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3 On 11 August 2004 the applicant was convicted of three further sets of offences that involved failure to comply with motor vehicle registration requirements under the relevant legislation and rules. At or near the outset of the hearing of those charges, the applicant left the court but the matters proceeded and she was convicted in her absence. Later that day, the applicant filed notices of appeal in the County Court in relation to the 14 sets of convictions.

4 The notices of appeal came on for hearing before Judge Gaynor in the County Court on 20 October 2004. Her Honour refused the applicant leave to be represented by a McKenzie friend and she also rejected her application for an adjournment that was made on the basis that she had not realised that the appeals would involve a re-hearing in the County Court on that day. Because the appeals were brought outside the prescribed period,[2] they were deemed to be applications for leave to appeal.[3] Relevantly, the legislation empowered the court to grant leave if it was satisfied that "exceptional circumstances" existed that justified the making of such an order.[4] Her Honour, however, was not satisfied that "exceptional circumstances" were made out and struck out the 11 sets of appeals. As to the later notices of appeal, the informant in respect of one set of the appeals did not appear, and her Honour said that she was not prepared to adjourn the matters. In the event, the corresponding charges were struck out. As to the remaining notices of appeal, her Honour struck them out after she rejected the applicant's application for an adjournment, made on the ground that she was not prepared to proceed that day, for the reasons I have earlier summarised.

5 Being dissatisfied with her Honour's decision, the applicant instituted a judicial review of it pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. A number of interlocutory proceedings were then put in train, but there is no need to detail them here. Suffice it to say that, on 9 November 2005, the applicant filed an amended summons on an originating motion naming the County Court of Victoria and one of the informants as defendants. The applicant also filed eight further originating motions, respectively directed to each of the remaining informants. On 9 December 2005, the respondents to the originating motions filed summonses relevantly seeking orders pursuant to Rule 23.01 of the Rules of Court that the respective originating motions be dismissed.

6 On 14 December 2005 his Honour dismissed the originating motions on the basis that they were vexatious and an abuse of process of the court. On 12 January 2005, the applicant filed notices of appeal against his Honour's orders and served them on the respondents. On 13 February 2006, each of the respondents (other than the County Court of Victoria) filed a summons in this Court seeking an order that the respective appeals be dismissed as incompetent given that the impugned orders were, it was said, interlocutory and no leave to appeal had been obtained.

7 In the proceeding in each of the three courts the applicant admitted the factual circumstances underlying the offences with which she had been charged that related to motor registration and like offences. Thus, for example, she admitted that the motor vehicle driven by her at the relevant times was unregistered and that she had attached to it motor vehicle plates that were essentially false. Her case was, as I understand it, that she was not obliged to comply with the requirements of VicRoads in relation to the registration of motor vehicle and number plates for a number of reasons. For example, it was said that VicRoads was an unlawful monopoly, having been established by the Road Safety Act contrary to the requirements of the common law and various pieces of legislation, including the Statute of Monopolies, the Commonwealth Constitution, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the Imperial Acts Application Act 1980. The applicant also contended that she had a "common law" right to have the vehicle registered and to provide number plates to it and to petition the Queen in relation to those matters. Furthermore, it was said, at the time of the offences she was exercising her constitutionally protected political right to protest against the VicRoads situation and, therefore she could not be lawfully prosecuted for such conduct. The applicant further asserted that the claims so raised by her necessarily involved matters under the Commonwealth Constitution, including its interpretation, within the meaning of s.78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Consequently, she said, she served, by pre-paid registered mail, a Notice of Constitutional Matter, dated 22 August 2005, on the several Attorneys-General. As far as we can make out from the material before us, the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth responded to that notice, advising that he did not propose to take part in the proceedings. The Attorney-General for Victoria similarly advised that he would not be intervening.

8 It seems clear enough that the impugned orders are interlocutory - see, for example, Little v. State of Victoria[5] and Dodoro v. Knighting[6] - and, therefore, the applicant needs to obtain leave before an appeal can be properly pursued by her. And it is also plain enough that, to the extent that the applicant now seeks leave to appeal, she is well out of time - see Rule 64.03(3). It follows that the applicant cannot pursue the application for leave to appeal unless she first obtains an order extending the time within which to make such an application. The applicant, who was unrepresented, was given leave to apply ore tenus for such an extension of time and was informed by us that this will necessarily involve considering whether his Honour erred. The parties addressed submissions to that issue. We should say that Ms Van Rooy's principal case is helpfully set out in a number of documents that she filed, including her notices of appeal, her affidavits of 23 January and 6 March 2006, her outline of submissions of 22 January and 6 March 2006, the Notice of Constitutional Matter dated 22 August 2005 and the amended summons on notice of motion of 9 November 2005. Many of the applicant's written arguments were elaborated on during the oral submissions.

9 We now turn to consider whether an extension of time should be granted. It seems to us that, by itself, the applicant's mere delay in seeking leave to appeal should not deny her an extension of time. But in a case such as this, where no relevant proceeding is on foot, some attention must be given to the applicant's prospects of success of securing leave to appeal, because if there is no realistic prospect of her obtaining leave, it would be futile to grant the extension of time sought - see Jackamarra v. Krakouer[7], where the court drew a distinction between an application for extension of time within which to begin an appeal and an application for extension of time once an appeal is on foot. In the former case, said their Honours, some attention needs to be given the applicant's prospects of success.[8] Although that case was concerned with an application for extension of time to appeal, we think that the principle to which we have referred operates in relation to an application such as the present.

10 In order to obtain leave the applicant will need to demonstrate that the impugned order is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal and that substantial injustice will result if it is allowed to stand.[9] We consider that it is not reasonably arguable that the order is attended with relevant doubt. As Callaway, J.A. pointed out in Dodoro[10], in determining whether to grant leave it must be shown that the order is attended with sufficient doubt, and it is rarely enough to point to an error in the reasoning if the appeal has insufficient prospects of success. Here, the applicant effectively admits the facts which are said to constitute the offences, albeit subject to her claim that the legislation in question is inapplicable for the reasons we have summarised. We consider that those reasons do not excuse the applicant from complying with the motor vehicle registration laws and they do not raise a matter under the Commonwealth Constitution as the applicant claims. Moreover, the applicant decided not to be present in the Magistrates' Court during the proceeding against her and she cannot now complain that she was convicted in her absence. If that be right, then his Honour's decision that the review proceedings are an abuse of process is not attended with relevant doubt. In any event, even if it could be said that there is such a doubt, we consider that no substantial injustice will result if the order were to remain because, even if it and the orders of Judge Gaynor were set aside, given the applicant's attitude in respect of the charges to which we have referred, she has no realistic prospect of succeeding in her appeals to the County Court. Thus, we would decline to exercise the discretion to grant the extension of time sought.

11 It follows that the applicant's appeals remain incompetent and should be dismissed as such on the respondents' respective summonses. In those circumstances there would be no point in making the orders sought by the applicant in her summonses, so that these summonses should be dismissed.

12 Consequently, the orders of the Court are: