austlii:cth/ARTA/2025/541
General information, not legal advice.
ARTA
2025-03-21
Original judgment source is linked above.
Hewish and Australian Securities and Investments Commission (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 541 (21 March 2025)
Respondent: Australian Securities and Investments Commission
Decision: The respondent's application to vacate the hearing dates will be dismissed if the applicant confirms in writing to the Tribunal and to the respondent by 5pm (AEST) on 21 March 2025 that he wishes to proceed with the hearing notwithstanding the risk that proceeding with the hearing may result in him providing assistance to the prosecution in the conduct of the foreshadowed criminal case, including:
(a) as a result of evidence being given that leads ASIC to make inquiries and obtain evidence that it might not have been able to obtain or lead had the Tribunal proceedings not gone ahead;
(b) telegraphing to the prosecution any defence upon which Mr Hewish may rely;
(c) confining the defences which could be appropriately run in any criminal proceedings; and
(d) by the waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination as a result of documents tendered or evidence given.
If the applicant fails to give that confirmation by that time, the application is granted.
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - application to vacate hearing dates in week prior to commencement of hearing - application brought by respondent - primary proceedings involve review of decisions to ban the applicant from the financial services industry for ten years - application based on possible criminal prosecution arising out of same facts - risk of prejudice to criminal proceedings as a result of proceeding with Tribunal review - applicant suffering ongoing financial prejudice from ban - applicant strong preference for review continuing - application dismissed provided applicant acknowledges potential prejudice to him in the conduct criminal proceedings
CFMEU v ACCC [2016] FCAFC 97
Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police & Ors v Zhao & Anor [2015] HCA 5
Hammond v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors [1982] HCA 42; (1982) 42 ALR 327
NSW Food Authority v Nutricia Australia Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCCA 252; (2008) 72 NSWLR 456.
Street Nation Pty Ltd and Australian Communications Authority [2004] AATA 1251
X7 v Australian Crime Commission [2013] HCA 29; (2013) 248 CLR 92
Administrative Review Tribunal (Common Procedures) Practice Direction 2024
(a) Under Mr Hewish's leadership, UGC (or its representatives) gave inappropriate and conflicted personal advice to its clients to establish a self-managed superannuation fund (SMSF), rollover their superannuation from an APRA-regulated fund into the SMSF and invest in speculative and highly speculative investments related to Mr Hewish. The investments included: > > > (i) Shares in an unlisted public company, Global Capital Property Fund Ltd (GCPF) - Mr Hewish was a director of GCPF. GCPF invested in companies including companies related to Mr Hewish which were undertaking property development; > > > > (ii) Interests in the Pivotal Diversified Fund (Pivotal), an unlisted registered managed investment scheme which invested a portion of its funds in financial products related to Mr Hewish, including GCPF.
(a)
(b) Potential targets for provision of this advice were identified by the purchase of lists of contact details from a company which compiled them by using the chance to win an iPhone to persuade people to supply their details;
(c) Salespeople working for companies known as corporate authorised representatives (CARs) used call scripts when talking to potential targets, that created the impression that they were offering an audit of the potential target's superannuation arrangements;
(d) When people were persuaded to undergo an examination of their superannuation arrangements, they were inevitably guided into transferring funds from APRA regulated funds to self managed superannuation funds and then advised to invest in vehicles associated with Mr Hewish. A referral to UGC followed and the transactions were executed by UGC (with limited additional advice). This policy of providing referred clients with limited advice was referred to as the Limited Advice Model;
(e) By its use of the Limited Advice Model, UGC contravened a number of its obligations under the Corporations Act 2001 (Corps Act);
(f) Mr Hewish was involved in UGC's contraventions, including by reason of his position as UGC's sole director, responsible manager and key person; and
(g) ASIC had reason to believe that Mr Hewish:
(i) was not adequately trained or was not competent to participate in the financial services industry;
(ii) is not fit and proper to participate in the financial services industry; and
(iii) is likely to contravene a financial services law.
(a) to adjourn the listed hearing; and > > (b) that the matter be listed for directions 'not before 2 February 2026'.
...ASIC's position is that these orders have become necessary to avoid the risk of prejudice to Mr Hewish in contemplated future criminal proceedings. In particular, ASIC's ongoing investigation into the affairs of UGC and its officers and directors includes investigation into possible breaches by Mr Hewish of sections 1041E and 1041G of the Corporations Act, in relation to the authorisation of promotional material used by UGC's corporate authorised representatives. The question of whether or not Mr Hewish authorised certain promotional materials has been put in issue in these proceedings. The overlap in subject matter creates a risk of prejudice to any criminal proceedings which may be brought against Mr Hewish in relation to the subject matter.
(a) On 23 May 2022, ASIC commenced a formal investigation in relation to suspected contraventions by UGC and/or its officers and representatives of a number of sections of the Corps Act; > > (b) On 9 February 2023, the scope of ASIC's investigation was expanded to include suspected contraventions by UGC and/or its officers and representatives of sections 952E and 1041H of the Corps Act; > > (c) On 17 May 2024 the investigation was further expanded to include further suspected contraventions by UGC and GCPF and/or their officers and representatives; > > (d) ASIC's investigation is ongoing; > > (e) The subject matter of the suspected offences, including under s 1041E and 1041G relates to the officers and representatives of both UGC and > > GCPF including the applicant's suspected involvement in the preparation and/or dissemination of presentations and call scripts given by UGC's CARs to investors that contained various representations about the nature of the investment; > > (f) Offences under ss1041E and 1041G carry a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment.
(a) On 24 January 2025, the applicant put in issue the question of the provenance and authorisation of the call scripts and presentations included in the T documents and referred to in the delegate's decision and in ASIC's SFIC - these being the call scripts used by corporate authorised representatives (CARs); > > (b) Prior to this date it was not apparent that this would be in issue or that the Tribunal would have to make contested findings on the issue... > > (c) The use of call scripts and presentations by the CARs forms part of the overall advice model which was utilised by UGC. > > (d) In order for the Tribunal to make any findings as to the provenance of the call scripts and presentations, it would need to have regard to the evidence of the applicant, the evidence of ASIC, and cross examination of the applicant on these points (should that occur); > > (e) On the basis of the material filed by the applicant, ASIC does not understand there to be any issue between the parties as to whether the call scripts and presentations were misleading, which the applicant appears to accept.
5.12 The Tribunal will not adjourn a hearing date unless it considers that there are good reasons to justify the adjournment. > > ... > > 5.14 An application for an adjournment made within 10 days of a hearing is unlikely to be granted unless there are good reasons for doing so.
The Tribunal must pursue the objective of providing an > > independent mechanism of review that: > > (a) is fair and just; and > > (b) ensures that applications to the Tribunal are resolved as > > quickly, and with as little formality and expense, as a proper > > consideration of the matters before the Tribunal permits; and > > (c) is accessible and responsive to the diverse needs of parties to > > proceedings; and > > (d) improves the transparency and quality of government > > decision-making; and > > (e) promotes public trust and confidence in the Tribunal.
The mere fact that proceedings are pending in a court of law does not mean that any parallel or related administrative inquiry, conducted for proper administrative purposes, constitutes an interference with the due administration of justice in that court...
On the other hand, it is fundamental to the administration of criminal justice that a person who is the subject of pending criminal proceedings in a court of law should not be subjected to having his part in the matters involved in those criminal proceedings made the subject of a parallel inquisitorial inquiry by an administrative tribunal with powers to compel the giving of evidence and the production of documents which largely correspond (and, to some extent, exceed) the powers of the Criminal Court. Such extra-curial inquisitorial investigation of the involvement of a person who has been committed for trial in the matters which form the basis of the criminal proceedings against him constitutes, in my view, an improper interference with the due administration of justice in the proceedings against him in the Criminal Court and contempt of court.
(i) where both civil and criminal proceedings are pending, a stay of the civil proceeding will be ordered where 'the interests of justice require such an order': Zhao (HC) at [36]; > > (ii) a court will not grant a stay of a civil proceeding merely because related charges have been brought against an accused and criminal proceedings are pending: Zhao (HC) at [35]; > > (iii) to warrant a stay of the civil proceedings 'it must be apparent' that the accused 'is at risk of prejudice in the conduct of his or her defence in the criminal trial': Zhao (HC) at [35]; > > (iv) the risk of prejudice must be real and, in considering what the interests of justice require, that risk is to be weighed against the prejudice that a stay of the civil proceeding would occasion: Zhao (HC) at [47] and [50].
The reasoning of both the High Court and the Court of Appeal in Zhao recognised that a potential prejudice for an accused is that evidence given by that person in a civil proceeding would reveal or telegraph information to the prosecutor about the accused's defence in the criminal proceeding. The potential to advantage the prosecutor was regarded by the Court of Appeal as an infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence. The High Court relied upon a different but related foundation. As the Court noted at [18], by reference to the fundamental principle of the common law as explained in Lee v the Queen [2014] HCA 20; (2014) 253 CLR 455 at [32] -[33], the prosecution is to prove the guilt of an accused person and cannot compel a person charged with a crime to assist in the discharge of its onus of proof.
Even if the answer cannot be used in any way at the trial, any admission made in the examination will hinder, even prevent, the accused from challenging at trial that aspect of the prosecution case. And what would otherwise be a wholly accusatorial process, in which the accused may choose to offer no account of events, but simply test the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, is radically altered.
(a) as a result of evidence being given that leads ASIC to make inquiries and obtain evidence that it might not have been able to obtain or lead had the Tribunal proceedings not gone ahead; > > (b) telegraphing to the prosecution any defence upon which Mr Hewish may rely; > > (c) confining the defences which could be appropriately run in any criminal proceedings; and > > (d) by the waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination as a result of documents tendered or evidence given.
[1] See the authorities summarised by Spigelman CJ in Nutricia at [54] and following.
(1982) 42 ALR 327
(2008) 72 NSWLR 456
(2013) 248 CLR 92
(2014) 253 CLR 455