunal in circumstances where there is a genuine dispute under the RP Act. However, that does not exclude the possibility of an award of costs by the Tribunal: s 87(1) of the SAT Act. For example, where a party conducts itself in such a way to unnecessarily prolong the hearing or acts unreasonably or inappropriately, the Tribunal may decide that the justice of the case supports moving away from the starting point.[4]
3. The term 'costs of a proceeding' is defined in s 88(1) of the SAT Act to mean the costs of, or incidental to, a proceeding of the Tribunal, other than costs of a party. Section 88(2) of the SAT Act provides that the Tribunal may order all or any of the costs of a proceeding be paid by a party.
4. The power for the Tribunal to make an order for one party to pay all or any of another party's costs which includes an amount to compensate the other party for any expenses, loss, inconvenience or embarrassment resulting from the proceeding or the matter because of which the proceeding was brought is found in s 87(2) and 87(3) of the SAT Act, subject to the contrary in the relevant enabling Act. In this case, the enabling Act is the RP Act and it does not limit the Tribunal's powers to award costs.
5. If the Tribunal makes an order for the payment of costs and does not fix the amount of costs, that amount is to be assessed or settled in accordance with the rules (s 89 of the SAT Act).
6. The leading authority on the exercise of the discretion conferred upon the Tribunal to make orders for the payment of the costs is the decision of the Court of Appeal in Western Australian Planning Commission v Questdale Holdings Pty Ltd [2016] WASCA 32 (Questdale).
7. In considering the exercise of the discretion conferred upon the Tribunal under the SAT Act, Murphy JA made the following observations in Questdale at [49] to [62]:
   1. Although s 87(2) does not in terms say that the discretion is to be exercised if it is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case to do so, the judicial nature of the exercise and the scheme of the SAT Act indicates that, broadly speaking, that is the legislative intention.
   2. ... the 'important principle commonly referred to as the "usual order as to costs", under which the successful party is prima facie entitled to his or her costs, has no application given the presumptive position or starting point under s 87(1) of the SAT Act that each party is to bear its own costs'.
   3. Section 87(2) is to be construed in the context that the legal rationale for an order for costs is not to punish the person against whom the order is made, but to compensate or reimburse the person in whose favour it is made. That rationale is evident in s 87(3) of the SAT Act. Accordingly, even in a statutory context where the presumptive position is that no costs will be ordered, generally speaking, the question is whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, it is fair and reasonable that a party should be reimbursed for the costs it incurred. The onus is on the party seeking an order in its favour.

1. ... the nature of the dispute, ... is a relevant consideration.
2. ... every party to proceedings before the Tribunal is, ... taken to be cognisant of the Tribunal's objectives in s 9 of the SAT Act. ... [I]t will be relevant to consider whether and to what extent the [party] can establish that the [other party's] conduct in connection with the proceedings has impaired the attainment of the Tribunal's objectives to have the proceedings determined fairly and in accordance with the substantial merits, with as little formality and technicality as possible, and in a way which minimises the costs to the parties.
3. Nevertheless, the mere fact that a [party] ultimately fails on some contention or contentions advanced at [the hearing] would not, in itself, signify that it has acted inconsistently with the objectives in s 9. That is particularly so in the context that under s 46, s 47 and s 48 of the SAT Act, plainly unmeritorious claims, or claims made or pursued in circumstances which, broadly speaking, may be characterised as involving misconduct, may be screened out before the final hearing. The Tribunal in such circumstances may act on its own volition or on the application of a party.

1. The nature of the dispute for determination, ... will be a factor in the exercise of discretion under s 87(2) ... That is not in recognition of a rule that costs follow the event. Rather, it is a recognition that, generally speaking, the legislative purpose will be served by 'the claimant ... [receiving] his reasonable costs of obtaining the compensation that is, ex hypothesi, his due'. Even there, however, it would remain relevant to consider whether it would be fair and reasonable for the 'successful' [party] to be deprived of its costs, or part of its costs, in all the circumstances of the case, including having regard to the matters referred to earlier.
2. The above observations proceed on the basis that there is no offer that the Tribunal is obliged to consider pursuant to s 87(5) of the SAT Act and r 42 of the SAT Rules. Where r 42 applies, the weight to be given to that mandatory consideration will be a matter for the Tribunal in each case. On the one hand, its importance as a factor is informed by the evident legislative intent that, where possible, parties to proceedings should endeavour to consider settlement ...

1. The above observations are not intended to provide an exhaustive statement of the considerations which should, or may or may not, be taken into account under s 87(2) of the SAT Act in proceedings[.]
2. In McLerie and Koleszko [2014] WASAT 160 (S), the Tribunal set out additional factors that might contribute to the Tribunal making of a costs order as follows at [3]:

1. where a party conducts itself unreasonably, particularly where the conduct leads to unnecessary costs to the other party;
2. where a party has conducted itself inappropriately, particularly where the conduct leads to unnecessary costs to the other party;

1. where credibility of evidence is at the heart of a matter;

1. where the application undermines the integrity of proceedings under the relevant Act;
2. where the case is weak, being incredible or implausible or obviously unmeritorious;
3. where a party has to embark in proceedings to vindicate its clear contractual entitlement;
4. the circumstances of the case having regard to the above, or other factors, are such that the justice of the case supports moving away from the initial position that each party should bear their own costs[.]

1. The above observations from Questdale and summary from McLerie is a non-exhaustive range of factors and there may be other relevant factors for the Tribunal to take into account which point to the justice of the case requiring an award of costs.
2. In conclusion, the Tribunal takes a pragmatic approach in framing the costs order and this will naturally involve an impression and evaluation of not only the importance of the matters but also the time occupied and ambit of the submissions. However, it is unrealistic to expect mathematical precision in deciding what amount to award for costs.
3. I turn now to consider the circumstances of this case including the nature of the dispute, the conduct of the parties in order to determine whether or not it is fair and reasonable in all of the circumstances or realities of this case to exercise the Tribunal's discretionary power under s 87(2) of the SAT Act to make an award for costs in favour of Holiday Park, and if so, in what amount.

Exercise of Tribunal's discretion under s 87(2) of the SAT Act

1. A relevant consideration to the Tribunal's exercise of its discretion to make an order under Div 5 of the SAT Act, is the nature of the dispute. In considering the nature of the dispute this will require a consideration of the history of the dispute as well as the complexity of the dispute.
2. The history of the dispute and the dispute itself is not complex. The dispute dates back to 12 August 2025 when Holiday Park wrote to Mr Martin informing him they had completed an audit of all the sites at the Collie River Park and noted that they did not have a copy of a building permit for his caravan annexe in their records and requested that he provide a copy. On the same date, Mr Martin replied with the following unhelpful response, in part:

A copy of the documents were given to the park at the time of building, so if they have been lost then it is your responsibility to get another copy from the [S]hire.

1. As Mr Martin failed to provide the permit, this resulted in Holiday Park issuing to Mr Martin a default notice for other breach of a long-stay agreement and then subsequently a notice to terminate for other breach of agreement.
2. As Mr Martin had the permit (dated 9 November 2010) it was not reasonable for him to require Holiday Park to go to the expense of commencing the proceeding in the Tribunal.

1. The conduct of parties to the proceeding is also a relevant consideration to the Tribunal's exercise of its discretion to make an order for costs. In this regard, it is necessary to consider, whether, and to what extent a party has established that the conduct of the other party has impaired the attainment of the Tribunal's objectives as set out in s 9 of the SAT Act. That is, to have the proceedings determined fairly and in accordance with the substantial merits, speedily and with as little formality and technicality as possible, and in a way which minimises the costs to the parties.
2. Both Holiday Park and Mr Martin are self-represented parties.
3. The dispute has been in the Tribunal approximately three months. The matter was promptly resolved at the first directions hearing on 12 December 2025 when Mr Martin informed the Tribunal that he had the permit and would provide it to Holiday Park. He promptly did so on 17 December 2025. Holiday Park then promptly sought leave of the Tribunal to withdraw their application on 29 December 2025.
4. While both parties promptly complied with the orders of the Tribunal, Mr Martin's conduct caused Holiday Park to incur expense in making the application to the Tribunal in circumstances where Mr Martin had the permit and could have provided it at the time it was requested in or about August 2025.

1. As already stated, and repeated here, in assessing costs under Div 5 of the SAT Act, the Tribunal takes a relatively broadbrush approach as a matter of impression and without any attempt at mathematic precision. In doing so, the costs awarded are compensatory and not punitive.
2. It is well understood that costs do not follow the event in the proceeding in the Tribunal and that the broad discretion conferred on the Tribunal is to be properly exercised.
3. In assessing what is fair and reasonable as to what amount, if any, to be awarded against Mr Martin in favour of Holiday Park, I have had regard to:

(c) the conduct of Holiday Park and Mr Martin in the proceeding; and

(e) the outcome where Holiday Park was ultimately successful.

1. The nature of the dispute weighs in favour of an award of costs against Mr Martin under s 87(2) of the SAT Act. Mr Martin's actions necessitated Holiday Park expending time and effort in issuing the default notice, the termination notice and then making the application to the Tribunal. All of which could have been avoided if Martin provided a copy of the permit as requested in or about August 2025.
2. The conduct of Mr Martin impaired the attainment of the Tribunal objectives, as set out in s 9 of the SAT Act, which weighs in favour of an award of costs against Mr Martin under s 87(2) of the SAT Act. In particular, it was unreasonable for Mr Martin to require Holiday Park to pursue their application in the Tribunal. There is no basis for Mr Martin challenging Holiday Park's request for the permit in circumstances where Mr Martin had the permit and could have provided it to Holiday Park before they made the application to the Tribunal on 6 November 2025.

1. On balance, in my view, taking into consideration all the circumstances of this case including the conduct of the parties and the nature of the dispute, the legislative purpose of the SAT Act will be served by Holiday Park receiving their costs under s 87(2) of the SAT Act.
2. As already stated, but repeated here, in fixing costs, the Tribunal does not subject the costs to a detailed scrutiny. Rather, taking a relatively broadbrush, flexible and pragmatic approach in framing the costs order, looking at the realities of the case, and as a matter of impression and without any attempt at mathematical precision, I am satisfied, in assessing what is fair and reasonable in this case, with the overriding consideration to do justice between the parties, that the filing fee of $166 ought to be recovered by Holiday Park from Mr Martin pursuant to s 87(2) of the SAT Act within 30 days of these orders, or as otherwise agreed in writing by the parties.

1. The name of the applicant is corrected to Holiday Park Pty Ltd.
2. Pursuant to s 87(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), the respondent must pay to the applicant costs fixed in the amount of $166 to be paid within 30 days of these orders, or some other timeframe as agreed in writing by the parties.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

[1] The name of the applicant is corrected to Holiday Park Pty Ltd (from Bianca La Bianca). Ms La Bianca is the sole director of Holiday Park.

[2] Collier River Park was sold on or about 16 January 2026. Until it was sold, Ms La Bianca operated it with Mr Tony Verzini.

[3] Application for costs filed 29 December 2025.

[4] See for example Chew and Director General of the Department of Education and Training [2006] WASAT 248 at [85] and Medical Board of Western Australia and Kyi [2009] WASAT 22 at [73] to [74].