Body Corporate and Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 2020 (Accommodation Module)

The application for an interim order is hereby dismissed.

• [1] This dispute is about:
  1. The nomination of candidates for committee membership;
  2. A motion to engage a specific entity as its body corporate manager; and
  3. A decision made by the body corporate with respect to its budget for the repayment of a loan obtained to refurbish its swimming pool.

• [2] The scheme comprises 132 lots and common property, and is regulated under the Act and the Accommodation Module.
• [3] The applicant, Carole Medcalf, is the owner of Lot 214. The respondent is the body corporate.
• [4] A series of decisions were made at the Annual General Meeting ('AGM') for the year 2025, including the election of the committee of the respondent body corporate, the engagement of a body corporate manager, and budgets.
• [5] The subject of this decision is the following interim order sought by the applicant concerning the resolution to re-engage the body corporate manager, KBW Community Management Pty Ltd ('KBW'):

That the respondent [body corporate] is not to enter into any contract with KBW or apply the common seal to any contract with them until it is demonstrated [...] that the lodgement of Motion 9(a) was received prior to 28 February 2025, being the end of the financial year.

• [6] I am informed that, by the time the application was referred to department adjudication, the contract between the respondent body corporate and KBW was already executed.
• [7] Accordingly, I am unable to grant the interim order sought, given the action the applicant sought to prevent has already occurred, and so that part of the application is dismissed.

• [8] The applicant states that the financial year end date for the scheme is 28 February 2025.
• [9] On 28 January 2025, the applicant received a notice inviting nominations for committee membership and any motions to be included on the agenda for the 2025 AGM. This notice stated that all nominations and notices of motions must be provided 'no later than 28/02/2025'.
• [10] This notice had two forms enclosed for the purposes of the nomination and for the motions. Both forms noted the financial year end date as '28/02/2025' but required any nominations and motions to be provided by 'Wednesday 28 May 2025'.
• [11] Section 17(3) of the Accommodation Module requires such a notice inviting nominations to be given by the secretary to all lot owners at least three weeks before, but not earlier than six weeks before the end of the financial year. Section 17(4) of the Accommodation Module states[1] that nominations must be given to the secretary by the end of the financial year.
• [12] Subsequently in or around May 2025, the chairperson expressed to all owners on behalf of the committee that the discrepancy in the dates was due to a typographical error. He acknowledged that the financial year end date is indeed 28 February 2025, and that as per the requirements under the Accommodation Module, any nominations for committee membership ought to have been made no later than this date.
• [13] The chairperson indicated that the applicant insisted that any nominations provided after 28 February 2025 be rejected in order to ensure compliance with the Accommodation Module. However, he indicates that such an approach would have impacted the rights of lot owners to nominate for committee membership, given they would have reasonably believed that they had the entire period until 28 May 2025 to so nominate. He notes that the committee decided to uphold this important right to nominate and promote a democratic voting process, and accordingly, permitted lot owners to make nominations until 28 May 2025.
• [14] The applicant maintains that the acceptance of any nominations after the end of the financial year is unlawful, and that any such nominations were invalidly made.

• [15] Motion 9 of the 2025 AGM is a group of same issue motions for the engagement of a body corporate manager. Motion 9(a) pertains to the re-engagement of the existing body corporate manager, KBW, whilst Motion 9(b) relates to the engagement of Sunstate Strata Pty Ltd ('Sunstate Strata').
• [16] Motion 9(a) was submitted by the committee, whilst Motion 9(b) was submitted by the applicant.
• [17] Evidently, Motion 9(a) was carried and the respondent body corporate decided to re-engage KBW as its body corporate manager.
• [18] The applicant states that Motion 9(a) is irregular given the requirements under section 17(3) and (4) of the Accommodation Module have not been met.

• [19] Motions 5 to 7 pertain to body corporate funds and the setting of contributions to be levied in that regard.
• [20] The applicant states that in 2023 the respondent body corporate decided to obtain a loan for approximately $1 million to refurbish the swimming pool. Accordingly, it was decided that levies would be raised to pay off the loan in a period of five years. She states that while the 2023 levies covered funds to meet the loan commitment, the levies for the years that followed did not. She indicates that this issue was raised at the 2025 AGM with the chairperson and the body corporate manager, KBW, being unable to provide an explanation. She states that due to the inadequacy of the proposed levies, the body corporate then voted to increase the same by 10%, which in the applicant's view is still insufficient to cover the loan commitment for this year and the previous years. Accordingly, the body corporate account is purportedly in deficit. She claims this conduct to be contrary to section 150 of the Accommodation Module on budgets.

• [21] The applicant states that KBW's previous contract indicated that it would provide administrative services for at least five committee meetings per year. She states that the committee failed to meet at least five times, which meant that KBW were being paid for services that were not provided due to the committee's failures.
• [22] The applicant states that there has been an overlap of committee members on the last two committees and those elected at the 2025 AGM. She reiterates that KBW was and continues to be the scheme's body corporate manager following the AGM. She states that the deficit in the body corporate account is due to these committee members' and KBW's lack of oversight and mismanagement which demonstrates that they should not occupy such positions.
• [23] She also states that the secretary of the committee used body corporate resources to promote his 'team' for committee membership prior to the elections at the 2025 AGM.0020

• [24] In these circumstances, the application seeks the following final orders:

(a) That in the event of Motion 9(a) being received after 28 February 2025 that it be declared invalid;

(b) That in the event of Motion 9(a) being found invalid, that Motion 9(b) submission which was made prior to 28 February 2025 be accepted and that Sunstate Strata be appointed as strata managers effective immediately;

(c) That the Body Corporate be required to provide evidence that the nominations of the people named below were lodged before the 28 February 2025 and where they did not nominate in time, that they be removed from their position on the committee effective immediately

(i) Josef Purrer

(ii) Claire Blignaut

(iii) Anthony Purcell

(iv) Ian Cripwell

(v) Alex Evans

(vi) Kevin Hessey

(vii) Rashmi Madhan

(d) That any owner who submitted their nomination for a position/s prior to the 28 February be elected and that nominations for any remaining vacant positions be called for in accordance with [sections 33 and 34 of the Accommodation Module];

(e) That following the demonstration of validity, or not, of nominations for Committee and Motions, that a revised Sinking Fund budget, including increased levy amounts for each Lot owner, be prepared with alternative options developed as to recovery. This should include the possibility of extending the loan timeframe from 5 years with any implications for interest increases and payments outlined.

• [25] These final orders sought will be determined at a later stage (if the application for final orders proceeds) once the respondent body corporate, all owners and affected persons are provided an opportunity to make submissions; and the applicant an opportunity to reply to any such submissions.
• [26] The subject of this decision is the interim order sought by the applicant as described further above.

• [27] An adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances to resolve a dispute about a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the Community Management Statement ('CMS')[2] or about the exercise of rights or powers or performance of duties under the Act or CMS.[3] Further, an order may require a person to act, or prohibit a person from acting in a manner stated.[4] An order may also contain ancillary and consequential provisions the adjudicator considers necessary or appropriate. [5]
• [28] I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to determine the dispute in question by virtue of sections 276(1)(a) and (b) of the Act (read together with section 227(1)(b) of the Act).

• [29] This dispute was the subject of an application for department conciliation. A department conciliation session was held on 16 May 2025 unsuccessfully. I note that section 252E(5) of the Act states that evidence of anything said or done about the dispute in a department conciliation session is inadmissible in a proceeding.
• [30] This interim order application was lodged on 28 May 2025.
• [31] Subsequently, the Commissioner through her delegate sought further information in accordance with section 240 of the Act.
• [32] On 4 June 2025, the applicant provided the information so sought, immediately pursuant to which the dispute was referred to department adjudication by the Commissioner under section 247 of the Act.
• [33] The Commissioner may refer a matter for adjudication of an interim order application without the respondent and affected persons having an opportunity to make submissions on it. Furthermore, there is no statutory requirement for the department adjudicator to obtain comment from the respondent and any affected persons before such an application is determined.
• [34] On 4 June 2025, I through my delegate sought information from the committee as to whether the respondent body corporate had entered into a contract with KBW engaging it as the body corporate manager. On the same day, the committee confirmed that the contract had been executed.
• [35] I have investigated the dispute in accordance with section 271 of the Act by reviewing the application for interim orders and the response by the committee.

• [36] An adjudicator may make an interim order only if satisfied it is necessary due to the nature or urgency of the circumstances.[6] Accordingly, an applicant must satisfy the adjudicator that serious or irreparable damage would be caused without the interim order.
• [37] An interim order has effect for a period stated in the order, not to be longer than one year, and may be extended, varied, renewed or cancelled by the adjudicator until a final order is made, and otherwise lapses when an application is finally determined or withdrawn.[7]
• [38] An interim order is usually made in the form of a temporary injunction - an order not to do something, pending a final determination of an application.
• [39] In deciding whether an interim order is warranted, adjudicators often adopt the approach taken by courts to considering interlocutory injunction applications.[8] The first issue is whether the applicant has made out a 'prima facie case' or raised a 'serious legal question', in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is some probability that the applicant will succeed at the final determination stage. The second issue is whether any inconvenience or injury which the applicant would be likely to suffer if an interim order were refused outweighs or is outweighed by any inconvenience or injury which the respondent would suffer if an interim order were granted. Those two issues of serious legal question and balance of convenience are parts of one ultimate question - whether an interim order is warranted - and therefore should not be addressed mechanically or in isolation from one another.
• [40] The questions of law and fact raised by the application do not need to be finally decided at the interim order determination stage, and doing so is not appropriate where the evidence is potentially incomplete, or questions of law require opposing arguments and unhurried consideration. That said, if the answer to a question of fact or law is clear on the evidence and issues as presented in the interim application, it may be appropriate and beneficial to decide such questions at the interlocutory stage.[9]
• [41] Even if the considerations of urgency or balance of convenience favour the applicant, it is not inappropriate for an interim order application to be dismissed if there is little or no prospect of success on the legal arguments and the uncontroversial facts, at the final determination stage.
• [42] Ordinarily, an interim injunction should do no more than maintain the status quo for a limited time or until the determination of the main application, usually in the form of a restraining injunction. An interim order in the form of a mandatory injunction, i.e., an order requiring a respondent to do something (as opposed to a restraint) which is not needed to preserve an existing interest of the applicant and which imposes a non-compensable burden or loss on the respondent is a special case. It is rarely made by courts and calls for particularly careful consideration, with the effect that the balance of convenience is shifted in the respondent's favour (all other things being equal).[10]

• [43] I have not set out in this decision every element of the interim order application and supporting documents but all such material have been considered.
• [44] The only question before me for determination at this stage is whether an interim order is warranted.

• [45] I note that based on the evidence, by the time the application was referred to department adjudication, the contract between the respondent body corporate and KBW was already executed.
• [46] Accordingly, I am unable to grant the interim order sought, given the action the applicant sought to prevent has already occurred.

• [47] The applicant's primary objection to the engagement of KBW as the body corporate manager is the invalidity of Motion 9(a) of the 2025 AGM. She claims that the invalidity is the result of a contravention of sections 17(3) and (4) of the Accommodation Module.
• [48] Section 17 of the Accommodation Module reads as follows:

17 Nomination procedures for committee election other than at first annual general meeting [SM, s 16]

(1) This section states how individuals are nominated for election as a voting member of a committee at the annual general meeting for the community titles scheme, other than the first annual general meeting.

(2) The secretary must serve a notice on each owner of a lot shown on the body corporate's roll-

(a) setting out an owner's right of nomination under section 18 and inviting nomination; and

(b) stating that the owner, or a person nominated by the owner, is not eligible to be a voting member of the committee if the owner owes a body corporate debt in relation to a lot or lots owned by the owner at the time the members of the committee are chosen.

(3) The notice must be given at least 3 weeks before, but not earlier than 6 weeks before, the end of the body corporate's financial year.

See also section 76

(4) Nominations must comply with section 19 and must be given to the secretary by the end of the body corporate's financial year.

(5) As soon as practicable after receiving a nomination under this section, the secretary must forward written notice to the candidate acknowledging the nomination has been received.

• [49] It is pertinent to note that this provision does not have any bearing on the engagement of a body corporate manager. This is because a body corporate manager, albeit a member of the committee, is a non-voting member.[11] Section 17 above pertains to the nomination for election as a voting member.
• [50] I also note that Motion 9(a) was submitted by the committee. The legislation permits both a member of the body corporate (i.e., a lot owner) and the committee to submit motions for consideration at a general meeting.[12] The legislation imposes time limits for members when submitting any motions for an AGM, i.e., before the end of the financial year immediately preceding the meeting.[13] However, there is no such express time limit imposed on the committee when submitting a motion for consideration, so long as any motions are included on the notice of AGM that is issued to all members.
• [51] Accordingly, there is no serious legal question to be determined for the aspect of the dispute that pertains to both the interim and final order, i.e., the engagement of KBW as the body corporate manager.
• [52] I note that the applicant has provided various reasons that seem to suggest that it would be unreasonable for the respondent body corporate to engage KBW as its body corporate manager.
• [53] Her reasons indicate that KBW was previously contracted to provide administrative services for at least five committee meetings annually, but given there were less than five committee meetings held that year, KBW was essentially paid for services it did not provide. This argument does not reflect any shortcomings in KBWs services or indicate there is any fault attributable to the same.
• [54] Her reasons also indicate that KBWs lack of oversight and mismanagement has resulted in a deficit in the body corporate funds. She partially attributes the failure to budget for the loan repayments, to KBW.
• [55] In this regard, she has provided a copy of a contract engaging KBW for the period between 29 May 2020 and 28 May 2023. Based on her arguments, the loan repayments were accounted for during the year 2023, but was excluded in 2024 and 2025. Accordingly, the relevant contract to provide as evidence would be that prevailing in these excluded years.
• [56] Regardless, even if KBW was engaged in these excluded years on the same terms as it was previously, I do not at this stage find any shortcomings in the budget to be attributable to KBW. The contract provided indicates that KBW is tasked with preparing the 'draft budget' for each financial year[14]. Clause 2.2 of the contract states that KBW is engaged 'to supply administrative services only'. Further Clause 5.5 of the provided contract indicates that KBW is not responsible for performing the statutory functions of the body corporate or its committee; and that the contract does not relieve the same of its statutory functions.
• [57] Accordingly, I see no merit in the argument that the body corporate manager is responsible for the accuracy of the scheme's budgets. Furthermore, it is the body corporate (i.e., through its members) that adopts a budget by ordinary resolution.
• [58] Even if I am incorrect in that analysis and KBW is responsible for the budget in some manner, there is no evidence to suggest that it acted in bad faith.
• [59] I also note that the interim order sought as specifically worded by applicant bases the invalidity of Motion 9(a) only on the purported contravention of section 17 of the Accommodation Module.
• [60] As a result, I am not satisfied that the applicant has established a prima facie case or raised a serious legal question with respect to this aspect of the dispute.

• [61] Given there is no longer any urgency or other circumstances warranting the interim order sought, and given that the applicant has not raised a serious legal question or established a prima facie case, I do not consider it necessary to examine any question of the balance of convenience.

• [62] I would like to note my preliminary observations on the final orders sought and this dispute in general based on the very limited evidence available at this stage, in the hopes that it will either resolve this dispute or aid the parties' efforts at internal dispute resolution.

• [63] The first and second final orders sought are predicated on the notion that Motion 9(a) was submitted in contravention of Sections 17(3) and (4) of the Accommodation Module. I have explained above why there is no serious legal question in that regard, and why those provisions have no application in respect of Motion 9(a).

Information from body corporate records given to interested persons

• [64] One aspect of the third final order sought pertains to the respondent body corporate providing evidence that the nominations of certain named persons were lodged before 28 February 2025. The remainder of the order sought is dependent on this information.
• [65] In this regard, I would like to draw the applicant's attention to section 205 of the Act, which provides interested persons such as lot owners a mechanism to obtain information held by the body corporate upon payment of a prescribed fee.
• [66] The applicant is free to contact the Information and Community Education Unit of the Commissioner's Office for further details on this provision of the Act.[15]
• [67] If there is any information that the respondent body corporate can provide which indicates that the nominations were made prior to the end of the financial year, this may resolve this aspect of the dispute. If the information suggests the nominations were made after this date, the parties may consider the following observations.

The purpose and scope of section 17 of the Accommodation Module

• [68] One of the secondary objects of the Act is 'to balance the rights of individuals with the responsibility for self management as an inherent aspect of community titles schemes'.[16]
• [69] The explanatory notes to the Accommodation Module provides insight into the legislative purpose behind specific provisions of the module. In relation to the provisions on committee membership it states as follows:

Providing clarity about when (and how many) nominations for ordinary membership of the committee should be invited at a general meeting benefits scheme governance by promoting lot owner involvement and larger committees, and reducing the potential for disputes.[17]

• [70] Accordingly, it is my preliminary view that section 17 of the Accommodation Module is intended to ensure among other things timely and relevant nominations; to ensure that all owners are provided a fair opportunity to exercise their right to nominate for committee membership and hence an opportunity to be involved in the governance of the scheme; and to promote larger committees.
• [71] Furthermore, strictly speaking, the respondent in my preliminary view, has not contravened section 17(3) of the Accommodation Module, given the secretary issued the notice on 28 January 2025, which is four weeks and three days before the financial year end date, 28 February 2025. This is within the required period of at least three weeks before but not earlier than six weeks before the financial year end date.
• [72] It is section 17(4) of the Accommodation Module that requires nominations to be given to the secretary by the end of the financial year. It is my preliminary view that this provision does not expressly bar the secretary from accepting nominations made thereafter, but rather provides the secretary with a basis to refuse a nomination made after this date.
• [73] I also note that the applicant states that the respondent body corporate unlawfully extended the financial year end date and the nomination closing date from 28 February 2025 to 31 March 2025. The applicant has not provided any evidence in that regard. Regardless, the legislation permits a body corporate to change its financial year.[18]

• [74] I also would like to draw the parties' attention to section 94(2) of the Act which requires bodies corporate to act reasonably including when making decisions. Similarly, section 100(5) of the Act requires committees to act reasonably in making decisions. (Further, section 100(1) of the Act states that a decision of the committee is a decision of the body corporate.) In the event this does not occur, an adjudicator may intervene to make an order that is just and equitable to resolve a dispute.
• [75] In addition to the duty to act reasonably, bodies corporate and their committees are subject to mandatory general law duties such as:
  1. The duty to act in good faith; and
  2. The duty to make fully considered, rational and reasonable decisions that are not conflicted, arbitrary, patently absurd or plainly unjust.[19]
• [76] A party aggrieved by a body corporate's decision or action often cites this concept of reasonableness in their argument that the decision or action was unfair to them. Whilst, unsurprisingly the Act does not provide any guidance as to what is considered reasonable or unreasonable, it has been the subject of considerable discussion over the past decade or so.
• [77] The question of whether a body corporate has acted unreasonably is not a straightforward one. What is reasonable is a question of fact, based on a consideration of all relevant matters in the circumstances of the particular case.
• [78] There is no onus on a body corporate to satisfy an adjudicator that it acted reasonably.[20] Rather, it is for the person alleging that the conduct or decision was unreasonable to prove the same.
• [79] The test of reasonableness was considered by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal ('QCAT') in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall[21] ('Beaches') which held as follows:

(a) 'Reasonable action is evidence-based and rational';[22]

(b) 'A finding that a decision or action in issue is "not irrational, absurd or ridiculous" does not necessarily mean it is a reasonable one'.[23]

• [80] QCAT also held in Beaches that legal unreasonableness encompasses decision-making errors such as irrelevance, adding that decision-making in practice requires that 'all relevant matters [be] taken into consideration and irrelevant ones left out'.[24]
• [81] A legally reasonable decision is not a uniquely right one. It involves matters of degree about which contrary - even opposite - conclusions can be reasonably reached on the same body of evidence by different lines of reasoning or by reference to other determinants without either being demonstrably right or manifestly wrong'.[25] Accordingly, it is not sufficient to find that the body corporate could have made a better or more reasonable decision, or that a different body corporate could reasonably have come to a different decision.[26] Further, it is not the adjudicator's role to substitute his/her own view as to what would be the preferable decision by the body corporate.[27]
• [82] A legally unreasonable decision made by a body corporate can be overridden by an adjudicator under section 276 of the BCCM Act (often read together with a relevant item under Schedule 5 of the BCCM Act), which states in part that an adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances to resolve a dispute about the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties under the Act or CMS. This has been contemplated under the BCCM Act, specifically items 17, 24 and 25 of Schedule 5.
• [83] The evidence provided by the applicant indicates that the secretary or body corporate manager made a typographical error in noting the closing date for nominations. The committee seemingly then considered the consequences of the error and made a decision to permit nominations until the erroneously noted closing date.
• [84] Further, the evidence indicates that the applicant notified the respondent body corporate of the error around mid April 2025, well after the end of the financial year. The applicant has provided no evidence at this stage to indicate that the respondent body corporate either noticed or was made aware of this error prior to the end of the financial year, whereupon it may have reissued the notices with the correct date whilst still providing lot owners with adequate time to nominate for committee membership.
• [85] It is my preliminary view based on the limited evidence before me, that the decision made by the committee in the circumstances of the aforesaid error was not unreasonable. It decided that strict compliance with the relevant provision of the Accommodation Module should not prevail over the rights of lot owners to nominate for committee membership in circumstances where the typographical error was discovered rather late.
• [86] The committee may have made a different yet reasonable decision, or a more reasonable decision, however the decision that it did indeed make is not in my preliminary view unreasonable.
• [87] If the applicant wishes to pursue the claim that the committee acted unreasonably in the circumstances, she would be required to demonstrate the same with sufficient evidence, which the application in its present state does not contain. I reiterate that the rather heavy onus to prove that the committee acted unreasonably lies with the applicant and not the respondent body corporate.

• [88] There is ample precedent that states that the highly detailed provisions of the regulation modules (such as the Accommodation Module) make non-compliance with it almost inevitable.[28] It has been held that non-compliance of an insubstantial nature will not be allowed to imperil the actions of bodies corporate or their committees, particularly when such actions are taken in good faith.[29] (There are however provisions which require strict compliance, such as those serving a consumer protection purpose, for e.g. section 125 of the Accommodation Module. [30])
• [89] Importantly, it was held in Carroll and Ors v Body Corporate for Palm Springs Residences CTS 29467[31]:

The [Act] is a lengthy, technical and complex instrument, with no fewer than six sets of subordinate and similarly complex 'module regulations'. It cannot be the case that the legislature expected all, or even most committee members of a body corporate, small, large or very large, to be experts in corporate law, or masters of community management. Indeed, the [Act] implicitly recognises that, if this legislation were at all times, and in all circumstances applied with the utmost rigour and most precious attention to detail, its objects and policies would be retarded by endemic disputation, rather than advanced.

The direction that a 'body corporate must act reasonably' in the performance of its 'general functions' does not suggest that every minor irregularity should be pounced on to impede or paralyse the normal conduct of business. The Code of Conduct for committee members does not demand administrative perfection, but simply directs them to 'take reasonable steps' to comply with the [Act]. If people 'honestly and reasonably believe' that they are validly elected members of a committee, their decision, which would otherwise be void, are not to be set aside.

There is no good reason to suppose that the [Act] is intended to be more draconian that [sic] the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which provides:

A proceeding under [the Corporations Act 2001] is not invalidated because of any procedural irregularity unless the Court is of the opinion that the irregularity has caused or may cause substantial injustice that cannot be remedied by any order of the Court...

This remedial provision has been construed liberally, as remedial legislation should be. It is capable of excusing the invalid appointment of a director, or the failure to assemble a quorum. It seems to be that the provisions of the [Act] should be approached in a similar way.

• [90] The applicant (with whom the onus lies) has not set out details of any injustice caused as a result of the purported irregularity of accepting nominations after the end of financial year.
• [91] If the applicant wishes to pursue this claim, she will have to provide sufficient evidence of the same.

• [92] I urge the parties to further consider the issue with respect to the sufficiency of the levies to cover its loan commitments.
• [93] If the respondent body corporate agrees with the applicant that the budget requires correction and that the contributions levied may be insufficient, there is precedent[32] which provides for how the same can be regularised. For e.g., the respondent body corporate may convene an extraordinary general meeting to make a subsequent decision regarding the budget and contributions.
• [94] I reiterate that either party may contact the Information and Community Education Unit of the Commissioner's Office for further information in this regard.[33]

• [95] The applicant expresses various concerns with certain committee members and with KBW as the body corporate manager. I note however, that the final orders (except for the fifth final order sought) as worded by the applicant, limit the issues to mere procedural irregularities.
• [96] Furthermore, these concerns about the committee members and KBW do not have any substantial bearing on the fifth final order sought. The issue thereunder is mainly whether the loan was accounted for in the budget.
• [97] Accordingly, if the applicant continues to have these concerns, she may consider the provisions on removal of committee members and the termination of a body corporate manager. However, it is pertinent to note that she would require the support of the majority of members of the body corporate to effect such removal or termination.

• [98] At the time this application for interim orders was referred to department adjudication, the action the applicant sought to prevent by way of an interim order, i.e., to prevent the respondent body corporate from executing a contract to engage a body corporate manager, had already occurred.
• [99] Furthermore, the applicant has not raised a relevant serious legal question or established a prima facie case.
• [100] In these circumstances, an interim order is not warranted and the application is dismissed.

[2] The CMS includes the scheme's by-laws

[3] Sections 276)(1)(a) and (b) of the Act

[5] See Brighton on Broadwater Breezes [2018] QBCCMCmr 243 at [8]

[8] For general principles see for e.g., Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46 and SDW2 Pty Ltd v JLF Corporation Pty Ltd & Ors [2017] QSC 1

[9] Cohen v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 70 at [6]

[10] Meagher, Gummow and Lehane's Equity: Doctrines & Remedies (J.D. Heydon, M.J. Leeming, P.G. Turner) (Fourth Edition) (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002) at [21-395]; Bingham & Anor v 7-Eleven Stores P/L [2003] QCA 402 at [106]-[108]

[11] Section 13(1)(a) of the Accommodation Module

[12] Section 76(1) of the Accommodation Module

[13] Section 76(6) of the Accommodation Module

[15] By calling 1800 060 119(freecall) or visiting https://www.qld.gov.au/law/housing-and-neighbours/body-corporate/legislation-and-bccm/services/enquire

[16] Section 4(a) of the Act

[17] Page 14, Explanatory Notes for SL 2020 No. 229

[18] See sections 283 and 321A(1) of the Act

[19] Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [35]

[20] Edgecliff Apartments [2021] QBCCMCmr 30 at [23] to [27] citing Ainsworth v Albrecht [2016] HCA 40; Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177

[21] [2016] QCATA 177

[22] SZLGP v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 1198 [15] - [16] as cited in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [23]

[23] McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCA 45; (2006) 228 CLR 423 [60] (Hayne J) as cited in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [24]

[24] Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [36] and [42]

[25] Woden Valley Glass v Psaila (1993) 122 ALR 378, 391 as cited in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [47]

[26] Edgecliff Apartments [2021] QBCCMCmr 30 at [23] to [27] citing Ainsworth v Albrecht [2016] HCA 40; Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177

[28] See Wei-Xin Chen v Body Corporate for Wishart Village CTS 19482 Appeal D 4080 of 2000, District Court of Queensland, 29 May 2001 (Unreported) at [27]

[30] See Tang v Body Corporate for Greenly Gardens CTS 41566 [2019] QCAT 207 at [41]

[31] [2013] QCATA 21 at [22] to [25]

[32] See Panorama 22 [2001] QBCCMCmr 80

[33] By calling 1800 060 119(freecall) or visiting https://www.qld.gov.au/law/housing-and-neighbours/body-corporate/legislation-and-bccm/services/enquire