3. The Comparison of the funds included the usual low target return for the existing fund and the high target return for GCPF along with the unsubstantiated assumption that other funds invested by the SMSF would yield 10%. It also noted the need to reserve funds in cash to ensure the SMSF could pay UGC's administration fees as they were charged in the future.
4. Not surprisingly, the comparison yielded the conclusion that BD was $242,754 better off if she switched to an SMSF and invested in GCPF.[120]
5. In the Authority to proceed section BD signed the following statements:

Acknowledge that UGC has not provided any investment recommendations or any personal advice in relation to investment recommendations or any personal advice in relation to investment recommendations and that any investments considered for my SMSF fall outside of UGC's agreed Engagement for this Statement of Advice.

Confirm my understanding that any investment or opportunity presented to me by Integral Wealth does not convey an endorsement of these investments by UGC, regardless of how I was introduced to UGC.[121]

1. Miki Petrovic rang her on 20 May 2021.[122] He gave the usual disclaimer that UGC was not engaged to provide best interest advice but was obliged to provide it under legislation that took effect last year.
2. Mr Petrovic went through the Comparison table in the Statement of Advice. While doing so, BD asked 'so you are advising that I don't add [employer contributions] into that account [GCPF] I keep AMP going'. Mr Petrovic replied 'no'. He also stated 'We are forecasting it [the GCPF option] will reach $690,000'. Mr Petrovic also explained that the SMSF is more expensive than her existing superannuation fund, but 'in terms of returns and control that you are able to have there is no real comparison.'[123]
3. BD set up an SMSF and invested in GCPF.

1. NH came to UGC through Integral.[124] In November 2021, he signed the Authority to Provide Contact Details. [REDACTED]
2. After undertaking the documentation process with Integral he was referred to UGC. He went through the fact find process with a UGC employee in mid-November 2021 and identified increased wealth and better returns in super as his goals.
3. He was sent the usual letter that stated::

1. Setup a new SMSF, so that you can direct your own investment decisions and access investments that may not be available through any retail superannuation fund, and
2. Invest your superannuation money in the Global Capital Property Fund and Pivotal Diversified Fund.[125]
3. As previously noted those statements suggest a much more definite state of mind than was in fact the case.
4. The Pivotal a fund referred to was set up by Mr Hewish and marketed by Integral. Pivotal invested across a range of products including:

(a) Ordinary shares in GCPF; > > (b) Units in UGC Global Alpha Fund; > > (c) Units in UGC Platinum Alpha Fund; > > (d) Units in UGC Private Equity Fund; and > > (e) Third party investments the investment manager of the fund believes will help the fund achieve its stated investment objectives; > > (f) Cash or cash equivalent investments.[126]

5. Pivotal is an open-ended unlisted registered managed investment scheme that was open to retail investors, which invested in a number of products related to Mr Hewish, including GCPF. Like GCPF, it targeted a 13% return for investors. It is described as a 'speculative' investment in is Products Disclosure Statements.[127] Mr Hewish is a director, and his family trust, owns 25% of the shares in Pivotal's investment manager, The Australian Funds Management Group Pty Ltd ('AFMG').[128]
6. Like GCPF Management, AFMG drew fees from Pivotal and the larger the investment in the fund, the more the management company was entitled to draw as a management fee. The investment into Pivotal also attracted a 3.3% fee payable to Integral.[129]
7. The usual comparison table was drawn up for NH, against his current fund, LUCRF Super ('LUCRF').
8. Estimated long term future returns for LUCRF were selected at 5.65%. The previous financial year LUCRF had returned 18%. It is unclear how the 5.65% number was selected as it was well below the average performance of LUCRF since NH had joined that fund. The returns estimated for the combination of investments proposed for NH were assumed at 13.5%. Despite much higher fees resulting from an SMSF, the comparison concluded that over 10 years NH would be more than $400,000 better off.[130]
9. A second comparison was also included in the Statement of Advice. The estimated future return number used came from the 10-year returns for LUCRF, which were reasonable but lower than the actual returns NH had earned since he joined LUCRF. Using the target returns for GCPF and Pivotal, establishing an SMSF and investing in GCPF and Pivotal came out as a better investment, despite the high fees.
10. NH when giving authority to proceed acknowledged the following:

Acknowledge that UGC has not provided any investment recommendations or any personal advice in relation to investment recommendations and that any investments considered for my SMSF fall outside of UGC's agreed Engagement for this Statement of Advice.[131]

1. NH invested in GCPF and Pivotal after setting up an SMSF.

1. JJ's paperwork followed the pattern described above in relation to the other investors. She made her superannuation switch in May 2022 having been signed up by Wealth Rite earlier that month. She invested in both GCPF and Pivotal.
2. Her benefit analysis was particularly egregious. Having earned 21.76% in a growth-oriented Mercer fund the previous year, her benefit calculation was done on the basis of her existing superannuation generating a 6.4% return. Even with that modest number being used for the benefit calculation, the benefit in 10 years without contributions only reached $176,568.[132] She invested in both GCPF and Pivotal.

1. As can be seen, UGC and its authorised corporate representatives ran a system for enticing customers to create SMSFs and invest in products associated with Mr Hewish. This system ran from at least the start of 2020 to late 2022.
2. Most of the documents that clients signed were designed to ensure that no-one was responsible for saying that GCPF or Pivotal were good investments. The documents were designed to create the illusion that the client was independently forming the view that these funds were good investments and was simply approaching UGC to document their intentions. When the files are examined, it is clear that the documents do not reflect the reality.
3. The documents were dishonest. The presentations were dishonest. The advice given was based on faulty foundations and not in the best interests of the client. No financial adviser could have recommended the investment proposal as being in the best interests of the client. The combination of high fees, lack of liquidity, low risk spread and unproven foundation for earning returns meant that the only certainty was that the client's capital would be eaten away by fees. Whether investment returns would be better or worse than in the existing superannuation funds was not knowable. The lower risk option was always to remain with the existing low fee funds which, in some circumstances, could generate returns in the 18 to 20% range and overall generated returns close to double digits if high growth options were selected. The funds did not require cash reserves to be set aside to pay UGC's fees and had a proven track record and government guarantees. Any objective consideration of the client's best interests would not have led to the client being advised to invest in GCPF and Pivotal through an SMSF. The desire to earn fees is the best explanation for Integral, Wealth Rite and UGC steering the clients into those products.
4. Mr Hewish engineered the system. He was personally involved in approving the marketing presentations that clients were subjected to by his corporate authorised representatives. He hoped that with deft client transfers he could maintain the pretence that no-one for whom he was responsible was giving personal advice and recommending the investments. The entire design of the documentation was to escape professional responsibility for putting clients into inappropriate investments that primarily benefited Mr Hewish and his business associates. The system was an exercise in self-interest prevailing over professional responsibility from start to finish.
5. It is surprising that Mr Hewish has come to the Tribunal and defended the system he created. I found him to be a sincere witness who genuinely felt he had done nothing wrong. He was aware of his obligations as a financial adviser but somehow felt that by a combination of careful documentation and patched together processes, UGC and its authorised representatives had somehow managed to generate an $85 million investment for GCPF without ever giving anyone personal advice and without ever having an obligation to consider the best interests of the client beyond ensuring that the investment wasn't positively contrary to the client's best interests.
6. I am prepared to proceed on the basis that what Mr Hewish says is what he genuinely thought, but it makes no difference to the outcome. Mr Hewish has had the benefit of a decision by an ASIC delegate and he has had the benefit of experienced legal representation throughout the ASIC process. Despite these opportunities to consider and reflect on how he let his client's down, he continues to think that whatever he did was not that bad. It is that lack of insight that makes a banning order of at least 10 years appropriate.
7. From when it was registered to its eventual winding-up, GCPF invested in 15 special purpose vehicles to undertake property-development projects, four of which are related to Mr Hewish. At the point of GCPF's winding-up, only one project had been completed, many of the projects having suffered from delays related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The results of the remaining projects remain to be seen, and several are forecasted to make capital losses.[133] GCPF never paid a dividend to its investors.

1. Pursuant to s 920A(1)(d) of the Corporations Act, ASIC may make a banning order against a person if ASIC has reason to believe that the person is not a fit and proper person to:

(i) Provide one or more financial services; or > > (ii) Perform one or more functions as an officer of an entity that carries on a financial services business; or > > (iii) Control an entity that carries on a financial services business.

2. As I have noted in previous decisions in this area, the concept of a person being 'fit' involves three things - honesty, knowledge and ability - honesty to execute the responsibility truly, without malice affection or partiality; knowledge to know what he ought duly to do; and ability so he can execute his responsibilities diligently.[134] The facts support the conclusion that Mr Hewish does not have sufficient knowledge to even know when he and those for whom he is legally responsible are giving personal advice. This renders him unfit to give such advice because he cannot properly understand his legal obligations. Further, he seems unable to appreciate that representatives operating under his AFSL should not be guiding clients of into products from which he and his representatives will benefit. He lacks a very basic understanding of his duties as a financial adviser. On the facts known there clearly are reasons to believe that Mr Hewish is not a fit and proper person to provide financial services, or perform functions as an officer within a financial services business, or control an entity that carries on a financial services business.
3. For the same reason ASIC has reason to believe that Mr Hewish is not adequately trained or is not competent to provide one or more financial services, perform one or more functions as an officer of an entity that carries on a financial services business, or control an entity that carries on a financial services business.
4. I am also satisfied that Mr Hewish has been involved in the contravention of a financial services law by another person. UGC was obliged to do all things necessary to ensure that the financial services covered by UGCs AFSL were provided efficiently, honestly and fairly, and to have in place adequate arrangements for the management of conflicts of interest that may arise in relation to activities undertaken by the licensee or a representative of the licensee in the provision of financial services as part of the financial services business of the licensee or the representative (s 912A). [REDACTED] As UGC's principal, Mr Hewish was responsible for ensuring that UGC and its authorised representatives had proper conflict of interest arrangements in place. Mr Hewish knew about the fees the companies he had an interest in would earn if investments were made in GCPF in accordance with the structure recommended to clients by both UGC representatives and authorised representatives. He made no effective attempt to manage that conflict of interest.
5. I am satisfied that all of this behaviour amounts to a contravention of a financial services law by UGC. [REDACTED]
6. [REDACTED]
7. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the necessary thresholds for imposing a banning order on Mr Hewish are satisfied. The question then is what period should the ban cover, and should it exclude Mr Hewish entirely from the financial services industry in all capacities.

1. ASIC contends that the banning order should extend for ten years and should exclude Mr Hewish from providing any financial services, controlling an entity that carries on a financial services business or performing any function involved in carrying on of a financial services business.
2. The scope of the banning order is discretionary. In exercising the discretion, it is appropriate for me to have regard to any guidance materials that are applied by ASIC when exercising the discretion. ASIC Regulatory Guide 98 deals with the appropriate length of a banning order.
3. A banning order of 10 years is appropriate if:

(a) There is any dishonest conduct; > > (b) Conduct that shows serious incompetence or irresponsibility; > > (c) Significant adverse impact on confidence in the integrity of the financial services industry.

4. Mr Hewish's conduct meets all of those criteria.
5. [REDACTED]
6. Mr Hewish's conduct in applying the limited advice model to a marketing structure where:

(a) corporate authorised representatives were operating under his firm's AFSL; and > > (b) were marketing products when giving personal advice from which he personally stood to gain fees if the investments were made

1. [REDACTED]
2. Having regard to the seriousness of the findings and the need to deter others from operating advice models that cause retail investors to establish SMSFs to invest their retirement savings in related party products that are not appropriate for them, a 10-year ban is appropriate.
3. I have given consideration as to whether Mr Hewish should be allowed to continue in the industry in some capacity. He has no qualifications, interest or experience outside of the financial services industry. Consequently, a banning order that prevents him taking employment in the industry will prevent him utilising the skills that he has developed after an extended period working in the industry.
4. I have formed the view that it would not be appropriate to allow the applicant to provide financial services in any capacity during the period of the ban.
5. [REDACTED]
6. Section 760A of the Corps Act expressly states that the main object of Chapter 7 is to promote honesty by those who provide financial services. Consumer confidence in financial products and services is enhanced if the people with whom they deal have a reputation for honesty as well as a private determination to be honest while providing the service. Consumers of financial products and services are often acquiring products and services which they have an imperfect understanding of and in those circumstances are uniquely dependent on the advisers with whom they deal. It is therefore essential to the efficient operation of the markets for those services that consumers are confident in the honesty of the people allowed to provide the service. This makes lapses in honesty in any context a matter which is relevant to promoting the objectives of the Corporations Act. It creates a significant difficulty in allowing a person to continuing to provide financial services in any capacity where they are known to have engaged in dishonest conduct.
7. As Deputy President McCabe emphasised in Williams and Australian Securities and Investments Commission[135] (albeit in the context of a different statutory trigger):

...evidence of dishonesty occurring in most contexts is problematic since a commitment (and reputation for commitment) to honest dealing is essential to this role.

1. In my assessment, where the promotion of honesty on the part of those who participate in the industry is the objective that the Parliament is seeking to attain, dishonesty in most contexts is highly relevant to the question of whether a person should be permitted to participate in the industry in any capacity. In this case there is a close link between the dishonesty in which the applicant engaged and the duties of a financial adviser. The duties of a financial adviser require them to be honest and reliable. These are essential qualities for the performance of the duties. If a person demonstrates that they do not have these qualities, or are prone to very significant lapses when it is to their benefit, they have created doubts about the appropriateness of allowing them to continue to work in the industry at all.
2. The dishonesty in which Mr Hewish engaged is serious enough that it renders it inappropriate for him to participate in the financial services industry in any capacity for the term of the ban.

1. I have considered Mr Hewish's submissions on this issue including that:

(a) ASIC seeks small penalties against much bigger failings in large corporates, but is very tough on smaller players in the industry; > > (b) He invested heavily in employing and engaging compliance specialists to ensure UGC was doing the right thing; > > (c) Any non-compliance was inadvertent; and > > (d) [REDACTED]

2. None of these matters persuade me that a lesser penalty should be imposed. It may well be that ASIC should take a greater interest in identifying the individuals who mastermind large scale breaches of the Corporations Act within large corporations, and then ensure that they are excluded from the industry. That however is not an argument for imposing lesser penalties when the person responsible for breaches in a smaller organisation can be clearly identified.
3. Mr Hewish did spend significant sums on compliance and for that he can be commended. It is troubling that despite that expenditure no-one identified the profound problems with the Limited Advice Model despite regular compliance meetings. However expending money on compliance does not diminish Mr Hewish's responsibility for the system that was deployed. [REDACTED] He should have been able to avoid basic non-compliance just by having higher personal standards of integrity.
4. For the reasons outlined above I do not accept that non-compliance was inadvertent.
5. [REDACTED]

1. I am satisfied that the decision under review should be affirmed. ASIC's decision should operate from the date the ban was originally imposed.

Dates of Hearing 24 to 27 March 2025 and 2 to 5 June 2025

Applicant's representative Self-represented litigant

[1] A bastardisation of the older aphorism 'a fool and his money are soon parted'.

[2] T-Documents, T7.1, 1884; T7.37, 2427.

[3] Financial Adviser Standards and Ethics Authority Ltd, Financial Planners and Advisers Code of Ethics 2019 (at 8 February 2019) para 5.

[4] Corporations Act s 920A(1)(g).

[8] Corporations Act s 911A.

[9] Ibid, s 766A(1).

[10] For the complete definition see Corporations Act s 766B.

[12] Ibid, s 961B(1). Subsection (2) sets out how that duty can be satisfied.

[13] Ibid, s 961G.

[14] Ibid, s 961H.

[15] Ibid, s 961J.

[16] JJHSUBS, tab 2, 4-5. Referring: ASIC, Regulatory Guide 175: AFS licensing: Financial product advisers - Conduct and disclosure (21 November 2024), 175.176, 175.286, 175.321.

[17] Corporations Act, 917B noting the carve out in 917D.

[19] To the extent that his proposition is controversial I deal with it at [91] and [146] below

[21] See s 912A

[23] Affidavit of Joel James Hewish made 1 November 2024 ('First Hewish Affidavit'), [102].

[28] Transcript of Proceedings, Hewish v Australian Securities and Investments Commission, (Administrative Review Tribunal, ART2024/3838, Deputy President O'Donovan, 24 March 2025 - 27 March 2025), 51, 54. ('Transcript - Part 1')

[29] Ibid, 40, 73. Transcript of Proceedings, Hewish v Australian Securities and Investments Commission, (Administrative Review Tribunal, ART2024/3838, Deputy President O'Donovan, 2 June 2025 - 5 June 2025), 300. ('Transcript - Part 2')

[31] Transcript - Part 1, 58.

[32] First Hewish Affidavit, [157]-[158].

[33] Transcript - Part 2, 95. JJHSUBS, tab 2, 4-5. Referring: ASIC, Regulatory Guide 175: AFS licensing: Financial product advisers - Conduct and disclosure (21 November 2024), 175.176, 175.286, 175.321.

[34] Transcript - Part 1, 58.

[35] First Hewish Affidavit, [163]-[165].

[38] Transcript - Part 2, 100.

[40] Corporations Act, s 917B.

[41] The First Hewish Affidavit, [170]-[172].

[42] Affidavit of Susanne Julie Harris dated 9 September 2024, [59]. ('First Harris Affidavit')

[43] Through Hewish Capital Pty Ltd, a company controlled by Mr Hewish, in which him and his wife are equal shareholders.

[44] First Harris affidavit, [218]-[223].

[45] First Hewish affidavit, [180]-[182].

[47] ASIC through ASIC, Regulatory Guide 105: AFS licensing: Organisational competence (23 June 2022). ('RG 105'). RG 105 uses this concept to assess compliance with s 912A of the Corporations Act which requires licensees to maintain competence to provide financial services.

[48]ASIC, _Regulatory Guide 105: AFS licensing: Meeting the general obligations (_23 June 2022), 104.36. ('RG 104')

[49] Transcript - Part 2, 210-211. T-Documents, T7.206, 6644-6645.

[50] Transcript - Part 2, 170, 196; Exhibit A8.

[53] Transcript - Part 2, 210-211. T-Documents, T7.206, 6644.

[56] Marked 'annexure A' to the reasons.

[57] See ss 946A, 961B, 961G, 961H, 961J.

[60] T-Documents, T7.196, 6458-6459. Transcript - Part 2, 210-211. T-Documents, T7.206, 6644-6645

[63] Transcript - Part 1, 41, 125-127.

[64] Westpac Securities Administration Ltd v Australian. Securities and Investments Commission [2021] HCA 3; [2021] 270 CLR 118, 129.

[65] Transcript - Part 2, 175.

[66] T-Documents, T7.84, 3681; T7.91, 3763.

[67] First Hewish affidavit, [180]-[182].

[75] Transcript - Part 2, 281.

[77] Transcript - Part 1, 203

[91] Transcript - Part 2, 173-174.

[124] Although it is unclear whether Integral were still operating under UGC's AFSL when he engaged with Integral

[133] First Hewish Affidavit at [478]-[479]; First Harris Affidavit, [256], [301]-[302], [311]-[312].

[134] Hughes & Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2) [1955] HCA 28; (1955) 93 CLR 127, 156 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan & Webb JJ).

[135] [2018] AATA 2312, [47].