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[2026] NSWCATAD 217
General information, not legal advice.
NCAT Administrative and Equal Opportunity
2026-07-22
J McAteer, Senior Member
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: HGQ v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2026] NSWCATAD 217
Hearing dates: 17 April 2026
Date of orders: 22 July 2026
Decision date: 22 July 2026
Jurisdiction: Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division
Before: J McAteer, Senior Member
Decision: (1) In proceedings 2025/00390376 the decision of the respondent of 9 July 2025 is set aside. In substitution of that decision the Tribunal dismisses the application.
(2) In proceedings 2025/00339563 the decision of the respondent of 9 July 2025 is set aside. In substitution of that decision the respondent is to grant the applicant one recognition payment in the nature of Category B in the sum of $10,000.00 pursuant to s 35(2)(b) and s 36(1)(c) of the VR and S Act.
(3) In proceedings 2025/00390388 the decision of the respondent of 9 July 2025 is set aside. In substitution of that decision the respondent is to grant the applicant one recognition payment in the nature of Category C in the sum of $5,000.00 pursuant to s 35(3)(1) and s 36(1)(d) of the VR and S Act.
Catchwords: VICTIMS Support – Administrative law – act of violence – single act of violence as series of related acts – whether evidence satisfied elements of act of violence being treated as separate acts – whether medical evidence verifies injury arising from series of acts – related acts – unelated acts – circumstances of acts of violence – nature of evidence and material required – onus
Legislation Cited: Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014
Victims Rights and Support Act 2013
Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 (repealed)
Victims Support and Rehabilitation Regulation 2019
Cases Cited: BMF v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2016] NSWCATAD 144
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] AATA; (1979) 46 FLR 409
GCL v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2024] NSWCATAD 200
GTP v Commissioner Victims Rights [2025] NSWCATAD 128
Parker v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 28 NSWLR 282
Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Brown [2003] HCA 54
Texts Cited: Nil
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: HGQ (Applicant)
Commissioner of Victims Rights (Respondent)
Representation: Solicitors:
Victims of Crime Assistance League (Agent) (Applicant)
Victims Services Legal (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2025/00339563
2025/00390376
2025/00390388
Publication restriction: The publication or broadcast of the name of HGQ is prohibited. This order is made under section 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013.
Note: A Reference to the name of a person includes a reference to any information, picture or other material that identifies the person or is likely to lead to the identification of the person.
The applicant made a number of claims to the Commissioner of Victims Rights seeking recognition payments under the victims of crime scheme. The applicant asserts that she is a victim of violent crime and has suffered injury as a result. The victims of crime scheme provides that eligible victims may recover financial grants or payments and access to the provision of services under the Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 (the Act or VR and S Act).
In order to be eligible to recover under the scheme, a victim must either be a primary victim (the victim of an assault), or a secondary victim or family victim. As will be explained in these reasons, victims of crime must pass through various factual thresholds as set out in the Legislation in order to receive benefits under the scheme. In the current matter, the applicant has previously established before the Commissioner that the evidence establishes that she could receive a victims recognition payment for the relevant claimed events for the matters before the Tribunal.
These proceedings however concern whether the applicant in each of her claims having established that she was a victim of a violent crime (the statutory term being "act of violence") in accordance with the Act, whether that act of violence which is subject of the individual claim, should be treated as a separate act of violence rather than each claim forming one of a series of related acts, and is entitled to a separate recognition payment on each claim where an act of violence is established. There are three claims before the Tribunal, as three other successful claims (see * below) before the Commissioner were deemed to "capture" the current claims whereby the acts of violence were considered as being a series of related acts rather than individual, separate acts.
The applicant has lodged three applications for administrative review with the Tribunal. Each application concerns an administrative review of how the respondent has dealt with her initial applications and internal reviews for Victims Support. The applicant in these proceedings before the Tribunal is referred to as "HGQ" pursuant to an order of the Tribunal under s 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (the NCAT Act) made on 21 November 2025. In these reasons some aspects of HGQ's circumstances, such as specific locations, names and exact birthday dates have been redacted or referred to generally in order to prevent constructive identification of HGQ in the reasons.
These three applications concern incidents that arise from a period in HGQ's life where as a child she was abused by three male extended family members / relatives. The three "related acts claims" are marked "*" below at [7].
Victims Services claim 00538898 concerned sexual abuse in the 1980's by "R.D." when HGQ was nine or 10 years of age.
Victims Services claim 00538907 concerned sexual abuse occurring during the 1970's (or 1980's see [14], [75] & [76] below) by "A.D.".
Victims Services claim 00538951 concerned sexual abuse occurring from the late 1970's to the mid 1980s by "R.D." (a different individual to claim 00538898).
The Tribunal notes that HGQ has made a number of other claims and to the extent necessary the Tribunal will be required to address them because (a) details of those matters appear in the material of the parties and in particular the Commissioner, and (b) in order to address the competing 'separate acts’ / 'series of related acts' arguments, some inquiry in this regard will be required. These matters were canvassed briefly at the hearing.
The following history and brief details of claims to Victims Services by HGQ are uncontroversial between the parties. They views only differ in respect of appropriate outcome concerning recognition payments.
Claim 424552 period 1/1/1976 - 21/12/1989 abused by P.P.*
Claim 466866 period 1/1/1983 - 31/8/1983 abused by P.P. W.B. & L.B.
Claim 466878 period 12/12/1978 - 12/2/1985 abused by J.D. & P.P.*
Claim 470337 period 1/9/836 - 12/2/1986 abused by W.B. & P.P.
Claim 538821 period 1/1/79 - 31/12/1981 abused by K.P.*
Claim 538868 period 1/1/1978 - 31/12/1983 abused by B.W.
Claim 38896 period 1/1/1983 - 31/12/1984 abused by "Pnt Pop".
Claim 538898 period 1/1/1983 - 31/12/1984 abused by R.D.
Claim 538907 period 12/2/1974 -12/2/1975 abused by A.D.
Claim 538951 period 1/1/1977- 31/12/1986 abused by Rt. D.
These last three claims from the list above are the matters currently before the Tribunal (538898, 538607 and 538651). As noted above these three claims were considered by the Commissioner's delegate to constitute a series of related acts of violence, related to other claims from the list (see*) involving members of the applicant's immediate and extended family (claims 424552, 464878 and 538821) and as such the victims support available was deemed incorporated into those claims on which victims support was awarded.
HGQ received victims support on six of her seven claims not currently before the Tribunal. Those six claims (including the three that the current applications were considered to be related acts) were awarded victims support by way of a Category B recognition payment. Of HGQ's 10 applications, six were successful, four were unsuccessful with three of those now subject to administrative review. The Tribunal has no other details of the other seven claims including why one was unsuccessful.
The three claims were dealt with jointly in one combined decision on Internal Review. It is apparent from the decision under review (the joint decision) that the claims concern allegations occurring north of Sydney during the 1970's and 1980's. These matters are referred to as all being abuse, including sexual abuse, perpetrated by family members (like the vast majority of the other claims).
In respect of the key issue as to whether HGQ was the victim of an act of violence the Senior Assessor as delegate observes the following at [22]:
"22. The documentary evidence is sufficient to find that it is more probable than not that (HGQ) was the victim of childhood sexual abuse, including sexual abuse, including sexual assault at (location) committed by members of her family including (names given: R.D, A.D. and Rt.D.). this occurred between January 1977 and 31 December 1985. I find the act of violence is made up of a series of related acts, as two or more acts were committed against the victim, by the same group of offenders over a period of time."
"27. The evidence on the current applications and the applications previously determined (00424582, 00464878, and 00538821) contain similar descriptions of how the violence has impacted (HGQ). For example, Certificates of injury previously completed by Ms Smith (Psychologist) also provides diagnosis of Complex PTSD, Attachment Disorder, and Dissociation.
28. While I acknowledge that the offenders on the applications are different, they are all part of the same group of persons within the meaning of section 19 (4) (i), being male family members. The violence is also stated to have occurred during (HGQ's) youth, with it overlapping periods of violence. Moreover, the incidents appear to be related given the impact on (HGQ) is similar, according to the evidence provided. Because of this, I find the violence described on the current applications are part of a series of related acts established on earlier applications."
Below is a summary of the alleged violent conduct perpetrated against the HGQ extracted form the summary provided by her in each of the three claims when before the Commissioner:
2025/00339563 (NCAT) 538898 (Victims Services):
(a) Between the ages of 9 years and 10 years (HGQ) was sexually abused by her paternal Grandfather (RD).
(a) When she was 10 years old, (HGQ) was sexually abused by her cousin (AD) who was four years older than her. (Curiously the act of violence is said to have occurred between 12/2/1974 and 12/2/1975 as per [7] above when HGQ would only have been in her first year of life).
(a) Between the ages of 3 to 11 years (HGQ) was sexually abused by her uncle (RD) when accompanying her father and uncle fishing in a boat - (further the claim refers to sexual abuse by both her father and her uncle but appears only pressed in respect of the uncle).
5 Meaning of "victim of crime"
(1) For this Act, a victim of crime is a person who suffers harm as a direct result of an act committed, or apparently committed, by another person in the course of-
(a) a criminal offence, including a criminal offence involving a motor vehicle, or
(b) conduct of a kind referred to in the Modern Slavery Act 2018, section 5(1), definition of modern slavery, paragraph (b).
(2) A person suffers harm if, as a result of such an act-
(a) the person suffers actual physical bodily harm or psychological or psychiatric harm, or
(b) the person's property is deliberately taken, destroyed or damaged.
(3) If the person dies as a result of the act concerned, a member of the person's immediate family is also a victim of crime for the purposes of this Part.
(4) If a person dies as a result of the act concerned and there is more than one member of the person's immediate family, members of the immediate family may nominate a representative for the purposes of the Charter of Victims Rights.
…
19 Meaning of "act of violence"
(1) In this Act, act of violence means an act or series of related acts, whether committed by one or more persons-
(a) that has apparently occurred in the course of the commission of an offence, and
(b) that has involved violent conduct against one or more persons, and
(c) that has resulted in injury or death to one or more of those persons.
(2) For the avoidance of doubt, the reference to an offence in subsection (1)(a) extends to conduct of a person that would constitute an offence were it not for the fact that the person cannot, or might not, be held to be criminally responsible for the conduct because of the person's age or mental illness or impairment.
(3) For the purposes of this section, violent conduct extends to sexual assault and domestic violence.
(3A) To avoid doubt, a road crime is not an act of violence except in the circumstances provided for in section 25(2A) and (2B).
(4) Except as provided by subsections (5) and (6), a series of related acts is two or more acts that are related because-
(a) they were committed against the same person, and
(b) in the opinion of the Tribunal or the Commissioner-
(i) they were committed at approximately the same time, or
(ii) they were committed over a period of time by the same person or group of persons, or
(iii) they were, for any other reason, related to each other.
(5) An act is not related to another act if, in the opinion of the Tribunal or the Commissioner, having regard to the particular circumstances of those acts, they ought not to be treated as related acts.
(6) An act is not related to any earlier act in respect of which support is given under this Act if it occurs after the support is given.
(7) For the purposes of this Act, a series of related acts, whether committed by one or more persons, constitutes a single act of violence.
…
20 Meaning of "primary victim"
(1) A primary victim of an act of violence or act of modern slavery is a person who is injured, or dies, as a direct result of that act.
(2) A primary victim of an act of violence or act of modern slavery extends to a person who is injured, or dies, as a direct result of-
(a) trying to prevent another person from committing that act, or
(b) trying to help or rescue another person against whom that act is being committed or has just been committed, or
(c) trying to arrest another person who is committing, or who has just committed, that act.
…
recognition payment means a payment made in recognition of the trauma suffered by a victim of an act of violence.
39 Documentary evidence
(1) An application for victims support is to be accompanied by such documentary evidence as may be required by the approved form.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the documentary evidence to be required:
(a) for an application for financial assistance for immediate needs under section 26-is documentary evidence (such as a medical or police report or a report by an agency that provides support services to victims of crime) sufficient to support, on the balance of probability, the applicant's claim to be a victim of an act of violence, and
(b) for an application for financial assistance for economic loss under section 26 or 27 or for a recognition payment-is:
(i) a police report, or a report by a Government agency or any other agency that provides support services to victims of crime, sufficient to support, on the balance of probability, the applicant's claim to be a victim of an act of violence, and
(ii) a medical, dental or counselling report verifying that the applicant or child who is the primary victim concerned has actually been injured as a result of an act of violence.
(Emphasis added)
These are preconditions under the Act which lead to a recognition payment and must be satisfied prior to an applicant accessing the benefits of the victims of crime scheme. Once an eligible victim (of an act of violence) has passed through the initial threshold, an assessment of the circumstances of the incident(s) and level of injury is carried out to determine the appropriate recognition payment.
In the three applications before the Commissioner the initial decision maker made a finding that they were not satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to that (HGQ) was the victim of (the relevant claimed conduct). Ultimately they made a finding that... "as such I am not satisfied the available evidence provides sufficient probative value to establish that an act of violence has taken place against (HGQ) as per the definition under section 19 of the Act".
The passages quoted at [20] above are produced in identical form in respect of the reasoning language at [20] and [24] of claims 538907 (2025/00390381), and 538898 (2025/00339563) and [21] and [25] of claim 538951 (2025/00390376). However, as noted above on Internal Review the Senior Assessor finds that the act of violence threshold has been met and the issue of contention is the rolling of the claims into a series of related acts of violence incorporated into claims already determined as set out at [3], [8] and [12] above.
On 29 August 2025 HGQ filed an administrative review application with the Tribunal. (Reference: 2025/00339563)
On 5 December 2024 following a requirement of the Tribunal, HGQ filed two further administrative review applications (References: 2025/00390376, and 2025/00390388).
51 Application to Tribunal for administrative review of decision concerning recognition payment
(1) An applicant for a recognition payment who is aggrieved by the decision of a decision maker in respect of the application may apply to the Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of a decision made by the Commissioner following an internal review under section 49 of the decision maker's decision with respect to the recognition payment.
(2) An applicant for a recognition payment who is aggrieved by the decision of the Commissioner in respect of the application may apply to the Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of a decision made by the Commissioner.
At the first directions listing the Tribunal noted that there were in effect decisions relating to three claims which HGQ sought administrative review. Two further review applications were required and the respondent agreed that was the appropriate course and as such would not press any limitation issue as to jurisdiction as the proposed further claims would be further out of time. In an application for administrative review subject to any extension of time granted, it must be lodged within the 28 day period provided for by the operation of s 55 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997, (the ADR Act) and cl 23 and 24 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014.
Section 41 of the NCAT Act provides for the Tribunal to extend the time for an applicant to make an application to the Tribunal. It provides:
41 Extensions of time
(1) The Tribunal may, of its own motion or on application by any person, extend the period of time for the doing of anything under any legislation in respect of which the Tribunal has jurisdiction despite anything to the contrary under that legislation.
(2) Such an application may be made even though the relevant period of time has expired.
As s 57 of the ADR Act has been repealed the Tribunal is not required to determine whether an out of time application has been supported by a reasonable explanation for the delay in making the application. Section 41 of the NCAT Act does not import the same language as the former s 57. However the authorities indicate that there must be some explanation for the delay when the Tribunal is called upon to exercise its discretion.
Noting that the delay was not pressed, the Tribunal extended time on the first application (2025/00339565) as the applicant had provided evidence that she was having difficulty in coping and being able to reengage in the victims support process. In accordance with the legislation as an act of violence had been found by the Senior Assessor on review, it appeared that consideration of the legal / factual question would for HGQ, be in the interests of justice.
The Tribunal also noted that there was no prejudice attaching to the respondent in respect of extending time for the other two applications (2025/000390378 and 2025/00390388) and that those applications were effectively lodged at the request of the Tribunal to regularise the proceedings. As such, the Tribunal made an order extending time to lodge the reviews (to the extent necessary), pursuant to s 41 of the NCAT Act.
The Tribunal's powers in relation to an application for administrative review are governed by s 63 of the ADR Act, which provides:
(1) In determining an application for an administrative review under this Act of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following:
(a) any relevant factual material,
(b) any applicable written or unwritten law.
(2) For this purpose, the Tribunal may exercise all of the functions that are conferred or imposed by any relevant legislation on the administrator who made the decision.
(3) In determining an application for the administrative review of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal may decide:
(a) to affirm the administratively reviewable decision, or
(b) to vary the administratively reviewable decision, or
(c) to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and make a decision in substitution for the administratively reviewable decision it set aside, or
(d) to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and remit the matter for reconsideration by the administrator in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal.
The matters were heard over one sitting of the Tribunal. The Commissioner was legally represented and HGQ was represented by an agent advocate from a victims of crime support service. Noting that the documents produced by the Commissioner under section 58 of the ADR Act contained all the evidence that the parties wished to rely upon, particularly noting that it was not disputed that HGQ was the victim of an act of violence in each claim (as outlined at [11] above), the hearing focused on legal argument and submissions. No further evidence was adduced concerning the claims other than a written statement by HGQ.
HGQ did however file and serve submissions in each matter on 12 February 2026 which included a brief statement (as noted above) for which she was not subject to cross examination. The Commissioner also filed and served submissions on 13 March 2026.
HGQ submitted that the acts of violence that were the subject of her reviews should be treated as separate to other claims because each claim considers an act of violence linked to a specific perpetrator. In this regard HGQ submitted that for each claim:
A different offender was involved;
A different relationship of trust and authority existed (prior to the offending);
Different circumstances of coercion, secrecy, and power imbalance existed;
The acts of violence occurred at different developmental stages of (HGQ's) childhood.
In her statement HGQ addressed the issues around a lack of witnesses to the abuse and some earlier criticisms concerning "verification" was raised in the initial decisions. HGQ noted that the abuse occurred in a private setting and that she dissociated as a survival response.
HGQ submitted that delayed recall and fragmented disclosure are well-recognised features of complex childhood trauma and do not undermine the occurrence or seriousness of the acts.
In respect of 2025/00339563 concerning abuse by her uncle RD, HGQ submitted that the abuse occurred during the perpetrator's repeated access to HGQ during extended family visits, adults consuming alcohol, being isolated during boating and fishing trips and specifically that the perpetrator acted independently. HGQ submitted that "his conduct was not dependent on, incidental to, or part of a single course of conduct with other perpetrators." HGQ submitted further that: "treating his actions as merely 'related' to others because of family connection fails to consider the particular circumstances required by section 19 (5)".
HGQ submitted that there was an error in how the Assessors had exercised the discretion under s 19. HGQ submitted that they had placed disproportionate weight on: the family relationship, overlapping childhood timeframes and similarity of diagnosis. HGQ submitted that insufficient weight was given to the evidence of: multiple independent offenders, materially different circumstances and the statutory requirement under section 19(5) to consider whether the acts ought not to be treated as related. HGQ submitted that this had resulted in an overly broad application of s 19(4) and a failure to properly apply s 19(5).
The Commissioner submitted that the acts of violence were related and relied upon the observations of the Tribunal in BMF v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2020] NSWCATAD 97 (BMF) concerning the provisions of appropriate independent professional evidence indicating that injury arose as a direct result of the act of violence. I note however that the evidence required to meet s 39 of the VR and S Act has already been satisfied in each claim as the Senior Assessor had moved past that point. In the later part of their joint decision they were "in the territory" of s 19(4) concerning whether acts of violence in each claim could potentially be related to each other in some way so as to provide for them to be treated as related acts and receive a "global award".
The Commissioner also relied upon the case of GCL v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2024] NSWCATAD 200 (GCL). They submitted that GCL provided authority for when multiple offenders can be considered as engaged in a series of related acts.
Curiously even though the Commissioner's delegate had found that there was an act of violence established on each claim, the review being on the issue of applying section 19(4) of the VR and S Act to treat the claims as involving related acts of violence, they provided detailed submissions concerning whether the Tribunal could be satisfied that injury arose as a direct result of the acts of violence. Their main submission at [29]-[35] of their written submissions concluded contrary to their earlier finding that an act of violence was established, submitting that "the evidence available is not sufficient to satisfy section 39(2)(b) for approval of a recognition payment on each application, and accordingly each application must be dismissed."
I have carefully considered the arguments made by HGQ in respect of these reviews. On the totality of the evidence and material before the Tribunal, for the reasons that follow I will find that there is an act of violence in respect of the claim involving the grandfather, and that is a distinct series of related acts for the purposes of s 35(2) of the VR and S Act 2013. That matter will result in a Category B Recognition payment in accordance with s 35(2)(b) - Claim 2025/00339563.
In respect of the claim involving the male cousin some four years older than HGQ, I will find that there is an act of violence involving a sexual assault and that act of violence is unrelated to other claims or acts of violence. That claim will result in a Category C recognition payment pursuant to s 35(3)(a) of the V R and S Act - Claim 2025/00390388.
In respect of the claim involving the Uncle "R.D." I am not satisfied on the available evidence that it is sufficient to establish to the civil standard that the claimed acts of violence occurred. The reasons are set out below under the claim heading 2025/00390376. That claim will therefore be dismissed.
As noted from the consideration of the written submissions of the Commissioner, I am somewhat confused by aspects of the case run before the Tribunal. Whilst an administrative review is a hearing de novo or hearing afresh, and the case of Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] AATA; (1979) 46 FLR 409 establishes that upon review the task of the Tribunal is to look at all of the evidence and material before the Tribunal at the time of deciding the matter, it is somewhat unusual that the Commissioner ran a case that was in part going behind findings that they had already made on Internal Review.
I accept that such an approach is not unheard of, but in my view such an approach in the stated circumstances is worthy of comment when dealing with a scheme that is widely accepted as beneficial in nature as per Brown (Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Brown [2003] HCA 54). It was not the case that the Commissioner was able to point to fresh evidence to establish that there were logical evidentiary grounds to resile from their earlier finding concerning the establishment of an act of violence as I have done in one claim.
The position simply put is that having made a finding on an act of violence under s 19(1) of the VR and S Act, such a finding incorporates all aspects of s 19(1) being that the act(s) or action, (a) apparently occurred in the commission of an offence, (b) involved violent conduct, and (c) resulted in injury or death. A Primary Victim of an act of violence is a person who, under s 20(1) of the VR and S Act, sustains injury or death as a direct result of that act. In essence s 19(1) and s 20 are in application the same in that under s 19(1)(c) the action(s) must result in injury or death and under s 20 must be as a direct result. (Emphasis added).
The other aspect of the case run before the Tribunal is the implied criticism of the s 39 material submitted by HGQ to support her claims. This material was accepted by the Delegate on Internal Review. Whilst the Commissioner's arguments on the s 39 material canvassed the commentary in BMF, on my assessment any controversy appears misplaced.
Section 39 material whilst being required to be evidence sufficient to support on the balance of probabilities the applicant's claim to be the victim of an act of violence, to use the statutory language, such material is usually supplemental to primary evidence which is what instigates the claim and usually causes the reports, medical assessment etc. to be brought into being.
For a recognition payment or an application for financial assistance the decision maker must also consider the s 39 material for sufficiency in addition to the s 19 material. That consideration is usually a later or subsequent step but often will occur in tandem with a consideration of other evidence.
Often the most cogent evidence is the claimant's own report or that of a witness who does not necessarily qualify under s 39 of the V R and S Act. The s 39 material therefore supplements that primary material in a practical sense, even if the statute makes it mandatory that it sufficiently (either standing alone or duplicating the other material), identify the elements of s 19(1) of the VR and S Act.
In summary, once a finding is made under s 19(1) of the Act, the s 39 material is examined to determine whether it sufficiently confirms that finding.
A section 19(1) finding should be made in the totality of the material for all applications for victims support where possible. Counselling provides some exceptions that allow initial treatment for the purposes of establishing whether (or not) an act of violence actually occurred, such as whether the treatment sessions establish that an applicant for support was injured in accordance with s 19(1)(c) of the VR and S Act.
I have carefully read HGQ's statement and submission to the Tribunal and fully accept that she is a victim of sustained childhood sexual abuse. I note that HGQ took particular issue with the initial delegate's finding that she was not the victim of an act of violence on any of these three claims. Whilst upsetting and clearly traumatic for HGQ, the issue to remember is that once an individual choses to make an application for payment which is contingent on the submission and testing of evidence of probative value, sometimes that evidence may not meet the threshold for a positive finding to be made entitling a claimant to publicly funded support.
The fact that a claimant may not always succeed does not mean that their experience is neither valid or significant. I note that in each of the initial decisions the Assessor acknowledged the difficulty of the circumstances of HGQ and the limitations of the material before them. At [25] of the first instance decision in 2025/00339563 (Claim 538898) the delegate observes:
"My decision does not in any way mean I disbelieve (HGQ), but rather, based on the available evidence and for the reasons articulated above, I am not satisfied that I can find an act of violence established in this matter. I appreciate this will not be the decision (HGQ) is anticipating but I hope she understands the reasons I am unable to approve her support in the present case."
A similar observation is made at [26] of the first instance decision in 2025/00390376 (Claim 538951), and [25] of 2025/00390388 (Claim 538907). As an applicant to a statutory scheme there is an onus on HGQ to put sufficient evidence before the adjudicator to establish whether she qualifies for victims support. Whilst the threshold that a claimant is required to meet is fairly low in that the civil standard applies, and the system of victim support is not predicated on consequent positive criminal justice outcomes like some other domestic jurisdictions, nevertheless there must be evidence of a standard sufficient to determine that it was more likely than not that the matters, as alleged occurred.
I make the observation above observing that ultimately prior to coming to the Tribunal, an act of violence had been established on at least nine of her 10 applications for victims support, even if recognition payments had only been approved on six of those.
In addition, now that she is before the Tribunal on her own application, HGQ has a further duty to fully disclose all relevant matters and a duty to cooperate with the Tribunal to give effect to the Guiding Principle under the NCAT Act as set out at s 36 of that Act.
In the case of GTP v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2025] NSWCATAD 128 (GTP) the Tribunal addressed the same issue as is broadly ventilated by the Commissioner in these proceedings. A situation whereby a child was subject to sexual abuse and assaults at different times by different perpetrators. In that case the Tribunal overturned a previous finding of the Commissioner that the acts were related because they involved the same type of violence and occurred at the same or similar location.
What those findings omitted was that the victim was a child forced into sexual servitude being required to service adult male patrons of a brothel. Only a small number of potential claims were made by GTP because these were the only matters whereby she retained sufficient details of the facts in order to make a claim. At [74]-[78] of GTP the Tribunal addressed this issue in the following manner:
"74. It is clear that the legislature has given the finder of fact significant discretion to consider that acts of violence related to form one series of related acts, or unrelated acts. The language in the statute at s 19 (5) is clear in that: 'An act is not related to another act if, in the opinion of the Tribunal or the Commissioner, having regard to the particular circumstances of those acts, they ought not to be treated s related acts .
75. Likewise in s 19 (4) a broad discretion applies when one has regard to the statutory language particularly at 19 (4) (b) (iii) .. 'they were for any other reason, related to each other.'
76. The statutory basis for the Commissioner's finding that GTP's incidents of sexual assaults were a series of related acts is found in the provision of s 19 (4). That section provides:
(4) Except as provided by subsections (5) and (6), a series of related acts is two or more acts that are related because:
(a) they were committed against the same person, and
(b) in the opinion of the Tribunal or the Commissioner:
(i) they were committed at approximately the same time, or
(ii) they were committed over a period of time by the same person or group of persons, or
(iii) they were, for any other reason, related to each other.
77. Both delegates of the Commissioner focus on the similarities in that GTP was the victim, the assaults were sexual in nature comprising sexual assault and sexual touching, and they occurred apparently at the same premises in South Western Sydney. They also note that all perpetrators were male and the Commissioner made submissions that they had similar interests in that at [79] of the Commissioner's submissions reference is made to the perpetrators all having similar sexual predilections.
79. Each assault involved a patron of a reportedly illegal brothel who (based on the applicant's evidence of the Madam's comments to her) knowingly sought out an underage child for the purpose of committing acts of sexual assault.
78. I do not agree with this submission. The fact that the perpetrators were persons with similar interests is not in my view a relevant consideration when examining an incidence of assault. The Parliament has made it clear that the relevant matters that 'count against' any victim claiming support are contributory behaviour, offending - being that at the time they were involved in their own criminal act or enterprise or in some instances a failure to mitigate injury. None of these matters (which are outlined at s 25 and 44 of the Act) apply to GTP and her circumstances, nor is it argued that they do. However, the circumstances of the acts of violence which are beyond GTP's control such as her life circumstances, are submitted against her. I do not accept that such a matter counts against her both having regard to the objects of the Act and the available evidence as to context."
"80. Like in GCL whilst that applicant was in immigration detention not of his own choosing, so was GTP in circumstances not of her own choosing. It is wrong to consider that matters beyond a persons control should count against them when considering factors to be taken into account as to persons eligibility for victims support, including the extent and nature of that support.
81. The significant issue in the current case concerns two matters. The most significant in my view is that the perpetrators were five distinct individuals with nothing in common other than their gender, their engagement of the services of the brothel, their asserted sexual predilections as set out at [77] above, and their propensity to engage in criminality. There is no evidence that any of the perpetrators knew each other, or that they had knowledge that GTP had been assaulted and as a result violated by other patrons like them.
82. These five men engaged in various assaults of GTP. Whilst nearly all claimed matters had a sexual element at least one perpetrator also engaged in general corporal violence in the nature of choking. There is evidence that hair on GTP's scalp was pulled and significantly there is evidence that sexual assaults in respect of one perpetrator involved the use or circumstances where an offensive weapon was present. (Knife held to GTP).
83. Unlike the circumstances in GCL the assaults did not occur at approximately the same time or closely following each other, but occurred at different dates over an extended period of time."
Clearly in HGQ's claims the vast majority of matters occur at different times. Whilst there is some overlap there is no suggestion backed up by evidence that certain assaults occurred in concert with another, other than some very unclear evidence about matters occurring on the fishing boat on the lake which I will address below on 2025/00390376.
Whilst unlike GTP, in HGQ's case there is evidence that various perpetrators knew each other (being members of the extended family), there is limited reliable evidence that each perpetrator was aware of the other violations of HGQ by other family members even if HGQ suggests that this either was or must be the case. The only reference made in the material before the Tribunal concerns the assault by the older male cousin in claim 2025/00390388.
This claim concerns repeated sexual abuse by HGQ's grandfather when he was babysitting HGQ or when she was at their residence so that he and others may provide care. The evidence indicates that HGQ's family residence and the grandparent's residence were within walking distance of each other.
I note that the application lists the matters as occurring from 1 January 1983 to 31 December 1983. I note that the Senior Assessor in review found act of violence. I find that the evidence is sufficient to establish an act of violence in accordance with s 19(1) of the VR and S Act. The material provided through Victims of Crime Assistance League (VOCAL) following disclosure on 2 August 2024 is sufficient in the absence of any evidence to the contrary to establish that when HGQ was 9 and 10 years of age various instances of sexual abuse occurred at the grandparents home during the day and on the rare instances that HGQ's mother had her stay over there overnight.
The Certificate of Injury of Ms Smith provides evidence of injury. Section 19(1)(a), (b) and (c) are met and I so find. I note also that the VOCAL Report and Ms Smith's Certificate meet the requirements of s 39(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the VR and S Act as set out at [18] above.
I also find that there are no issues under s 44 of the VR and S Act noting that the incidents occurred when HGQ was a child. Turning to whether the act or acts of violence are a series of related acts (either quarantined from other claims or multiple acts in a discrete claim), I observe the following:
The allegations involved a solitary perpetrator, the grandfather, acting alone.
Whilst there was a relationship of blood or law with other perpetrators, there is little if any evidence that any other perpetrator was aware that the grandfather had also abused HGQ.
The abuse occurred at a different location on different dates even if there was overlap concerning other abusers assaulting HGQ in the same calendar years.
The abuse was committed in part over the same period of time as other abuse, but not committed by the same group of persons, but an individual acting alone aware or unaware or other parallel abuse occurring in HGQ's life.
I find that this claim cannot be considered a part of any other claim that the Tribunal is aware of on the limited information before it. The main piece of information that the Tribunal has is the aide memoir prepared by the Commissioner and received without objection as Annexure A to their material lodged on 13 March 2026 as referred to at [7] above. Therefore the decision will be set aside.
Section 35 of the VR and S Act sets out the types of acts of violence (descriptions of the assaults) or the nature of an act of violence against the relevant category of recognition payment. The section provides:
35 Categories of recognition payment
(1) A category A recognition payment is a payment given in respect of an act of violence or act of modern slavery that apparently occurred in the course of the commission of a homicide.
(2) A category B recognition payment is a payment given in respect of an act of violence or act of modern slavery of the following kinds-
(a) a sexual assault resulting in serious bodily injury or which involved an offensive weapon or was carried out by 2 or more persons,
(b) a sexual assault, sexual touching or sexual act or attempted sexual assault involving violence that is one of a series of related acts.
(3) A category C recognition payment is a payment given in respect of an act of violence or act of modern slavery involving any of the following-
(a) a sexual assault other than one referred to in subsection (2) (b),
(b) an attempted sexual assault resulting in serious bodily injury,
(c) an assault resulting in grievous bodily harm,
(d) physical assault of a child that is one of a series of related acts.
(4) A category D recognition payment is a payment given in respect of an act of violence or act of modern slavery involving any of the following-
(a) sexual touching or sexual act,
(b) an attempted sexual assault involving violence other than one referred to in subsection (3) (b),
(c) a robbery involving violence,
(d) an assault (not resulting in grievous bodily harm).
(Emphasis added)
I find that for this claim HGQ will be entitled to a Category B recognition payment as referred to at [41] above.
Section 36 of the Act sets out how recognition payments (as described in s 35) are payable:
36 Recognition payments
(1) Recognition payments are payable as follows:
(a) a category A recognition payment of an amount prescribed by the regulations is payable:
(i) to each family victim (other than a child referred to in subparagraph (ii)) who, immediately before the death of a primary victim as a result of an act of violence described in section 35 (1), was financially dependent on the primary victim, and
(ii) to each child of a primary victim who, immediately before the death of the primary victim as a result of an act of violence described in section 35 (1), was under the age of 18 years,
(b) a category A recognition payment of an amount prescribed by the regulations is payable to the following who were not, immediately before the death of the primary victim concerned, financially dependent on a primary victim who died as a result of an act of violence described in section 35 (1):
(i) a parent, step-parent or guardian of the primary victim,
(ii) any person who, immediately before the death of the primary victim, was the victim's spouse or de facto partner as referred to in section 22 (3) (b),
(c) a category B recognition payment of an amount prescribed by the regulations is payable to a primary victim who suffered injury as a result of an act of violence described in section 35 (2),
(d) a category C recognition payment of an amount prescribed by the regulations is payable to a primary victim who suffered injury as a result of an act of violence described in section 35 (3),
(e) a category D recognition payment of an amount prescribed by the regulations is payable to a primary victim who suffered injury as a result of an act of violence described in section 35 (4).
(2) Only one recognition payment is payable to a single victim in respect of a series of related acts of violence against the victim.
(Emphasis added)
14 Recognition payments
The following are the prescribed amounts of recognition payment for the purposes of section 36 of the Act-
(a) for a category A recognition payment referred to in section 36(1)(a) of the Act-$15,000,
(b) for a category A recognition payment referred to in section 36(1)(b) of the Act-$7,500,
(c) for a category B recognition payment-$10,000,
(d) for a category C recognition payment-$5,000,
(e) for a category D recognition payment-$1,500.
(Emphasis added)
Having regard to the totality of the evidence and material before me I find that HGQ is a victim of an act of violence in accordance with s 19 of the Act, and as outlined above has satisfied the criteria of s 39 with no s 44 issues.
On the basis of the above finding HGQ's claim for a recognition payment succeeds and the decision of the respondent will be set aside. The applicant is entitled to a recognition payment in the amount of $10,000 and that amount will be payable to the applicant.
The claim relates to sexual abuse by HGQ's cousin. It is summarised at [14] above.
The evidence in this claim as noted is somewhat contradictory. In the application HGQ says that her cousin sexually abused her from 12 February 1974 to 12 February 1975 equating approximately the HGQ's first year of life. This cannot be the case because I do not accept that HGQ is able to recall with any clarity events from her first year of life no matter how traumatic, sufficient to provide evidence of probative value that could be accepted as a claim.
In any event it appears that this declaration was a mistake because later in her material she refers to the abuse from her male cousin as occurring when she was 10 years of age and he was 14 years of age.
However there is only one documented evening of abuse being the evening when the tents were pitched in the backyard and the children were sleeping in the tents. On that basis having reviewed all of the evidence I find that HGQ was the victim of an act of violence and that s 39 has been met with no s 44 issues, I also find that the incident is not captured as a series of related acts, related to the other successful claims concerning abuse by extended family members.
I make that finding because:
The cousin was a different perpetrator to those in the other claims.
The cousin was acting alone (at least in respect of his abuse of HGQ).
The perpetrator himself was a child whereas the other claimants engaged in abuse were predominantly adults.
The matter was reported to an adult (RD the Uncle) who tried to investigate what had occurred early the following day when it was reported to him.
It follows that based on those findings, HGQ is entitled to a Category C recognition payment in the nature of s 35(3)(a) of the VR and S Act.
On the basis of the above finding HGQ's claim for a recognition payment succeeds and the decision of the respondent will be set aside. The applicant is entitled to a recognition payment in the amount of $5,000 and that amount will be payable to the applicant.
"(a) Between the ages of 3 to 11 years (HGQ) was sexually abused by her uncle (RD) when accompanying her father and uncle fishing in a boat - (further the claim refers to sexual abuse by both her father and her uncle but appears only pressed in respect of the uncle.)"
Whilst I appreciate that the events upon which HGQ's claim is based occurred many years ago and have only fairly recently been revived, there must still be sufficient evidence of probative value to satisfy the finder of fact that it was more likely than not that the matters as alleged occurred.
My preliminary concern is that the claim only concerns the Uncle, even though there is also a reference to the father being a perpetrator. The way in which the allegations are couched requires the finder of fact to identify that HGQ and her father and her Uncle were on a boat with a cabin, out fishing on the lake during the day. This is said to have occurred on multiple occasions around school holidays and long weekends when the Uncle came and visited the family. The men were said to have been consuming alcohol at various times whilst out fishing. What is less clear is the circumstances of the actual abuse.
In her material filed 12 February 2026 for this review, HGQ states the following at 5. in her statement titled "Document 1":
"5. lead Case - Abuse by 'R.D.'
13. For the purposes of the Tribunal's consideration, I rely on the abuse perpetrated by my uncle (R.D.) as the primary reference point.
14. His conduct involved:
- Repeated access to me during extended family visits,
- Heavy alcohol use by adults,
- Isolation during boating and fishing trips where escape was impossible, and
- Prolonged anticipatory fear knowing the abuse would occur.
15. These circumstances produced specific trauma responses including freezing, fawning, dissociation, and chronic anticipatory terror.
16. (R.D.) acted independently. His conduct was not dependent on, incidental to, or part of a single course of conduct with other perpetrators.
17. Treating his actions as merely 'related' to others because of family connection fails to consider the particular circumstances required by section 19(5)."
I note that this material was prepared primarily to establish on administrative review the presence of separate acts of violence not a series of related acts.
In her application for victims support HGQ provides the following description of the conduct (act of violence) that this claim is based on:
"On 2 August 2024 (HGQ) disclosed to me that between the ages of 3 years to 11 years she was sexually abused by her uncle Mr (RD). (HGQ) reported that Mr (RD) would regularly visit her home, usually during Xmas holidays and long weekends. (HGQ) reported that Mr (RD) and her father would spend the weekend Fishing in the inlet around (location) and the pair would take (HGQ) with them. (HGQ) reported both her father and uncle were heavy drinkers and whilst they were fishing she would be down in the sleeping area of the boat and would be made to have sexual intercourse with either her father or uncle whenever they wanted it."
The Internal Review application does not advance the allegations further, but in essence responds to the 'verification' questions or 'corroboration' queries posed by the initial Assessor. The Internal Review decision, being a joint decision, deals with all three clams and in respect of this claim, provides limited engagement on the s 19(1)(a) and (b) issues. There is no analysis of the circumstances of the self reported evidence of the serious assaults. Whilst the allegations (as reproduced at [86] above), are set out, paragraph [22] of the review decision, it then moves straight to a finding that the documentary evidence is sufficient. I disagree.
There are a number of matters in the account which lead me to a position that it is more likely than not that the conduct did not occur, at least not in the circumstances as described by HGQ.
HGQ refers to her father being present and also engaged in sexual abuse, yet no claim is made in respect of these actions of her father. If I am mistaken and such a claim is made then that claims administrative details such as: offenders, dates etc. do not align with any matter on Annexure A. That Annexure of the Commissioner's submissions identifies a number of Victims Services claims involving HGQ's father. Claim 00424552 is a claim apparently based on the father acting in an individual capacity when engaged in acts of violence against HGQ. Claim 00466866, Claim 00466878 and Claim 00470337 all involve HGQ's father and at least one other perpetrator as committing acts of violence against HGQ.
As can be seen from the list set out at [7] above, Claim 00424552 covers abuse in the period January 1976 to December 1985. Claim 00466866 covers abuse in concert with WB and LB in the period January 1980 to August 1983. Claim 00466878 covers abuse in concert with JD in the period February 1979 - February 1985. Claim 00470337 covers abuse in concert with WB in the period February 1983 - February 1986. These four claims are the totality of the claims concerning HGQ's father.
In my view there is no relevant claim from HGQ concerning the abuse that took place at the hands of her father on the boat when the alleged co-abuser JD was present. I am not privy to the details of the four claims outlined above at [90] other than the information gleaned from the table at Annexure A and reproduced in part at [7] and [90]. There is a time overlap in the dates in this current claim (VS Claim 00538951) which covers 1/1/1977- 31/12/1985 and the only claim against the father as sole offender (Claim 00424552) which covers 1/1/1974 - 21/12/1989.
However, the father based claim begins two years prior to this claim and concludes four years after the current claim period. In my view these matters (in the absence of any evidence or material put forward by HGQ other than the material filed 12 February 2025), lead to the conclusion on balance, that Claim 00424552 is unrelated to the current claim. If it was related then the binary details of the claim would at the very least include JD as an offender, which they do not. HGQ has referred to other co-offenders in claims involving her father but not this claim. JD is not mentioned in any of the three other claims based on the father of HGQ abusing her with co-offenders. I therefore find on the above analysis and available evidence that claim 00424552 is unrelated to the matters submitted in Claim 00538951. I also find, that in the absence of any reference to JD, Claims 00466866, 00466878 and Claim 00470331 do not relate.
In my view it seems highly unusual that HGQ would make a claim about her uncle sexually abusing her in the fishing boat but not make a claim about the father. In addition whilst I appreciate that HGQ would have felt trapped on the boat and unable to evade any perpetrator in a practical way, it does seem unusual that she would willingly go with her adult male relatives in such circumstances knowing what was likely to follow based on prior experiences on the boat apparently over her entire childhood. Clearly there was a power imbalance and HGQ was a child. However it appears unexplained why HGQ continued to accompany the older male relatives on the boat over a period of some eight years, especially when she was older near the end of the claimed period, and could not have gone to another family member such as her mother to protest.
I note that in claim 2025/00390388 (VS 00538907) at [78] above, HGQ was able to report the incident with her cousin to adult family members. In this case it was her uncle (RD), the nominated perpetrator in the current matter, who took the lead in trying to investigate that matter. If the findings above on claim 202/00390388 (Claim 538907) are to be accepted, HGQ was abused in that claim around 1984. In such circumstances matters are further conflicted by on the one hand, allegedly being sexually abused on a boat in this period, and on the other hand being able to report sexual abuse by another family member in the same period that the person who the report was made to was actively engaged in abuse of the claimant herself, (HGQ).
The Tribunal is only able to work with the evidence before it. Evidence must be weighed and this is especially so when it cannot be verified. Whilst there is no requirement that any matter other than the presence of injury must be verified under the Scheme, all other matters are considered on the balance of probabilities which equates to the finder of fact being reasonably satisfied that the allegations as made, refer to factual matters. They must examine and weigh all the available information, and contrast it to make findings.
A victim of crime suffers greatly and they are to be supported wherever the scheme allows. However, whilst the standard is reasonably low, such as balance of probability findings, the removal now of any requirement to report crimes to NSW Police and no requirement that perpetrators are even accurately identified, let alone prosecuted, there must still be sufficient evidence to satisfy the decision maker.
The role of the finder of fact is to weigh up all the evidence and material before them, and to ensure that the process is fair to both parties. In this instance the matters that have caused me to doubt aspects of the allegations were clearly before both parties. No evidence was adduced at hearing nor was any sought to be adduced. The position of each party was that the Tribunal had enough information before it to make a decision. No witness was called and as a result no propositions were to put any witness with an opportunity to rebut.
The issues were clearly before both parties in a hearing de novo, where the Tribunal was not bound by any earlier decision of the regulator (Commissioner). It was open to the Tribunal to find an act of violence on each claim, or not. It was also open to the Tribunal to find that any acts of violence were related to other claims, or that discrete claims were not to be treated as related acts.
In assessing this discrete claim I have found a range of factors which create sufficient doubt to tip the balance that the allegation made by HGQ that her uncle sexually abused her over a period of eight years whilst in the presence of her father, who also engaged in abuse in the same context, on the fishing boat, is misplaced.
For the reasons outlined at [88] - [94] above, I find that it is unlikely that the conduct as alleged, on the available evidence occurred. On that basis, there is sufficient doubt that the conduct occurred, sufficient to displace the necessary finding that it was more likely than not that the conduct occurred.
On this basis the decision under review will be set aside, but dismissed for other reasons on Claim 538907 NCAT application 2025/000390388.
In my view in reaching this position post hearing, there was no requirement to alert any party to this possibility, essentially because all claims before the Tribunal had been dismissed on Internal Review. There was no loss of benefit to HGQ sufficient to require a Parker Direction (Parker v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 28 NSWLR 282).
For the reasons outlined above, the decision of the respondent will be set aside in three applications for administrative review. However, for different reasons in proceedings number 2025/00390376 in substitution of the decision a finding will be made that HGQ was not a victim of an act of violence and the application will be dismissed.
In proceedings 2025/00339563 the respondent is to grant the applicant one recognition payment in the nature of Category B in the sum of $10,000.00 pursuant to s 35 (2) (b) and s 36 (1) (c) of the VR and S Act.
In proceedings 2025/00390388 the respondent is to grant the applicant one recognition payment in the nature of Category C in the sum of $5,000.00 pursuant to s 35(3)(a) and s 36(1)(d) of the VR and S Act.
As a result of the decisions in the three claims above, the applicant is to be provided with total additional recognition payments for the two successful claims providing a total payment in the amount of $15,000.00 in accordance with any other requirements under s 48 of the VR and S Act.
**********
I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar
HGQ
Commissioner of Victims Rights
(1979) 46 FLR 409
(1992) 28 NSWLR 282