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[2026] NSWCATAD 322
General information, not legal advice.
NCAT Administrative and Equal Opportunity
2026-10-26
EA MacIntyre, Senior Member
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: HKU v The Hon Yasmin Maree Catley [2026] NSWCATAD 322
Hearing dates: 18 September 2026
Date of orders: 26 October 2026
Decision date: 26 October 2026
Jurisdiction: Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division
Before: EA MacIntyre, Senior Member
Decision: (1) Application dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
(2) Pursuant to s 64(1)(a) and (c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), the disclosure of the name of the Applicant or reference to any information, picture or other material that identifies the Applicant or is likely to lead to the identification of the Applicant is prohibited.
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - reviewable decision - conduct - jurisdiction - privacy - “public sector agency” - Member of Parliament - Civil and Administrative Tribunal
Legislation Cited: Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW)
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW)
Government Sector Audit Act 1983 (NSW)
Government Sector Audit Regulation 2021 (NSW)
Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (NSW)
Members of Parliament Staff Act 2013 (NSW) Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW)
Cases Cited: EHG v The Hon Yasmin Catley MP [2025] NSWCATAD 176
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24
Texts Cited: Nil
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: HKU (Applicant)
The Hon Yasmin Maree Catley (Respondent)
Representation: Applicant (Self represented)
D Birch, Crown Solicitor (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2026/00102917
Publication restriction: Pursuant to s 64(1)(a) and (c) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), the disclosure of the names of the Applicant or reference to any information, picture or other material that identifies the Applicant or is likely to lead to the identification of the Applicant is prohibited.
This is an application pursuant to the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) (“PPIP Act”) seeking remedies for alleged breaches arising from certain disclosure of personal information of HKU, the applicant in these proceedings (“Applicant”).
The alleged disclosure was made by the respondent in these proceedings, the Hon Yasmin Maree Catley MP (“Respondent”).
The Respondent was a member of the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales and a Minister at all relevant times.
The Applicant was a constituent of the seat held by the Respondent in the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales.
In early 2024, the Respondent had engaged with the Applicant by undertaking certain advocacy for the Applicant concerning a dispute between the Applicant and her former employer.
On 12 January 2024, the Respondent sent a letter to the Hon Sophie Cotsis MP who was the Minister for Industrial Relations at the time, making representations on behalf of the Applicant. The representations included a request that the conduct of the Applicant's employer be investigated and the relevant matter reviewed.
The Respondent is alleged to have disclosed personal information about the Applicant to the Minister for Industrial Relations.
In October 2025, the Applicant made what she said was an application for internal review of the Respondent’s conduct under s 53 of the PPIP Act. The Applicant alleged unlawful use of her personal information. The Applicant in particular said that her identity had been “stolen” by the Respondent. In circumstances involving an application under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW), the Respondent was recorded as the contact person for a reference number that the Applicant considered to be the reference number for her complaint with her employer.
On 12 March 2026, the Applicant lodged an application for administrative review in the Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“Tribunal”). In her application, the Applicant referred to a failure to conduct an internal review under s 53 of the PPIP Act, a failure to notify the IPC and the conduct on the part of the Respondent about which the Applicant complained. This is the application for administrative review before the Tribunal in these proceedings.
The hearing of these proceedings took place on 14 September 2026. The Applicant appeared in person and represented herself. The Respondent was represented by Counsel.
The Privacy Commissioner was represented at the hearing by their solicitor.
The evidence before the Tribunal included the evidence of Mr Mark Webb. Mr Webb was Chief Executive of the New South Wales Department of Parliamentary Services and has held that role since 2016. He gave evidence concerning audits and the finances of Members of Parliament in New South Wales.
The questions for determination are;
whether the Respondent’s conduct in issue was in her capacity as a Member of Parliament, as a Minister or otherwise;
if her conduct was as a Member of Parliament, whether the relevant conduct was conduct of a “public sector agency” within the meaning of the PPIP Act and reviewable as such under Part 5 of the PPIP Act; and
whether the application for review in these proceedings has been made on time?
The Applicant said that she understood the Respondent to both be the Member of Parliament representing her and a Minister. She said that she believed she had approached the Respondent in her capacity as a Minister. She said that she believed that she was dealing with personnel of the Respondent at her electoral office acting as representatives of a Minister. I accept that this is what the Applicant believed.
The evidence included a letter from the Respondent to Minister Cotsis dated 12 January 2024. The letterhead described the Respondent as: “Yasmin Catley MP Member for Swansea”. The signature block in the letter described the Respondent as:
“The Hon. Yasmin Catley MP
Member for Swansea
Minister for Police and Counter-Terrorism”
The letter of 12 January 2024 said that the Respondent was writing on behalf of the Applicant who had “contacted my office regarding an ongoing Safe Work matter”. It referred to a dispute between the Applicant and her former employer regarding “unlawful discrimination, workplace mobbing and denial of natural justice”.
The evidence also included a letter in reply addressed to the Respondent from Minister Cotsis dated 2 May 2024. It was addressed to the Respondent as “Member for Swansea”, “Minister for Police and Counter-Terrorism” and “Minister for the Hunter”. The letter described the Respondent’s representations on behalf of the Applicant and the outcome of her complaint against her former employer.
There was also other correspondence in evidence that included a description of the Respondent as a Minister, including an email from Safe Work dated 17 April 2024.
While the letter sent by the Respondent dated 12 January 2024 was on her letterhead as a Member of Parliament, her signature block also described her as a Minister for Police and Counter-Terrorism. The response she received from Minister Cotsis likewise addressed her in her capacity as “Member for Swansea” and also “Minister for Police and Counter-Terrorism” and “Minister for the Hunter”.
I do not think that the Respondent’s signature block, letterhead or the capacity in which she was addressed by Minister Cotsis or anyone else are of material assistance in making a determination of the capacity in which the Respondent was acting when dealing with the Applicant’s affairs. It may be open to infer that the sending of the relevant letter to Minister Cotsis on her letterhead as a Member of Parliament allows for a conclusion that she was acting in her capacity as a Member of Parliament. However, in circumstances where she was also described as a Minister, the particular letterhead the Respondent used, though relevant, cannot carry significant weight.
Equally, the point of contact used by the Applicant to communicate with the Respondent cannot determine the question of the capacity in which the Respondent was acting. That point of contact was the Respondent’s electoral office.
The workings of government can be complex and difficult for a member of the public to navigate, particularly when the person whom a member of the public approaches carries out multiple functions within government. In these circumstances, the particular place or the means by which a member of the public makes contact with government should not carry much weight in making a determination of the capacity in which the person was acting after being approached by a member of the public.
The determination of the question, in my opinion, must turn on first identifying the subject matter the Respondent was handling and then considering what particular function of the Respondent captured that subject matter.
The subject of the correspondence and other communications in evidence was a workplace dispute between the Applicant and her former employer, including the Applicant’s allegations of discrimination and workplace mobbing. These were not, on the evidence, matters that fell within the Respondent’s portfolio of Police and Counter-Terrorism. The Applicant made allegations of potential criminal conduct. However, without further evidence as to the alleged criminality, I find no basis to conclude that the relevant subject matter involved the Respondent’s portfolio of Police and Counter-Terrorism.
At the time of the reply from Minister Cotsis, the Respondent was also described as holding the portfolio of Minister for the Hunter. The evidence does not reveal that the subject matter of the Applicant’s specific complaints involved affairs of the Hunter region. The complaints were about a particular dispute with her former employer.
In my opinion, the conduct of the Respondent and her staff in addressing the Applicant’s affairs did not fall within any particular Ministerial portfolio held by the Respondent. This is so even if the Applicant believed she was dealing with the Respondent in her capacity as a Minister. The dealings in issue are better described as concerning the affairs of a particular constituent, namely a dispute between the constituent and the constituent’s former employer, about which they approached their local member for assistance.
The capacity in which the Respondent’s staff were acting when dealing with the Applicant, also bears relevance to the determination of whether the conduct in issue involved the functions of a Member of Parliament or Ministerial functions. I find that the staff dealing with the Applicant’s affairs were staff at the Respondent’s office in her electorate. They were not, on the evidence, employed as Ministerial staff nor carrying out functions of the Respondent as a Minister.
I am satisfied in these circumstances that the Respondent was dealing with the Applicant in her capacity as a Member of Parliament.
The next question for determination is whether the Respondent was a “public sector agency” when acting in her capacity as a Member of Parliament in dealing with the Applicant's complaints. She must fall within the description of “public sector agency” before the Tribunal can have jurisdiction to hear the Applicant’s administrative review application.
The Respondent submitted that the conduct in issue involved the Respondent acting in her capacity as a Member of Parliament and not as Minister. The Respondent said that in these circumstances, the Respondent was not a “public service agency” whose conduct was subject to review under the PPIP Act.
Under s 28 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (“NCAT Act”), the “Tribunal has such jurisdiction and functions as may be conferred or imposed on it”. Section 30 goes on to say that the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) (“ADR Act”) provides for the circumstances in which the Tribunal has administrative review jurisdiction over a decision of an administrator.
Sections 53 and 55 of the PPIP Act confer or impose on the Tribunal certain jurisdiction and functions within the meaning of s 30 of the NCAT Act. Section 53 allows for an application for internal review in respect of relevant conduct of a “public sector agency”. If the person seeking review is not satisfied, the Tribunal has jurisdiction under s 55(1) of the PPIP Act for administrative review of the relevant conduct of the particular “public sector agency”.
The question, in these circumstances, is whether the conduct the subject of the present proceedings is that of a “public sector agency”. In other words, the question is whether the Respondent in her capacity as a Member of Parlialment or the office serving her as a Member of Parliament, are a “public sector agency”. If not, the Tribunal cannot have jurisdiction under s 55 of the PPIP Act to hear the application before it.
What is a “public sector agency” is defined in s 3 of the PPIP Act. It says:
“public sector agency means any of the following—
(a) a Public Service agency or the Teaching Service,
(a1) the office of a political office holder within the meaning of the Members of Parliament Staff Act 2013, being the office comprising the persons employed by the political office holder under Part 2 of that Act,
(b) a statutory body representing the Crown,
(c) (Repealed)
(d) an auditable entity within the meaning of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 or any other entity within the meaning of that Act (or entity of a kind) prescribed by the regulations, but excluding an entity (or entity of a kind) prescribed by the regulations,
(e) the NSW Police Force,
(e1) (Repealed)
(f) a local government authority,
(f1) a State owned corporation that is not subject to the Privacy Act 1988 of the Commonwealth,
(g) a person or body that—
(I) provides data services (being services relating to the collection, processing, disclosure or use of personal information or that provide for access to such information) for or on behalf of a body referred to in paragraph (a)–(f1) of this definition, or that receives funding from any such body in connection with providing data services, and
(ii) is prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this definition.
Note—
Section 4B enables the regulations to declare that a public sector agency is to be regarded as being part of another public sector agency for the purposes of this Act. It also enables the regulations to declare that a part of a public sector agency is to be regarded as being a separate public sector agency from the public sector agency of which it forms part for the purposes of this Act”.
Paragraph (a1) of the definition of “public sector agency” captures the office of a “political office holder” within the meaning of the Members of Parliament Staff Act 2013 (NSW) (“MPS Act”). This must be an “office comprising the persons employed by the political office holder” under Part 2 of that Act.
Section 3 of the MPS Act defines a “political office holder” to mean:
“(a) a Minister, or
(b) the Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly, or
(c) the holder of a Parliamentary office in respect of which a determination under section 4 is in force”.
The Respondent was a “Minister” at all relevant times and in that capacity, is a “political office holder”. A Member of Parliament, however, does not fall within the definition of “political office holder”. As a consequence, the Respondent did not, by reason only of being a Minister, answer the description of a “political office holder” when she was acting in her capacity as a Member of Parliament.
Nor has it been shown that the Respondent was a holder of a Parliamentary office in respect of which a determination under s 4 of the MPS Act was in force. Additionally, the Respondent was not the Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly. It follows that the Respondent, to the extent that she has acted as a Member of Parliament, is not a “political office holder”.
The consequence is that the Respondent’s office, comprising those employed to serve her as a Member of Parliament, is not an “office” that falls within paragraph (a1) of the definition of “public sector agency”. This is because paragraph (a1) relevantly captures the “office of a political office holder”. These words, in my opinion, do not include an office comprising people employed to serve the Respondent in a capacity other than as a “political office holder”.
The question then arises as to whether the Respondent is an “auditable entity” within the meaning of paragraph (d) of the definition of “public sector agency”. This is a concept that captures an “auditable agency” within the meaning of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 (NSW) (“GSA Act”) or any other entity within the meaning of that Act (or entity of a kind) prescribed by the regulations.
Section 4 of the GSA Act says:
“auditable entity means each of the following—
(a) a GSF agency (whether or not a reporting GSF agency),
(b) a university or any of its controlled entities (within the meaning of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018),
(c) any other entity—
(a) the financial reports or statements of which are subject to audit by the Auditor-General under this Act, the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 or any other Act, or
(ii) that is prescribed by the regulations to be an auditable entity”.
What is a “GSF agency” is defined in s 4 of the GSA Act to have the same meaning as in the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (NSW) (“GSF Act”). Section 2.4 of the GSF Act defines a “GSF Agency” to mean various specified entities. It was not shown that a Member of Parliament fell within any relevant category within s 2.4 of the GSF Act.
Section 2.4(4) of the GSF Act expressly provides that a “GSF agency” does not include the “Legislature of New South Wales”. It was not in dispute that the Respondent as a Member of Parliament belonged to the Legislature of New South Wales. However, given that a Member of Parliament does not, in any event, fall within s 2.4 as a GSF agency, I do not need to consider whether an individual Member of Parliament as such, is excluded from being a GSF agency by the words “Legislature of New South Wales”.
The Government Sector Audit Regulation 2021 (NSW) does not prescribe a Member of Parliament to be an “auditable entity” for the purposes of paragraph (c)(ii) of the definition of “auditable entity”.
The question remains as to whether a Member of Parliament is an entity within the meaning of paragraph (c)(in) of the definition of “auditable entity” whose financial reports or statements are subject to audit by the Auditor-General under the GSA Act, the GSF Act or any other Act.
Part 7 of the GSF Act sets out provisions for financial reporting and preparing financial statements. These provisions apply to a “GSF agency” including any relevant “reporting GSF agencies”. For the reasons set out at [42] above, a Member of Parliament is not a “GSF agency”.
There was no legislation relating to audits other than the GSA Act, GSF Act and Government Sector Audit Regulation 2021 (NSW) put before the Tribunal. There was in particular no legislation before the Tribunal that required financial reports or statements of Members of Parliament to be audited by the Auditor-General.
Mr Webb gave evidence as to practices for carrying out audits. He said that the entitlements of individual Members of Parliament are paid directly to the member. His evidence was that Members of Parliament could maintain private bank accounts that received these payments but there were no accounts they maintained that were subject to audit by government, under the GSA, GFA or otherwise. He also said that individual Members of Parliament do not prepare financial reports or financial statements for audit by the Auditor General. He said that financial statements are prepared for Parliament as a whole.
I am satisfied in these circumstances that Members of Parliament are not as such, entities whose financial reports or statements are subject to audit by the Auditor-General under the GSA Act, the GSF Act or any other Act.
For the reasons set out above, a Member of Parliament does not fall within the definition of “public sector agency” within the meaning of ss 53 and 55 of the PPIP Act. This is because Members of Parliament do not fall within paragraphs (a1) or (d) of that definition. There were no other paragraphs of the definition of “public sector agency” that were shown to have application to a Member of Parliament.
As a consequence, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the Applicant’s application for administrative review in these proceedings, in circumstances where the conduct in issue was conduct of the Respondent acting in her capacity as a Member of Parliament and the personnel dealing with the Applicant’s affairs were staff serving her in her capacity as a Member of Parliament.
The Respondent made the submission that Members of Parliament formed part of the legislative branch of government and not part of the executive branch. I understood her submission to be that the provisions of the PPIP Act, applying as they did to “public sector agencies” were not intended to apply beyond the executive branch of government to the legislative branch.
The observance of the doctrine of the separation of powers between the arms of government in New South Wales as a matter of convention is well understood, even if the doctrine may have certain qualifications in its application as a formal constitutional mandate binding the States (Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1996] HCA 24, per Dawson J, at [27], [31] and Toohey J, at [13]). However, I do not need to decide whether or not the doctrine of the separation of powers overlays the workings of the PPIP Act so as to limit its operation to the executive branch of government. I have reached the conclusion that a Member of Parliament is not a “public sector agency” on the basis of construction of the applicable statutory provisions as set out above and having done so, do not need to rely on the doctrine of the separation of powers.
The Applicant submitted that if the PPIP Act did not apply to Members of Parliament and their offices, this was a gap in the reach of the PPIP Act that could not be justified. I make note of the Applicant’s submission for the record. However, the Tribunal’s function is one of determining matters before it within the applicable statutory framework and does not extend to addressing matters of public policy of the kind raised by the Applicant. This is a matter within the purview of Parliament and not administrative review.
I note for the record that the Privacy Commissioner expressed views that accorded with those of the Respondent, namely that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to review the conduct of the Respondent in circumstances where that conduct occurred in her capacity as a Member of Parliament.
Even if the Respondent were acting in her capacity as a Minister (which I have found she was not), the Tribunal has previously found that a Minister is a “political office holder” for the purposes of relevant legislation and as such, does not fall within the definition of a “public sector agency” for the purposes of the PPIP Act (EHG v The Hon Yasmin Catley MP [2025] NSWCATAD 176, at [27]).
The question arises whether the application for administrative review before the Tribunal in these proceedings was brought within time. If it was not, the further question for determination was whether an extension of time be allowed so that the application could be heard.
Relevantly, the time for lodgement of an administrative review application is 28 days from the day on which the 60-day period for internal review expires or the day on which the Applicant was notified of the result of internal review, whichever is the later.
The 28-day period after the date on which the initial 60-day period expired ended on 17 January 2026. The Applicant, however, made her application for review on 12 March 2026. The application was, as a consequence, out of time.
To the extent that the Applicant required an extension of time under s 41 of the NCAT Act to file an application for administrative review, the Respondent did not wish to be heard against the grant of such an extension.
I do not need to consider further whether an extension of time should be granted in the absence of jurisdiction to hear the Applicant’s application for administrative review, for the reasons set out above.
However, to the extent that such an extension of time is necessary, I grant an extension of time until 12 March 2026 for the making of the Applicant’s application for administrative review.
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I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar
HKU
The Hon Yasmin Maree Catley