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[2011] ACTSC 24
Supreme Court of the ACT
2011-02-18
Refshauge J
Original judgment source is linked above.
(b) in the event that the plaintiff makes no application to the court within those seven days, or the court gives the defendants leave to do so, the defendants be at liberty to enter into the proposed contract.
(c) where the defendants have entered into the proposed contract, the plaintiff shall submit to the defendants, through their solicitors, not later than seven days prior to the date of completion notified by the defendants, withdrawal of caveat dealing number AF 798275X in registrable form;
(d) should the plaintiff fail or refuse to sign and return to the defendants prior to the date of completion the duly signed withdrawal of caveat then, acting under s 4(3) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (NSW), I appoint under s 94 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) the Registrar of the ACT Supreme Court to execute such a withdrawal of caveat as is submitted by the defendants, upon her being satisfied of such failure or refusal;
(e) on completion of the sale, the defendants shall deduct from the gross proceeds of the sale:
(f) the balance of the gross proceeds of the sale, after the deductions referred to in 4(e) have been made, shall be paid to the defendants' solicitors' trust account to be held on an interest bearing deposit pending further order.
1. On 31 January 2011, I delivered reasons for proposing certain orders to permit the sale of certain properties said to be part of the Estate of the deceased Graeme William Box, but claimed by the plaintiff, or in which she claimed to have an interest or other entitlement. See Hillman v Box and Ors as Executors of the Will of Box (No 2) ACTSC 10 (at [79]), where the proposed orders are set out.
5. Neither plaintiff nor defendants submitted that I should vary the proposed orders except in one way. The only variation proposed was for the deletion of a proposed provision that a copy of the order relevant to the sale of what was called the Spence property should be attached to the contract of sale for that property, which should also include in it a statement that it was made under the order.
6. Although the draft minutes originally submitted by the defendants had proposed such a provision, their subsequent submissions now proposed its deletion. They described the rationale as that they "are unable to see any legal or formal requirement [for it]" and that "there may be the incorrect perception of a 'fire sale' on the part of prospective purchasers."
7. The plaintiff agrees to the deletion of that provision.
8. I accept that there is no legal requirement for it, and will not include it in the formal orders made. The order will, however, still be required to be filed with the Registrar-General, and this should meet all legal requirements sufficiently.
9. Accordingly, with that variation, I will make the orders as I otherwise proposed with a minor clarification to the amended 4 (d).
10. The defendants submitted that they should have their costs since the orders to be made closely reflected the short minutes filed by them save for the reliance on s 79 of the Trustee Act 1925 (ACT).
11. It is true that I made some minor amendments to the other orders in accordance with proposals made by the plaintiff, who cannot be said to have "failed entirely," but it is fair to say that on the main issues, none of the substantive proposals of the plaintiff were accepted.
12. The plaintiff, on the other hand, submitted that the costs should be costs in the cause. This seems to be submitted on the basis that the court, recognising that the parties would not accept alternatives discussed by me (see Hillman v Box & Ors as Executors of the Estate of Box (No 2) (at [7] to [23]), had to draft its own proposals.
13. I do not accept that characterisation. It seems to me that I had to include that in order to explain why there was a difference between the approach of the two parties to be resolved in the variation that had to be made to my original orders (see Hillman v Box and Ors as Executors of the Estate of Box [2010] ACTSC 153). It is also true that neither party provided the answer to an important question of how I could, within jurisdiction, order that the Registrar of the Supreme Court execute the contract and transfer, and I had to decide that for myself.
14. Basically, however, I rejected completely the plaintiff's proposals in relation to the Spence property and broadly adopted the defendants' proposals. The amendments in relation to the order about the property at Queanbeyan, NSW, that I made as submitted by the plaintiff, were not insignificant but were quite minor and, primarily, drafting matters.
15. In those circumstances, it seems to me that the defendants should have their costs. There is one modification to that. Since the variation of the order proposed about the Spence property was made necessary because of its inclusion originally at the suggestion of the defendants, they should not have their costs of proposing its deletion.
16. Further, I do not see any reason, and no submissions were made about this, why the common order in interlocutory applications, that the costs not be assessed or paid until judgment, should not be made. I have already ordered that the defendants have access to $50,000 from the estate to pay legal fees and so they should not be under any financial pressure as a result, but I will permit that order to be varied if necessary for cause.
17. Accordingly, I make two separate orders as follows:
(b) in the event that the plaintiff makes no application to the court within those seven days, or the court gives the defendants leave to do so, the defendants be at liberty to enter into the proposed contract.
(c) where the defendants have entered into the proposed contract, the plaintiff shall submit to the defendants, through their solicitors, not later than seven days prior to the date of completion notified by the defendants, withdrawal of caveat dealing number AF 798275X in registrable form;
(d) should the plaintiff fail or refuse to sign and return to the defendants prior to the date of completion the duly signed withdrawal of caveat then, acting under s 4(3) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (NSW), I appoint under s 94 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) the Registrar of the ACT Supreme Court to execute such a withdrawal of caveat as is submitted by the defendants, upon her being satisfied of such failure or refusal;
(e) on completion of the sale, the defendants shall deduct from the gross proceeds of the sale:
(f) the balance of the gross proceeds of the sale, after the deductions referred to in 4(e) have been made, shall be paid to the defendants' solicitors' trust account to be held on an interest bearing deposit pending further order.
3. Order 5 made on 8 December 2010 be varied by omitting "4(f)" and substituting "4(e)".
I certify that the preceding seventeen (17) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour, Justice Refshauge.
Hillman
Box and Others as executors of the will of Box