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2 On various dates between 5 November 2003 and 13 May 2005 the applicant was respectively convicted in the Magistrates' Court of ten sets of charges relating to road offences including driving an unregistered motor vehicle, driving while his licence was suspended and displaying false number plates. Before the hearings in the Magistrates' Court the applicant served on the court a Notice of Disclosure by which he effectively required the court to state whether it had the power and authority to hear certain constitutional matters that he said would be raised by him in relation to the charges. Since he received no response, he did not appear in court in respect of a number of the offences in question with which he was charged and was convicted in his absence. On 4 July 2005, the applicant filed notices of appeal against the convictions pursuant to s.83 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1989. As is apparent, they were filed outside the time prescribed by the legislation.[2]

3 Between 30 June and 21 July 2005, the applicant was convicted of three further sets of like offences and, on 25 July 2005, he filed a further three notices of appeal against those convictions, this time within the prescribed period. The 13 notices of appeal came on for hearing in the County Court on 27 September 2005. Prior to that, the applicant served on the County Court a Notice of Constitutional Matter, purportedly pursuant to s.78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), and a Notice of Disclosure in a form that was relevantly similar to the notice that was served on the Magistrates' Court. The County Court did not respond to those notices. In our view, the court was under no obligation to respond. Be that as it may, at the hearing the three last mentioned notices of appeal were adjourned to 8 May 2006. Because, as has been said, the ten notices of appeal were filed out of time, they were deemed to be applications for leave to appeal.[3] The legislation, however, provides that leave to appeal may be granted by the County Court if it is of the opinion that the failure to file a notice of appeal within the time prescribed was due to "exceptional circumstances".[4] As we understand it, the applicant claimed that "exceptional circumstances" were constituted by the fact that he wanted to have all the appeals against his convictions disposed of at the same time. Thus, he said, he delayed bringing appeals until all the charges were dealt with. Her Honour, however, did not accept that this constituted "exceptional circumstances" and refused the applicant leave to appeal, ordering that the ten notices of appeal be struck out.

4 On 1 December 2005, the applicant filed an originating motion seeking to review the decision of the County Court. It is apparent that this proceeding was filed well outside the time prescribed by Rule 56.02(1) of the Rules of Court. Rule 56.02(3) provides that the court shall not extend the time limit "except in special circumstances". It seems, however, that, in the end, no point was taken as to the late filing of the proceeding. As we understand it, the originating motion alleged, amongst other matters, that the applicant was denied natural justice in the Magistrates' Court and that that court did not have jurisdiction to deal with the "legal arguments and grounds" raised by the applicant. The originating motion sought various orders that included orders that the impugned decision of the County Court be quashed and the matter be re-heard by it in so far as it had jurisdiction to do so.

5 The applicant does not challenge the facts underlying the charges, but contends, as we understand him, that he was not required to comply with the requirements of the Road Safety Act 1986, and the Regulations made under it, that created the offences of which he was convicted because, so it was said, VicRoads, which controls the registration of motor vehicle and the use of number plates on vehicles, was established by that Act in contravention of the common law and legislation that includes the Statute of Monopolies, the Commonwealth Constitution, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the Imperial Acts Application Act 1980. Moreover, it was claimed, at the time of the driving in question, the applicant was exercising his constitutionally protected right of political protest against VicRoads' unlawful monopoly. Thus, it was said, he could not have been lawfully prosecuted for his conduct.

6 Before his Honour, the applicant based his application for prerogative relief on submissions that included the claim that he was not liable under the legislation for the reasons just mentioned. He also contended that the County Court judge erred in not granting him leave to appeal and pointed to various jurisdictional limitations that he said operated to inhibit the Magistrates' Court from hearing his case. He made like submissions about the jurisdiction of the County Court. His Honour concluded, however, that none of these matters raised any issue of prerogative relief and, therefore, the application had to fall. His Honour went on to dismiss the originating motion on 13 December 2005.

7 As we have said, on 12 January 2006 the applicant filed a notice of appeal against his Honour's decision. He also filed, on that day, the summons that is before us seeking a stay of his Honour's order. As has also been noted, by summons filed on 23 February 2006, the respondents sought an order dismissing the appeal as incompetent. It is convenient to deal first with the respondent's summons.

8 It is clear enough that, as the respondents point out, the impugned decision is interlocutory. It is concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the County Court to refuse leave to appeal, which is plainly interlocutory, as is the decision of his Honour, because neither finally disposes of the parties' rights in the principal cause.[5] In any event, his Honour's decision to refuse an order in the nature of certiorari is interlocutory.

9 It follows that the applicant must obtain leave before he can properly pursue an appeal. Importantly, because he is well out of time to make such an application - Rule 64.03 of the Rules of Court - he must first obtain an order extending the prescribed period. The Court gave the applicant leave to make an application for extension of time ore tenus and explained that this necessarily involved the consideration of whether his Honour's decision is wrong or at least attended with relevant doubt. The parties made their submissions in that context. So far as the applicant is concerned, he relied essentially on the arguments and contentions that are contained in the written material that was before us, that included two outlines of submissions filed on 9 March 2006, the affidavits of the applicant and Mr Olney filed on 12 and 16 January 2006 respectively, the Notice of Constitutional Matter and Notice of Disclosure, each dated 5 September 2005, and the originating motion of 1 December 2005. Moreover, Mr Olney made oral submissions in elaboration of the written ones.

10 It is clear enough that, in a case such as this, mere delay of a relatively short period, which is what occurred here, would not, of itself, disentitle the applicant to an extension of time. But, as we have said in Van Rooy v. County Court of Victoria[6], in a situation such as the present, some attention must be given to the prospect of the applicant obtaining leave.

11 We consider that, even if the Court extended the time limit, the applicant has no realistic prospect of making out the Niemann requirements[7] for obtaining leave for the following reasons. First, we think that his Honour's order is not attended with relevant doubt.[8] The applicant's claim that he is under no obligation to comply with the requirements of the relevant State legislation relating to the registration of motor vehicles is obviously based on a misunderstanding of the law on his part. There is no common law entitling him to have his vehicle otherwise registered. Similarly, the creation of VicRoads is not inconsistent with the common law or the legislation to which he referred and his right to protest does not entitle him to immunity from prosecution if he thereby breaches the law. We mention for completeness that we also consider that his claims do not raise a constitutional matter within the meaning of s.78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Moreover, we can detect no material error in the decision of the County Court judge that the applicant has failed to satisfy the requirement that "exceptional circumstances" existed that warranted the grant of leave to appeal. Furthermore, the applicant's absence from the Magistrates' Court when some of the charges against him were heard was, as Mr Olney fairly agreed, the result of his own decision, and he cannot now complain about being convicted on those charges in his absence. Thus, even if the decision of his Honour were set aside, the applicant would have no realistic prospect of succeeding in having the charges dismissed on the grounds that he pursues. Secondly, no substantial injustice will result if the impugned order were left to stand. This is because, even if the decision of Harper, J. and that of the County Court judge were set aside and the matter were heard afresh in the County Court, his appeals would most likely be dismissed.

12 Thus, we would refuse to grant the applicant an extension of time within which to appeal against the decision of 13 December 2005. It follows that the purported appeal remains incompetent and, therefore, it should be dismissed on that basis. It also follows that the applicant's application for a stay of the impugned order should fail. Thus, on the respondents' summons, we would order that the applicant's appeal be dismissed as incompetent and the applicant's summons filed on 12 January 2006 be dismissed.

13 The orders of the Court are: